Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization

Officer Block 5 & Enlisted Block 6: Senior Region

Course Overview

The mission of the RCLF program is to ensure that Marine units are globally prepared and regionally focused so that they are effective in navigating and influencing the culturally complex twenty-first century operating environment in support of Marine Corps missions and requirements. The program is based on 17 regions of the world; however, in Officer Block 4 and Enlisted Block 5, Marines cover regions based on Combatant Command (CCMD) Areas of Responsibility (AORs). In this final block of the program, Officer Block 5 and Enlisted Block 6, the material covers all CCMD AORs.

Learning Outcomes

A. Analyze operational impacts of culturally complex interactions (Regional and Cultural Studies)
B. Manage ambiguity and conflict using culturally appropriate and mission-effective behavior (Regional and Cultural Studies; Leadership)
C. Assess the impact of cultural values on plans, policies, and strategies (Regional and Cultural Studies; Leadership; and Warfighting)
D. Examine cultural variability in joint, interagency, and multinational operating environments (Regional and Cultural Studies).

Course Flow

This workbook serves as your instructional guide. It consists of three chapters. *Chapter 1* contains an expansion on prior Operational Culture General concepts and skills. *Chapter 2* includes an introductory section on the National Military Strategy and National Security Strategy. The sections in Chapter 2 that follow are detailed analyses of culture in the plans, policies, and strategies of the Area of Operations (AO) for Combatant Commands. *Chapter 3* includes an introductory piece on cultural variability in operations. What follows are a series of cases and examples, each section devoted to a specific CCMD, of the significance of cultural variability.

To successfully complete this block of instruction, Marines will need to download the materials zip file and read the workbook. Marines must then complete an end-of-course evaluation and end-of-course survey.

Checklist:

☐ Senior Region Workbook (MarineNet)
☐ End-of-Course Evaluation (MarineNet)
☐ End-of-Course Survey (MarineNet)

Table of Contents

1 List of Figures

1 Operational Culture-General and Cross-Cultural Competence

1.1 Culture General Concepts[1]

Beginning with OB2/EB3, RCLF education has introduced foundational culture-general concepts and skills that can help Marines anticipate misunderstanding and make sense of cultural complexity. The content in this section *extends* the concepts presented in previous RCLF Blocks by focusing on the interconnected nature of different aspects of human behavior, and *assists* with the process of preparing for, adapting, to and learning from intercultural interactions.

At this point in your life you have dealt with many culture-general concepts in one way, shape, or form. Your past experiences are invaluable when it comes to culture education, not only for yourself but also for those Marines under your charge. Because there is no way to predict what sort of situations into which you and your Marines will deploy, it is impossible to give you 100 percent accurate information regarding the state of the local people, partners, and adversaries with whom you might interact. As you progress through this section, it will be useful for you to think of the concepts through the lens of your own experiences, and reflect on how these concepts impacted your job on different levels. Some of these concepts help to explain human behavior on the interpersonal and micro levels, while others deal with more macro-level interactions. The key to remember is that the content in this section is less about predictability, and more about providing tools for managing uncertainty and tension that inevitably arise when individuals with different worldviews interact.

As you read through the content here, it may be useful to consider how you as a leader might leverage your experiences and knowledge of these concepts to push down important information to your Marines before deployment. While culture-specific information is useful for understanding the cultural backdrop of a deployment, culture-general concepts (and the questions they will help you generate) can give you a better grasp of what is happening in real time in the potential absence of information. Thinking through how these concepts may play out in your specific area can serve as a useful problem-solving exercise for you and the Marines under your command. Asking questions about how these concepts manifest in a specific area and problematizing how your own actions might impact your overall mission will better prepare you and those under your charge for any surprises or difficult situations that may develop.

Although there is no magic bullet for navigating through the “gray area” inherent to leading at the strategic level, this section is designed to promote thinking processes associated with cultural sense-making, which advance your ability to:

- Recognize connections
- Frame problems in multiple ways
- Acknowledge the legitimacy of competing perspectives
- Generate alternative interpretations

[1] CAVEAT: This document is adapted from material developed as part of a forthcoming chapter of a culture general textbook and also contains sections adapted from unclassified materials that also were used in the production of the Culture Generic Information Requirements Handbook (C-GIRH), DoD-GIRH-2634-001-08 and the Cultural Intelligence Indicators Guide (CIIG), DOD-GIRH-2634-001-10, which are available from Marine Corps Intelligence Activity's dissemination manager.

Various strategies for cultural sense-making will be introduced in the pages that follow that are designed to both promote reflection on past experiences, as well as plan for future intercultural interactions. This introduction will set the stage for a discussion in the next section devoted to "strategic culture" and the impact of cultural values on plans, strategies, and policies.

1.2 The Value of Culture General: A Re-introduction

Culture-general concepts are those underlying thinking processes, ideas, and knowledge areas that help you identify, understand, and use region and culture-specific knowledge more effectively. Whether first on the scene or a veteran in theater, these foundational concepts help you process the information you encounter, vet it against what you already know, and determine how best to incorporate it into your thinking, planning, and actions. No one has 100 percent understanding of culture at any time; yours will always be imperfect. How you refine your understanding, adjust for the misalignments between your preparation and reality on the ground, and deepen your insights into people's deep assumptions and underlying connections among different aspects of life requires an understanding of these concepts. They explain the ways people organize themselves, think about their worlds, or construct their identities, for example, rather than provide you the details of a particular group of people. This way you are prepared to look for and ask questions to find out more about such ideas in your particular context and to identify change, challenges, and opportunity more readily.

TALK WITH YOUR MARINES

When your Marines first hear about culture general versus culture specific information, they may have trouble grasping the difference between the types of information. A simple metaphor to help avoid confusion is to set it up as the difference between giving somebody directions to get to a place (culture specific information) versus teaching somebody the basic principles of land navigation (culture general information). Directions from one point to another are relatively easy to convey and will work for most situations; but as soon as something changes in the route, trouble may arise. A baseline knowledge of culture-general concepts and skills can give Marines the tools they need to fill in the gaps when something changes.

You will notice that the culture-general concepts are broken down into a larger number of sections than you would commonly see in a planning framework or learning schema. This way of breaking up the subject matter is not intended as another framework. Instead, it is designed to convey as many useful concepts as possible in relatively short segments. The more concepts you understand, the easier it will be to gain the understanding you need to inform your thinking, planning, and interactions. The chapter begins by introducing some concepts for thinking systematically about culture – holism, variation, and change – and concludes with concepts for understanding the complexities associated with human behavior.

1.3 Concepts for Thinking Systematically about Culture

1.3.1 Holism - Building situational awareness with a holistic perspective

The concept of holism is a thinking tool you can use to ensure you maintain sufficient situational awareness. The frameworks that the services use to help you systematize your thinking about culture divide cultural information into discreet categories. Regardless of the one you use, it's important to (1) remember that the real world will not necessarily arrange itself to fit into categories, and (2) remain attentive to interactions and connections that crosscut any set of categories you use. Keep in mind that

these interactions and connections mean it will rarely be effective to focus exclusively on one aspect of culture. Whenever you hear anyone say, "It's really all about ... (tribes, economics, religion, politics, et cetera)," you should immediately be suspicious. There are almost no questions to which a military person needs answers that can be fixed with an answer that begins with "It's all about …." It is inconvenient, but it is true. **Holism is the idea that all socio-cultural aspects of human life are interconnected in ways that vary greatly from culture to culture.** From your own experience, you know that politics affects economics. Family structure affects job choices. Religion affects politics. Every aspect affects every other aspect in some way, even if it is indirectly.

As an example, in the U.S., family ties and economic choices are usually loosely related. Children typically make their own choices about what job to take, though their family may try to influence them. However, family and occupation may be tightly related in other places. A young man might be allowed to take only certain kinds of jobs approved by his family, or he may be raised to expect that his male family members will be instrumental in getting him a job. With your own culture, you have a somewhat easier time predicting how aspects of culture affect one another. When operating within or analyzing another culture, it can be harder. What we think of as "a culture" is something like a fabric that is constantly being woven and pulled apart by all the people in a group. The threads are things like social organization, kinship patterns, symbols, formal and informal politics, systems for getting resources, beliefs, organized religion, identities, ideas about social status, et cetera. While people around the world have similar materials to use, they combine them into different patterns and use different styles of weaving. What is common across all cultures is that tugging on any one thread will tend to move other threads around.

If you tug on, for example, an economic thread, such as closing a market temporarily for security purposes, you might think you understand what will happen. You could, therefore, end up surprised when the local reaction seems to be about religion or family instead of economics. This interconnectedness means that a cultural factor that appears to have little military relevance in many places may be highly significant elsewhere. Consider wedding rituals. They would not seem to be something worth learning about, but once you learn that some ceremonies commonly involve firing weapons, or that weddings may lead to heightened sensitivities toward mounted or dismounted patrols in close vicinity, they take on a military relevance.

If you do not try to figure out the local version of these inter-connections, you will not understand how a local population, the population you are analyzing, or your partner military will react to your plans, presence, and actions. A group's response to your operations may be hard to anticipate or appear nonsensical, leading the commander and staff to draw erroneous conclusions about the source of the reaction. Failure to understand a group's reactions can significantly undermine your ability to carry out a mission. You have probably thought about this when you have considered the "second and third order effects" of a decision.

TALK WITH YOUR MARINES

As you know, interaction is not always what you say and do directly to another person; it is also what people observe in your demeanor, actions, and words in general. A good example of this can be found in a situation occurred while a Marine colonel was mentoring law enforcement personnel in Senegal. The colonel was aware that his counterparts did not always treat their subordinates with respect. Meanwhile, his team of Marines was almost entirely made up of SNCOs. This could have been a source of friction if the Senegalese officers did not want to work with lower-ranking Marines. There was one

administrative sergeant the colonel wanted the Senegalese to heed. The colonel knew the Senegalese were observing his actions, so he used that as a way of modeling behavior. He presumed: "If I treat my sergeant a certain way, they see it." Later, when his sergeant had gained the respect of the Senegalese, the colonel made a different decision regarding his public treatment of his sergeant. He was displeased with the Senegalese officers' level of effort, but he felt it was better to avoid direct confrontation. Instead, he walked into the law enforcement headquarters one day and whispered to his sergeant, "Hey, roll with it." He then loudly chastised his own sergeant for not getting the work done. The "good cop/bad cop" worked with the Senegalese. When they saw their friend, the Marine sergeant, get in trouble on their behalf, they quickly corrected their behavior. Interaction includes the ability to communicate in many ways. In many cases, non-verbal and indirect communication skills are useful in foreign environments.

Holism also explains why some information may seem to fit in more than one place in a database, checklist, or framework. Human life has not organized itself into categories or checklists for our convenience. There is no absolute framework for figuring out what aspects of culture are going to be relevant to a mission or a campaign in advance. However, learning to look for and trace the interconnections will help you make those assessments as you go.

So, what's the right approach? Do not limit your thinking to the obvious, the simple, or the singular. Looking at culture holistically means thinking about how your question or action might affect or be affected by many different things. Picture putting your question/action at the center of a circle. Around the edge of the circle are all the different aspects of culture that you know about. If you are considering helping the community build a clinic, for example, you might ask:

- How might a clinic be connected to other aspects of culture?
- Would you be helping or hurting part of the economic system, perhaps a taxi service that provides transport to a clinic further away?
- Is there some part of the belief system that is relevant, maybe ideas about what causes illness?
- How might social structure and social roles be involved?
- Are women, men, and children all allowed to seek health care in the same ways and from the same people?
- Are local political leaders likely to see the U.S. building a clinic as something that increases their power and influence or as something that threatens it?
- Will clinic leadership selection ignite a local power struggle?

Although you can never be sure you have considered all possible connections, going through the process of holistically assessing a situation greatly increases the likelihood that your actions will have the effect you intend. It also helps you anticipate and mitigate or leverage potential second and third order effects that occur.

1.3.2 Culture Variation and Change

Variation and change are critical concepts for military personnel to integrate into their thinking about culture. How many times have you learned about a group of people only to find that what you learned did not hold true for the guy you met? It happens all the time. That is not to say there is no value in preparatory learning; of course, there is. However, military personnel must always remember that people

do not always believe the same things in the same way, even if they belong to the same group. That's variation. And what was true yesterday or last year may not hold today. Cultures can change, and, at times, very rapidly. The thinking processes – variation and change – help you understand and to (1) move beyond the disconnect between what you studied and learned and what you see on the ground, (2) avoid stereotypical thinking that can leave you surprised, confused, or – worse – misguided, (3) anticipate challenges, and (4) seek out opportunities. As they are present wherever people are, it behooves military personnel – whether their mission directly or indirectly involves people – to have a firm understanding of these concepts.

Variation

Variation is the idea that cultural norms are unevenly shared within a group. It is not realistic to assume that any individual will always behave in lock step with a broad description of culture. People within a group do not all know and believe the exact things or to the same extent, practice beliefs and express ideals in the same way, or even think the same things are beautiful, right, or edible, for that matter. Even though they may have a great deal in common, people in a group know and believe different things. They have different ideas about what is and is not acceptable. This idea is very familiar to U.S. culture. For example, in the U.S., most people would say they value the idea of individual rights, but there is a great deal of variation in how they think individual rights should be balanced with other values such as equality and public safety. You encounter these kinds of differences in every group, even those considered particularly cohesive like the Marine Corps. Within the group, there is usually a range of acceptable thoughts and behaviors. There may be general agreement about an "ideal," but usually there is tolerance for deviation up to a point. So, when observing a group, you should not be surprised if people's actual behavior is a little different from what you have learned about the values and beliefs of the group.

TALK WITH YOUR MARINES

Often, there is a tendency to use cross-cultural examples where two groups are very different from one another. Sometimes it can be trickier to navigate military partnerships when values and practices appear to overlap. For instance, many Marines who have advised Georgian troops have remarked favorably on their tendency to endure hardships and be ready for the fight. Taking these reflections into account, it is possible to imagine how Marines and Georgians feel they have many shared values. For instance, a Marine and a Georgian officer may agree on what it means to have "honor, courage, and commitment." A Georgian field officer could demonstrate these values by patrolling on point with his men in territory where IEDs and firefights are common. To a Marine field officer, this behavior is understandable, but also risky. His or her view of commitment could be to remain healthy so that you can fulfill your primary duties as a leader and remain in the fight for the long term. But to a Georgian officer, even if he is severely injured and must leave his unit, he has demonstrated a different type of commitment. Not only has he saved one of his men from injury, he has met his own fate without excuses. Marine officers can have very fruitful and interesting conversations with their counterparts about values. There may be areas of agreement, but as so often happens in cross-cultural interactions, the subtle differences are just as interesting and critical to understand.

Additionally, it is important to remember that an aspect of culture may be shared across groups, but be used differently. For example, large religions, such as Islam or Christianity, may be shared by groups across the globe. However, they are understood and practiced very differently in different places. Visiting the congregation of a Catholic church in rural Guatemala would give you a very different understanding of

how much Christianity influences behavior than you would get from visiting a Catholic congregation in a major urban area of the U.S. Even within a smaller area, there can be operationally relevant differences. For example, let us look at Pashtunwali, the Pashtun honor code. Within and among Pashtun groups, it is not understood or used in a uniform way. People in the various Pashtun groups may emphasize some aspects of Pashtunwali and deemphasize others. Some may see Pashtunwali as a very important set of values and organize much of their behavior around it. Others may see it as an important part of their heritage, but not something that guides day-to-day behavior. No matter if the cultural aspect is shared across the globe or across the mountains, military personnel need to be cautious in forming assumptions or drawing conclusions about a group of people based on experience with or learning about similar groups to avoid cultural blinders that do not account for variation. Being able to discern how individuals you are engaging think about such things needs to shape your thinking, planning, and interaction.

Change

Change is a normal part of culture and can arise for many different reasons, such as variation, innovation, and contact with other groups. Sometimes, change happens fast and is easily noticed. Other times, there is slow, incremental change over time. Understanding how change happens can help you notice important changes that are relevant to your mission and help you anticipate second and third order effects of your decisions.

Internal variation is a common source of change. In the United States, what is considered normal and appropriate is not the same as it was 100 years ago. Those changes did not happen overnight. Often, they did not happen as the result of some outside force. Many of the changes happened as the result of gradual shifts in the daily behavior, thoughts, and interactions of hundreds of thousands of people. An idea held by a small part of the group may grow in popularity, becoming the majority opinion, as was the case with abolitionist views on slavery. In contrast, that same small part of the group might give up an idea or practice, resulting in its gradual disappearance from the culture.

Changes resulting from innovation are more familiar. The introduction of the automobile contributed to change in many aspects of U.S. culture, e.g., the way we think about distances, our ideas about what it means to be independent, the kinds of relationships we maintain, where and how we work or go to church, our economic and foreign policies, and the idea of a beautiful automobile and the open road as classic symbols of the United States. The automobile alone was not enough to drive all these changes. Other things had to be in flux too, but the innovation served as a catalyst for far more than just transportation.

TALK WITH YOUR MARINES

Many places where you deploy as a Marine are in the process of drastic change. Conflict drives social and environmental change in sometimes unpredictable ways, and you and your Marines are part of that equation. When Marines first arrive in country on a deployment, the local population and partner forces may not know exactly what to expect or how to interact. It is crucial that leaders take time to explain this to their junior Marines, as it is their everyday interactions with these other populations that will shape how U.S. forces are perceived in an ever-changing space.

Contact with other groups can be a major source of change. When groups come into contact, whether through trade, warfare, migration, or some other reason, they exchange ideas. In extreme cases, such as

one group conquering another, change may be imposed on the losing group, although even in these cases, there is usually some change in both cultures. More often, groups will adjust, sometimes exchanging ideas, sometimes coming up with entirely new ideas or practices because of interaction.

There are a few additional aspects of change that are relevant to Marines:

1. *Change does not always happen in a way that is pervasive or consistent.*

So, for example, in the U.S., we still "dial the phone" even though telephones with dials are extremely rare now. People who are 18 vote and go to war, but are not allowed to drink alcohol or gamble in most U.S. states. The U.S. has laws prohibiting discrimination based on sex, but most women continue to earn significantly less than a male doing the same job. Within your own culture, these internal mismatches and contradictions often are accepted without much comment. In a cross-cultural interaction, they can be jarring or confusing. Do not assume that an individual or group is illogical just because everything about their culture is not perfectly consistent. It is also not safe to assume that some aspects of culture "just haven't caught up." There may be other influences at play. To take the example of age restrictions on drinking, it seems illogical that people who can fight for their country are not allowed to have a beer afterward. Still, there is resistance to lowering the drinking age because of historical American attitudes toward alcohol, and concern about alcohol-related injury and death rates among teenagers.

2. *Change often occurs during times of conflict or disruption.*

Since military personnel are often early on the scene when a conflict erupts or a disaster strikes, it is important to recognize the role these major disruptions can play in shaping the local culture. During times of conflict or in a disaster, the usual methods for getting through the day may stop working for the local population, and they may begin to tinker with cultural patterns. They may try adopting new ideas or ways of solving problems. They may also try to preserve what is familiar, highlighting "traditional" ways of doing things and resisting efforts to introduce new ideas. They may switch rapidly among a range of possible behaviors. This is normal for people trying to cope with a new, confusing, or frightening situation. In these rapidly shifting, sometimes chaotic situations, older analyses of culture may become irrelevant, the pre-deployment cultural preparation outdated. Although it can be complex, tracking these small shifts can help you understand and perhaps influence the changes that are occurring.

1.4 Culture general concepts for understanding behavior

In this section, we discuss concepts and knowledge areas that will help you understand human behavior. These pertain to all culture groups and all individuals, as they are underlying concepts about the human experience – how people organize themselves, interact with and explain their world, conceptualize self and other, et cetera. You can use this knowledge to improve your understanding of available region- and culture-specific information and analysis of it, and to help in times when such information is absent or incorrect to make sense of what you are observing and experiencing. For each knowledge area, we provide a discussion section and then, for some areas, broaden or deepen the discussion on key points within the knowledge area.

1.4.1 Acquiring, Sharing, and Saving Resources: Subsistence and Exchange

Discussion

This knowledge area encompasses the concepts and information used to understand how people acquire, store, share, and exchange resources – commonly referred to here as subsistence patterns and exchange

systems (or economies). Subsistence patterns refer to the primary ways in which people get the resources they want and need. A group rarely relies on only one mode of subsistence. For example, one group may engage in agriculture and herding to feed themselves, and plant more of certain crops, mine gems, and fish specifically for trading with other groups. In the United States, most people engage in wage labor for subsistence. It is also common for people to garden, hunt, and trade – sometimes as a means of supplementing monetary income, and sometimes because they enjoy these subsistence activities.

Exchange refers to all the ways a group stores, distributes, and trades resources. Exchange includes practices that are formally recognized as part of the economy as well as those that are not officially recognized, such as gift-giving, charity, barter, reciprocity, and remittances. It also includes practices that may be considered improper or illegal in the group, such as bribery or the sale of prohibited items. Regarding this last category, it is important to remember that what is considered improper varies across and within groups. While some practices may be officially illegal, they still can be considered normal and proper by most people, as is the case in areas where it is normal practice to tip or bribe government officials.

When you think about economics, you may tend to think about money, banks, stores, the stock market, farms, factories, jobs, and the market system. This pattern is widespread now but is not universal. Military personnel need to think beyond these to gain a full understanding of the exchange systems at play locally. Money, taxes, and market-exchange systems are common parts of exchange, but rarely the only means by which resources are stored, distributed, and moved. Older, more persistent economic systems are often still at work. Such systems include the sharing of resources and labor among family, friends, and social networks – plus trading, which is one of the most common market exchange systems. Often, people prefer to trade goods even when money is supposedly available. Trading may save time or provide access to a resource that cannot readily be purchased with money. This also can happen where local currency is so unstable that people choose to avoid it. People are unlikely to entirely abandon older exchange systems quickly or ever. In a time of crisis, they may even rely on the familiar ways more than a new, market-based system. These other means of exchange may be less visible and harder to discover, yet they can still be critical parts of how resources are used and moved in a group or network.

TALK WITH YOUR MARINES

Human subsistence and exchange networks are often extremely complicated and work their way into many aspects of life. It is very easy to unintentionally interfere with local subsistence and exchange networks when Marines deploy. It is important to acknowledge this and think through any possible ramifications. How might U.S. military presence impact the availability and exchange of resources? Who stands to gain from those changes, and who might come up short? What might you be missing? Working through these questions with your Marines ahead of time can help minimize the chance that you unintentionally disrupt the livelihoods of the local population and make unwanted enemies.

Also, other aspects of non-market economic systems can be a little harder to see and understand. Even something as seemingly simple as the straightforward exchange of goods of equal value may not exist in some regions. Instead, the exchange may be partially about what we expect – moving resources – and partly about building a working relationship (see section on reciprocity below). If you fail to see what the local people expect from the exchange, it may be very hard to understand or anticipate people's behavior. Remember, in our economy, we focus on the goods being transferred. In other groups, it is very common for economic activity to serve a critical role in building and maintaining social relationships. In turn, these social relationships, rather than faith in an abstract idea about economic forces, ensure the stability and

reliability of the economy. Seeing economic patterns from the insiders' perspective will help you understand, use, and influence the system rather than being surprised and frustrated by it.

Subsistence strategies – past and present matter

Some common types of subsistence strategies include hunting and gathering, agriculture, nomadic herding, and wage labor. Although many groups now use some mix of strategies, there may be important aspects of collective identity, narratives, ideals, and beliefs associated with the strategy that were most prevalent in the past.

For example, many U.S. communities are proud of their agricultural or ranching heritage. Even in communities where few people still make their living by farming or ranging, their ideals, material culture, and rituals reflect this heritage. People in such communities may hold positions on political or social topics that are more aligned with this past than their current situation. They also may choose to display identity markers associated with this past, such as clothing or manner of speech. This can be confusing for somebody who is new and sees only current economic activity. Such indicators can be important clues to the history and values of a group.

Subsistence and exchange are tied to other aspects of culture. A group's laws, beliefs, and values may limit how certain goods, such as family heirlooms, or kinds of labor (such as work by children), can be exchanged. People with certain social roles may have limited access to some aspects of exchange. Certain types of exchange, such as reciprocity, may be important in maintaining social relationships, as giving and receiving of resources reinforce the bonds among individuals. While not every aspect of exchange will be critical to military operations, it is important to be aware that there are different kinds of exchange taking place, and that people may interpret assistance from or to military personnel in terms of a kind of exchange other than a simple transaction or gift.

Key Points

Corruption

Across many types of missions and in all areas of the world, military personnel report seeing exchanges that, according to United States norms and departmental and service-level rules, constitute corruption. However, some exchanges that we categorize as corruption are perceived very differently and are merely evidence of a different economic system at work. What we see as a bribe between villagers and the military may be perceived as a gift or normal payment by locals – the equivalent of bringing a bottle of wine to a dinner or tipping a waitress. Something that looks like nepotism to us may be seen by others as honorable attention to family needs. In short, some practices that seem illicit to us may be not only acceptable, but expected in other places. So long as everyone understands the rules, the system works. This does not mean military personnel should ignore corruption. The central requirement is opening your eyes to what is *really* there and how people are *really* getting things done, rather than how you *expect* things to work or think they *should* work. Employing cultural skills such as suspending judgment and perspective taking will help you determine how the action is understood by the people involved. That additional moment of data gathering and thought can help you make a well-informed and effective decision about how to respond.

Reciprocity – Connecting Exchange and Social Relationships

One aspect of exchange warrants special mention: reciprocity. In the simplest terms, reciprocity is a series of exchanges over time that creates or reinforces a relationship – the sort of thing that is implied in our

expressions "what goes around comes around," "return the favor," "pay it forward," and "you scratch my back, and I'll scratch yours." You buy somebody a coffee and, in U.S. culture, there is an implied need for that person to reciprocate – to return the favor – at some indeterminate point in the future. The fact that the exchange takes place over time creates or maintains some sort of relationship. The established relationship is not necessarily discussed openly, meaning you may be establishing and/or reinforcing it without realizing you are doing so. This can cause issues in the long run for military personnel.

Perhaps someone you do not know well buys you a birthday present. It feels awkward because now you feel like you should reciprocate, and you may feel that the person is trying to build an unwelcome relationship. In the United States, reciprocity now seems like it is mostly about gift-giving and maintaining friendships and family relationships; most resources move around using a market exchange – what you would traditionally think of as economics. However, throughout history, reciprocity has been a fundamental mechanism in building and maintaining social organization and moving resources around in the population. For many people, this is still a fundamental way to get through life. Reciprocity is used to accomplish the following:

- Create and maintain relationships – the specifics of local culture influence the type and intensity of the relationships that are part of a specific kind of exchange.
- Store resources – many cultures use reciprocity to build social networks that store wealth in the form of favors or resources that can be called upon in time of need.

People can build relationships through reciprocity within a group and across a social network or among groups. There are several types of reciprocity, but two matter most for military personnel.

Generalized reciprocity (what goes around comes around) is when people help one another and share resources without calculating on an individual basis. It is assumed that things will even out eventually. This is the strongest form of reciprocity in terms of supporting group cohesion and ensuring everyone has enough resources. When military personnel become enmeshed in this sort of network, it can build tremendous trust with and among the local population, but presents dangers in that it can be difficult for the military personnel to extract themselves from the network without causing harm and creating the potential for conflict.

Balanced reciprocity (you scratch my back, and I'll scratch yours) is when both people involved know that an equal exchange is expected at some point. A foreign counterpart, interpreter, or local may offer a gift with the full expectation that the service member will, at some point, return a gift of equal value. This kind of reciprocity can be helpful in building trust with individuals and is somewhat less dangerous than generalized reciprocity. You must learn how value is calculated with your counterpart in the exchange to avoid inadvertently over- or under-giving. It also is critical to understand that, in most cultures, the return gift does not end the relationship. "Balancing the scales" does not necessarily mean that you can leave the relationship gracefully. Instead, it may establish an expectation of future exchanges.

There can be negative aspects of building a reciprocal relationship. A person from another culture may presume a continuing relationship based on gifts given or assistance rendered (either by or to U.S. personnel), leading to misunderstandings and unintended offenses. A person may also deliberately try to use reciprocity to make U.S. personnel feel obligated to return favors. Not understanding the role reciprocity plays within and across cultures can lead to problems, as U.S. actions that disrupt or restrict normal social patterns may severely undermine the economic base and resource stability of an area by

disrupting these seemingly "informal" flows of resources and favors, which, of course, can have unintended second or third order impacts on your mission.

Division of Labor

In almost all groups, there is some form of division of labor – not everyone does every type of work that needs to be accomplished in a family or a group. Sometimes the division is formalized, but more often it is so deeply entangled in cultural patterns that they are the normal and right way things work.

Division of labor is most often found along age, sex or gender, and class or caste lines. You may also see distinctions made based on racial categories, ethnicity, religion, or some other factor. In the U.S., with a few exceptions, children below a certain age are not expected or allowed to participate in wage labor. A small child may take on a paper route or do family chores, but most people would be shocked to see a child going to work in a factory in the twenty-first century. Likewise, we have a general expectation that very old people should not have to work. These patterns do not hold true across the globe. There are many places where the very young and the very old are expected to work, whether inside or outside the household. There are banking/loan systems available to Muslims who are expected to avoid using Western banking and loan systems for religious reasons. Access to these kinds of exchanges may be denied to non-Muslims. There are gendered exchange systems, with some types of exchange or some types of goods being associated with males or females. Often, such restrictions may not be formalized into explicit rules but can still be strong. These are only a few examples of the kinds of access differences that exist.

Stratification and beliefs about the inherited capabilities of people who belong to a segment of the population inform the division of labor with groups. Stratification systems, such as the historical caste system in India, limit the educational and employment opportunities of people based on the caste into which they were born. Similarly, many societies divide labor based on sex, with women doing work around the home or in limited sectors of the market economy, and men being more involved in economic activity outside the domestic sphere. In the military and law enforcement, service in particular positions or levels can be restricted based on sex, race, class, or some other factor, such as tribal affiliation.

As with all aspects of culture, division of labor can change, even in very rigid systems. In our own history, we have seen changes in division of labor based on sex, with more women entering the wage labor market and more men taking on responsibilities for domestic work. Also, both men and women have access to a broader range of occupations than they did a century ago. Men now work as nurses, a historically female profession, and women work as engineers, a profession once limited to men. Other groups have and are managing similar changes.

Military personnel need to be aware of divisions of labor to ensure they understand the expectations of locals and military partners about who can and cannot be involved in certain activities. Observing how labor is divided also can provide clues about historical or current assumptions about subgroups that may be important in understanding social structure, politics, or some other relevant aspect of culture.

Resources – Distribution, Access, and Ownership

Certain aspects of exchange are often involved in cross-cultural misunderstandings. Thus, it is important to reiterate the following about resources:

Distribution. Most groups now participate in some form of market exchange and a system of taxation, but some groups may continue to distribute resources in other ways, a few of which were addressed previously. Other forms of distribution frequently are connected to reinforcing some aspect of social relations or beliefs. For example, charity redistributes wealth in a community and can simultaneously reinforce a belief that those who have been fortunate have a responsibility to share that fortune with others. In contrast, in some groups, charity reinforces social stratification, emphasizing socio-economic differences rather than mitigating them. The important thing to remember is that all forms of distribution, including market exchanges and taxation, are connected to other beliefs, relationships, and power dynamics. When getting involved in the distribution of resources, it is best to find out as much as possible about these other connections in order to anticipate second and third order effects of your proposed actions.

Access. It is important to remain mindful of the fact that parts of the population will have differential access to resources and the means of distributing resources. As with divisions of labor, access to resources can be limited by such factors as sex/gender, age, religion, et cetera. You may find that one sex is not allowed to have money or that only some parts of a population have access to public utilities, such as water. People in lower classes or castes may not be allowed to open a business, or there may be quiet discrimination that makes it harder for them to get an education, a loan, or some other resource that would allow them to improve their socioeconomic status. While differential access is an important aspect of exchange systems in all places, its relevance is highlighted in situations where military personnel are involved in the distribution of resources. If you provide resources to a government official for distribution to people who have just experienced a natural disaster, it is good to know if that official will distribute them evenly across the population or will be using a social calculus different from your own.

Ownership. Although Western concepts of formal ownership are becoming more pervasive, military personnel may still encounter alternative models from time to time. For example, grazing lands may not be owned by any one individual, but each family may have a right to use them – a factor that becomes relevant when thinking about setting up a facility on land "nobody owns." The same may be true with resources such as wild game or plants. Additionally, some groups retain some sense that ownership is affected by need, not only by purchase or possession. This could lead to confusion about whether an act is theft, a misunderstanding of the concept of ownership, or somebody deliberately manipulating an older concept of ownership to get away with taking something. It is not always easy to identify these other conceptions of ownership at work; therefore, it is worth remembering that they may be a factor when interpreting behavior.

1.4.2 Organizing and interacting: Relationships, Roles, and Identity

Discussion

This knowledge area encompasses the concepts and information needed to understand a group's patterns of roles, relationships, and social organization as well as how people use those patterns to shape interactions within the group and between the group and others. It includes topics such as social stratification, sub-groups or other divisions, kinship, status, and identity. This is a particularly complex knowledge area because many different patterns are likely to co-exist within one group, and there may be people both within and from outside the group trying to change the accepted patterns.

Every group has common social roles that involve expectations about behavior, status, and interaction – such as the roles of politician, brother, priest, wife, or community leader. Social roles often, but not exclusively, are linked to kinship or occupation. A person may take on a different social role depending on

context or at different stages of life. There also is variation in the flexibility or inflexibility of social roles both within and across groups. For example, in some groups, there may be an absolute expectation that part of the social role of being an adult son or daughter is to provide for older relatives, but a different group may see that responsibility as being balanced against the individual desires and aspirations of the adult children.

Social roles and identity patterns share a reciprocal relationship. When a person assumes a certain role, such as community leader, that role may become an important part of his personal identity. Also, some social roles may be restricted based on identity factors, as was the case historically in the U.S. when married women were not allowed to be teachers, and people identified as a race other than white were not allowed to serve in political roles. Some social roles and aspects of identity are *ascribed*, meaning they are determined by the group and cannot easily be changed by the individual. Other aspects are achieved or *avowed*, meaning the individual has some ability to choose them.

Social roles play an important part in the way people structure their relationships and interactions. For example, when interacting with an elected official, people often behave more formally and respectfully than they might if interacting with the same individual in a different role, such as a child's sporting coach. In such cases, people are shaping their interaction around the social role, rather than the individual occupying it. Both social roles and identity are commonly linked to social status with some roles or identities being perceived as more or less valuable, important, or privileged. In turn, social status can affect how people interact. For example, a person who has a high social status may expect deferential behavior from people with lower status, and there may be serious consequences if this expectation is not met.

The concept of social organization refers to broad, enduring patterns of roles and relationships. You can learn a lot about a group of people by the way that they organize themselves. One of the most basic forms of social organization is kinship, which takes many different forms and levels of importance across groups. Observing kinship patterns, the tapestry of social relationships, is one way to better understand the roles such relationships play within a culture. For example, family tends to be a very important theme throughout all cultures, but the exact meaning of the idea does vary from place to place and people to people. In the U.S., there is the traditional idea of the nuclear family: father, mother, and children. That basic unit may interact with other related family units, but it generally moves along its own course, making financial and lifestyle choices that will have the most positive impact for that unit. For most of human history, this has not been the case. Other cultures past and present put different levels of importance on the idea of family and who regarded as family. Understanding the characteristics and significance of such relationships offers insight into a host of things, such as how power and authority are derived, how conflict is resolved, how and why economic choices are made, et cetera.

Another form of social organization is the formation of sub-groups or sectors within a larger group, based on things like ethnicity or race, occupation, religious beliefs, or socio-economic status. These sub-groups may or may not be tightly organized and formally recognized; such subgroupings have significant influence over people's perceptions of how they can interact with one another. Most groups also have some form of social stratification, ways in which some parts of the population have more privilege than others, such as socio-economic classes or a caste system. As is the case with individual social status, these broader stratification patterns can be closed (e.g., the Indian caste system), meaning the individual has no ability to change their position within the hierarchy. Others may be more flexible, giving individuals at least some possibility of changing position, as is the case in some socio-economic class systems.

Social organization also includes the institutions people create and use to organize their lives. These institutions may look familiar to people from the U.S., such as churches, educational or legal systems, governance, and social services. Other institutions may be less easy to recognize, such as a system of apprenticeships that is managed separately from the educational system. Oftentimes, those less visible or understood receive less or no attention from those outside the group. That makes sense to an extent, as they are difficult to recognize. However, institutions – whether formally and officially structured or just understood throughout the group – are important and powerful social tools to the group and need to be accounted for when analyzing, planning, and engaging.

One final aspect of social organization is social networks. Social networks cross the more easily perceived social boundaries of groups, sub-groups, and social stratification and give people a wider range of possible interactions. For example, social networks based on school ties, religion, or political affiliation may make it possible for somebody to have interactions that normally would be made difficult by the boundaries of social groups or stratification.

Key Points

Groups and Networks

It is common to hear groups and networks discussed interchangeably; however, they are not the same thing, and it is important to be intentional in how you think about and use these concepts of social organization. Simply put, groups act as a unit; networks are not an entity and do not act as a unit.

A group is a set of people who share some sense of collective identity and perceive boundaries around themselves. There are people in the group and people who are not, although members can be added or subtracted. There is at least the possibility of them acting as a unit. Organizations, businesses, religious institutions, school classes, hobby clubs, political parties, tribes, military units, professional associations, et cetera., are all types of groups. All have the capacity to act as a unit.

Networks are ways of describing the relationships among individuals. A chart of one person's network would look somewhat different from a chart of the network of a close friend of his. Network analysis is useful for understanding the relationships among people and how those relationships might be used to move information, things, or assistance. It is erroneous to assume that everyone in a person's social network is part of similar groups. For example, the fact that someone is in a social network with a terrorist does not necessarily mean anything about the person's politics. He may be in a relationship based on school ties or some other affiliation that is too weak for the terrorist to effectively mobilize him.

Identity

Identity is commonly defined as a set of *social expectations* related to ourselves and others that is shaped by such factors as profession, gender, race, social class, ethnicity, family, sexual orientation, religion, and language. People's sense of identity shapes how they behave, what options they believe are open to them, and how they are perceived by the people around them. In times of conflict, it can be the symbol for which people fight. There are some aspects of identity that are products of choice and personality and others that are shaped more by contexts and relationships (including ascribed—imposed—identity). Many different elements shape an individual's sense of identity, to include:

- ethnicity
- corporate group membership – e.g. tribe, clan, military service,
- gender (sex, sexual preferences, social roles)

- kinship roles – e.g. son, mother, sibling, niece/nephew
- nationality and state affiliation
- race
- religion
- resource status -wealth/poverty
- social status (possibly defined by several of the other identity aspects)
- occupations
- other group memberships
- political affiliations/memberships

The elements people choose to emphasize in an interaction will depend on the situation in which they find themselves. For example, a Marine may choose to introduce himself by his military occupational specialty in some situations and as "Mason's Dad" in others. It depends on where he is and with whom he is interacting. Identity contributes to the many roles we play in our lives and is always changing and evolving. With these roles come role expectations. Role expectations are sets of behavior and characteristics associated with particular situations. The key to remember is that just because you meet a person in one context does not necessarily mean that s/he will privilege (or that you will observe) the same aspect of his identity the next time you interact.

How we pick up on other people's identities is somewhat culturally dependent and the signals from one culture may mean something very different in another culture. For example, the concept of men holding hands is generally given sexual connotations in the U.S. Yet, in Saudi Arabia, for example, male touching is not assumed to be sexual, and the men might be very offended at the suggestion. In the United States, gender does not give as many clues about possible occupation as it might elsewhere (although, still, a "male nurse" may be teased for choosing an occupation historically held by women). Also, we in the U.S. tend to be less attuned to picking up on kinship roles, which are somewhat less important to us than they are elsewhere. So, when conducting business, you may not care if your business partner has a lot of relatives in the area, but in a culture where he is obliged to share profits with all of them, it might be good to know about his family.

In general, military personnel need to be attuned to identity indicators that help them figure out how to interact and what to expect about:

- danger or safety in a situation
- likely behavior of counterparts or locals
- changes in the behavior of counterparts or locals
- traction points (commonalities/differences)
- how the person does/does not share your affiliations and loyalties

You already have the understanding and skills to identify someone's identity. It is something that you do every day, albeit maybe not through transparent deliberation but rather intrinsically. The challenge is to be disciplined to look for cultural differences in the signals you are reading when encountering an unfamiliar culture.

Race and Ethnicity

As noted above, race and ethnicity are elements that figure into identity formation. These concepts tend to be used very loosely much in the same way that people tend to use the word "tribe" to mean all kinds

of things. In fact, they mean different things. Race refers to categories that group people primarily according to perceived differences in physical characteristics. Racial categories vary greatly across cultures with distinction made on different characteristics or at different places on a spectrum of difference. For example, Brazilian concepts of race, like those in the United States, are somewhat based on skin color but include more categories between black and white. In many African countries, there are racial categories based on physical distinctions among people someone from the U.S. would categorize as all being "black." Categories within one culture also change over time. In the United States, there used to be a racial category of "Irish" that was different from being "white." While there is no scientific basis for any culture's concept of race, the categories are socially significant. You may see racial categories, and related power structures, in a foreign military. The officers may be primarily from a dominant racial category or mixed race, while the enlisted are primarily from a race with lower social standing. Learning the local definitions of race can help in figuring out how people align themselves and how outsiders – like U.S. forces – are perceived.

An ethnic group refers to a group that shares a sense of common history and culture and often geography. Ideas about race may form part of an ethnic identity, but not always. It is possible for two people to be socially the same race and have different ethnic identities or vice versa. In an increasingly mobile world, ethnic identities often take on a trans-national aspect, with people maintaining family and cultural ties across great distances. Like race, ethnicity has no scientific basis. It is an idea entirely constructed by the group. The criteria used to include or exclude members may change over time for political or other reasons. In fact, entire ethnic identities may be constructed rapidly with potentially devastating consequences. For example, historically, the "ethnic" identities of Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda seem to have been fluid social groupings based on a distinction between farmers and herders. These identities were made more significant and expanded into quasi-racial identities by the actions of European colonists who used them to categorize the local population. Those colonial distinctions became a useful way to *mobilize* the population during the genocide in the 1990s, where many of the Tutsi ruling minority were raped, maimed, and murdered by the majority Hutus.

Both race and ethnicity vary in importance at different times in a group's history. While the sense of shared racial or ethnic identity may barely be mentioned during times of peace, in times of tension or conflict, people may "rally around" an identity, lending it more power for a time. This points to an important consideration when assessing a situation where an element of identity such as race, ethnicity, religion, et cetera. seems to be at the core of the problem. Sometimes, people outside of the culture and the conflict assume such conflicts have been going on "for thousands of years" and are, therefore, unsolvable because they do not understand how elements of identity can be mobilized. Making observations about the role of race, ethnicity, and other elements of identity in a conflict is important, but it is equally important to determine why people are rallying around those identities and elicit examples of how the groups managed to get along in the past. Again, what is important is not our terms, "race" or "ethnicity" or something else, but recognizing the criteria local people use to categorize each other (and us) and understanding the current significance of those categories.

Group Membership

Group memberships also inform identity formation. People belong to many different groups at the same time, such as hobby groups, churches, political parties, or the military. Each group affiliation provides each member something, a sense of belonging, security, purpose, opportunity, et cetera. At times, the various groups to which people belong hold conflicting beliefs or ideals, and members reconcile this incongruity in different ways. Furthermore, the fact that a person belongs to a group does not necessarily mean that

he believes in everything the group espouses (remember *variation* above). In the United States, many people are members of churches or political parties without fully sharing the ideals of those groups. Throughout the world people join groups because they think it will advance their careers or find them a better spouse or make their parents happy or just help them get through their days more easily. This may be particularly true in authoritarian regimes, such as Iraq under Saddam Hussein. People may have joined political parties or tried to marry into a tribe or clan, not because of any deeply held belief, but simply because they thought it would make life easier.

This means that you should not assume that every member of a group is going to move in lockstep with its purposes. Even in places where religion, tribal identity, or membership in a political party is strong, there are members who pick and choose which parts of a group's expectations to follow. People also may behave differently depending on context – perhaps being more relaxed at home, but carefully following "the rules" in public. Understanding the importance of context and how people make decisions about their behavior can be key in avoiding accidentally embarrassing, alienating, or angering a potential ally. Additionally, in any group, there are almost always a few members who are open to different ideas. If they can be identified, these people may be helpful in shifting the group's opinions or understanding the group. On the flip side, do not underestimate the power of these affiliations. They shape the way a person thinks about things, sometimes even when that person is not fully invested in the group. For example, in the United States, people tend to think in terms of a two-party political system, not even imagining what it would be like to have an equally powerful third or fourth party. It is not that they do not like the idea; it just does not occur to them to think about it. Even for people who are not Democrats or Republicans, the traditional dominance of those groups tends to create mental "blinders" that do not exist in countries with multi-party systems.

Organizations

Organizations – businesses, militaries, churches, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) – are a type of group that requires specific attention. We sometimes forget that an organization is just a group of people that has come together for a specific purpose and, thus, has created shared patterns of meaning, behavior, and symbols particular to itself just like other groups. People in organizations create some of these patterns deliberately as a way of creating cohesion among members, and some patterns emerge over time from the habits and ideas of members. Each organization develops decision-making processes and has preferences for how to interact with outsiders. For example, do they do business with outsiders only in meetings or do they prefer quasi-social settings? This consideration is especially important if you are advising or training a military partner. For instance, you could have several meetings in the commanding officer's elaborately decorated office and never get anywhere. It is not until you happen to share a ride in a vehicle with him one day that you end up agreeing on a training schedule in less than a half an hour. Military personnel who have worked alongside military counterparts from different countries usually notice similarities and differences between the military's culture and the cultures from which military personnel are drawn. When working with organizations, it is important to remember that people within the organization are shaped both by their organizational affiliation as well as their affiliation with other culture groups. You should approach trying to understand an organization and those within it just like you would any culture group and its members.

Tribes

Another type of group warrants attention: tribes. Within DoD, there has been a tendency to see any sub-state group as "a tribe." Then there is a further assumption that all tribes are organized the same way, and will operate and make decisions the same way. Historically, in the U.S. campaigns against Native

Americans, this led to different problems. First, commanders wanted to see every group as a tribe because it would mean that there would be a convenient leader with whom to negotiate. Many Native American groups had different leaders for different aspects of life. Many groups with band structure did not have anyone who would have been recognizable as a political leader to Western eyes. This led to negotiations being conducted with the wrong people. A commander might make an agreement with one family elder, mistaken for a tribal leader, only to find out too late that other families did not think the agreement applied to them. It is understandable that a commander with experience with tribes in one area (Iraq, for example) might try to apply that experience in a new place (Afghanistan or the Philippines, for example). This may work, so long as the commander realizes that tribes are organized and make decisions in very different ways. Even something as seemingly unrelated as a clan structure that cuts across tribal lines or different marriage patterns can make a huge difference in the way tribal leaders determine courses of action.

"Tribe" is just a convenient, catch-all word that we use instead of having to list all the specific characteristics and expressions of this type of group. In social science terms, a tribe is simply a non-state corporate group (corporate group just means that it has membership rules) at a certain level of organizational complexity. There are many types of tribes. Most have somewhat more formal leadership than would be found in smaller units of social organization. Most are made up of smaller segments. Most tend to use kinship as an organizing principle, often with clans or lineages involved that may cross-cut tribal lines. Some organize themselves into confederacies, but usually only for special events or threats, preferring to maintain autonomy at other times. Leadership can be inherited, but there is usually some flexibility to allow leadership to pass to those who have achieved recognition for their actions. Leadership often is based on persuasion rather than the ability to exert force or withhold or provide resources. However, none of these things holds true for all tribes in all places. Just like with any other group, military personnel must remain open to observe, be critical of what they see, and avoid being blinded by familiarity, (familiarity can lead you to false conclusions and, thus, impact your effectiveness).

Cohesion – Ritual, Narrative, and Symbol

Groups stay together over long periods of time and through changes in cultural patterns for many different reasons – shared interests or beliefs, habit, identity, et cetera. While these reasons for group cohesion may be discussed overtly, especially in times of change or stress, there are more subtle ways that people reinforce the importance of the group and a collective sense of identity.

Three of the most easily observed ways of group cohesion are ritual, narrative, and symbol. Celebrations, ceremonies, stories, myths, jokes, music, and symbolic objects (flags, emblems, et cetera) can be used to give individuals a shared experience that reinforces their sense of belonging or the importance of group membership. For example, military life is full of these constellations of symbols, stories, and activities that reinforce group identity. Unit insignia, service symbols, the stories units or services tell about themselves; these help people define the group and their membership in it. In situations where a sense of collective purpose and identity must be forged out, such as a complex multinational operation, people often will create symbols and rituals to help the emerging group cohere to accomplish its purpose.

The ways rituals, narrative, and symbols are used can highlight important values of the group or can indicate when a group is being mobilized for a political purpose. These aspects of social organization are useful to remember for crafting working relationships and shared purpose when different groups must work together. Also, they can be very important to a group when it is trying to recover from conflict or catastrophe. For military personnel, it may be necessary to support people attempting to bring the group together via these means, even when it seems like time and resources are needed elsewhere.

Mobilization

The concept of mobilization warrants specific attention, as it has been mentioned throughout this section on organizing and interacting, and is particularly germane to the military profession for the role it can play in both fomenting and quelling conflict. When we talk about something being "mobilized," it means the process of how people's attention, conversation, and behavior start to crystallize around some element or facet of identity. You might see more of a certain kind of poster or distinctive clothing. You might notice people talking about social problems in terms of ethnicity when you know that there are political, religious, and economic reasons for those problems. People might start emphasizing a religious or political (or other) part of their identity in how they dress, how they talk and what they talk about, and how they choose to spend their time. Being able to recognize when people are mobilizing can help you anticipate reactions and perhaps shape behavior.

Many aspects of culture tend to stay in low gear or neutral until something happens to focus people's attention. After September 11, 2001, people who had never given the flag much thought started to fly it or wear flag pins or put flag stickers on their cars. During election years, people often think and speak more about their party affiliation. In times of conflict, sometimes people start to make ethnic or racial distinctions between themselves and their adversary in ways they rarely did before. During peacetime, these sorts of things can come and go without much cause for concern. During times when tensions are high and the potential for conflict is great, mobilization can be an indicator of danger. For example, if people start talking about their problems in terms of ethnic differences and to emphasize their own ethnic identity, it may lead to their simplifying a complex problem and blaming it on another group. It becomes easier and easier to simplify, to blame, and then to think about doing harm.

Sometimes mobilization happens without manipulation of a social or environmental change. However, sometimes the mobilization is orchestrated for political purposes. For example, a leader or group hoping to gain power might encourage people to identify with a political party by linking the party to important values in the group. In times of stress (economic problems, political change or disruption, violence, et cetera), people often rally around a group or identity – even if they were not particularly invested in it previously. Paying attention to how people talk about group membership – and changes in the degree to which they seem to be "playing by the rules" of their group – can give you clues to how the operating environment is changing. Take note, as this can reshape the battlespace in a very short time.

While mobilization of aspects of identity can lead to tensions, it also can help resolve them. For example, a group that mobilizes around a common sense of community membership may find it easier to downplay religious or ethnic differences. Leveraging a local historical counternarrative to one that causes disruption can help people reframe the situation using their own culture. It must be emphasized that mobilization is not inherently good or bad. When people mobilize, the results – in terms of U.S. interests – can be positive, negative, or neutral. Mobilization is simply a process, a way to motivate people, albeit a very powerful one, and one that you need to be adept at identifying and using, if the need arises.

1.4.3 Answering Questions: Beliefs, Logic, Questioning, and Investigation

Discussion

This knowledge area encompasses the beliefs, logics, values, learning, knowledge, and modes of questioning and investigation of a group (sometimes referred to as worldview). It includes, but is not limited to, topics such as religion and other beliefs, what people perceive to be logical and rational ways of thinking, what people believe is right and important, how the group thinks about and accomplishes learning and teaching, and the myths, history, and narratives that are important to the group. As with

other aspects of culture, it is very common for multiple patterns of belief to coexist, even when an outsider might see them as conflicting. People may be very devout in a monotheistic religion that instructs people to believe that a god controls all activities in the world. However, the same people may place great emphasis on scientific logic and have shrines to ancestral spirits.

People use beliefs and knowledge to think about not only spiritual questions, but also more practical matters of how the world works, why things happen, and what is right or wrong. Beliefs need not be explicitly linked to religion to have significant impact. In the United States, many people place great value on individual rights and responsibilities. This value is reinforced by some religious traditions in the country, but also is shared by many nonreligious people. Myths, historical stories, and other narratives also are important in how people interpret events and make decisions. For example, a group with many narratives or myths about past invasions may be more inclined to be wary of U.S. military presence than a group without this sense of shared history.

Groups or sub-groups also form orientations toward developing knowledge through learning that are shaped by beliefs. Some kinds of learning are perceived to be the responsibility of the family or community, others expected to be covered in more formal educational systems, and others are things that will be handled during employment or apprenticeship. Access to learning can be linked to social roles, status, or stratification, with some parts of the group restricted in what kinds of learning opportunities they have. Some groups prevent female children from attending formal school. Instead, these children are expected to learn from their family everything they need to know to fulfill the restricted set of social roles available to them. It is important to remember that people's beliefs are not always reflected in official policies. For example, even in places where people place a high social value on education, this value may not be reflected in how the government distributes funds or in the accessibility of education (even basic education) to low-income students.

People also use beliefs about knowledge to structure how questions get asked and by whom. In a group where scientific ideas about causation are accepted, questions about the cause of a disease would be perceived as being best answered by medical or scientific professionals using a structured scientific method. Yet, in a group that sees cause and effect as driven by supernatural forces, people see it as more appropriate to get answers to such questions from a person connected to spiritual matters, such as a shaman or priest.

The core considerations for this knowledge area are that ideas about what is logical and rational are not universally shared and that beliefs, values, and systems of logic are entangled in all aspects of life. It is important to learn as much as possible about these aspects of culture and to watch for their influence across all other aspects.

Key Points

Questioning and Investigating

The processes of developing and challenging knowledge are heavily influenced by many aspects of culture, such as beliefs, social roles, division of labor, and power. In the U.S., we have a division of labor that has created specialists, such as scientists and law enforcement officials, who are considered the appropriate people to investigate certain kinds of questions. It would be considered unusual, dangerous, and illegal for a regular citizen to attempt to conduct genetic experiments with pathogens or to investigate suspected criminal activity. Other kinds of questioning, such as challenging political and religious positions, are (at least ideally) seen as the right of all citizens, regardless of their position or status. There also is a fair

amount of freedom of choice in the types of evidence or expertise people use to answer questions. When confronting questions about the origins of the universe, people are free to rely on explanations provided by scientists, philosophers, religious leaders, or some combination.

This type of arrangement may seem natural and normal to people who have grown up in the U.S., but it does not hold true in all places. Most military personnel who have travelled outside the U.S. have encountered situations where political and/or religious dissent was illegal or restricted only to a subsection of the population, based on wealth, kinship, age, or gender. It also is possible for academic or scientific questioning and research to be restricted to certain topics. For example, a group might welcome scientific explanations related to some aspects of biology, but restrict a scientist's ability to write about the subject of evolution.

A group's arrangements for who can question or investigate certain subjects can affect interactions with U.S. military personnel in ways that may not be easy to identify initially. These patterns affect what topics are acceptable for conversation in certain contexts, who can answer questions or make decisions on certain topics, and what kinds of arguments or evidence will be persuasive. They also can affect work with military partners, as there may be different patterns in who can question orders – and how orders can be questioned – or who can raise difficult questions to superiors. Since many patterns about questioning and investigation are so deeply rooted that they are assumed to be natural, people may not think to tell you about them in advance.

How People Use Beliefs and Logic

At its most fundamental level, the terms belief, belief system, and worldview refer to the ways people answer basic questions such as: What is important? What is good or bad? Why do things happen (ideas about cause and effect)? What counts as legitimate evidence when you are trying to figure something out? Who are we as a group? The terms also refer to the specific details of beliefs as well as the practices, narratives, sayings, symbols, and material culture that are used to experience and reinforce beliefs.

Connections: The use of the term "system" regarding belief should not be taken to indicate that a group's beliefs will form a consistent, predictable set of ideas and practices. It is very normal for a group to hold beliefs that, from an outside perspective, seem to contradict one another. It also is very normal for belief to appear to be a sort of patchwork. Folklore and local myths continue to be an important part of life, even when many people accept a new religion or a new "official" history. Rituals that were developed as part of one religion are co-opted by a new one, and new stories are told to explain the ritual's purpose. People tinker with old ideas to accommodate new knowledge or opportunities.

Beliefs may appear to be only loosely connected, yet it can sometimes be difficult to insert new ideas or change old ones. Some aspects of belief do reinforce one another and are influenced by other cultural factors. In a place with no microscopes, where people believe illness is caused by magic or divine judgment, your assertion that disease is caused by tiny, invisible creatures in the blood might make you seem a little crazy.

Beliefs often connect many different elements of life, sometimes in unexpected ways. That is why you may take an action that seems very simple to you, such as building a clinic, only to suddenly find people outraged because this tugs on an important element of their beliefs, perhaps the idea that taking ill people out of their homes and away from the protection of their families makes them vulnerable to witchcraft.

Explaining ordinary life: People use aspects of belief to explain ordinary things that happen in daily life, such as erratic behavior, illness, good fortune, the seasons, weather, why dropped objects fall rather than rise, and so forth. They also use belief to help answer more abstract questions such as what happens when people die, why some behaviors are acceptable and others are not, how the universe works and why it exists, or how their group came to be. Additionally, the practices, stories, and symbols that reinforce aspects of belief can be a very important means of maintaining group identity and cohesion.

Supernatural explanations: When people in the U.S. think of belief, they tend to focus on ideas about the supernatural. For example, organized religion can be one important part of belief. Other explanatory frameworks for the supernatural, such as animism, witchcraft, luck, and magic, may be present instead of religion or exist alongside it.

Using history and myth: Not all aspects of belief involve supernatural answers to questions. Groups often develop a sense of history that may be only loosely connected to what we might think of as the "real facts." Sometimes, this history takes the form of myths, stories, or parables that only some in the group take to be the literal truth. Even supposedly true histories take liberties, emphasizing some events or people and neglecting others, casting rivals in a negative light and skimming past the flaws of heroes.

Choosing kinds of logic and evidence: Groups use different types of logic and value different sources as evidence. Many people emphasize the scientific method or type of logic as objective ways to explain the world around them. These ideas are broadly accepted as useful, but it is important to realize that they, too, are rooted in certain beliefs about cause and effect, what counts as evidence, and which topics and kinds of questions are most important. For example, contemporary Western medicine has long relied on the scientific method for diagnosis and treatment. However, it took more than two centuries for the modern Western medical profession to apply those same methods to mental illness rather than assuming the cause was personal weakness or something spiritual. In contrast, some cultures have always treated emotional and cognitive issues as important parts of health.

Different ideas about what is logical or rational can be especially difficult to discover and understand. In the U.S., we tend to think there is only one kind of logic and one kind of rationality, but our systems are based on certain assumptions that may not be shared in all cultures. We assume that to make a rational choice you must strip out your emotional reactions and focus on "facts." The exclusion of emotion is a choice. There is no absolute reason why emotion needs to be discounted from rational calculation, except that in our culture, emotion is seen as interfering with an idealized version of the kinds of evidence and thinking we prefer.

In contrast, if you are in a place where people believe it is natural to include emotions in their decision-making, your attempts to exclude it may seem very strange. It might come across as excluding an important factor for an arbitrary reason, as if you were asked to determine the market value of a load of fruit and refused to count the bananas because you do not like the color yellow. It is easy to imagine a meeting of U.S. military personnel and people from such a group where both parties leave a negotiation frustrated. You might feel that they were unwilling to have a rational conversation because they kept bringing feelings into the discussions. They might feel you were unwilling to be rational because you refused to address the emotional aspects of the problem or players. If neither of you realizes that different concepts of rationality are at play in such negotiations, you could have a hard time ever reaching an agreement.

Filtering experience: People use beliefs as filters. These filters can have a profound influence on how people experience the world, affecting what people notice and ignore, how they categorize things, what seems logical, what feels right or upsetting. The resulting view of how the world works is often taken to be absolute reality rather than a reflection of the belief.

Change: Still, like all aspects of culture, beliefs change over time through all the same processes described in this document. Like all cultural change, it may happen in a way that appears disjointed with individuals changing behavior but still professing beliefs that are out of sync with how they are acting. It is not enough to simply insert a new idea and hope that people like it. Even as behavior changes, it can take a long time for other aspects of the belief system to shift so the new idea can be accommodated. It also can take a long time for the group to adjust or create associated practices, narratives, sayings, symbols, and material culture that are used to integrate the idea and to pass it on to subsequent generations.

1.4.4 Influencing: Power and Making Decisions

Discussion

This knowledge area encompasses the officially recognized and unofficial ways that power and influence are gained, lost, and used by a group (sometimes referred to as formal and informal political systems). It also includes how different kinds of decisions are made and who gets to make them.

Broadly speaking, power and control are about getting people to do (or not do) something. Authority refers to the official or popular acknowledgement that a person has the right to exert power. These two things do not always come in the same package. It is possible for somebody to have power without authority, especially if he controls resources or has the means to use force, as is the case with drug cartels. It also is possible to have authority, but no real power, something that can be a significant challenge for officials in newly formed or unstable governments.

A further consideration is legitimacy, which is the degree to which authority and the use of power are perceived as being correct and are accepted. It is possible for an official, structured authority to be acknowledged as powerful, but perceived as illegitimate. This perception may undermine the ability of an individual or organization to exercise power effectively; it may also create problems for the people in the community, as they navigate different power processes. Legitimacy can be a particularly important concept for military personnel because there can be great differences in perception within a community or between a community and outsiders. What is regarded as legitimate authority and use of power by U.S. military personnel may be understood very differently by people in the local area or region. When these kinds of differences arise, it is important to avoid focusing exclusively on trying to create the perception of legitimacy. It is just as important to understand why people are not accepting something and what alternatives they would propose.

In the United States, people tend to think about power and control in terms of formal political processes, government institutions, and nation-states, all arrangements that have the sort of structured authority described above. These are important aspects of how people organize power in many places, but they are not the only aspects of this knowledge area that matter for military personnel. The ability to wield power may be very direct in cases where people have structured authority or control something, such as resources, the ability to use force, or the ability to give definitive interpretations of important guidelines. (This latter category – controllable definitions of important guidelines – includes laws, religious doctrine, regulations, or history.) However, people also wield power – and are perceived as legitimate – in more indirect ways: they accomplish this by influencing the beliefs and positions of others, or by subtly

controlling any of the things listed above. It is very common in many groups for high-status community members – elders, religious leaders and scholars, highly educated individuals, the wealthy, or people from families with a long history in the area – to have great influence and legitimacy. Individuals without high status may gain legitimacy through advocacy for a sector of the population that feels the formal political structures are not acting in its interests. Also, people who can effectively leverage their social networks to achieve their objectives can have significant influence within a group (consider the inner workings of the "old boys" network in the U.S. or *wasta* in Arab societies). Even individuals whose social role or status prohibits them from formal participation in politics or decision-making can have a great deal of indirect influence. This can be seen in any place where women are not allowed a recognized political voice, but who – as individuals or collaboratively – wield power and affect decisions through male relatives. Keeping track of the social roles and individuals who have influence in aspects of culture can seem daunting, but over time, patterns will emerge that make this area easier to learn about and understand.

Is there such a thing as an ungoverned area?

Simply, no, there is no such thing as an ungoverned area. Wherever there are people, there is some form of governance. It may not look like the kind of government you would recognize – with officials and bureaucracy. Expecting to see that kind of government is a form of the cultural blinders mentioned earlier and may make it difficult to see the local system that people are using to govern themselves. Watch for how decisions are made and who is consulted before action is taken. Look for patterns in the way resources and people move in the area. Listen to people's stories for hints about where authority lies. Also, be aware that there may be more than one form of governance at work in a particular place. They may be in conflict or they may simply apply to different groups who have worked out how to coexist.

Power and authority intersect with decision-making for groups in complex ways. Official decision-making structures and processes are often layered on top of other expectations about how decisions should be made. For example, a government official may have the authority and power to make decisions about resource distribution for education. However, he may realize that his final decision will be more legitimate, accepted, and acted on more readily if he consults with community leaders, important religious figures, and other influential organizations or individuals. In many cases, this kind of consultation is not officially required and may not be pointed out as a formal part of the decision-making process, but it is still expected by all stakeholders. Also, sometimes the decision-making process can depend on context and topic. For one topic, one or a handful of individuals with authority may be expected to deliberate and make decisions for the group. For another topic, a process such as voting can enable the group to make decisions based on the will of the majority of people allowed a voice in the matter being debated. These kinds of practices should be familiar to U.S. military personnel who have observed military and civilian authorities socializing ideas and building consensus prior to making and announcing a decision. It is as important to observe and understand the activities and narratives leading up to a decision and the processes expected for kinds of decisions, as it is to know who makes the final call.

One final note on the intersection between power and decision-making involves implementation. Many of you will have encountered situations, at home or abroad, where a decision is made, but not acted on in the expected way. People may creatively reinterpret a decision to suit their own purposes or simply find ways to ignore it. In some cases, this kind of disconnect between decision and action results from lack of authority or legitimacy, as described above. It also can result from corruption, lack of trained personnel to do necessary work, or other problems. However, in places where part of the population does not have access to the formal political system and other decision-making processes, not acting on a decision or

deliberately undermining the decision in small ways may be a form of resistance and protest. People may believe, often quite correctly, that this type of resistance is the only political action available to them, a situation that can have a significant effect on mission accomplishment.

As is always the case, this knowledge area relates to all the others. Social roles, organizations, and status have a major impact on who can wield power and how. Religious convictions are often deeply entangled with political decision-making. Ideas about how knowledge is gained or what counts as a valid argument are very important in decision-making. Symbols and the built environment are often used to create or reinforce the legitimacy. Recognizing these connections will make it easier for military personnel to understand and anticipate the use of power and decision-making processes.

Key Points

Contract and Personal Trust

The mechanisms groups use to reach agreement warrant additional attention; this is because U.S. military personnel, at times, express frustration or confusion over the process. Through recent operations, many military personnel have gained experience earning trust in the day-to-day affairs of other groups. They tell stories of many meetings in which participants took a great deal of time to get to know one another on a personal level before making decisions, or the importance of relationships developed over multiple deployments. Some people have had a difficult time adjusting to the apparent intrusion of personal matters into what they perceived should have been a largely impersonal, professional process. Part of the reason for this adjustment period has to do with the way people in different groups construct trust – through formal, codified practices (collectively referred to here as “contract”) or personal relationships.

In the U.S., as it is in many other places, we place a great deal of emphasis on the formal mechanisms of decision-making, governance, social control, and agreements. People in the U.S. may shake hands on a deal, but most will also want a document that makes the agreement official in some way. We do have many ideals, stories, and aphorisms about the importance of personal responsibility and integrity (e.g., “a man’s word is his bond” or “will you shake on it?” or “reputation is everything.”), and often prefer to elect or do business with people we trust. However, in practical terms, we tend to place our trust in contract – processes, structures, positions, and rules – rather than individual people. Given the choice between buying a car based on a handshake and personal assurance about the vehicle’s condition on the one hand and a written warranty on the other, many of us would take the warranty. When we buy groceries, we like to be able to rely on a system of governance that requires certain levels of sanitation and safety rather than having to get to know each farmer and baker supplying the store. The use of contract rather than personal trust provides a shortcut, a way around the complexities of assessing the personal integrity of every individual with whom, directly or indirectly, we interact.

In contrast, many groups emphasize personal trust as a necessary precursor to other types of agreements. There is more to this than simply drinking tea and discussing family at the beginning of meetings. A trust relationship often carries with it the expectation of personal responsibility for ensuring that agreements are carried out. It may also carry an expectation that the relationship carries over into other issues and agreements. Cultural patterns that emphasize personal trust also affect the way social networks are used with information, resources, and instructions moving across a network, perhaps cross-cutting or avoiding formal channels, without the need for official arrangements or hierarchies. Most importantly for U.S. military personnel, when personal trust rather than just contract is required, we lose our familiar shortcuts. This must be considered when planning, whether a meeting or a campaign. As Anna Simons

pointed out in her report on challenges in developing knowledge for conflicts outside the cosmopolitan West,

"What is much less well appreciated is how trust is routinely secured in the non-Western world: never by money, always by time."[1]

1.4.5 Social Control and Managing Conflict

Discussion

This knowledge area encompasses ideas and practices people have developed to regulate social relations, individual behavior, and the rules of a group as well as establish patterns in how rules are used and what happens when people violate them. It also includes accepted processes for disputing and for managing or resolving disputes and conflicts. As such, it includes things familiar to U.S. military personnel like legal systems, structured law enforcement, and official punishment and sanctions as well as different concepts of justice and different ideas about how disputes should be handled, which may be less familiar to you.

All groups develop rules to govern behavior and interactions. The term "norm" is generally used to refer to rules that are commonly understood (although sometimes contested) but not codified in a group. The term "law" refers to rules that have been codified into a formal system, which generally includes concepts and processes for enforcement, dispute resolution, punishment, restitution, and reconciliation. The degree of emphasis placed on aspects of a legal system can vary. For example, in the United States, our concept of justice emphasizes punishment and sometimes restitution. In places with different concepts of justice, restitution and reconciliation may be seen the more important outcomes.

For military personnel learning about social control in a group, it is critical to recognize that, while laws may be easier to learn about, norms may have as much or more power in governing behavior. Norms are ingrained into the group; they are the expected and accepted range of variation in a behavior – what counts as the normal for a given situation. People learn group expectations and limits as they grow up or become members. Stories about what happens to people who break the rules or do not fit in are usually deeply embedded in that learning. In our own cultural settings, we pick up on visual and verbal cues and use the knowledge gained over our lifetimes to pick up on the norms for a setting. We figure out the applicable norms for a new situation without needing to spend a lot of time analyzing it. For example, in the U.S., nobody feels the need to formally teach children not to be cannibals. Children learn it deeply from jokes, horror stories, and the reactions of adults to news stories about violations of this taboo. Also, we do relatively little explicit teaching about norms of career success, what relationships should be like, or how you should treat your family. Despite that, people feel a great deal of social pressure to conform to norms in these areas.

The challenge in intercultural situations is that norms are not always called out explicitly in rule books or laws, and people may not be conscious enough of them to warn you about them. This is because, to the people who have lived with them all their lives, norms often seem like the obvious, correct, natural way of doing things. Obviously, you do not eat people, right? Norms usually go unmentioned and unnoticed until somebody violates them. Consequently, it is important to try to learn about norms in advance and equally important to be able to manage your interpersonal interactions so that you can recover when one of you, inevitably, makes a mistake.

It is common to talk about rules as means to maintain social order, and this is true in the basic sense. However, it also is important to recognize that rules, the group's norms and laws, also frequently serve to

reinforce social stratification and inequalities, providing advantages to some parts of the group and disadvantages for others. This latter effect is sometimes overt and acknowledged, sometimes subtle. Likewise, rules do not always form a coherent system. Groups can have some rules that seem contradictory, especially during times of significant change. For example, long after women in the United States were legally allowed to vote, there was still a strong norm of women being expected to vote as directed by a husband, father, or brother.

When rules are broken, there are patterns in how the group responds. In the case of norms, all or part of the group is likely to respond to a rule breaker through social sanction. Social sanction can take many forms including, but not limited to, providing guidance, snubbing or shunning, gossip, shaming, or even violence. When a group believes somebody has behaved in a way that is beyond acceptable limits, members may expend a lot of energy expressing their displeasure through obvious gossip, publicly humiliating the individual, or excluding him from activities and conversations. These activities demonstrate the group's disapproval and warn the individual to change his ways. These mechanisms can be incredibly powerful influences on behavior. The social sanction employed by the group members can depend on the individual as much as the offense. For example, if a child violates a norm of deference to a person of high social status, she might be gently corrected. An older person might be forgiven the offense without sanction, while a middle-aged offender might be shunned or beaten for the same behavior. As many military personnel have experienced, most groups are willing to make allowances for outsiders not understanding norms. Offenses may be ignored or gently corrected. However, it is important to understand that in almost all situations, the outsider is expected to learn "correct" behavior over time.

When a law is broken, the situation is usually taken up by the formalized system of justice. This system may look like a familiar arrangement of police, courts, jails, and so forth, or the system may consist of a group of elders convening to hear about the situation and deciding what should be done. The system may be multi-faceted, with some matters being handled by local mediators or judges and others entering into a system of courts. No matter what the system looks like, underpinning it will be a set of assumptions about what should be considered in decision-making and what constitutes a desirable, just outcome. In the United States, our ideal is that individuals should be equal before the law, that a person's social status, race, sex, and other such factors should not be considered in the judgment, and that an individual is innocent until proven guilty. Also, while our judicial system is expected to consider some aspects of context, such as killing in self-defense, other aspects are not allowed, or their consideration may be contested. The ideal of "equal before the law" is not a cultural universal, and many groups consider it very appropriate to judge a person differently based on personal characteristics or the situation. Likewise, the kinds of evidence that can be considered are influenced by other aspects of culture. So, in a place where many people believe sorcery can cause loss or death, evidence of a person practicing magic might be a legitimate consideration.

Perhaps more importantly, there also is a great deal of variation in what people see as the desired outcome of a judicial process. In the United States, people expect that a judgment will include the declaration of guilt/blame or innocence, and a prescription for some type of punishment if the offender is found guilty. Again, this expectation is not universal. In some places, the outcome of a judicial process is expected to be the restoration of social harmony through restitution and acts of reconciliation rather than blame and punishment. In fact, placing blame and imposing punishment may make things worse, as exacerbating tensions rather than reducing them.

The preceding paragraphs focused mainly on violations of rules by individuals or small groups. All groups also have ways of handling broader disputes and conflicts that occur within the group or between groups. All groups have tensions of one sort or another with other groups, and these are generally managed rather than fully resolved. It is far more common for such tensions, even very difficult ones, to be managed rather than to erupt into violence. When a tension reaches a point where one or both parties feel some action is required, there are culturally accepted ways of disputing. For example, many forms of public protest, strikes, mediation, seeking greater political power, and legal action are all considered acceptable in the United States. In many places, these disputing practices are not allowed, but there may be other ways, such as gaining an audience with a ruler or religious leader and persuading him to intervene.

Centuries-old conflict

U.S. military personnel often find themselves amid something that the U.S. public thinks of as an intractable conflict that has been going on for centuries. Violent conflict is usually the exception rather than the rule. The raw materials for conflict exist in every group in every place. However, tensions between different religious, political, ethnic, tribal, or other groups are often managed without violence for hundreds of years. There may be jokes at each other's expense, and there may be discrimination, but people usually figure out how to get along. People rarely fight one another just because they believe different things or act differently. So the question is usually not whether you can "fix" the underlying tensions. They usually do not need to be fixed, but the population may need some help to get the situation back on a stable footing.

Even when a conflict results in collective violence, there generally are forms of violence that are accepted and forms that are not. Historically, some groups have accepted raiding and feuding as legitimate means of addressing grievances. The international community continues to try to impose rules on large-scale warfare, such as distinctions between combatants and non-combatants and treatment of prisoners of war.

When violence does occur, the right question to ask is: what happened that led people to take violent action? When answering this question, it is critical to remember three things:

There is rarely only one cause for social unrest or violence, although one thing may serve as the spark that sets a pile of firewood ablaze. Common causes of conflict include (1) resource shortages, (2) changes in land-ownership rules or the ability to access resources on certain pieces of land, (3) prolonged differences in economic resources among different groups in an area, (4) rapid social change due to cross-cultural contact and/or industrial development, (5) discrimination (actual or perceived), 6) political repression, and (7) outside forces mobilizing some part of the population. Any combination of factors – in addition to the perception that the normal means of managing tensions are not working – can lead to violence. Normally, if you are trying to find the answer to this question, you will hear many explanations for the violence, many of which are likely to be true. Because of cultural variation, not everyone in a group will be reacting to the same conditions.

The reasons people give to explain violence may not always be accurate. This does not mean they are lying. It simply means they may be thinking and talking in terms of politics or religion – for example, when the underlying causes may be economic or ethnic (or any other combination) or when there are multiple reasons. This second factor is particularly true when local or regional leaders are trying to mobilize people to a cause. For example, they may feel that couching their goals in religious terms is more likely to get the response they want than if they talk about politics or history.

It is not common for people to resort to group violence unless they feel all other options are gone or unless they are led to it. Sometimes, people are led to violence by a leader who mobilizes their feelings of patriotism or faith or their sense of having been discriminated against. People are more easily manipulated by leaders if they feel they have no other options. If they cannot make things physically or economically secure for their families, and believe that they do not have recourse to any centers of authority, they may become willing to believe violence will bring about the change they want.

Again, the tensions that underlie the conflict are not necessarily going to be resolved; they need to be returned to state where they can be managed. The goal of a mediator in any conflict is to help the parties reach that state. For navigating daily operations, you must develop information that will help you understand the range of reasons for violence, how those reasons might be mobilized by whom, and what lines of influence can be used to manage the situation and produce a greater sense of security for the population.

Finally, all arrangements of social control, disputing, and conflict resolution rely on some mixture of perceived legitimacy and the threat of force or sanction (in the form of confinement, banishment, violence, or some other punishment). When some part of a population or an entire group does not have access to or does not accept the legitimacy of the social controls and patterns of dispute/conflict resolution being imposed, the members of that group or population may try to pursue the conflict in ways that are perceived by other stakeholders as illegal or immoral. In the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2003 and 2014, each side accused the other of illegal and immoral acts, in part because there were different concepts of what actions were acceptable within the conflict. Conflicts in which the rules of disputing are, themselves, part of what is being disputed can be particularly complex to resolve, especially through non-violent means.

1.4.6 Staying Well and Dealing with Illness: Health, Nutrition, and Well-being

Discussion

This knowledge area encompasses the beliefs, social relationships, institutions, and other aspects of culture that intersect with the overall health and well-being of a group. It includes topics such as beliefs about the causes and treatments of disease, power dynamics that affect access to sufficient water and food, how beliefs and social relations affect how care is provided, and how people are expected to behave when sick or injured. It involves not only what we would think of as physical health and nutrition, but also cultural orientations toward mental health and whether health is an individual or social matter. It also includes the health and treatment of wild and domestic animals that may be important for subsistence, labor, exchange, or symbolic reasons. Cultural ideas about health matter not only for medical missions, but also more broadly for any type of military operation. Because health and other aspects of culture (beliefs, social relations, exchange, et cetera.) are frequently tied together, a disease event or some U.S. action related to health may have a ripple effect throughout the group that may impact your operations.

Health issues affect other aspects of culture in both short term and long-term ways. For example, in many countries, epidemics of human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) occurred at times when there were weak public health and medical infrastructures, and aid from the international community was insufficient to provide the levels of care common in the West. The outbreaks killed many young and middle-aged adults, leaving large numbers of children and elderly people on their own. Over long periods of time, the HIV/AIDS epidemic resulted in significant changes in economic patterns and family structure. It also altered social roles, with the elderly and children having to head households and support the family. As is often the case with lingering illnesses or debilitating injury, caring

for the ill added an additional time- and resource-burden on families and communities. Disease burdens or health and nutrition insecurity can contribute to instability as well as affect the social, political, and economic contexts you will encounter when carrying out your missions.

When assessing the health situation of a group, the physical, psychological, environmental, veterinary, agricultural, and infrastructure aspects of health matter. It is important to include both individual medical issues and broader public health challenges in your assessments, such as those arising from insufficient clean water, nutritional problems, or the presence of environmental toxins. It also is necessary to assess less-visible aspects of health, such as beliefs about what causes disease and how it should be treated, or how social divisions, roles, and status may affect people's ways of seeking care. In many places, you need to be aware of the involvement of different kinds of practitioners, such as midwives, religious figures, herbalists, and community leaders in parts of the local health-care community that may seem unusual to you. (As in the case of *empacho*[2], described below.) Overall, the goal is to balance learning about the community's health from the standpoint of U.S. ideas about health with learning how the community thinks about health and what is necessary to maintain it or solve problems.

In the case of health and well-being, many common assumptions in the United States are decidedly uncommon elsewhere. Consider what aspects of U.S. beliefs and norms about health may be considered unusual by the local population. Many military personnel are familiar enough with other cultures to recognize that certain normal U.S. practices, such as a male physician treating a female patient, may be seen as unacceptable among certain groups. However, in some places, even more basic assumptions may not be shared. For example, most people in the U.S. believe that many diseases are caused by tiny organisms, invisible to the naked eye, that travel in people's blood and other bodily fluids. To some people, this may seem stranger than believing disease is caused by witchcraft. The idea that teeth and eyes are not part of routine medical care in the U.S. system seems illogical to people in many other areas, as does the idea that mental illness is something separate from and more shameful than physical illness. Even the idea that a patient might be divided from his family or social network during treatment, something we take for granted, could be perceived as strange or dangerous to other people. This last assumption caused problems in some past responses to Ebola virus disease (EVD) when people became afraid, sometimes even hostile, as relatives disappeared into isolation and treatment centers. In some areas, responders used transparent sheeting in place of walls so that families could monitor how patients were treated and communicate with them, greatly reducing tension. Understanding such differences in fundamental beliefs and values can help you understand reactions and plan more effectively.

At the most basic level, understanding the health situations and practices of a group will help military personnel understand what the community is contending with that can affect the mission. For example, if you know your local partners are coping with exhaustion from malarial parasites or worried about malnourished children, you can make more realistic plans for how much can be accomplished in a day. At a more complex level, understanding the cultural aspects of health can provide insights into many other aspects of culture as well as help anticipate the second and third order impacts of and that will affect operations.

1.4.7 Having Fun: Leisure, Play, and Humor

Discussion

This knowledge area encompasses activities that people in the United States would typically consider distinct from work, done for enjoyment or as personal pursuits. It includes things like sports, social gatherings, hobbies, sportfishing and hunting, using media (films, television, websites, et cetera), reading

for pleasure, relaxing at home, and outings or vacations. It also includes the special rules and expectations that apply to these activities.

Leisure activities can offer important insights into a group's culture. At the most basic level, things people choose to do with free time can show what they think is important or provide windows into other values. Some groups spend a lot of leisure time in sports or other activities that provide opportunities for individual or team competition. However, competition is not universally valued, and people from other groups may choose to spend their leisure time on activities that focus on artistic expression or more directly building social bonds. Additionally, some groups do not have clear distinctions between work and leisure activities and times. Most frequently, military personnel will encounter groups where there is a broad range of available leisure activities.

All groups have ideas about and activities they consider to be fun. Talking about and participating in leisure activities are well-established ways of building rapport. Many military personnel have reported that discussions of sports, hunting, or movies are the initial icebreakers in discussions with partner forces and local populations. What groups consider fun is not necessarily shared across groups, as there are cultural differences in what counts as fun. For example, local people may enjoy a goat roast and spend as much time discussing all the details of killing and preparing the goat as you might spend discussing the nuances of a football game. The global entertainment industry and increasing Internet access mean that it is now sometimes easier for military personnel to encounter people who have seen the same films, websites, and television shows. These commonalities can be useful for rapport building, but interactions should not be limited to what is familiar and comfortable. If facing an unknown leisure activity, observe and ask about any special expectations for behavior. For example, when an individual is invited to dinner party at a family home, some groups expect the guest to bring a small gift. However, in other places, such a gift may be perceived as rude because it suggests the host cannot provide for the guest. There is no universal pattern. It is necessary to observe and ask questions.

Social stratification, roles, and status may be reflected in who chooses (or is allowed) to participate in certain activities. In the United States, attending the opera tends to be associated with the upper socio-economic classes, although the only formal barrier to other people attending is cost. Participation in sports is still segregated by sex and/or race in many places, and the rules about segregation can be very strict. There also is cross-cultural variation in assumptions about who should have leisure time and why. People in the U.S. often assume that children and the elderly should have more leisure time than young and middle-aged adults, and that they should not have to be involved in wage labor. In other groups, this may not be perceived as desirable or may be impractical. This does not necessarily mean that children and the elderly are unhappy. They may value the chance to contribute to the family or community.

As is the case with artistic expression, leisure activities are sometimes a context in which broader issues are challenged. For example, watching sports matches and sport hunting were traditionally male-only activities in the United States until recently. Over time, more women have chosen to challenge traditional gender stereotypes by openly displaying their interest in these activities or trying to participate. In cases where one part of a group is disadvantaged in ways that are not openly acknowledged, it can sometimes be safer for people to highlight the issue in leisure activities rather than openly challenge the more powerful group. So, it might be easier for people to try out the idea of ethnic integration in a series of soccer games than in the political process. This is not to suggest that people perceive leisure activities as unimportant. After all, Jackie Robinson and Larry Doby received threats after breaking baseball's color barrier in 1945. However, as with the arts, sometimes people are more willing to allow challenges and exploration in these kinds of activities.

Key Points

Leisure and Work – Are They Two Different Things?

The idea of leisure and work as separate activities is not universally shared. In the U.S., people often compartmentalize the times and spaces where leisure activity is to take place. These kinds of separations are not followed in many places military personnel may operate. The concept of leisure itself, in the way it is commonly understood in the U.S., seems to be a recent development in human history. This is not because people in the past never had time to relax or pursue activities purely for enjoyment. It is just that the perception of a need to make a distinction between work and leisure does not seem to have been widespread. Blurred lines between work activities and non-work activities have sometimes created friction for military personnel. A typical example is when a meeting includes time spent socializing, gossiping, making and eating food, and other activities military personnel consider unrelated to work. U.S. personnel may become frustrated, wanting to "get down to business" and stop "wasting time," or become uncomfortable because they feel this is not acceptable/legal behavior for them when on official business. The other people at the meeting may see no reason that a business meeting should not also be enjoyable. They may see the maintenance of relationships and exchange of information and hospitality as being equally important as the specific topic of the meeting. In fact, the lines between leisure and work are also blurred in the United States. Most military personnel have had to participate in "mandatory fun" where something cast as leisure was merely an extension of work. Most people in the U.S. also have had experiences where an activity that we might normally characterize as work, like helping somebody move, took on some characteristics of a social gathering.

TALK WITH YOUR MARINES

While engaging in leisure time activities with partner forces can help build rapport and improve relations it is also a chance to unintentionally cause offense. Before engaging in such activities, encourage your Marines to think through the purpose of the activity. Is it a competitive sporting game? Or perhaps a way to get to know others, or make them laugh? Local and partner nation individuals will not necessarily go into an activity with the same mindset as Marines, so trying to establish intent and understanding proper conduct are important.

It is not critical to determine what "counts" as leisure and what "counts" as work in the group being studied. Just keep in mind that the separation between work and leisure activities is not universally shared. For interaction, what matters is being able to identify opportunities for participation and the different assumptions that may cause friction if not addressed, and being able to understand what leisure activities mean to partners or local people and what clues they provide to other aspects of culture.

1.4.8 Conclusion

The culture-general concepts presented here are designed to improve your understanding of human behavior. They describe the underlying thinking processes and knowledge areas that are relevant, no matter your counterpart or operating environment. These are things you already know and have experienced; these concepts just give you the words to help make the ideas more transparent. As you read through the text, you might have recalled previous Marine Corps deployments where learning experiences typified some of the ideas discussed here. As a military professional, having a firm understanding in these concepts will serve you well as instances of cultural complexity and "gray areas" in intercultural interactions arise more frequently in the next phase of your career. Now that you have a solid understanding of the underlying factors shaping human interaction and decision-making, the next section turns to strategic culture as a means of integrating cultural considerations in the analysis of state strategy and behavior.

[1] Anna Simons, "Improving Human Intelligence in the War on Terrorism: The Need for an Ethnographic Capability". (report, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of Net Assessment, 2004), 11.

[2] Robert T. Trotter II, "A Case of Lead Poisoning from Folk Remedies in Mexican American Communities," in *Understanding and Applying Medical Anthropology*, by P. Brown (Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Pub. Co., 1998), 279.

2 Culture in Plans, Policies, and Strategies of Geographic Combatant Commands

2.1 Introduction to Culture in Plans, Policies, and Strategies

2.1.1 Strategic Culture

One traditional approach to the study of a state's security, defense policies, and behavior focuses on the physical characteristics of the state and its environment. This approach perceives the international environment in terms of distribution of military, economic, and demographic capabilities among states, also called balance of power. The greater the capabilities of a state compared to the capabilities of another state, the greater the power of the former. Thus, the distribution of physical capabilities ultimately determines the outcome in interactions between states, especially interactions in the areas of security and defense. What states do and how they do it is determined by the relative power they have. Bigger states, possessing greater economies, larger militaries, and larger territories and populations are expected to achieve their goals when confronting smaller states, which accordingly possess smaller capabilities and resources. Similarly, an alliance of states that possesses larger resources and military capabilities than another alliance is expected to prevail in a conflict between the two. Even when the relationships between the states are not violent, the nature of the states' goals, preferences, and behavior is supposed to be determined by the relative power of the states. In other words, a state's behavior in international relations is determined by its relative power.

This perspective is challenged by many arguments, one of which proposes that states operate in an environment that is not only material but also partially cultural. Culture influences the ways a state's security community – those involved in formulating and implementing the security and defense policies of the state – sees the international environment and the state's place in it, and defines and implements the national security policies. In other words, a state's behavior is influenced not only by the state's physical attributes and how they relate to the physical attributes of other states, but also by non-material, cultural factors. This approach embraces culture as an independent variable that partially explains the decisions and behavior displayed by the state in the areas of foreign policy, security, and defense.

There have been many attempts in the past to incorporate culture in the study of state behavior related to security. Thucydides in his *History of the Peloponnesian War* attributes differences in the behavior of the warring parties to cultural differences among the city states. He does not explain the causes and conduct of hostilities between the city states by the distribution of power among them, but by the differences in national character and the character of the leadership. Similarly, Colin Gray points out that, according to Clausewitz, the object of war is "to impose our will on the enemy," and thus the strength of the enemy's will is the subject of cultural enquiry.[3]

One way to understand the behavior of the state and the sources of this behavior is through the concept of strategic culture.[4] A strategic culture approach investigates the relevance of cultural context in influencing strategy, including strategic preferences and choices. If strategy refers to the way a state uses the instruments of power at its disposal in the pursuit of its interests, the strategic culture approach helps understand how the cultural context shapes a state's interests, preferences, and choices, as well as how it goes about achieving them.

Every state, or security community, has a strategic culture that is the product of its historical experience. This means the United States has a distinctive way of looking at and understanding the world and its place

in it, and acting strategically. The U.S. is a large, resource-rich, and powerful country with global political and economic interests, protected by two oceans from other large countries. For more than a century, the U.S. has experienced no civil war or war with its neighbors. The location, size, and historical experience of the United States has, among other factors, bred and sustained a particular strategic culture that is very different from the strategic cultures of other states. This also means that Russia, or any other state, has a way of seeing the world – and its place in it – that is significantly different from the American way; these states also act to achieve their strategic interests in ways that are different from the United States. Simply put, security communities think and behave differently when it comes to strategic matters. One must keep in mind that differences in strategic cultures are a matter of degree – they can be similar in terms of interests, preferences, and choices, or very different, creating frictions and conflict.

Strategic culture has a very important impact on the military, its structure, what it does, and how it does it. The American military has few functions that involve maintaining domestic order and stability; instead, the U.S. military deploys to defend national interests globally. This requires the U.S. military to have an ability to quickly deploy forces, of various sizes, to any location; this requirement is, in fact, the chief reason for the existence of the Marine Corps – a self-sustaining expeditionary force capable of deploying globally very fast.

Very importantly, the strategic culture approach does not deny the importance of material factors (relative military power, economic and demographic capabilities, as well as geographic size and location), but points out that attempts to explain the behavior of states solely in terms of material factors are insufficient. Culture is one of many factors that influence policies and behavior. Material factors, the personalities of decision-makers, the opponents, frictions, and luck, are the other factors that – along with culture – have their own influence. In other words, culture is not the sole explanation for decisions and behavior.

The modern study of strategic culture was initially developed in the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s to address the differences between the nuclear strategies of the U.S. and the Soviet Union.[5] Studies analyzed the distinct styles of the two countries and explained the differences by pointing at national cultures. In fact, these studies included culture as the primary explanation for differences in nuclear strategies. Since these early explorations into strategic culture, there has been a lively academic debate on the usefulness of the concept. It must be pointed out that the concept is not universally accepted and is variably defined in the field of security studies. However, strategic culture remains a useful concept for understanding and anticipating the decisions and behavior of states in the areas of security and defense.[6]

Strategic culture, shaped by historical and cultural experiences, acts as a lens through which a nation's security community views other nations and the world. Members of the security community begin their enculturation in the nation's strategic culture long before formally joining the community – mainly through social, political, and economic interactions; education; the arts; media; et cetera. After joining the security community, its members are further encultured through more education and training, practice, and commitment to the missions of the institution of the community; while this occurs, they gradually absorb the values, beliefs, norms, and practices of that community, especially those related to security.

2.1.2 Culture in National Security Documents

States differ in their values, beliefs, and practices *vis-à-vis* peace, war, and strategy – in other words, they differ in strategic culture. These differences are very likely to manifest themselves in high-level official

documents, including national security strategies, military strategies and doctrines, white papers, defense reviews, and others. These documents not only outline a security community's understanding of the nation's interests and goals in national security, but also provide insight into what informs and shapes the creation of specific, lower-level, security and defense policies. For example, U.S. combatant commands (COCOMs) issue regular posture statements and theater strategies outlining theater priorities and supporting activities in the respective COCOM to fully support U.S. national security and national military strategies. These lower-level documents, while reflecting the priorities defined in higher-level documents, identify the specific policies and steps in the defense and advancement of national interests in the context of a COCOM.

The end of World War II marked the emergence of the United States as a truly global power. Thus, the last world war marked the first time American national interests were formally linked to the promotion and preservation of a particular international order that would promote those interests. Accordingly, the vision of this international order and the policies to advance and maintain it were integrated in national security documents.

World War II marked the emergence of the U.S. as the preeminent world power. In pursuit of an international order, while recognizing Soviet dominance in parts of Asia and Europe, the U.S. embarked on crafting a liberal world order based on institutions, alliances, norms, and practices that reflected American values and interests.[7] Initially this order was not global, but international, created with American allies in opposition to the Soviet order, including almost all Communist states.

The goal of the international order created in part by the United States was to stabilize international politics, safeguard American security and way of life, and advance American interests worldwide. More specifically, it included institutions and norms that promoted free trade, financial stability, political integration among states, conflict resolution, and democracy and human rights. The new post-World War II order was largely based on American values and interests; in other words, American values and norms significantly shaped the international order that emerged after the war. This international order was envisioned to protect U.S. values by facilitating an environment in which the ideals and practices of democracy and human rights – as they were understood and practiced in the United States – could flourish. When the authors of "National Security Council Report 68" (NSC-68) – America's first post-World War II national security strategy – addressed the threat posed by the Soviet Union, they described it as a mortal threat to American values and way of life, not simply as a military threat. NSC 68 posited that the way to address the Soviet threat required not only a formidable military response, but also the creation of an international order that would constrain the potency of the Soviet threat.

The post-World War II international order created by the United States and its allies is based on a wider variety of international institutions, laws, and norms, ranging from the formal to the informal. The U.S. was instrumental in creating and maintaining many of them: the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Group of Seven (G-7) industrial democracies, the Group of Twenty (G-20) international forum, and others. The new international order included global as well as regional institutions and organizations. This international order spurred development, trade, and political, social, and economic stability in those parts of the world that managed to maintain a commitment to this order. In contrast, the order created by the Soviet Union in the Communist world had very different values, norms, and rules. For example, it included no free trade, and had a very different understanding of democracy and human rights.

It must be pointed that the U.S. security documents created during that time– and now – did not see alternatives to the international order as envisioned by the U.S. and its allies as viable, but rather as a threat. Accordingly, the U.S. has consistently attempted to incorporate in the existing order those states which were on the outside. During the Cold War, for example, the Soviet Union maintained its own international order that included almost all Communist countries, and sought to impose its own model globally. Once the Communist order collapsed, the United States sought to incorporate all post-Communist states, including Russia, in the order maintained by Washington, its allies, and other states committed to it. Accordingly, the post-Communist states became members of the institutions and organizations from which they were previously excluded (the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, for example) and some of them even sought to fully integrate in the Western world by becoming members of NATO and the European Union (EU). Similarly, starting earlier, in the late 1970s, China was enticed by the U.S. to end its relative international isolation and join the order promoted by the United States.

Successive American national security strategies have posited that the only way to promote peace and security is to expand the international order promoted by the U.S., its allies, and its partners. Only when states outside this order fully embrace the order's values and norms would state threats to American national security be eliminated. Therefore, the U.S. has promoted free trade and human rights, for example, in states outside this order to integrate them into it. However, the integration process has been uneven. Some states, including Russia after the end of communism, appeared to embrace the rules-based order – only to slide back in the early 2000s and openly challenge some of its most important norms. China, on the other hand, only partially accepted the order, embracing many of its economic norms, while shunning democracy and human rights as understood by the West.[8]

2.1.3 Values and Interests in U.S. National Security Strategy

The relationship between national interests and values is complex. Some see it as dichotomous poles (for example, security versus liberty). However, interests and values can be also seen as alternative expressions of valuation.[9] For example, the survival of the U.S. is not just a national interest but also a core value essential to all Americans. Thus, national interests reflect core national values (or rather, what the security community defines as national interests in high-level national security documents).

Since the end of World War II, U.S. security documents have consistently expressed a commitment to the maintenance of an international order that is predictable and peaceful. Successive American administrations, both Republican and Democrat, have maintained this major theme in national security strategies. Since 1987, in accordance with the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, the U.S. has periodically published a *National Security Strategy* (NSS), broadly defining America's strategic outlook and policies. Even before the first publication of the formal NSS, the U.S. administration had published high-level security documents similarly identifying the country's security outlook and strategy. A review of high-level security documents since the end of World War II reveals the consistent presence of four core national interests:

- the security of the U.S., its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners
- a strong U.S. economy and an open international economic system
- respect and promotion of democracy and universal values at home and abroad
- a rules-based international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace and security

Although these broad core interests have been present in previous national security strategies, each of them had a major theme. For example, Clinton Administration strategies emphasized globalization and the importance of trade to foster democracy in places it previously did not exist. During the presidency of George W. Bush, there was an emphasis on security, particularly the threat of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction; President Bush pledged to use preemptive force in response, while promoting liberal democracy as a basis for political order and peace. No matter the emphasis of each national security strategy, every one of them committed to these four core national interests.

It is important to understand how and why the formalized formulation of interests and values in national security documents for every state are important, because they offer insights into potential alignments, frictions, and conflicts with other states. When the interests and values of two states are similar, it is reasonable to expect that those two states have few conflicts and handle frictions in bilateral relations peacefully. When the interests and values of two states differ substantially, there is a greater possibility for friction and conflicts. These frictions and conflicts are hard to overcome since they are the result of disagreements over core principles – they are associated with national survival, values, and ways of life. In addition, the consequences of conflicts between two powerful states that have different interests and values are especially dangerous.

The following section provides analysis on how culture affects the plans, strategies, and policies of the five U.S. COCOMs. Each COCOM includes states with interests and values relative to America that range from being closely aligned to being very different, with insights into how these similarities or differences affect U.S. security policies.

2.1.4 National Strategy and Geographic Combatant Commands

National strategic direction is governed by the U.S. Constitution, U.S. law, U.S. policy regarding internationally recognized law, and the national interest as represented by national security policy. This direction leads to unified action. National policy and planning documents generally provide national strategic direction. National strategic direction provides strategic context for the employment of the instruments of national power. Executive Branch and DOD documents, such as the *National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy,* and *National Military Strategy,* define the strategic purpose guiding employment of the military instrument of national power as part of a global strategy. One impo rtant strategic directive for employment of U.S. military forces is the *Unified Command Plan* (UCP), which establishes the military's six geographic Combatant Commands (CCMDs), of which U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) is the largest.

Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over assigned forces, and are responsible to the President and Secretary of Defense (SecDef) for command preparedness and performance of assigned missions. GCCs have responsibility for a geographic AOR assigned through the UCP. The UCP establishes CCMD missions and responsibilities, delineates the general geographical AOR for GCCs, and provides the framework used to assign forces for missions to the GCCs.

GCCs are the vital link between those who determine national security policy and strategy and the military forces that conduct military operations within their AORs. GCCs are responsible for a large geographical area and for effective coordination of operations within that area. Directives flow from the President and SecDef through CJCS to the GCCs, who plan and conduct the operations that achieve national or multinational strategic objectives. GCCs provide guidance and direction through strategic estimates, command strategies, and plans and orders for the employment of military force. As military force may not

achieve national objectives, military operations must be coordinated, synchronized, and if appropriate, integrated with other U.S. Government (USG) agencies, international governmental organizations (IGOs), NGOs, multinational forces (MNFs), and the private sector. GCCs direct this coordination and integration of military power to achieve strategic ends.

Using their strategic estimates and strategic options, GCCs develop strategies that translate national and multinational direction into strategic concepts or courses of action (COAs) to meet strategic and joint operation planning requirements. GCCs' plans provide strategic direction, assign missions, tasks, forces, and resources; designate objectives; provide authoritative direction; promulgate rules of engagement (ROE) and rules for the use of force; establish constraints and restraints (military limitations); and define policies and CONOPS to be integrated into subordinate or supporting plans. GCCs also exercise directive authority for logistics over assigned forces and authority for force protection over all DOD personnel (including their dependents) assigned, attached, transiting through, or training in the GCC's AOR.

GCCs develop their theater strategies by analyzing events in the operational environment and developing options to set conditions for achieving strategic end states. They translate these options into an integrated set of steady-state engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities described in theater and subordinate campaign plans. In some cases, a GCC may be required to develop a global campaign plan. These plans operationalize the GCC's theater strategy. Contingency plans developed to respond to specific contingencies are treated as branch plans to the campaign plan.

2.2 USAFRICOM: Culture in the Plans, Policies, and Strategies

2.2.1 Introduction

Since the end of European colonization in the 1950s and 60s,[10]Africa has experienced some progress but also some daunting challenges: ethnic conflict, poverty, religious extremism, competition over resources, insurgencies, and recurring and persistent humanitarian situations. A variety of actors with varying objectives work with African governments to build capacity in various sectors and to enable them to respond to crises. The actors— various states operating through their militaries and agencies, the United Nations (UN), and a vast array of NGOs – have all worked with African governments to resolve issues, mitigate threats, and meet the needs of various vulnerable groups.

Africa's crises have also provided an opportunity for the United States to expose its value system to populations through the programs it has implemented. Further, the United States has, over the years, adapted to working with other state and non-state actors, despite different organizational cultures and value systems, to achieve a common goal.

The navigation of these cultural factors among different actors is referred to as "horizontal interoperability." This is the concept used to describe how culture affects interoperability among members of an integrated mission.[11]

Vertical interoperability refers to how culture impacts an operation that puts the military (or aid workers) in direct contact with local populations.[12]

Both vertical and horizontal interoperability are essential to achieving an end state. This chapter will analyze interoperability in the African AOR, and identify areas of opportunity and friction points that arise at the strategic level — between actors as well as between actors and host countries.

The following section will look at:

- U.S. strategy toward Africa
- the African Union strategic plan

2.2.2 U.S. Strategy Toward Africa

U.S. priorities in Africa have been shaped by the impact of events on overall U.S. security and by its values. Overall, the U.S. agenda in Africa can be viewed from four pillars:[13]

- advancement of democracy
- boosting economic progress
- enhancing peace and security
- promoting opportunity and development

Figure 2-1: U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in 2014. *Source: The White House.*[14]

These four pillars are central to U.S. strategy toward Africa.[15] To advance these objectives, the U.S. employs a holistic approach in its engagement with Africa, employing different avenues that include engaging diplomatically with the Africa Union (AU). For example, in 2014 the U.S. hosted the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington to share views and approaches, and to advance its focus on trade and investment in Africa. The U.S. also engaged Africa through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), to achieve U.S objectives. The development projects implemented through USAID, spur economic growth in individual countries and further work to stem threats to U.S. interests in Africa. The following is a snapshot of U.S. objectives in Africa that together impart U.S. values through development.

Advancement of Democracy

USAID is the key agency that the U.S. leverages to advance U.S. objectives in Africa. USAID programs on good governance promotes participation and inclusion in governance, while also empowering civil society to promote transparency and accountability in the implementation of development projects.[16]

Although there have been democratic gains across Africa, with authoritarian regimes transitioning to multi-party democracies, most countries continue to struggle to maintain democratic gains. There has also been increased participation in the democratic process. However, many regimes are holding on to power and are causing a general anxiety in the public during each election year –- elections in many countries are marred with irregularities and, sometimes, violence. USAID programs work with civil society groups in countries open to reform to increase participation in the democratic process; and, in so doing, spread American values of transparency in the conduct of elections and peaceful transitions.

Longest-serving Presidents in Africa (More than 20 years)		
Country	Current President	In Office Since:
Angola	Jose Eduardo dos Santos	1979
Cameroon	Paul Biya	1982
Chad	Idris Deby	1990
Eritrea	Isais Afwerki	1991
Equatorial Guinea	Teodore Obiang Nguema	1979
Sudan	Omar al-Bashir	1989
Swaziland	King Mswati III	1986
Uganda	Yoweri Museveni	1987
Zimbabwe	Robert Mugabe	1987

Another major impediment to development in Africa is corruption. Government services are not accessible to all people – especially those living in the rural areas. It has become increasingly difficult to do business without a bribe. This obstacle has compromised national security, public health, and has the capacity to trigger unrest.[17] Bribes in most countries are labeled as “facilitation fees” and are openly

requested by civil servants. The U.S. has spent millions on anti-corruption programs in Africa. Between 2007 and 2013, the U.S. spent $170 million on long-term anticorruption programs in sub-Saharan Africa to bolster ethics and integrity in the public service.[18] Other areas that impede development in Africa include electoral malpractice, curtailment of media freedom, political suppression, abuse of presidential term limits, and lack of enforcement of existing human rights laws.

Boosting Economic Progress

Africa's growth over the last decade has ticked upward thanks to an increase in interconnectivity and new technology that has boosted income. Unlike earlier years where a major part of the economy relied largely on agriculture and/or pastoralism, most sectors today are technologically driven. Additionally, an increase in innovation has given rise to home-grown enterprises that are now contributing to the economy. One obvious example in the financial sector is the increased use of mobile money platforms – first adopted in Kenya in 2007 – which has since revolutionized the banking sector. Mobile money is inclusive, and has attracted rural customers who previously could not access the banking system. Today, mobile money platforms in Kenya account for approximately 2 million transactions daily ($1.7 trillion in 2013),[19] accounting for 60 percent of Kenya's GDP.[20]

Another sector that has evolved is mining, which has been streamlined and made more efficient through the adoption of technology. For example, mineral-rich counties such as Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) use the Kimberley Process – a certification process that tracks diamonds from source to market. The aim of the Kimberley Process is to stop the trade in diamonds acquired from conflict zones.[21] The process has saved diamond-producing countries millions of dollars while simultaneously preventing criminal cartels and armed groups from profiting from the illegal proceeds.

The U.S. has invested in projects that support economic growth and Africa's capacity to trade regionally and with the West. The U.S.-brokered Trade Africa initiative, which originally targeted East African countries, has now expanded to West and Southern Africa. Between 2014 and 2016, this program facilitated the trade of goods worth $283 million in exports from East Africa, and invested another $140 million, creating approximately 30,000 jobs.[22]Additionally, the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), enacted in 2000, encourages African countries to build free markets and has generated approximately $163 million in exports from Africa since 2013.[23]

Economic indicators suggest that Africa has a lot of potential, but growth is hindered by corruption and a harsh investment climate. Economic development is also directly affected by conflict and natural disasters, as well as inadequate infrastructure. Additionally, Africa's growing and unemployed youth population presents a unique set of challenges, including the risk of radicalization.

Enhancing Peace and Security

The stability trajectory of Africa remains fragile. The root causes of instability vary but the common denominators remain politically-instigated crises, natural disasters, poverty, pandemics, resource competition, and ethnic crises. Often these crises escalate, leading to conflict and instability that impact countries and regions; many of these escalated crises have had a direct bearing on U.S. interests and security. A good example of an issue that has direct bearing on U.S. security is the influx of refugees in conflict zones in Africa, and their susceptibility to human trafficking and irregular migration. (Africa is home to over 60 million refugees.)[24] Because of this, U.S. priorities are aimed at protecting the homeland from threats arising in Africa, as well as protecting U.S. interests in Africa.

Food insecurity is a conflict trigger in Africa; the U.S. has invested millions in emergency assistance and in development funds across Africa. Additionally, the U.S. – through USAID – applies a long-term approach to effecting change on the continent, as seen in programs like Food for Peace which began in 1954.[25]This program has continued to mitigate the effects of drought and famine in Africa. USAID also works alongside African countries and with international organizations – such as the World Food Program (WFP) and a host of NGOs – to meet the nutritional needs of vulnerable groups.

Another agency with a direct role in Africa is the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), which has established a presence in Egypt, Morocco, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa. DEA helps these countries to dismantle narcotrafficking and money-laundering networks.[26]

The U.S. has continued to use diplomatic measures to mitigate mass atrocities in places like Darfur in Sudan. However, for threats that pose a higher risk to the security of the United States, U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) is actively building the capacity of partner forces to better respond. USAFRICOM assistance ranges from training missions to logistical assistance to intelligence sharing. This U.S. COCOM also works with regional forces – such as the Africa Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) – to address stability and security threats, and to respond to humanitarian challenges on the ground.

Promoting Opportunity and Development

African countries have developed strategic plans aimed at increasing economic growth and poverty reduction. However, there are numerous challenges to the full implementation of these plans: pandemics, drought, and famine can negatively impact a country's budget. Therefore, to meet these strategic goals, African governments have over the years opened new areas of engagement with Western allies to meet current and future demands.

The U.S. has partnered with Africa to promote opportunity for its young population with a focus on climate change, global health, and food security. The programs are aimed at reducing poverty by boosting education and combating diseases such as the HIV/AIDS and malaria. The U.S. has invested millions in prevention and treatment programs across Africa through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPHAR) and the President's Malaria Initiative. Other programs that promote U.S. values in Africa include the African Women Entrepreneurship Program, which promotes maternal health and the protection of women in conflict zones; as well as the President's Young African Leaders Initiative, which opens opportunities for youth. The U.S. is also investing millions through the Power Africa Project to increase access to power in East Africa by utilizing alternative energy sources, such as wind, solar, hydropower, natural gas, and geothermal resources.[27] This program is expected to have a significant impact in every sector, providing employment, reducing the cost of living, and improving the overall quality of life.

Additionally, the U.S. responds to humanitarian crises by offering emergency assistance as well as investing in programs that promote sustainability and reduce the vulnerability of affected populations. One example of this is the operation to contain the spread of the EVD in West Africa. The spread of the Ebola virus was attributed to the state of an inadequately staffed health-care system, coupled with a non-existent diagnostic reporting structure, ill-equipped facilities, and limited access to health care, especially in rural areas. This hindered the diagnosis, treatment, and monitoring of the outbreak, and necessitated an international intervention to stem the spread of the disease.

Unlike East, Central, and Southern Africa – where the U.S. has invested millions of dollars to stem the spread of HIV/AIDS – fewer resources had been invested to boost the health-care infrastructure in West

Africa pre-Ebola.[28] Experts point to this as part of the reason why the health sector was ill-prepared for the EVD outbreak in 2014**.**

Overall U.S. implementation of priorities are generally considered to have been successful at promoting American values. Populations are now receptive to principals of good governance and are demanding accountability and transparency from their governments. Additionally, governments are now more proactive in meeting the needs of their populations; this is partly due to the expansion of democratic space and an electorate that is more aware of their rights and duties as citizens. In 2015, the President of Nigeria conceded defeat to his rival in a free and fair election. This was historic because there had been no precedent of a civilian-civilian transfer of power since the country's independence in 1960.

2.2.3 The African Union Strategic Plan and Africa's Priorities

The AU began as the "Organization of African Unity (OAU)" in 1963, just as most of its member states were gaining independence. The OAU structures were amended in the 1990s, leading to the renaming of the organization as the "African Union" in 2002.[29] The AU has been the center of integration efforts aimed at promoting peace and stability, and is the main body tasked with driving African integration for the benefit of member states.

The AU has the following priorities:[30]

- promote peace and stability, good governance, democracy, and human rights
- expand agricultural production and promote sustainable development
- promote inclusive economic development and industrialization through infrastructural development
- enhance education and health
- mainstream the participation of women and the youth
- mobilize resources to enable Africa to finance its programs
- strengthen relationships with regional bodies and strategic partners

The African Union has also developed strategic partnerships to achieve the above objectives. It has invested in continent-to-continent partnerships like Africa-Europe and Africa-Asia, and in continent-to-country partnerships like the Africa-U.S. partnership that gave rise to the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Member states also have agreements with European countries and the U.S. for various kinds of assistance, including military assistance. The AU and the U.S. have agreements to bolster Africa's peacekeeping capacity as well as its capacity to respond to conflict.

The following is a summary of U.S. support for AU peacekeeping operations and its conflict-response capability:[31]

- Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) program has helped to build the capacity of African partners to conduct peacekeeping training.
- Since 2005, through the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, which is primarily funded by GPOI, the United States has trained more than 248,000 peacekeepers from 25 partner countries across the continent, prior to their deployment to UN and AU peacekeeping operations. The United States has expended more than $241 million in ACOTA activities since 2009.
- In addition, through GPOI funding, USAFRICOM has conducted specialized peacekeeping training for the AU and 22 African partner countries since 2005 aimed at building a cadre of professional peacekeepers.
- The United States also has provided training and equipment to more than 1,100 African police prior to their deployment to UN peacekeeping operations in Darfur, South Sudan, and Mali, through the International Police Peacekeeping Operations Support (IPPOS) program, underscoring the critical role of civilians in peacekeeping.
- The United States is committed to delivering approximately $70 million worth of deployment equipment to African peacekeepers by the end of 2017, including for AU forces in Somalia and the Central African Republic, (CAR) which will give willing peacekeepers enhanced tools to carry out their missions.

In addition to investments in Africa's peace keeping capacity, the U.S. has made available direct assistance to African militaries and has invested millions more through USAID programs. USAID programs including Power Africa, Feed the Future, and Emergency Humanitarian Assistance, such as that which was given during the EVD outbreak. All of this is aimed to support the four pillars that comprise the U.S. strategy in Africa.

In addition to the AU, African countries have also organized themselves under regional bodies that work to promote trade, economic integration, and peace and security of member states. The three main bodies are:

- Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), comprised of 15 West Africa States[32]
- East Africa Community (EAC), comprised of five East African countries[33]
- Southern African Development Community (SADC), comprised of fifteen Southern African countries[34]

ECOWAS has in the past organized military responses to crises in West Africa. For example, in January 2016, Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, and Togo came together under ECOWAS and deployed troops to The Gambia in response to post-election crisis – the then incumbent former President Yahya Jammeh had refused to transfer power to the winner of the December 1, 2015 elections, Adama Barrow. The deployment of troops coupled with and high level negotiations saw the incumbent step down and leave to country to pave way for the democratically elected government.[35] The move by ECOWAS was in alignment with AU priorities and was commended by the U.S. and the West, who all urged the incumbent to allow a peaceful transfer of power.

Africa's priorities and U.S. priorities do not always align. Over the years, friction points have arisen that hindered the access of development funds. For example, one of AU's priorities is to promote human rights in Africa. On this issue, the U.S. and the AU have found some common ground: both have worked to promote access for women's participation in the economy and governance, and in safeguarding the rights of vulnerable groups such as refugees. However, not every advance by the U.S. in human rights has been backed by the AU.

The U.S. places value on equality and respects the right of same-sex couples to live free of discrimination. However, same-sex relations are outlawed in 37 African countries; this presents a friction point and a culture war in the U.S.-Africa partnership. In 2014, Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni signed a law criminalizing same-sex relations; in response, the U.S. released a statement condemning the law. The U.S. followed up the declaration with direct actions that included cuts in aid, visa restrictions, and the cancelation of a military exercise; these measures were taken by the U.S. to "reinforce support for human rights of all Ugandans regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity."[36]The AU, as did many African countries, stood by Uganda. The same issue had been highlighted in President Barak Obama's speech on his visit to Senegal in 2013.

President Obama, in an answer to a question at a press conference in Senegal, said:[37]

"… (T)his topic (of same-sex relations) did not come up in the conversation that I had with President Sall in a bilateral meeting. But let me just make a general statement. The issue of gays and lesbians, and how they're treated, has come up and has been controversial in many parts of Africa. So I want the African people just to hear what I believe, and that is that every country, every group of people, every religion have different customs, different traditions....But when it comes to how the state treats people, how the law treats people, I believe that everybody has to be treated equally."

Senegalese President Macky Sall responded by saying:

"Now, on the issue of homosexuality, Mr. President, … these issues are all societal issues basically, and we cannot have a standard model which is applicable to all nations, all countries – you said it, we all have different cultures. We have different religions. We have different traditions…. And even in countries where this has been decriminalized and homosexual marriage is allowed, people don't share the same views. Senegal, as far as it is concerned, is a very tolerant…. We don't tell anybody that he will not be recruited because he is gay…. But we are still not ready to decriminalize homosexuality."

These sentiments were echoed during President Obama's visit to Kenya in 2015, where the issue was termed as a "non-issue" by his Kenyan counterpart. President Uhuru Kenyatta instead highlighted priority areas –"we want to focus on other issues that are day to day issues for our people…economic development… health, education, infrastructure…encouraging entrepreneurship…."[38]

Secondly, the U.S. has experienced challenges in its endeavor to promote democracy in Africa. The U.S. has been proactive in it its diplomatic efforts to advance democracy and to safeguard human rights. However, many authoritarian regimes have solidified their grip on power and have presided over crimes and atrocities, exercising impunity and in most cases escaping justice. South Sudan and the Sudan region of Darfur are examples of countries that have been in the spotlight. The U.S. and some of its allies have raised alarm and responded by issuing sanctions against Sudan for its actions in Darfur. In addition to

sanctions, the U.S. supports the efforts of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in its endeavor to prosecute Sudan's President Omar el-Bashir for mass atrocities in Darfur.

The court was established under the Rome Statute and was adopted in 1998; it currently has 122 member states. The ICC's mandate is to prosecute individuals for the crime of genocide, for war crimes, and for crimes against humanity.[39]Although the U.S. has not ratified the Rome Statute (and is thus not under its jurisdiction), the Court's objectives are in line with the U.S. objective to advance peace and security as well as to safeguard human rights. This includes "mitigating mass atrocities and holding perpetrators accountable."[40]

In recent years, the ICC has become a friction point between the West and Africa. This is because there is a general feeling among AU member states that the Court has unfairly targeted African countries. To date, 27 percent (34 countries) of the total number of members are African countries and the debate on whether the court has unfairly targeted African countries grew from the fact that of the 10 situations (cases) before the court, only Georgia is not an African country. Situations in Uganda, Kenya, the DRC, Darfur Sudan, CAR, Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, and Mali have all been investigated and prosecuted by the Court. Additionally, of the 11 situations under investigation, 4 are African countries; they include Nigeria, Gabon, Burundi, and Guinea. African countries view the posture of the ICC as an infringement on their sovereignty – especially because African countries claim that they can prosecute the same cases in their own courts.

The perception of the ICC has negatively impacted the Court's ability to prosecute crimes as African governments have mobilized efforts to frustrate its work. The ICC has also resurrected a now-popular myth that the Court is a tool used by the West to subdue and re-colonize African countries. This myth was used to mobilize the population during the 2013 election in Kenya when two indictees of the Court, – now President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto – were campaigning for office. The two won the election by propagating the myth. This sovereignty argument lacks legality, but effectively galvanized support. Though the last of the Kenya cases ended in 2016 without any conviction, it triggered a move by other African countries to withdraw from the Rome statute.[41]The AU has not spoken out against withdrawals, but has established a court to safeguard human rights in Africa: the African Court on Human and People's Rights.

Finally, the U.S. has experienced resistance as it relates to USAFRICOM. At the Command's inception in 2007, many African countries resisted hosting USAFRICOM: it was regarded warily as an extension of American imperialism. The Command is now based in Stuttgart, Germany. However, the U.S. maintains a presence in Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, alongside France and China; the U.S. also conducts military operations across the continent from this and other locations.

The following section will look at military partnerships with Africa, and friction points that have arisen as a result of these partnerships.

2.2.4 Military Partnerships in Africa

Africa faces numerous challenges and enduring humanitarian crises that have made the continent vulnerable to a host of threats. These threats include terrorism, human trafficking, and a thriving illegal arms trade. Together, these threats pose a security challenge to the United States. Additionally, limited resources and in some cases, poor management of resources make Africa difficult to secure against or mitigate the effect of emerging threats.

The U.S. has long been engaged in Africa, supporting humanitarian missions alongside countries and non-state actors like the UN. The organizational culture, management structure of multinational peacekeeping troops, and primary languages of all these players are distinctly different and can negatively impact mission coordination. Additionally, the culture and language of the host population can impact the theater campaign plan of any incoming foreign military or humanitarian organization.

Foreign forces in Africa must contend with a different way of doing things – from dealing with proxemics to differing definitions of reciprocity, identity, and priorities. This calls for a clear understanding of the local practices to maneuver and adapt while accomplishing set goals. Consequently, anticipating differences in management style and organizational culture between humanitarian organizations such as the UN is important and essential to mission success.

The following section will look at the military partnerships in Africa's operational environment, and the points of tension that arise because of cultural differences and differing priorities at the strategic level.

The following section will analyze the workings of:

- USAFRICOM
- France in Africa
- China in Africa
- UN Peacekeeping Forces

Specific Issues That Have Invited International Actors:

Terrorism: Terror groups such as Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria, Chad, and Cameroon; Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in North Africa and the Sahel; Al-Shabaab in Somalia; and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, South Sudan, and Central African Republic.

Pandemics: EVD in Sierra Leone and Liberia, HIV/AIDs, especially in East, Central, and Southern Africa; and Malaria all across Africa.

Humanitarian Emergencies: Drought and famine in the Horn of Africa, flooding in southern Africa.

2.2.5 U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM)

Since its inception in 2007, USAFRICOM has deployed forces in Africa for emergency evacuations, humanitarian assistance, and military to military engagement, in support of counterterrorism operations, as well as to mitigate threats.[42] USAFRICOM has also worked among populations winning hearts and minds as part of its end-state.

USAFRICOM has continued to sustain a partnership between the United States and 10 northern and western African nations in support of counter-terrorism efforts under the umbrella of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)[43], which has in turn bolstered the region's engagement in Mali under the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA).[44] For instance, in 2013, the U.S. sent 10 service members to support French and African troops in Mali engaged in a mission to stem the threat of extremists in northern Mali after the ousting of the democratically-elected president in 2012.[45] Then, in 2014, the U.S. sent 80 troops to Chad to help find 200 girls kidnapped by the terror group Boko Haram.[46]

Additionally, a public health crisis emerged in West Africa that involved the outbreak of the EVD in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. The U.S. deployed approximately 3,000 Marines in support of Operation United Assistance, a USAID-led operation to contain the spread of the virus.[47]

Figure 2-2: U.S. military Ebola medical support team in West Africa. *Source: Medical Wing U.S. Air Force.*[48]

In East Africa, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) conducts training and capacity building for regional militaries, as well as enhancing community projects around the region.[49]

Figure 2-3: Delegates from the East Africa Stand By Force (EASF) at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti. *Source: USAFRICOM.*[50]

The region is also host to U.S. troops. Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti supports over 3,000 U.S. USAFRICOM troops working to advance the interests of the U.S. and its partners in the region.[51] These troops are also supporting AMISOM to bolster Somali's government, allow for humanitarian access, and to counter Al-Shabaab's activities in Somalia. Additionally, the U.S. is a key player in South Sudan, and has invested millions in humanitarian aid and in resolving the governance stalemate that continues to plague the country since it gained independence from Sudan in 2011. In 2013, fighting broke out in South Sudan after the government of Salva Kiir accused Riek Marchar, a former vice president and opposition leader, of planning a *coup d'état*. The ensuing violence left hundreds of people dead and thousands displaced. U.S. Marines were deployed on an evacuation mission that saw a Marine helicopter hit by rebel weapons fire.[52]

Figure 2-4: Marines repatriate U.S. citizens from South Sudan in 2014 after political violence broke out. *Source: U.S. Marine Corps.*[54]

Additionally, USAFRICOM has deployed forces to support Uganda's Operation Lightening Thunder, which aimed to counter and pursue the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). LRA activity spread into neighboring countries of South Sudan, Darfur in Sudan, northeast DRC, and the CAR. LRA activity has consistently diminished because of USAFRICOM's support for the operation.[53]

USAFRICOM programs in Southern Africa are comprised of combined exercises in support of a regional effort to develop continental security. Another exercise, Southern Accord 2015, which took place in Zambia, is an annual joint exercise intended to increase interoperability between the United States and Southern African countries for peace support operations, while increasing capabilities to combat terrorism and transnational threats in the region.[55] Finally, Africa Endeavor, another USAFRICOM program, is an annual 10-day communications exercise that focuses on interoperability and information

sharing with partner nations.[56] The exercise was first held in 2006 in South Africa; the most recent exercise took place in Botswana, with participation by more than 1,800 communications specialists from 40 countries.[57]U.S. Naval Forces Africa (NAVAF) has also conducted the maritime security cooperation program, Africa Partnership Station (APS); it is aimed at strengthening maritime safety and security through training and other collaborative activities in this region.[58]

The U.S. has consistently backed counterterrorism measures in Africa and is now even more committed in the Horn of Africa (HOA) and in West Africa where Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram operate. Both terror groups have been designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations by the U.S. State Department. Somalia has not had any viable governing structures for much of the last 25 years.

Notwithstanding U.S. support in the various operations in Africa, the American Government has had to stand up for its values in the area of human rights and good governance. For example, Nigeria is a strong democracy that boasts a large and capable military. However, reports in 2016 regarding the fight against Boko Haram in northern Nigeria brought to the fore human rights violations by government forces as well as corruption allegations in the security organs of the country. This obviously is a friction point, especially because the U.S. has invested heavily in the fight against of Boko Haram, in addition to its commitment to human rights. Following the reports of Nigerian abuses, the U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry, responded by saying:

> *"It is understandable in the wake of terrorist activity, some people are tempted to crackdown on everyone and anyone who could theoretically pose some sort of a threat…I caution against that today. Extremism cannot be defeated through repression."*[59]

Before the reports in 2016, the U.S. had in 2013 turned down Nigeria's request for AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters due to corruption allegations. Nigeria responded to the action by cancelling a U.S. - Nigeria military training mission.[60] Further, Nigeria turned to Russia for procurement of heavy equipment for the fight against Boko Haram.

Relations between the U.S. and African countries have also been tested by issues touching on corruption. This is especially so because corruption has been termed a national security threat in some countries because of its ability to compromise a nation's safeguards in an age of terror. Although there are numerous U.S.-funded programs in Africa geared toward promoting transparency, accountability, and reducing corruption in the public sector, corruption in the defense sector has not been easy to confront because of secrecy and impunity. The AU continues to encourage member states to enact anti-corruption legislation, and to investigate and prosecute corruption cases under the Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption adopted in 2003.[61] However, it is up to each member state to reduce graft and mitigate its impact.

In 2015, a leading anti-corruption think tank, Transparency International, graded African countries—with most receiving a grade of between 'E' (corruption at very high levels) and 'F' (corruption at critical levels).[62]Although the U.S. supports anti-corruption programs across Africa through USAID's governance initiatives, it has gone further in countries such as South Sudan, where corruption is at critical levels.



Figure 2-5: Corruption in the Defense Sector: Africa (2015). *Source: Transparency International.*[63]

South Sudan has experienced a crisis since 2013 that has resulted in rights abuses and massive corruption. The U.S. State Department in 2016 endorsed a report that linked corruption to the armed conflict in South Sudan. It revealed that government officials and politicians have continued to profit from the war and the atrocities committed against the population. As a key donor to South Sudan, the U.S. has openly accused the leadership of South Sudan of "pillaging government coffers," and is currently pursuing measures to deter corruption in South Sudan in an effort to protect human rights and to entrench transparency and accountability in governance.[64]Additionally, the U.S. is pursuing an arms embargo against the Republic of South Sudan through the U.N. Security Council.[65] The government of South Sudan has denied any complicity, and characterizes the efforts by the U.S. to impose an arms embargo as being "ill-thought," saying that it will compromise its ability to safeguard the peace.

One of the four pillars that define U.S. objectives is promoting opportunity and development in all areas, including public health. In 2015, the U.S. joined the EVD response effort in West Africa. The U.S. response included training health-care workers, as well as building Ebola Treatment Units (ETUs) and providing equipment that could be used by the general population after the pandemic ended.[66] Notwithstanding the unprecedented intervention by the U.S. and its partners in West Africa, reports reveal that 40 percent of patients surveyed in Sierra Leone and Liberia paid bribes in order to receive medical services.[67] Further, local officials were said to have profited from the crisis through price fixing on certain goods.[68]

Corruption in humanitarian emergencies remains a challenge, especially because of weak governance structures. Non-governmental organizations, although they are not immune to corruption, apply more transparent systems in their service delivery, and have thus mitigated the impact of corruption on populations. Regardless, it remains a friction point between Africa and the West, and is a challenge that will continue to impact relations between the U.S. and individual states. It is also worth noting that the shared aim of fighting corruption has opened opportunities for collaboration with states to bridge gaps that may endanger a nation's security.

As USAFRICOM works with African militaries on counterterrorism, on intercepting illegal maritime activity, and on humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HA/DR), it has had to adapt its theater campaign plans to accommodate differences in organizational culture, especially when working with local populations. At the strategic level, USAFRICOM has had the advantage of working with allies such as France, the United Kingdom, and the United Nations to achieve its objectives. The following section will consider other actors in the Africa AOR, and friction points that have arisen at the strategic level.

France in Africa

France's ties with Africa date back to the 1800s when it began establishing colonies in West and Central Africa. In all, France colonized 13 countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, CAR, and Gabon). Today, France's influence in Africa persists: currently, France has approximately 3,000 troops in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, CAR, and Mauritania.[69] Additionally, France maintains military bases in Dakar, Senegal; Libreville, Gabon; and in Djibouti.[70]In fact, many police departments in former French colonies (notably Mali and Niger) are modeled on the French *gendarmerie* – the French *Gendarmerie Nationale*, one of the oldest institutions in France; this model has also been adopted by many West African armies.[71]

Apart from leveraging its relationship with former colonies to advance its objectives in Africa, France sees Africa as vital to its economy. Although its exports and imports from Africa are not significant, France's telecom companies have increased their market share in Africa. Its interests in Africa have also much to do with its own security. French foreign policy in Africa is geared toward stabilizing fragile areas and enhancing the capacity of former French colonies to respond to threats that also often threaten France.

France has a long history of military intervention in Africa.

> *"France's strategy is one of "prevention and projection," which emphasizes using the smallest force possible, optimizing use of military technology, prioritizing intelligence, and pre-positioning forces in a region to respond quickly to crises—all of which are reflected in current African deployments."*[72]

French interests in Africa frequently intersect with U.S. interests. Although France, like the U.S., works to build the capacity of African militaries to bolster their response to threats, France goes further than the U.S., deploying a greater number of military personnel.

Many French troops work with both UN peacekeeping forces and directly with host governments. For example, in 2013 France had 400 troops working alongside government forces in the CAR, and deployed another 1,200 troops to work under the UN mission (2014-2016).[73] Although the U.S. has fewer forces deployed in Africa, the American government sends financial support and other resources to Africa to support its security interests in Africa.

France and the U.S. have collaborated in the Sahel. At the onset of the crisis in Mali in 2013, France immediately responded with boots on the ground while the U.S. authorized the release of $50 million in military assistance to Chad and France. The American government sent additional money to assist in Mali's elections with a goal of stabilizing the country and the region.[74] Additionally, the U.S. set up an autonomous aerial vehicle (UAV; "drone") base in Niger to counter threats posed by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and to stop the infiltration of Boko Haram into Niger from Nigeria.[75] This support augmented millions already being invested in this region to bolster the capacity of partner nations to respond to threats.

Figure 2-6: 15th MEU Marines train with French troops in Djibouti. *Source: U.S. Marine Corps.*[76]

The close association between France and the United States in Africa is also notable in Djibouti, where both countries maintain a physical presence. Marines and French troops train together and collaborate to achieve common goals.

> *"At the strategic level, this course provided an opportunity to strengthen the already existing partnership between U.S. and French forces. At the tactical level, the training provided by this course enhanced interoperability and allowed both sides to share tactics and procedures with one another…"*[77]

Though France is viewed as a first responder by many African governments, the relationship between France and some countries has not always been seamless. It has been widely perceived by populations in some of France's former colonies that France has propped up dictatorial regimes. This friction point in vertical interoperability is best displayed by protests outside the French embassy in Bangui, CAR, in 2012. Local groups mobilized and marched to the French embassy to protest France's alleged interference in the CAR government affairs; protesters called on France to quash a "rebel offensive." French President François Hollande responded by saying that the days of using French military might to prop up governments "are over."[78] It is not clear whether there has been any positive impact or a change of perception from France's change of tack after this event.

More significantly, in 2014, a report alleged that some of the 1,500 French stabilization troops deployed in the CAR engaged in sexual assaults.[79] The sexual assault allegations, most of which involved children, were an embarrassment for France, and drew condemnation from the government of CAR, the AU, and

the UN. France launched an investigation into the alleged crimes, but no one was held accountable. This further tainted France's image in Africa, and impinged on its credibility as a human rights defender.

The allegations of its conduct in the CAR mirror another ghost of the past: the French response to the Rwanda genocide.

The 1994 Rwanda genocide is an event that impacted the relationship between Africa and France – and more so between Rwanda and France – and remains a friction point today. Rwanda's current government under Paul Kagame – a man credited with restoring stability – broke diplomatic relations with France in 2006[80] over France's attempt to open investigations into the genocide. Rwanda further proceeded to change its official language from French to English in 2008.[81] The spat between the two countries saw Rwanda allege that France and Belgium played a "direct role in the political preparation for the genocide," an allegation that France denied. However, France later admitted that "mistakes" had been made, and that it had suffered "a sort of blindness" in its response to the genocide.[82]

The Rwandan genocide resulted in the deaths of over one million people and the displacement of thousands more. The killings had been planned and executed using government resources and structure, which had until then painted the Tutsi as the enemy. In response, the Hutu mobilized to eliminate the former government as an act of self-defense.

Today, migration has become another issue that is widely expected to cause friction in the relationship between France and some African countries. By 2014, 8.9 percent of France's population (64.4 million) was reported to be immigrants.[83] Migrant workers are smuggled from Africa to Europe in search of better opportunities.[84] There have been numerous accounts of capsized boats carrying migrants from North Africa. These unsafe passages were facilitated by unstable or weak government, corrupt customs officials along the Sahelian and North African borders, and criminal cartels that coordinate cross-border smuggling.[85] Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Libya, and Sudan are source countries for irregular migration; these countries are linked to smuggling routes that converge in Libya, the main access path used to smuggle migrants to Europe.[86]

The high numbers of illegal migrants in France has caused a debate in France and the EU. The surge in undocumented residents has resulted in increased enforcement of existing laws, as well as diplomatic deals meant to deter migration. In 2016, Mali refused to admit two persons deported from France, claiming that they were not Malians. These diplomatic challenges often stem from domestic issues: in this case, Mali had signed a "migrant return agreement" with the EU that caused an uproar domestically with a majority of Malians claiming that their government had betrayed them. Many Malians and other Africans see migration as an avenue to better opportunities.[87]

Despite these notable friction points, French military assistance continues. Chad, Mali, and CAR have all continued to benefit from direct and indirect French military support to fight extremism. The AU also values France's contributions: in 2013, the AU President praised France for a "remarkable" job fighting extremism in the Sahel, and said that French troops were "practically saving" the continent.[88]

China in Africa

China has actively engaged Africa since the 1990s under a conceptualized framework geared toward promoting trade, culture, and diplomatic ties with African countries through the creation of the Forum on

China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000. FOCAC, driven by a principle of non-interference, promotes a mutually beneficial relationship between China and African countries. Since its inception, FOCAC has increased bilateral cooperation by focusing on broad objectives that are agreeable to both China and Africa, achieved through "mutual understanding, consensus, friendship, and cooperation."[89] There have been several bilateral meetings since 2000 between FOCAC with African governments to seek consensus and align priorities. Additionally, the bilateral meetings resulted in a formal China-Africa policy, in effect since 2006.[90]

The China-Africa policy outlines the following:[91]

- China adheres to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, respects African countries that have chosen "a road of development," and supports efforts by African countries to grow stronger through unity.
- China supports the endeavors of African countries for economic development and nation building, carries out cooperation in various forms of economic and social development, and promotes the common prosperity of China and Africa.
- China will strengthen cooperation with Africa in the UN and other multilateral systems by supporting shared demands and reasonable propositions, and continue to appeal to the international community to give more attention to questions concerning peace and development in Africa.
- China and Africa will learn from and draw upon each other's experience in governance and development, and strengthen exchanges and cooperation in education, science, culture, and health. China supports efforts by African countries to enhance capacity building and will work together with Africa in the exploration of the path to sustainable development.

The above China-Africa policy is driven by a variety of Chinese needs. These include:[92]

- need for raw material for its industry including oil, gas, iron ore, copper, coltan, among others
- need for Africa as a market for China exports
- need to expand its diplomatic, strategic platform thus raise its international influence and enhance its status and political legitimacy
- need to ensure safety of China's investments on the continent

Likewise, Africa needs China as a market for its raw material and as a source for finished products. Further, Africa needs China's investments in industry. To that end, China has invested millions in the oil production sectors in Angola, Nigeria, and South Sudan. China has also invested in the mining sector in the DRC. Africa sees China's partnership as an avenue to open up economic opportunities for its population in manufacturing, construction, resource mining, and trade. This is important because reducing unemployment is a key priority for many governments in Africa. Additionally, Africa looks to China to advance its political stature; it leans toward China because of Beijing's policy of non-interference in African domestic affairs and its respect for African sovereignty. The issue of sovereignty remains a sensitive one in relations between the West and African countries, especially because of the continent's colonial history.

China has tactfully handled its strategic relationship with African countries by ensuring that its engagements are consensus driven. This has endeared China to African countries because they see value in a culture based on collaboration and consensus building. China-Africa negotiation is closely aligned with how power, especially political power, is brokered in most African societies. This approach is in contrast to what Africa experienced during the colonial times. Today, China's collaborative policy is carried out through negotiations at bilateral meetings held once every three years since FOCAC's establishment in 2000. Although this approach limits friction points at the strategic level, it doesn't necessarily obliterate opposition at the project-implementation level.

A good example of the friction points that arise can be seen in large infrastructure projects. The many negotiated agreements for roads and bridges allow for the employment of expatriate workers who take up managerial and technical positions, as well as menial labor. Generally, labor laws prohibit a monopoly of Chinese workers. As a result, the percentage of Chinese workers across Africa is negligible compared to the local workers employed by Chinese construction companies. However, there are exceptions. In Angola, a country that has emerged from conflict, initial Chinese projects brought in more Chinese laborers than, say Malawi, which because of its stability had accessible skilled labor. It is only when there is an imbalance that impacts the social structure that friction points arise. For example, in Kenya, there have been incidents where the local populations have alleged unfair labor practices and in some cases have attacked Chinese workers claiming that they are taking their jobs.[93] Additionally, a rise of Chinese-owned small- and medium-sized enterprises has triggered protests, with many local people claiming that Chinese businesses employed tactics that give them an unfair advantage over locally owned cottage industries in the formal and informal sectors.[94]

Because China's policy in Africa is that of non-interference in the domestic affairs of African countries—even when there are violations of human rights—friction points have arisen between China and the U.S. over their respective interests in Africa. For example, the United Nations and the U.S. imposed arms embargos on Sudan and Zimbabwe due to human rights abuses. However, both countries have continued to acquire military equipment from China – despite reports that there have been violations of international human rights laws in the Darfur region of Sudan.[95]

The HOA is of strategic importance to both countries; the U.S. has invested millions in capacity-building programs in all countries in this region. In South Sudan, the U.S. is the largest donor, and has invested in manpower to help the national government set up governance structures. In 2013, two years after independence, fighting broke out in the capital, Juba, after the government of Salva Kiir accused Riek Marchar of planning a *coup d'état*. The violence left hundreds of people dead and thousands displaced. Since 2013, there have been various agreements and a ceasefire; however, the security situation remains fragile. The U.S. is still a key supporter of mediation between the warring factions and remains engaged in this peace process, despite the fact that a Marine helicopter was hit by rebel forces during an evacuation mission in 2013.[96]

China's entry into South Sudan is especially poignant because of the role the U.S. played to advance the independence of South Sudan. To date, the U.S. remains the most influential player in the South Sudan peace process – both before 2011 and since it gained independence. But China is making advances to build its legitimacy as a player in the HOA. By 2016, China had begun building its first naval facility in Djibouti, thereby joining the U.S. and France who already had a presence there.[98] This action is worrying to the U.S., particularly because Chinese cyberattacks have been a concern.[99]Additionally, China sent 1,000 peacekeeping troops to South Sudan after persuading the UN to expand the mandate of peacekeeping troops. Peacekeeping troops in South Sudan have been tasked with protecting oil installations in addition to protecting civilians.[100]This was a direct effort on China's part to protect its investments in South Sudan's oil fields.

Figure 2-7: China peacekeepers work to build a road in South Sudan.
Source: Wikipedia.[97]

China's presence in the HOA also means that even though the U.S. and China differ on the issue of Darfur, the pursuit of their individual objectives – the establishment of a peaceful and democratic state (U.S.) and the stabilization of a trading partner and oil producer (China) – will result in a stronger and more secure region.

China has also used its position on the UN Security Council to advance its credibility and legitimacy in Africa by pushing an African agenda. This has been evident on issues concerning the ICC. China is not a signatory to the Rome statute that gives the ICC jurisdiction to try cases. Crimes against humanity notwithstanding, China has employed a short power distance with Africa by closely collaborating with them and backing a campaign to suspend cases against African heads of state. In 2013, China backed a resolution by the AU and Kenya to suspend the cases against Kenya's President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto. Though the cases were dismissed in 2015 and 2016 respectively, China urged that the "Security Council 'actively and positively' support the demand made by the African Union and Kenya."[101] Further, China stated that the "dignity of President Uhuru Kenyatta and Vice President William Ruto be respected by the UN Security Council and the ICC."[102]Additionally, China has continued to engage Sudan and defend its President Omar al-Bashir, who has been indicted by the ICC for war crimes in Darfur, referring to him as an "old friend of the Chinese people."[103] This approach has been in contrast to that of the U.S., which has continued to call for justice for victims of the Darfur conflict in line with its objectives to safeguard human rights.

China's development record in Africa ranks behind that of the U.S. in terms of dollars spent. However, African governments see China as a partner developing country, and are more trusting of its motives than those of the West. This is probably because China's roads, bridges, and stadiums are visible evidence that give China a more favorable reputation in the short term. A party official in Tanzania put it this way:

"Companies in the West are business-oriented, they are to make profits whatever projects they participate in, they look for what they can get out of it, not what African countries would get out of it. China does not have that approach. China is to help the African nations build their own capacity to develop and that's the difference we very much appreciate."[104]

Although there is much more than meets the eye when it comes to China infrastructure loans and the quality of their products, it has become more politically expedient for African governments to lean on China in order to deliver their election promises. Additionally, China has given African countries the opportunity to project their economic independence and detach themselves from their former colonizers whom they may differ with from time to time on issues of governance. In the long term, however, African countries look to the West to build their human capacity, to respond to crises and to work methodically to eradicate poverty and disease.

United Nations Peacekeeping Forces

The UN, with a membership of 193 countries, was established in 1945 after World War II in an endeavor to seek and maintain international peace and security.[105] The UN Charter lists four main objectives[106]:

- to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace
- to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace
- to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion
- to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends

To achieve its objectives, the UN set up various agencies such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the WFP, among others, in order to respond to crises, as well as to allow member states to work together toward common goals.

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) carries out the mandate, derived from the UN Charter, to maintain international peace and security.[107] To this end, the UN has deployed peacekeeping troops across the globe to respond to crises. DPKO currently has peacekeeping troops in seven countries in Africa including CAR, Côte d'Ivoire, DRC, Liberia, Mali, Sudan, and South Sudan.[108]

All UN member states are members of the General Assembly. The UN Security Council takes the lead in determining "the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression."[109] The U.S is a permanent member of the Security Council, and is a key decision-maker and a major contributor to the DPKO. Currently, the U.S. contributes 28.57 percent of the estimated $7.87 billion peacekeeping budget, with China coming in second at 10.29 percent, and Japan third at 9.68 percent.[110] However the U.S. is not a major troop contributor. Main, non-African country troop contributors to missions in Africa are Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, China, and Nepal.

Below is a list, by country, of current missions and troop contributions to current missions in Africa:[111]

UNITED NATIONS MISSIONS IN AFRICA			
Mission	**Country**	**Troops**	**Main Non-African Troop Contributors***
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (CAR) (MINUSCA) (Since 2014)	Central African Republic	12,152	Bangladesh (1073) Cambodia (216) Indonesia (207) Pakistan (1127) Peru (206)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) (Since 2013)	Mali	10,579	Bangladesh (1414) Cambodia (301) China (397) Germany (249) Indonesia (147) Nepal (146) Netherlands (315) Sweden (209)
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (MONUSCO) (Since 2010)	Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	18,620	Bangladesh (1711) China (219) India (3111) Indonesia (176) Nepal (1029) Pakistan (3446) Uruguay (1175)
African Union- United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) (Since 2007)	Darfur, Sudan	17,023	Bangladesh (373) China (230) Indonesia (812) Nepal (362) Pakistan (2120)
United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) (Since 2011)	Abyei, Sudan	4, 534	Ethiopia**

United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) (Since 2011)	South Sudan	13,723	Bangladesh (484) Cambodia (149) China (1051) India (2277) Japan (272) Mongolia (863) Nepal (1579) Republic of Korea (273) Sri Lanka (177)
United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) (Since 2004)	Côte d'Ivoire	2,807	Bangladesh (105)
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) (Since 2003)	Liberia	1,813	China 127 India 120 Pakistan 95 Ukraine 162
*** Total troop numbers for each mission include African countries, as well as non-African countries with minimal personnel numbers.** **** Ethiopia, an African country, is the main troop contributor to the UNISFA mission.**			

UN peacekeeping missions are authorized by the Security Council with the consent of the member state. Additionally, the UN is guided by the principle of neutrality, which means that peacekeeping troops deal with parties to a conflict with neutrality – like a referee would, only penalizing infractions. Troops are only authorized to use force in self-defense. Maintaining neutrality in UN missions in Africa bolsters the credibility of the UN, especially because many of the conflicts in Africa have many armed groups operating in an area. The African Union recognizes the role of the UN in responding to crises; however, there have been friction points that have arisen in the execution of its peacekeeping mandate on the continent.

The most disturbing issue recently facing the DPKO are allegations of sexual assault committed by UN peacekeeping troops deployed in the DRC, CAR, Côte d'Ivoire, Libya, Mali, and Sudan. The UN has been accused of a cover-up, partly to shield individual member-states that contribute troops from embarrassment. Additionally, the U.N. has no jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute foreign troops.

A statement released by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee regarding the resignation of a senior UN official turned whistleblower, indicated that the DKPO scandal was an indictment of the leadership at the UN.[112] "This resignation appears to be a damning indictment of the leadership at the United Nations that has failed to end the horrific sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers and protect those who report wrongdoing," said Committee Chairman Bob Corker (R-TN). "The so-called 'zero-tolerance' policy has provided cover for a culture of impunity where allegations are swept under the rug and whistleblowers are intimidated to stop them from revealing the truth. The U.S. must use its influence as the largest contributor to peacekeeping to restore accountability and oversight of missions that are supposed to be about protecting vulnerable populations and restoring stability during conflict."[113]

The AU urged the UN to investigate the allegations and hold perpetrators accountable. However, there is no system within the UN that can hold individual troops accountable because each troop contingent is under the command of its own national commanders. It is therefore left to member states to investigate and prosecute crimes. This has its own limitations because of the fragility of the areas in which peacekeeping troops are deployed.

Figure 2-8: Peacekeeping troops in Sudan. *Source: United Nations.*[114]

UN peacekeeping forces have to contend with issues such as language barriers and different operational structures while working toward the same end state. The difference in military culture in multinational operations has obviously impacted the relationship between the UN and the AU, and between host countries and contributing countries – especially as a result of the alleged sexual offences. For example French, Burundian, and Gabonese forces were accused of committing sexual offences in the CAR between 2013 and 2015.[115] The UN conducted investigations and notified the relevant governments, but internal investigations into the alleged incidents are seldom made public, so there is no way to ascertain whether anyone was held accountable.[116]

Because of the damning nature of the crimes, and because the UN culture demands that it defend its image as being at the forefront of alleviating suffering and safeguarding human rights, it has found a way around the jurisdiction issue to hold militaries accountable. In July 2016, violence broke out in Juba, South Sudan, that left many dead, including two peacekeepers. Further, there arose multiple allegations of sexual violence against civilians in close proximity of the UN Mission (UNMISS) headquarters and civilian protection sites that hosted approximately 27,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs).[118] The UN launched a special investigation and found that peacekeepers failed to respond to the violence, including rape and murder, orchestrated by South Sudanese government soldiers.[119] Though the UN could not punish the perpetrators of the violence – in this case, Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) soldiers – the UN Secretary General at the time, Ban Ki Moon, made a decision to fire the head of the UNMISS, a Kenyan Lieutenant General, Johnson Ondieki.[120]

Figure 2-9: Civilians seek shelter outside the UNMISS camp in Juba, South Sudan. *Source: United Nations.*[117]

The government of Kenya then responded to Ondieki's dismissal by withdrawing all of its 1,100 troops from South Sudan.[121] Additionally, the government of Kenya – which has been at the center of the South Sudan peace process before and since it gained independence in 2011 – announced that it would disengage from the peace process.[122] It is clear that UN action on this matter was in alignment with its culture, but in so doing, the UN muddied its relationship with Kenya, a peacekeeper-contributing country.

This action also revealed how both parties, the UN and Kenya, view their role in South Sudan. It is clear that Kenya expected power to be distributed evenly between itself and the UN because of its investment in South Sudan peace process. The Kenyan government expected to be consulted prior to Ondieki's dismissal, and accused the UN of acting unilaterally in it decision to fire its general. Notwithstanding this

fallout, the UN needed to act decisively because the sexual assault allegations in UN missions operations had reached critical levels. The boldness of the action sent a message that the UN is taking the issue seriously, and intends to restore its image and credibility in the eyes of the civilian population it is mandated to protect.

2.2.6 Conclusion

Africa has experienced significant security challenges that have called for both long-term and short-term approaches. These challenges have led to foreign militaries working alongside host nation forces to stabilize fragile areas. Humanitarian action is driven by the needs of a prescribed population, while military action is driven by a need to stabilize an environment. Foreign militaries seek to impact populations, and to change perceptions through winning hearts and minds campaigns.

The U.S., France, and China have taken part in both humanitarian and military operations in Africa. However, interoperability challenges cause friction when their goals in any AOR differ. The U.S. and France are allies; together they have cooperated in various AORS and worked together toward shared objectives. Although the perceptions of U.S. forces and those of French forces on the ground differ, African governments rely on both countries, especially for their support in counterterror operations – largely because of the power balance. France is a former colonizer and the U.S. has vast resources at its disposal; this reality governs the strategic relationship between African countries and the two powers. Notwithstanding, the U.S. is succeeding in the long-term in terms of value transfer – transparency, accountability, and respect for the rule of law are slowly being entrenched in governing structures across Africa. Additionally Americans troops on the ground – in the HOA, for example – are viewed favorably by local populations.

China on the other hand, has employed a slightly different military approach. For example, we see that China's involvement in South Sudan was pegged on additions to the mandate of peacekeeping forces – that is, to protect the oil fields in addition to protecting civilians. Additionally, China's presence in Djibouti, where both France and the U.S. have facilities, is of concern at the strategic level because China has in the past hacked the computer networks of U.S. Government agencies.[123]

Notwithstanding, the perception of China in Africa has been boosted by the massive Chinese-built infrastructure projects across the continent. Africa has turned to China because of its non-interference policy and for political expediency: the infrastructure projects are tangible objects that incumbents use to demonstrate their commitment to development and to meeting the needs of their populations.

The reality is that the objectives of the U.S., France, and China will always drive their involvement in the African AOR. It is also true that Africa's many challenges provide an opportunity for these powers to collaborate much more than they can at the UN. It is therefore vital to understand the goals and objectives of the actors present in a specific AOR in order to anticipate differences, and adapt the theater strategy to meet an end-state. This, in addition to understanding the host population, are essential for mission success.

2.3 USCENTCOM: Culture in the Plans, Policies, and Strategies

2.3.1 U.S. Adversarial and Partner Relationships

The U.S. has several complicated adversarial and partner relationships with key actors in the part of the world that comprises U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), many of which are regional, state, and non-state actors. While regional players are primary drivers of the geopolitical scene in this region, since the turn of the twenty-first century there has been a rise of activity from external state actors, specifically China and Russia. In order to achieve its foreign policy objectives, the U.S. works closely with an extensive list of players. America's relationship with these partners is often complicated, and frequently defined by competing national interests. The 2015 iteration of the U.S. NSS notes, "Five recent transitions, in particular, have significantly changed the security landscape, including since our last strategy in 2010."[124] With the geopolitical environment rapidly evolving in the USCENTCOM AOR, relationships with these players adapt quickly to meet contemporary challenges; however, U.S. interests are best served when the region is stable and seemingly predictable. Unfortunately, the USCENTCOM AOR differs from much of the globe in that it has become highly unstable and unpredictable. A great demographic shift is challenging the power status quo that has characterized much of the region since the 1970s, after the region has experienced a "youth bulge" in its demographics charts. Among the various regions that make up USCENTCOM's AOR, Central Asia has been the most geopolitically stable since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Significant geographic portions of the USCENTCOM AOR are currently locked in violent conflict, especially in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. The severe volatility of the region has forced the U.S. to strive to strike a balance in its interests, with the security of the U.S., its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners in lockstep with the struggle to promote an international order friendly to U.S. values. This has resulted in deprioritizing interests such as the advancement of universal values around the world, as well as the promotion of an open international economic system that promotes opportunities and prosperity, so that the U.S. can focus its limited resources, diplomatic undertakings, and military efforts to stabilizing the region and hindering both state and non-state actors from undermining the interests of the U.S.

In the 2016 USCENTCOM Posture Statement, GEN Lloyd J. Austin, USA, outlined five *critical focus areas*[125]:

- Iraq-Syria (Operation Inherent Resolve)
- Afghanistan (Operation Freedom's Sentinel/Resolute Support)
- Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO)
- Yemen
- Iran

In addition to the critical focus areas, USCENTCOM has 10 *priority efforts*:

1. Dismantle and eventually defeat ISIL in order to prevent further trans-regional spread of sectarian-fueled radical extremism, and to mitigate the continuing Iraq-Syria crisis.
2. Continue support to Afghanistan, in partnership with NATO, to assist Afghanistan as it establishes itself as a regionally integrated, secure, stable, and developing country; continue planning and coordination for the enduring U.S. and NATO partnerships in Afghanistan beyond the end of 2016.
3. Defeat al-Qaeda, deny violent extremists safe havens and freedom of movement, and limit the reach of terrorists, to enhance protection of the U.S. homeland and allies and partner nation homelands.
4. Counter the Iranian Threat Network's malign activities in the region, to include the impacts of surrogates and proxies.
5. Support a whole of government approach to developments in Yemen, preventing Yemen from growing as an ungoverned space for al-Qaeda (AQ)/Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs); and supporting regional stability efforts that retain U.S. counterterrorism capacity in the region.
6. Maintain a credible deterrent posture against Iran's evolving conventional and strategic military capabilities.
7. Prevent, and if required, counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; disrupt their development and prevent their use.
8. Protect lines of communication, ensure free use of the shared spaces (including the cyber commons), and secure unimpeded global access for legal commerce.
9. Shape, support, incentivize, and maintain ready, flexible regional Coalitions and partners, as well as cross-CCMD and interagency U.S. whole-of-government teams, to support crisis response; optimize military resources.
10. Develop and execute security cooperation programs, improving bilateral and multi-lateral partnerships, building partnered "capacities," and improving information sharing, security, and stability.

USCENTCOM COALITION NATIONS: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Yemen, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Jordan, Oman, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

To meet the many security challenges in the region, USCENTCOM is working with 51 nations that make up the USCENTCOM Coalition, eleven of which are in the USCENTCOM AOR. One of the largest military coalitions in U.S. history, the USCENTCOM Coalition came together following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, "with a common purpose-to fight terrorism,"[126] and is working "to promote peace and stability in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility and beyond."[127] As of January 2017, the primary focus of the USCENTCOM coalition is to defeat Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and members of the coalition are heavily investing their resources to achieve this mission. "Some partners are contributing to the military effort, by providing arms, equipment, training, or advice. These partners include countries in Europe and in the Middle East region that are contributing to the air campaign against ISIL targets. International contributions, however, are not solely or even primarily military contributions. The effort to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL will require reinforcing multiple lines of effort, including preventing the flow of funds and fighters to ISIL, and exposing its true nature."[128]

In addition to the close collaboration achieved on security matters through the USCENTCOM Coalition, the U.S. collaborates closely with many regional organizations that represent the political, security, and economic interests of nation-states throughout the Central Region. All of the various regions in

USCENTCOM's AOR are crucial to U.S. interests; however, factors contributing to their role in advancing U.S interests vary. In Central Asia, the region's geographic location between Russia and China, both major geopolitical challengers to the U.S., symbolizes the dynamics between the U.S., China, and Russia. Russia and China have often accused the U.S. of seeking to challenge their respective interests in the region. Central Asia's profile was raised at the height of the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan when U.S. military planners opened the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) to accommodate the increased demand in supplies.

In order to promote U.S. interests in Central Asia, the C5+1 was formed in 2015 "as a platform that brings together the five states of Central Asia and the United States to discuss and work on issues of common concern."[129] The timing of the establishment of the C5+1 aligned with "signs of a return from the ad-hoc post-Cold War world order to a new Cold War-type of relationship between the U.S. and Russia."[130]

One such sign occurred in September 2015, when Russia launched military operations in Syria as a defender of the Bashar al-Assad regime. The Central Asians responded, with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan publicly supporting Russia's involvement; Turkmenistan remained neutral, and Uzbekistan did not public ally condemn or condone Russia's action. In 2016, C5+1 launched five corresponding projects to promote their shared interests: (1) Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) Regional Dialogue, (2) Central Asia Business Competitiveness (CABC), (3) Transport Corridor Development, (4) Power the Future, and (5) Supporting National and Regional Adaptation Planning.[131] These projects are aimed at improving economic connectivity, adapting to and mitigating the impact of climate change, and increasing the dialogue regarding the common threat of terrorism.[132] With these projects in place, the C5+1 format "reinforces the message that the U.S. favors a region-centric approach and cooperative responsiveness in its relations with Central Asia."[133]

In the Middle East, the U.S. works closely with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and has collaborated with individual respective Gulf nations for over six decades on matters of mutual interest, including "confronting and deterring external aggression against allies and partners; ensuring the free flow of energy and commerce, and freedom of navigation in international waters; dismantling terrorist networks that threaten the safety of their people; and preventing the development or use of weapons of mass destruction."[134] Since2015, the U.S. and the GCC have annually held summits to reaffirm the strategic partnership in pursuit of a stable, secure, and prosperous region. Increased concerns over Iran's ambitions in the Middle East contributed to the GCC expressing the desire to have a security guarantee from the U.S. Speaking at the 2015 U.S.-GCC Summit, UAE Ambassador Yousef Al Otaiba said, "We are looking for some form of security guarantee, given the behavior of Iran in the region, given the rise of the extremist threat. In the past, we have survived with a gentleman's agreement with the United States about security. I think today we need something in writing. We need something institutionalized."[135]

During the 2016 U.S.-GCC Summit "leaders also committed to urgently undertake additional steps to intensify the campaign to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, Daesh) and al-Qaeda; de-escalate and seek to resolve regional conflicts; strengthen GCC states' capacity to address external and internal threats; and address Iran's destabilizing activities, while also working to reduce regional and sectarian tensions that fuel instability."[136] These shared interests reflect widespread consensus in the USCENTCOM AOR, that non-state violent actors are a threat to the stability of the region and that efforts to address them requires international collaboration. In order to ensure continuity of effort to "advance partnership on counterterrorism, streamlining the transfer of critical defense capabilities, missile defense, military preparedness, and cyber security,"[137] all U.S. and GCC working groups have agreed to meet at minimum twice annually.

In addition to the GCC, other organizations such as the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) reflect the economic priorities which are of great importance to the U.S. OPEC draws its significance on the international stage because oil is the most geopolitical commodity traded in the international market. For the U.S., oil continues to be its most significant energy source, "accounting for 36 percent of total primary energy supply (TPES) in 2013."[138]

OPEC was established in 1960 by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. The five founding members came together with the expressed objective to "coordinate and unify petroleum policies among Member Countries, in order to secure fair and stable prices for petroleum producers; an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consuming nations; and a fair return on capital to those investing in the industry."[139] During the 1970s, OPEC rose to international prominence on two occasions when oil prices rose steeply in a volatile market, "triggered by the Arab oil embargo in 1973, and the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution in 1979."[140] Since June 2014, world oil prices have more than halved because of surging U.S. and Saudi Arabia oil production, as well as a decrease in demand among numerous countries due to flat economic growth. Another key factor contributing to the decline in oil prices in 2015 was OPEC's decision to increase oil production levels; however, in late 2016 OPEC announced that it would again cut back its production.

Impact of the Downturn of the Price of Oil

Despite cuts to oil production, oil-producing countries are feeling the impact of depressed oil prices and the resultant loss of revenue. While each country's tolerance level varies, it is likely that they will all need to cut spending. As of 2016, all of the countries in the USCENTCOM AOR have been working to restructure their budgets and economies to deal with the significant decline in the price of oil. Among the Central Asian nations, Kazakhstan stands to lose the most because "Kazakhstan's budget is set at $40 a barrel, although it does have $55 billion in its national oil fund. An alternative budget is now being drawn up based on $20 a barrel, but such a change will almost certainly mean cuts in spending."[141] Across the Middle East, it is anticipated that, "In the short term, the Gulf Cooperation Council will not fall into financial crisis, but its member states are still making the financial adjustments needed to keep their reserves high and to avoid going deeper into debt. All of the Gulf nations will cut government spending in 2016 to some degree, albeit carefully, and will accelerate legal reforms."[142] With sharp austerity cuts taking place, many people in the Middle East are preparing for the social backlash that may arise from populations that have grown accustomed to some of the world's most generous social benefits obtained through government subsidies.

As one of the region's strongest geopolitical players, the reaction in Saudi Arabia may be the most crucial to defining how the Gulf nations will weather these incoming changes. Saudi Arabia depends on oil sales for 80 percent of its budget revenue; income from energy exports comprises 45 percent of Saudi GDP. Several factors hint at the potential instability in Saudi Arabia: "Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has hinted that reforms may be rapid, even as the king emphasizes the strength of the economy, but powerful members of the Saudi royal family will be wary of moving too swiftly. With dozens of privatization plans on the table, discontent within the ruling family is all but inevitable. Riyadh is also facing major regional changes with the return of Iran to the international economy and the enduring conflict in Yemen, meaning that defense and foreign spending will need to remain high."[143]

It is unclear how Iran will respond to declining oil revenue. Iran is home to the Middle East's second largest economy, yet experts predict that while the drop in oil prices will negatively impact Iran's anticipated revenue from the lifting of sanctions, Iran's economy is anticipated to weather the financial downturn. The financial pressure will help to restrain Iran from a direct confrontation with Saudi Arabia,

as President Hassan Rouhani is using the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as an opportunity to reintegrate Iran with the world economy.

Of tremendous impact to the economic relationship with oil-producing nations in the USCENTCOM AOR is one of the tremendous changes noted in the 2015 NSS, that "the U.S. is now the world's largest natural gas and oil producer."[144] Since 1943, America's dependence on foreign oil has greatly shaped its foreign policy in the USCENTROM AOR: "(W)ith concerns growing about the diminishing U.S. oil production capacity, President Franklin Roosevelt declares Saudi oil vital to U.S. security and provides financial support."[145] The U.S. government was able to provide Saudi Arabia with financial support via the Lend-Lease Bill, which allowed the U.S. to create a liberalized international economic order in the postwar world.

Oil additionally plays a role in the region as a key driver of international conflict "through eight distinct mechanisms: (1) resource wars, in which states try to acquire oil reserves by force; (2) petro-aggression, whereby oil insulates aggressive leaders such as Saddam Hussein or Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini from domestic opposition, and therefore makes them more willing to engage in risky foreign policy adventurism; (3) the externalization of civil wars in oil-producing states ("petrostates"); (4) financing for insurgencies—for instance, Iran funneling oil money to Hezbollah; (5) conflicts triggered by the prospect of oil-market domination, such as the United States' war with Iraq over Kuwait in 1991; (6) clashes over control of oil transit routes, such as shipping lanes and pipelines; (7) oil-related grievances, whereby the presence of foreign workers in petrostates helps extremist groups such as al-Qaeda recruit locals; and (8) oil-related obstacles to multilateral cooperation, such as when an importer's attempt to curry favor with a petrostate prevents multilateral cooperation on security issues."[146]



Figure 2-10: U.S. Domestic Oil Production Exceeds Imports for First Time in 18 Years. *Source: U.S. Department of Energy.*[147]

The International Energy Agency (IEA), of which the U.S. was a founding member, has noted revolutionary changes to U.S. energy policies between 2008-14, changes that have fundamentally changed the country's

energy policy landscape. For example, the IEA states, "In many aspects there have been significant improvements, and the country is in a strong position to deliver a reliable, affordable and environmentally sustainable energy system. The most obvious change has been the renaissance of oil and gas production: the growth in unconventional gas production, alongside increased output of light tight oil, is making a substantial contribution to economic activity and competitiveness."[148]

While the U.S. has successfully enhanced its energy security by becoming the world's largest natural gas and oil producer, this shift has significantly undermined the fiscal stability of many nations around the world, particularly partner nations in the USCENTCOM AOR such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Particularly concerning is the impact that this shift will have on Iran's ability to fully capitalize on the anticipated relief from the easement of economic sanctions as a term of the JCPOA, given Iran's vast oil and gas reserves.

Security Relationships

In Central and South Asia, the U.S. is working "with both India and Pakistan to promote strategic stability, combat terrorism, and advance regional economic integration in South and Central Asia."[149] In their efforts to combat terrorism, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, who are all signatories to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), have participated in counterterrorism and counter-extremism activities.

Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO): Established in 1992, the CSTO is the Russian-led organization originated with Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Its mission is to affirm the desire of all its participating member states to abstain from the use or threat of force, to not join other military alliances, and to reinforce a commitment to perceive an aggression against one signatory would be perceived as an aggression against all.

The bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia has been challenged over recent years due to opposing policy priorities; however, "shared security challenges have long defined U.S.-Saudi relations."[150] The security relationship of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia has been bolstered by, "new arms sales, continued security training arrangements, enhanced counterterrorism cooperation, and shared concerns about Iran, al-Qaeda, and the rise of the Islamic State organization (IS, aka ISIL/ISIS or the Arabic acronym Daesh)."[151]

Despite these shared security interests, Saudi Arabia's human rights record and its resistance to religious freedom, have been a source of concern for the U.S. This is illustrated in the tensions that arose in the Kingdom in response to limited political protests in the predominately Shi'a areas of the oil-rich Eastern Province: "The Obama Administration has endorsed Saudi citizens' rights to free assembly and free expression. Saudi leaders reject foreign interference in the country's internal affairs."[153]

Figure 2-11: CJTF-OIR Logo. *Source: USCENTOM.*[152]

Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) logo: The swords and olive branch indicate the dual nature of the Coalition: the defeat of ISIL and the restoration of stability to the region. The seven leaves of the olive branch represent the seven peoples of Iraq: Sunni, Shi'a, Kurdish, Turkmen, Assyrian, Yazidi, and Armenian. The colors used are a reflection of military assets: brown and green for land components; blue for air and naval. The three stars indicate the rank of the Command leadership, while the color gold represents the quality of excellence performed by the Command in the nation's defense.

2.3.2 Main Security Issues in USCENTCOM that Affect U.S. Interests

The list of security issues in the USCENTCOM AOR is extensive, and many of them are interconnected. Security challenges that impact U.S. interests in USCENTCOM include VEOs – specifically ISIL and al-Qaeda, Iran Threat Network's malign activities in the region, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the lack of secure unimpeded global access for legal commerce, and Russia's adversarial actions.

After a decade of conflict in Iraq and nearly five years of civil war in Syria, ISIL emerged as a game-changing threat to international security. The ideological and organizational roots of ISIL were formed under the leadership of former U.S. detainees Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al Badri al Samarra'I (aka Abu Bakr al Baghdadi) and Taha Subhi Falaha (aka Abu Mohammed al Adnani). The aforementioned were followers of the late Abu Musab al Zarqawi, who led the al-Qaeda faction in Iraq until his death in June 2006. At its core, ISIL is predominately led by Iraqis and Syrians – many of them former Ba'athists, though the group is bolstered by an influx of foreign fighters sympathetic to its cause.

By 2013, it was Abu Bakr al Baghdadi's expressed desire to merge al-Qaeda in Iraq with Jabhat al Nusra, al-Qaeda's affiliate in Syria. However, al-Qaeda and Jabhat al Nusra leadership rejected the notion of a merger, indicating an underlying source of tension between the Sunni factions. Since its inception, ISIL has managed to not only gain administrative control over areas in Iraq and Syria, but to also develop a network of affiliates throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. ISIL's members are driven by an apocalyptic ideology, distinguishing the organization from other terrorist groups with political motivations, such as al-Qaeda.

Having succeeded in achieving territorial control of areas in Iraq and Syria, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi declared the territory under his control as a caliphate to be administered under his rule as caliph. The declaration of a caliphate in 2014 attracted several thousand followers to ISIL's territory; however, the vast majority of Muslims reject Baghdadi's claim as caliph. In expressing a public rejection of Baghdadi's claim, prominent Islamic scholars from around the world issued an open letter and asked, "Who gave you authority over the *ummah* (community of believers)? Was it your group? If this is the case, then a group of no more than several thousand has appointed itself the ruler over a billion and a half Muslims. If you recognize the billion and a half people who consider themselves Muslims, how can you not consult them regarding your so-called caliphate? Thus, you face one of two conclusions: either you concur that they are Muslims and they did not appoint you caliph over them-in which case you are not the caliph-or, the other conclusion is that you do not accept them as Muslims, in which case Muslims are a small group not in need of a caliph-so why use the word 'caliph' at all?" In addition to mainstream Muslims who reject Baghdadi's claim as caliph, jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda, "also have rejected Baghdadi's appointment as caliph, arguing that he is simply another military commander and is owed no special loyalty."[154]

Not only has ISIL impacted U.S. interests in Iraq and Syria, but "IS-related considerations shape U.S. policy approaches to several countries of long-standing U.S. national security interest, including Nigeria, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Turkey, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Indonesia.

U.S. and partner efforts against IS-affiliated groups in these countries have generally intensified but also are being undertaken on case-by-case bases that reflect the unique prevailing circumstances in each locale."[155]

Degrade and Dismantle ISIL

In the USCENTCOM AOR, the U.S. security objective to defeat ISIL "remains the foundation of our Military Campaign Plan-to degrade, dismantle, and eventually defeat this enemy in Iraq and Syria."[156] After more than a decade of military resources spent in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. strategy against ISIL "remains predicated on the principle of working 'by, with, and through' U.S.-supported local partners as an alternative to large and direct applications of U.S. military force and/or large investments of U.S. personnel and resources."[157]

Since gaining control of vast territory in Syria and Iraq in 2014, ISIL "continues to commit gross, systematic abuses of human rights and violations of international law, including indiscriminate killing and deliberate targeting of civilians, mass executions and extrajudicial killings, persecution of individuals and entire communities on the basis of their identity, kidnapping of civilians, forced displacement of Shi'a communities and minority groups, killing and maiming of children, rape and other forms of sexual violence, along with numerous other atrocities."[158]

ISIL's provocations are a direct threat to the stability in Iraq, Syria, and the Middle East at large. The group has also proven a capacity to undermine security outside the USCENTCOM AOR, as exemplified by the December 2015 terrorist attacks in San Bernardino, California, and the November 2015 coordinated terrorist attacks on Paris. If ISIL is successfully defeated, further transregional spread of sectarian-fueled radical extremism will be substantially limited.

In order to degrade and defeat ISIL, the U.S. has assembled a global coalition, including eleven nations that make up USCENTCOM's AOR. Working in collaboration, Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel "set forth five mutually reinforcing lines of effort to degrade and defeat ISIL at an early September 2014 meeting with NATO counterparts. These lines of effort include: 1. Providing military support to our partners; 2. Impeding the flow of foreign fighters; 3. Stopping ISIL's financing and funding; 4. Addressing humanitarian crises in the region; and 5. Exposing ISIL's true nature."[159]

The Global Coalition is supporting the U.S. military campaign to defeat ISIL by carrying out Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR). Given the unique nature of the threat, "The name Inherent Resolve is intended to reflect the unwavering resolve and deep commitment of the U.S. and partner nations in the region and around the globe to eliminate the terrorist group ISIL and the threat they pose to Iraq, the region and the wider international community. It also symbolizes the willingness and dedication of coalition members to work closely with our friends in the region and apply all available dimensions of national power necessary-diplomatic, informational, military, economic—to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL.[160]"

Phase II (Dismantle) of CJTF-OIR is underway and the presence of ISIL in Iraq and Syria is being challenged. As of March 2016, in Iraq, "Iraqi Security Forces, which include Iraqi Army and Counter-Terrorism (CTS) forces, Kurdish Peshmerga, and various Sunni and Shi'a volunteer elements, with the support of U.S. and Coalition air operations and advisors and material donations, have effectively halted ISIL's advance. The enemy is now almost exclusively focused on defending his strongholds rather than projecting combat power."[161]

The CJTF-OIR military campaign has also made tremendous strides in Syria: "Forces are putting increased pressure on the enemy as they push south toward the capital of ISIL's self-proclaimed Caliphate in Raqqa. They have retaken more than 18,000 square kilometers of territory and cut ISIL's key lines of communication. They also secured a key border crossings between Syria and Turkey, impacting ISIL's ability to send in reinforcements and much-needed re-supply."[162]

On January 4, 2017, CJTF OIR spokesman Col John Dorian, USAF, announced, "U.S.-led coalition airstrikes in Iraq and Syria targeting the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant have recently killed several prominent leaders of that organization…precision coalition airstrikes in Mosul and other areas around Iraq have continued attacking ISIL leaders who facilitate and command and control the terrorist network."[163]

The successful removal of key ISIL leaders undermines ISIL's legitimacy among its followers, assists in the disruption of its financial resources, and hinders the terrorist group's ability to rearm itself. The U.S. has made tremendous strides in degrading ISIL, implementing a strategy that, according to then-Secretary of State John Kerry, has been designed to, "rehabilitate Iraq's military, to kill Daesh's leaders, to demolish their revenue sources, to curb their recruitment, to rebut their poisonous ideas, and to support our local partners as they liberate the towns and the communities that Daesh once occupied. I'm proud to tell you that that plan has in fact been working. Today, Kobani is free. Tikrit is free. Fallujah is free. Ramadi is free. And in time, Mosul, where there's about a 60 percent liberation of the eastern side of the community, is inextricably going to be free. And then, Raqqa. And before long, Daesh's phony caliphate is going to have been turned to dust."[164]

To combat terrorism, the U.S. State Department maintains a list of "State Sponsors of Terrorism," and designates countries once the Secretary of State determines "that the government of such country has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism." As a result of being designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, the U.S. is then able to impose on the country a wide range of sanctions, including: "A ban on arms-related exports and sales; controls over exports of dual-use items, requiring 30-day Congressional notification for goods or services that could significantly enhance the terrorist-list country's military capability or ability to support terrorism; prohibitions on economic assistance; and imposition of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions."[165] As of 2015, Syria, Iran, and Sudan remained designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism.

Syria remains the longest-standing country on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, having been designated as such in 1979 given the Assad regime's political support to several terrorist groups that have impacted the stability of the region. Many Syrian government actions are aimed to undermine the U.S. interests of countering terrorism, promoting democracy, and protecting human rights in the Middle East. Specifically, "the Syrian government has played an important role in the growth of terrorist networks in Syria through the Assad regime's permissive attitude toward al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups' foreign fighter facilitation efforts during the Iraq conflict. Syria has served for years as a hub for foreign terrorist fighters; the Syrian government's awareness and encouragement for many years of violent extremists' transit through Syria to enter Iraq, for the purpose of fighting Coalition troops, is well documented. Those very networks were among the violent extremist elements, including ISIL, which terrorized the Syrian and Iraqi population in 2015 and – in addition to other terrorist organizations within Syria – continued to attract thousands of foreign terrorist fighters to Syria in 2015. This environment has also allowed ISIL to plot or encourage external attacks in Libya, France, Lebanon, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United States."[166]

Syrian Civil War

The ongoing Syrian civil war is a security challenge with global ramifications. In March 2011, the majority Sunni population took to the streets in Syria's southern province of Dar'a in peaceful protests against the Assad government, demanding political reforms and social justice. The anti-government protesters called for a "repeal of the restrictive Emergency Law allowing arrests without charge, the legalization of political parties, and the removal of corrupt local officials."[167] This was a direct challenge to the rule of the minority Alawi sect, which had been in power since November 1970, when Hafiz al-Assad seized power in a bloodless coup.

Initially, the Syrian government's response to the protest movement was mixed: it agreed to the repeal of the Emergency Law, lifted the ban on political parties, and relaxed restrictions on local and national elections; however, the government failed to meet the popular call for Assad's resignation. The protests devolved into a violent insurgency that can partially be described as a civil war; partially a religious war with the influx of foreign Shi'a fighters from Iran and Lebanon; and what appears to be a proxy war that pits foreign actors Russia and Iran against the U.S. and its allies.

The Syrian civil war is a humanitarian catastrophe and is producing a displacement crisis that rivals historical highs. As of January 2017, UNHCR estimates that over 400,000 people have died in the Syrian civil war. Neighboring countries are working to assist Syrian refugees: Turkey is host to the largest number of Syrian refugees, with 2.7 million registered Syrians in its borders; Lebanon is estimated to be sheltering more than a million registered Syrians; Iraq has 230,000 Syrians; and Egypt is providing protection and assistance to an estimated 100,000.[168] Europe is also feeling the reverberations of the Syrian conflict: it received 884,461 asylum applications by Syrians from April 2011 to October 2016.[169]

With the increased military involvement of Russia, Lebanon's Hezbollah, and Iran, it has become increasingly unlikely that the Assad regime will be defeated militarily. The inability to defeat the Assad regime militarily undermines the efforts of Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S., who have been providing funding and weapons to the Sunni rebels. There are almost 1,200 Syrian anti-regime groups, but they are fractured. A "divided Syrian opposition is likely to suffer from inconsistent command and control and access to resources. Anti-regime forces continue to fight each other and the regime, with al-Qaeda's Syria-based affiliate Al-Nusrah Front and ISIL making gains at the expense of more moderate anti-regime forces. Increased Russian involvement is likely to harden the opposition's stance toward the regime and may undermine moderate forces [sic] cohesion, increasing the chance for radicalization among moderate opposition members."[170]

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA); aka "Iran Deal": An international agreement on the nuclear program of Iran reached in Vienna on July 14, 2015 between Iran, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the U.S., and the European Union, with the purpose of ensuring that Iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Amid the U.S. attempt to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the USCENTCOM AOR, Iran has continued to try to advance its nuclear program. To deter Iran from achieving full nuclear capacity, the U.S. led efforts under the Obama Administration to negotiate the JCPOA with the P5 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.), the European Union, and Iran. The aim of the JCPOA is to "ensure that Iran's nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful, and mark a fundamental shift in their approach to this issue. They [the signatory members] anticipate that full implementation of this

JCPOA will positively contribute to regional and international peace and security. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons."[171]

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is charged with verifying that Iran implements its key nuclear-related measures as outlined in the JCPOA. In a statement issued on October 18, 2015, the IAEA announced that "the Secretary of State [John Kerry] has confirmed the IAEA's verification. Because Iran has verifiably met its nuclear commitments, the United States and the EU have lifted nuclear-related sanctions on Iran, as described in the JCPOA."[172] With the lifting of the nuclear-related sanctions, Iran has unlocked estimates of $58 billion in Iranian assets "frozen" in Western banks since sanctions were imposed in 1980.

While the JCPOA places restrictions on Iran's nuclear program, "Iran continues to pursue policies that enflame sectarian tensions and threaten U.S. strategic interests in the USCENTCOM AOR."[173] In pursuit of its primary interest of establishing itself as a powerful force in the region, Iran's policies have been a source of destabilization in the Middle East. Many believe Iran is undermining U.S. efforts to resolve many of the region's violent conflicts. Iran's national security priorities often diverge from the U.S., and are often in conflict with the national security interests of U.S. regional allies, particularly the Gulf Arab states. Iran's actions reflect its priorities, namely: "ensuring regime survival, expanding regional influence, and enhancing Tehran's military capabilities and deterrence posture."[174]

As the world's leading Shi'a power, Iran is heavily invested in countering Saudi Arabia's geopolitical influence in the region, and has sought to ensure that Shi'a-led governments and militia groups gain legitimacy and power. Saudi Arabia's official position on the JCPOA was initially ambiguous, having not received official support or denouncement from a senior member of the Saudi royal family. However, in September 2015, during his visit to Washington, Saudi Arabia's King Salman bin Abdulaziz al Saud "expressed his support" for the JCPOA, "which once fully implemented will prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and thereby enhance security in the region."[175]

The JCPOA is not without its critics. Prior to the signing of the so-called "Iran Deal," in March 2015, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel delivered a speech at a joint meeting of the U.S. Congress where he criticized the JCPOA and argued his case for a tougher strategy in a nuclear deal with Iran. In his speech, Prime Minister Netanyahu recalled biblical animosity between the Jewish and Persian community: "Tomorrow night, on the Jewish holiday of Purim, we'll read the Book of Esther. We'll read of a powerful Persian viceroy named Haman, who plotted to destroy the Jewish people some 2,500 years ago. But a courageous Jewish woman, Queen Esther, exposed the plot and gave for the Jewish people the right to defend themselves against their enemies…Today the Jewish people face another attempt by yet another Persian potentate to destroy us. Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei spews the oldest hatred, the oldest hatred of anti-Semitism with the newest technology."[176]Prime Minister Netanyahu's opposition to the JCPOA is a source of tension between the U.S. and Israel; however, there are members of Israel's government who publicly support it. For example, Lieutenant General Gadi Eizenkot, the Israel Defense Forces chief of staff, said in January 2016: "The deal has actually removed the most serious danger to Israel's existence for the foreseeable future and greatly reduced the threat over the longer term."[177]

With the JCPOA in place, several developments have occurred that may impact Israel's qualitative military edge (QME): "(1) the prospect of greater Iranian capacity to affect the regional balance of power given its renewed global economic connectivity. (2) An increase in U.S. arms sales to Arab Gulf states in an effort to reassure them. (3) Russia's decision to finally deliver on a long-delayed agreement to provide Iran with an upgraded air defense system known as the S-300."[178]Ensuring Israel's QME has long been U.S. policy

in arms sales in the Middle East, but because the U.S. is the principle supplier of defense equipment to both Israel and the Gulf Arab states, the Pentagon is often criticized by Israeli officials over U.S. sales of sophisticated weaponry to Gulf Arab states. The U.S. is committed to Israel's security and has explained "the rationale for QME is that Israel must rely on better equipment and training to compensate for being much smaller in land and population than its potential adversaries. U.S. military aid also has helped Israel build a domestic defense industry, which ranks as one of the top global suppliers of arms."[179]

The implementation of the JCPOA raises additional questions pertinent to the Saudi Arabia-Iran rivalry. For example, "analysts continue to debate whether the kingdom might seek to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, a nuclear threshold status, or a formal U.S. defense guarantee if Iran moves toward creating a nuclear weapon or retains the capability to do so without what Saudi officials see as sufficient constraints or warning."[180] In regard to Saudi Arabia developing a nuclear weapons capability, it is expected that Saudi Arabia's close relationship with Pakistan would play a key role in facilitating its development. To illustrate the reactionary nature of Saudi Arabia's position, Saudi Prince Turki al Faisal bin Abd al Aziz al Saud declared: "(S)hould Iran acquire nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) must look at all the available options to meet the potential treat that will come from Iran-including the acquisition of nuclear weapons."[181]

Officials from Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (KA CARE) have announced plans to develop 16 nuclear power plants by 2040 so that nuclear energy can help reduce the Kingdom's consumption of oil and gas, while continuing to satisfy a high level of electricity consumption. In its effort to advance its nuclear capacity, "In June 2015, KA CARE officials signed an agreement with Rosatom (Russia's state-run nuclear company) to provide a basis for future Saudi-Russian nuclear energy cooperation, including in areas relating to nuclear power and fuel management. In January 2016, Saudi Arabia and China signed an unspecified memorandum of understanding regarding cooperation in the possible future construction of a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) in the kingdom."[182] The U.S. is heavily invested in its relationship with Saudi Arabia: the Saudis play a key role in maintaining security in the region through its geopolitical strength, its cultural importance, and its strategic importance. Despite Saudi Arabia's initial apprehension of the JCPOA, U.S. and Saudi Arabian interests are often aligned, incentivizing both countries to coordinate their policies.

In Syria, Iran has been cooperating with Russia in its efforts to ensure that Bashar al-Assad remains in power. While Russia and Iran have increased their direct military involvement in Syria, the U.S. – through several initiatives – has worked to bolster the moderate opposition as a "critical bulwark against extremism and the original values of the peaceful Syrian revolution: tolerance, democracy and basic human rights."[183] Despite Iran's efforts to ensure the survival of its key Iraqi, Yemeni, and Syrian allies, "in Iraq Iran and Hezbollah train and advise Iraqi Shi'a militant groups, and provide training and equipment to Government of Iraq forces. Iranian advisers have planned and led operations against ISIL."[184] However, while the U.S. and Iran have a shared interest in defeating ISIL, "Iranian-supported Iraqi Shi'a groups also warn of their willingness and preparedness to fight U.S. forces in Iraq. Although almost certainly not at the direction of Iran or group leadership, low-level Shi'a group members may have conducted attacks against coalition aircraft and personnel."[185]

Pakistan is another state actor in USCENTCOM's AOR that presents substantial concern due to its growing nuclear stockpile. Since separating from British India in 1947, Pakistan has been locked in a security competition with India, which has led Pakistan to develop a nuclear weapons program. In expanding its nuclear capabilities, Pakistan is driven by "India's economic growth, blooming strategic relationship with the United States, and development of nuclear and advanced conventional military capabilities and

doctrines."[186] The U.S. has expressed concern over the growth of Pakistan's nuclear capability. The American government believes that "the evolving doctrine associated with tactical nuclear weapons increases the risk of an incident or accident."[187]A nuclear explosion, accidental or otherwise, would have catastrophic consequences for U.S. and Pakistani interests.

Since India and Pakistan have developed their nuclear programs, the U.S. has shifted its priorities: "The first priority is the prevention of intentional or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons, which is most likely to occur during a military confrontation. Second is to maintain the security of nuclear weapons and materials to prevent their theft or diversion."[188] The expansion in Pakistan's nuclear capabilities undermines U.S. interests to prevent a nuclear exchange and to maintain effective security on nuclear weapons. The U.S. also wants to ensure that nuclear weapons and materials do not end up under the control of terrorist factions.

In dealing with countries in South Asia, the U.S. has pursued non-zero-sum relations. But as other state actors expand their capabilities to influence and control the region, the U.S. government is challenged in its ability to shape the primary challenges to its strategic interests. On February 29, 2016, the U.S. and Pakistan kicked off U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue to "foster a broader, long-term, and more comprehensive partnership and facilitate concrete cooperation on core shared interests such as energy, economics, counterterrorism, defense, strategic stability and education."[189] To foster strategic stability, both nations reaffirmed their commitment to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to states and non-state actors. In addition to their shared nonproliferation commitments, both Pakistan and the U.S. "agreed on the need for effective action against all violent extremists, specifically underscoring that no country's territory should be used to destabilize other countries."[190]

Among all the regions within the USCENTCOM AOR, Central Asia is the most committed to nuclear nonproliferation. On September 8, 2006, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan signed the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ) Treaty. The CANWFZ Treaty "obligates the five Central Asian States not to conduct research on, develop, manufacture, stockpile, or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere, not to seek or received assistance in these activities, and not to assist or encourage such activities. The Treaty also obligates Parties not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion and further requires each Treaty Party to bring into force, if it has not already done so, both a safeguards agreement and an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA")."[191] The CANWFZ Treaty advances U.S. nonproliferation objectives in the region, and clarifies the security benefits available to nation states that fully comply with the treaty's obligations. The achievements of the CANFWZ Treaty include enhanced regional cooperation, security, and stability. This treaty is a vehicle that provides the legal extension binding negative security assurances that are consistent with the strengthened negative security assurance announced in the 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review.[192]

When it comes to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, non-state actors are as much of a concern as irresponsible state actors. With the prevalence of non-state violent actors in the USCENTCOM AOR, the threat of terrorists or other non-state actors acquiring CBRN materials and technology remains prevalent. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report States, "today's most immediate and extreme danger is nuclear terrorism. Al Qaeda and their extremist allies are seeking nuclear weapons. We must assume they would use such weapons if they managed to obtain them. The vulnerability to theft or seizure of vast stocks of such nuclear materials around the world, and the availability of sensitive

equipment and technologies in the nuclear black market, create a serious risk that terrorists may acquire what they need to build a nuclear weapon."[193]

The flow of information and technology has eased with the expansion of knowledge sharing forums, such as the so-called "dark Web." The lack of geographical containment of CBRNs, as well as other security challenges speaks to the "new global political environment-distinguished by digital networks and worldwide flows of capital, material, people, and information-the geography of threats and crises grow more complex. While most security challenges remain rooted in a place or region, many will be driven by- and in turn drive-transnational dynamics."[194] The damage that terrorist groups can inflict with these weapons is evidenced by "several small-scale sulfur mustard attacks in Iraq and Syria, including the sulfur mustard attack in Marea on August 21, 2015,"[195] which the U.S. has officially blamed on ISIL. As a demonstration of its commitment to prevent the use of CBRNs by non-state actors, Saudi Arabia pledged $10 million in support of the creation of a center focused on the prevention of nuclear terrorism during the IAEA's Nuclear Security Summit in March 2016.

Russia Challenges U.S. Interests in the Middle East:

In 2013, Russia remerged in the Middle East as an undeniable, major geopolitical player, often pursuing policies that undermine those of the U.S. As Russia positions itself in the Middle East, it hopes to gain "a better bargaining position vis-à-vis the West in negotiating the relaxation of sanctions imposed after the annexation of Crimea and Russia's intervention in Eastern Ukraine."[196] In the Middle East, Russia joined regional nation-states Syria, Iraq, and Iran in what formed as an anti-ISIL coalition in 2015. In practice, the anti-ISIL coalition has militarily opposed all Sunni Islamists. In the fight against ISIL, the U.S. expanded efforts to cooperate with Russia to end the Syrian civil war and form a common front against ISIL and other terrorist groups. While the U.S. agrees with the need to militarily defeat ISIL, the U.S. has raised allegations against the Russian-led anti-ISIL coalition. Allegations ranged from the 2015 destruction of a U.N. aid convoy to the use of barrel, thermobaric, and cluster bombs by Syrian and Russian forces.

The economic sanctions imposed on Russia by the U.S. – a Congressionally-approved response to Moscow's aggression in Ukraine – have dampened Moscow's efforts to modernize its military. However, Russia continues to assert itself as a military player and powerbroker in the Middle East. Russian involvement in Syria has undermined U.S. efforts to support anti-regime forces by supplying "the Syrian regime with weapons, supplies, and intelligence throughout the Syrian civil war. Moscow began to deploy military forces to Syria in late August 2015, likely both [*sic*] to shore up the regime. Most Russian air strikes, artillery and rocket fires initially supported regime ground offensives and focused on opposition targets. An increasing number of strikes have since targeted Islamic State forces and facilities while sustaining operations against the opposition."[197]There is a perception that "these operations are meant to demonstrate strategic capabilities and message the West about the manner in which the Russian military could operate in a major conventional conflict."[198]

2.3.3 Historical Clashes of Interests

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is experiencing substantial changes that will reshape the geopolitical structure of the region, as noted in the 2015 NSS: "A struggle for power is underway among and within the many states of the Middle East and North Africa. This is a generational struggle in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war and 2011 Arab uprisings, which will redefine the region as well as relationships among communities and between citizens and their governments. This process will continue to be combustible, especially in societies where religious extremists take root, or rulers reject democratic reforms, exploit their economies, and crush civil society."[199] This particular change will reshape the

security landscape in USCENTCOM's AOR as the power balance, which has been in place since the 1970s, shifts. The shift of power from the central government to the citizenry is a conscious one. The so-called "Arab Spring" of 2011-12 provided several contemporary, empirical examples of the effects that widespread political mobilization, rebellion, and protest can have in shaping the social and political environment.

Widespread sectarian conflicts have taken root throughout the region and are a prime source of regional instability. The U.S. is committed to promoting stability and peace throughout the region and is working to address the underlying causes of conflict. The NSS published in 2015 affirms that "(w)e will support efforts to deescalate sectarian tensions and violence between Shi'a and Sunni communities throughout the region. We will help countries in transition make political and economic reforms and build state capacity to maintain security, law and order, and respect for human rights."[200]

While religious factors play a fundamental role (Saudi Arabia is the region's leading Sunni power and Iran as the region's leading Shi'a power), there are other factors that fuel animosity between the two regional powers. Prior to the Iranian revolution, Saudi Arabia and Iran had a positive relationship and were bilaterally countering mutual threats such as potential Soviet penetration of the Middle East during the Cold War and secular activities of the Ba'athists in Iraq during the 1960s. When British military forces ended their presence in the Persian Gulf in 1971, a new era of U.S.-dominated control came into the region. This led to the creation of President Richard Nixon's Twin-Pillar Policy to ensure that Iran and Saudi Arabia would lead the region and uphold U.S. interests in the Middle East. The Twin-Pillar Policy facilitated cooperation between the leadership in each respective country as substantial effort was exerted to defeat Communist movements in the area, particularly in Yemen and Oman.

The current Saudi-Iranian hostility can be traced back to the Iranian revolution of 1979, which removed a pro-Western leader from power, and placed Shi'a religious authorities at the head of Iran's government. To spread Shi'a fervor, Tehran implemented a policy of supporting Shi'a militias and political movements abroad. Saudi Arabia responded by taking steps to solidify its role as the world's leading Sunni power, to include spearheading the formation of the GCC.

Following the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war, Saudi Arabia exerted diplomatic efforts to improve its relationship with Iran, using the death of Ayatollah Khomeini as an opening to reconcile. At that time, Iran's President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was open to regional cooperation and negotiated with OPEC to significantly increase Iran's oil production quota. Despite these efforts, Iran's territorial dispute with the UAE undermined improvements to Saudi Arabia's relationship with Iran, leading Saudi Arabia to suspect Iranian involvement in the bombing of the Khobar Towers in 1996, which targeted U.S. military personnel. A subsequent change in Iran's leadership coincided with an expansion of power to Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah; these political shifts heralded a series of diplomatic exchanges, culminating in a security pact between the two rivals.

The 2003 U.S.-led invasion in Iraq has contributed to the imbalance of power in the region. For decades, Iraq under Saddam Hussein served as a Sunni-led counterweight to Iran. As adversaries, Iran and Iraq could balance and tame each other's political and territorial ambitions. Saddam Hussein had received approval from then-King Khalid of Saudi Arabia regarding his plans to engage in a military confrontation with Iran. King Khalid even provided significant financial backing to Iraq in its military campaign against Iran. The overthrow of the Ba'athist regime in Iraq allowed Iran to expand its influence throughout the region, primarily through its proxy groups, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Assad regime in Syria, Hamas in Gaza, and the Houthis in Yemen. This expansion of Iran's influence was most widely felt in Iraq, when

the new Shi'a-dominated government won elections, and Iran was able to expand its support for Shi'a militias, such as the Mahdi Army. When Iran ushered in its new president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in 2005, the incoming Iranian leader "promised to revive the ideological vigor of the early days of the Iranian revolution."[201]

This religious tension was clearly illustrated in Saudi Arabia's decision to execute a prominent Shi'a religious leader, Nimr al-Nimr, in early 2016. Sheikh Nimr was an outspoken supporter of large anti-government protests in 2011 in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province. His execution inflamed Shi'a discontent, precipitating angry protests across the region, the burning of the Saudi Embassy in Tehran, and the severing of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Many Muslim-majority countries took a measured approach to the dispute: they offered sympathy to Saudi Arabia, yet refrained from being openly hostile with Iran, mindful that the imminent lifting of American economic sanctions would soon make Iran a lucrative trading partner. The conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran worried many leaders in the Muslim world: Sartaj Aziz, a foreign affairs advisor to the Pakistani prime minister, warned his country's parliament that, "although Pakistan has received substantial Saudi financing to bolster its flagging economy, the government in Islamabad also faces pressure from its sizable Shi'a minority, and it plans to develop a major gas pipeline with Iran to solve its energy crisis."[202]

War-torn Yemen

The instability in Yemen provides a contemporary military expression of the geopolitical rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. In 2011, the crisis in Yemen took center stage in the Persian Gulf as a standoff took place in the capital city of Sana'a between security forces and protestors calling for President Ali Abdullah Saleh to step down. This occurred in conjunction with Saudi Arabia facing the threat of an Iranian destabilization campaign in eastern Saudi Arabia, and a popular uprising in the Kingdom of Bahrain, with the Shi'a majority calling for the removal of the Sunni monarchy of the al-Khalifa family.

In 2012, the GCC brokered an agreement with President Ali Abdullah Saleh for him to step down, and for his vice-president, Abd Rabboh Mansour Hadi, to take his place. After President Saleh stepped down, the GCC and the UN established a formal "National Dialogue" to build a new system of government in Yemen. The political transition did not ease the instability in Yemen; disunity within the military made it impossible for President Hadi to maintain order. In 2014, the Houthi – an insurgent Shi'a-majority group led by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi – began to play a defining role in Yemen's political transition. During the National Dialogue, Houthi representatives withdrew from the conference after the assassination of their representative. Saudi Arabia has asserted that the Houthis have received backing from Iran, citing Iran's effort to spread its regional influence. There is much debate over whether Iran has been backing the Houthis: "Some scholars, including USIP [U.S. Institute of Peace] Middle East specialist Robin Write, say accusations of Iranian involvement have been exaggerated and may divert international policy debates from the deep domestic causes of Yemen's violence. U.S. officials have accused Iran of involvement in Yemen but also have said the Houthi rebellion has been armed and driven by domestic events."[203] The Houthi rebels were able to take over Sana'a in January 2015, and placed President Hadi, along with several members of his government, under house arrest. By February 2015, the Houthis had "issued their own constitutional declaration and established governing bodies, moves that provoked public backlash and international condemnation. The UN Security Council called on the Houthis to withdraw from government and security institutions."[204]

Saudi Arabia continues to exercise a strong role in Yemen, intervening militarily, financially, and politically as it sees fit. Arguably, "Saudi support for President Hadi and the transition since 2011 is a hedge against potential threats to Saudi interests posed by a broad range of Yemeni political forces and armed

movements. These include the ousted Saleh and his disgruntled supporters; the northern Yemen-based Zaydi Shi'a Ansar Allah movement (translation: "Partisans of God"; also simply known as the Houthi Movement); the tribal and Sunni Islamist supporters of the Islah ("Reform") movement; and armed Salafi jihadists like Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula."[205] Adding to Saudi Arabia's frustration with the Houthi Movement is the allegation of Iranian support to the group, causing the conflict in Yemen to have the semblance of a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Following President Hadi's house arrest in January 2015 and his eventual escape to Saudi Arabia, President Hadi sought assistance against Houthi forces from the international community, "to provide instant support by all necessary means, including military intervention to protect Yemen and its people from continuous Houthi aggression and deter the expected attack to occur at any hour on the city of Aden and the rest of the southern regions, and to help Yemen in the face of Al Qaeda and ISIL."[206]

Saudi Arabia's decision to launch airstrikes against Yemen signaled a shift in its foreign policy, given the change in the Kingdom's own political leadership. Following the death of King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al Saud in January 2015, his half-brother Salman bin Abdulaziz al Saud was sworn in as the King of Saudi Arabia and the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. Soon after his appointment, King Salman appointed his son Mohammed bin Salman to the position of Minister of Defense. The Saudi-led air campaign pushed Yemen into a state of humanitarian crisis. International organizations and nongovernmental organizations have been unable to access air or sea ports or deliver humanitarian aid needed by 82 percent of the Yemeni. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the ongoing displacement has come with a range of concerns for basic needs and protection, citing that a "lack of water and sanitation and in some cases overcrowded shelters, expose displaced people to serious risks of disease and gender-based violence. Civilians are bearing the brunt of the violence in Yemen, with the conflict posing grave risks to their safety and psychosocial well-being. More than half of the population of 14.4 million people needs protection and assistance, including 7.4 million children."[207] As the poorest country in the region, Yemen is ill-equipped to deal with the humanitarian crisis at hand, and is facing a humanitarian catastrophe that will further complicate any prospects for peace.

In addition to the aforementioned challenges, the security vacuum in Yemen has also created a space of rivalry between Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIL, with both groups thriving in the chaos. In November 2014, ISIL declared that it was annexing territory in Yemen, using the term *Wilayat al-Yaman* ("Province of Yemen") when referring to this territory. Following ISIL's announcement of expansion into Yemen, AQAP openly rejected ISIL's claims to Yemeni territory, and ultimately more broadly rejected the call for ISIL to expand beyond territory in Iraq and Syria. Tensions between AQAP and ISIL in Yemen reflect the history of the relationship between the two groups. ISIL grew out of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) due to ideological disagreements in 2013. Whereas al-Qaeda has viewed the United States as its primary enemy, ISIL has focused on Bashar Assad's government in Syria and the Shi'a-led government in Iraq as its enemy. This is partly due to the Iraqi leadership in ISIL, many of whom are former Ba'athist officers. Another key difference is ISIL's focus on territorial conquest to establish an Islamic state in the Middle East, while al-Qaeda aims to establish a global jihad movement where war is primarily waged in the U.S., Israel, and Europe. Al-Qaeda's senior leadership exerted efforts to roll back ISIL's ambitions in 2013 by pleading with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to not establish a caliphate, as well as to resolve its disagreement with Jabhat al-Nusra, a- Qaeda's affiliate in Syria.

The U.S. has assisted Saudi-led military operations in Yemen; however, U.S. involvement in the conflict has placed America in a compromised position. The Houthi Movement's leader, Malik Al Houthi, has shifted the blame of the humanitarian catastrophe from Saudi Arabia to the U.S.: "The Americans determine targeting of every child, residential compound, house, home, shop, market, or mosque targets

in this country. They determined for the Saudi regime the targets to hit. Then, they supervised and ran the striking operation. Therefore, the Saudi regime is a soldier and servant of the Americans."

The U.S. is concerned about the ouster of President Hadi and his government, and the rapid growth of armed extremist threats from al-Qaeda and ISIL supporters in Yemen. However, the U.S. is equally concerned about Saudi Arabia's engagement with Yemen: "Saudi intervention has embroiled a key U.S. partner in a seemingly intractable armed conflict in which Saudi use of U.S.-origin weaponry appears to have contributed to mass displacement and resulted in civilian casualties and infrastructure damage. Extremist groups have gained new ground, and Houthi forces continue to threaten the kingdom's southern border, with some reported Iranian support."[208] In late 2016, the U.S. modified its support to the Saudi Arabian-led campaign, limiting its scope. The U.S. has also increased its role in vetting Saudi-chosen targets in Yemen.

2.3.4 Interests and Priorities in Central and South Asia

In 2009, the Obama Administration identified several core U.S. interests pertinent to Central and South Asia: "(E)ncouraging Central Asia's assistance in stabilizing Afghanistan; promoting democracy and respect for human rights; combating the trafficking of narcotics and people; supporting balanced energy policies and the development of energy resources; fostering economic growth and increased opportunities for our companies; and, finally, sustaining non-proliferation."[209] U.S. interests are misaligned with major geopolitical shifts and internal dynamics, which are facilitating greater cooperation between Central and South Asian states with Russia and China. One of the primary drivers of declining U.S. power in the region is the substantially smaller military footprint in Afghanistan, along with the elevation of China's ability to project economic power over Central Asian states.

At the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the U.S. played a lead role in helping the "five Central Asian states establish their independence and sovereignty. America fulfilled its promise of partnership at that crucial state, and these states have been important partners to the United States at critical times."[210]U.S. post-Cold War policy in the region had two phases. The first phase lasted from the dissolution of the Soviet Union until the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. "U.S. policy focused on three priorities: securing the legacy of Soviet weapons of mass destruction; helping the central Asian countries attain and defend their newly won sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity against a potential resurgence of Russian neo-imperialism; and breaking up Russia's monopoly over pipelines and transit routes for Central Asian oil and gas as a means of ensuring the region's independence from Russia."[211]

The second phase occurred right after the terrorist strikes against the United States on September 11, 2001. While there was continued interest in the political and economic reform agenda of the 1990s, "the United States elevated the importance of security cooperation with basing countries, and more broadly, America's geopolitical position in the region. Central Asia changed from an area of peripheral interest to one that commanded much greater attention in America's strategy, although the region's importance was based primarily on its role as an adjunct to Afghan stabilization efforts rather than a priority in and of itself."[212]In preparation for military operations in 2001, the U.S. military deployed to Central Asia to establish bases and cooperation programs with the host countries.

A prime example of how U.S. interests compete against one another in Central Asia can be found in the diplomatic tension that arose between Uzbekistan and the U.S. in 2005. Following the September 11 attacks, Uzbekistan granted the U.S. permission to utilize the Karshi-Khanabad Air Base as a hub for combat and humanitarian missions in Afghanistan. However, in 2005, Undersecretary of State R. Nicholas Burns issued U.S. calls for an "objective and transparent international investigation"[213] into the Andijan Massacre, when Uzbek troops fired into a crowd of protestors. By July 2005, Uzbekistan had formally

evicted the U.S. from the Karshi-Khanabad air base, with Uzbek President Islam Karimov balking at the possibility of an international probe. The competition between U.S. counterterrorism efforts and American policy of promoting democracy was tested in Uzbekistan. "We all knew basically that if we really wanted to keep access to the base, the way to do it was to shut up about democracy and turn a blind eye to the refugees," a senior U.S. Government official – speaking anonymously – told the *Washington Post*. "We could have saved the base if we had wanted."[214]

Despite this legacy, the trajectory of the region has shifted as a reflection of China's preeminent economic rise, coupled with Russia's desire to assert greater political and security dominance over its neighbors. These shifts have undermined the ability of the U.S. to influence Central Asian states to undergo further democratic and free-market economic reform. The U.S. has undertaken several initiatives to promote prosperity in the USCENTCOM AOR. In Central Asia and South Asia this is being achieved by the New Silk Road Initiative which was "first envisioned in 2011 as a means for Afghanistan to integrate further into the region by resuming traditional trading routes and reconstructing significant infrastructure links broken by decades of conflict."[215]

Four Key Areas of the New Silk Road Initiative:[216]

- regional energy markets
- trade and transport
- customs and border operations
- business and people-to-people

Afghanistan (Operation Freedom's Sentinel/Resolute Support)

The U.S. has invested tremendous time and resources in Afghanistan since 2001; the country continues to be an important ally of the U.S. in the fight against terrorism.

Between 2001 and 2016, there were 2,247 U.S. military deaths in Afghanistan; over 20,000 U.S. service members were wounded in action. U.S. and Afghanistan relations have been guided by, "the Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America signed in May 2012, which lays out respective economic and political commitments, as well as by the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) signed in September 2014, which lays out mutual security understandings."[217]

Tremendous progress has been achieved in Afghanistan, as noted in the *2016 CENTCOM Posture Statement*: "Meanwhile, we see positive developments across the populace. Of note, adult life expectancy has risen by 22 years from 42 years in 2002 to 64 years in 2012. We have seen the various state institutions develop and mature; and, the Afghans continue to make progress in the areas of governance, the judiciary, and respect for human rights, women's rights, and education. In 2001, less than 900,000 Afghans were enrolled in primary and secondary schools and almost none of them were girls. Today, there are more than 8 million students enrolled in school; 36 percent of them are girls."[218]

From October 2001 to December 2014, the U.S. led forces in Afghanistan in Operation Enduring Freedom. The American military presence in Afghanistan was a response to the September 11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. After Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Freedom's Sentinel came into play in Afghanistan, with a new training and advisory mission. U.S.-led forces have been training Afghan's National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). In 2015, ANDSF became fully responsible for the security of Afghanistan. "The ANDSF managed to deny the Taliban lasting gains. The Taliban saw the opportunity to exploit

weaknesses in the Afghans' still-maturing capabilities. Although the Taliban achieved some initial success, the ANDSF have retaken and reestablished security in key areas, such as Kunduz. Most important, the ANDSF continue to learn from their experiences and look to grow stronger and more capable."[219]

After the ANDSF assumed responsibility for Afghanistan's national defense, NATO launched the Resolute Support Mission (RSM), a non-combat mission that continues to provide training, advisement, and support to the ANDSF.

2.4 USEUCOM: Culture in the Plans, Policies, and Strategies

2.4.1 Key Actors and Relationships in the USEUCOM AOR

After World War II, the United States emerged as the preeminent world power. While recognizing Soviet dominance in parts of Asia and Europe, the U.S. also embarked on crafting a liberal world order based on institutions, alliances, norms, and practices that reflected American values and interests.[220] The goal of this international order was to stabilize international politics, safeguard American security and way of life, and advance American interests worldwide. More specifically, it included institutions and norms that promoted free trade, financial stability, political integration among states, conflict resolution, and democracy and human rights. The new post-World War II order was based on American values and interests; in other words, American values and norms shaped the international order that emerged after the war.

The post-WWII international order was as much a result of American preeminence as a response to a Soviet threat to American security and interests. Soviet containment and advancing a new order became the focus of American strategic thinking and policies. Accordingly, in the late 1940s and early 50s, Europe became the centerpiece of American grand strategy and efforts to both contain threats to its security and craft the new international order. The U.S. devoted enormous resources to Europe seeking to rebuild the war-ravaged continent, deter Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe from further expanding to the west, support the establishment of democratic order, and encourage integration among the European states. Accordingly, Washington provided humanitarian and economic assistance, mostly to Western European states, in the form of the Marshall Plan.[221] It also committed to the security of Western Europe by forming the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 and, in 1952, establishing the United States European Command to manage the extensive American military buildup on the continent.

The U.S. was also instrumental in creating and maintaining international institutions – including the United Nations, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (later known as the World Trade Organization), the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and others – that spurred economic stability, development, and trade; not only in Europe but also worldwide. Of course, the areas of Europe under Soviet dominance and Communist rule remained outside this new order and actively opposed it.

It was during this early post-World War II period that the United States defined its core national interests in the world, and in Europe, which remain unchanged to this day. U.S. efforts were facilitated by the Europeans, who after WWII, with the support of America, embarked on their own political project of eliminating war from the continent. The states in Western Europe, seeking to ban violence as a legitimate way to address disputes among themselves and fearing Communist expansion in the continent, embarked on forging a political, economic, and social union based on common values and norms, which were very like those of the U.S. In the process, the countries in Western Europe created the EU – a union of states that gradually integrated their politics, economies, and people. While the EU focused on integration and development in Europe, NATO provided its security. Thus, after World War II there gradually emerged the Euro-Atlantic community based on common political, economic, and social values as well as common security interests.[222]

American interests in Europe remained constant during the Cold War and after the collapse of the Communist regimes and the Soviet Union. In fact, the disappearance of the Soviet Union did not greatly diminish Europe's place in American foreign and security policy. The NSS of the U.S. in 2015 identifies Europe as "indispensable partner, including for tackling global security challenges, promoting prosperity, and upholding international norms."[223] In other words, Europe is regarded as a partner in confronting

global challenges and promoting a particular global order, rather than just focusing on regional threats. This view is also reflected in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which identifies Europe as "our principal partner in promoting global security" and "home to our most stalwart and capable allies and partners."[224] It also highlights a recent example of cooperation with European allies on operations in Afghanistan and Libya.[225]



Figure 2-12: EU member states (in blue) and candidate states (in yellow).
Source: Wikimedia.[226]

The NSS document acknowledges the historical roots of the Euro-Atlantic community, and notes that it has expanded in the last quarter century as countries previously under Communist and Soviet rule have integrated in the community. In other words, the number of European states committed to common values and interests has expanded. The document also commits the U.S. to further strengthening the bonds in the transatlantic community by enhancing the ties between NATO and the EU.[227]

All members of the Euro-Atlantic community, save for the U.S. and Canada, are in the USEUCOM AOR. However, USEUCOM also includes states that neither belong to nor aspire to join NATO and the EU; additionally, they do not share the values and norms of the Euro-Atlantic community. Chief among them is Russia, which not only does not share the Euro-Atlantic community's values and interests, but sees them as a threat to its security. The Russian state espouses a very different set of values, and accordingly sees a different international order as optimal for its interests and security. As the Joint Operating Environment (JOE) publication point out, rising powers, including Russia, "have increasingly expressed dissatisfaction with their roles, access, and authorities within the current system," which may lead them to challenge or reject current international rules and norms.[228] It notes that those states, "increasingly dissatisfied with the current Western-derived notion of international order," will seek to revise it. The JOE singles out Russia's leadership as viewing the current international order in which the West takes a leadership role as threatening to Russia and others.[229] This view is seconded by the U.S. National Intelligence Council, which points out that:

"The post-World War II international order that enabled today's political, economic, and security structures and institutions is in question as power diffuses globally, shifting seats at the 'table' in international decision making. Today, aspiring powers seek to adjust the rules of the game and international context in ways favorable to their interests. … Norms that were thought to be settled will be increasingly threatened if current trends hold, and consensus to build new norms may be elusive –

particularly as Russia, and China, and other actors such as ISIL seek to shape regions and international norms in their favor."[230]

Instead of the current order, some states, including Russia, are seeking to create an alternative international order by setting up institutions that exclude or marginalize the Euro-Atlantic community and the rest of the Western world. In Europe, after years of relative weakness following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia has recently sought to regain its former international status and, in the process, has actively attempted to undermine the cohesion of the Euro-Atlantic community and the international order in Europe and beyond. Russian challenges to security and established order escalated starting in 2008 when it fought a short war with Georgia and, again, in 2014, when Moscow annexed Crimea from Ukraine and then supported a pro-Russia insurgency in eastern Ukraine. At the same time, Russia's military dramatically increased its presence abroad – to include stepped-up air and sea patrols, direct participation in Syria's civil war, military exercises with partners – and in the process challenged established international norms.

The following text is divided into two sections. The first section outlines the frictions created by differences in values and interests between the United States and Russia. The second section highlights congruence of interests based on shared values. For this purpose, the paper investigates the latest national security documents produced by both countries. The text will not focus on all areas of friction and congruence, but rather on those that are clearly influenced by the strategic cultures of the countries.

2.4.2 U.S. Interests and Areas of Culture-Based Frictions and Conflicts in the USEUCOM AOR

In support of the objectives set by the NSS, National Military Strategy (NMS), the QDR, and other national security papers, a set of documents define USEUCOM's priorities and supporting activities in Europe. Above all, they direct the American military to: (1) counter Russia's influence and aggression, (2) address the growing instability on Europe's southern flank, and (3) advance enduring American interests, including the security of the U.S., a strong economy, respect for universal values, and rules-based international order.[231]

Russia

After years of relative weakness following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia has recently sought to regain its former international status and, in the process, has actively attempted to undermine the cohesion of the Euro-Atlantic community and the international order in Europe and beyond. Russian challenges to security and established order escalated, starting in 2008, when it fought a short war with Georgia, and again, in 2014, when Moscow annexed Crimea from Ukraine, and then supported a pro-Russia insurgency in eastern Ukraine. At the same time, Russia's military dramatically increased its presence abroad – air and sea patrols, direct participation in Syria's civil war, military exercises with partners – and, in the process, challenged established international norms.

In his USEUCOM Theater Strategy in 2016, Gen Philip M. Breedlove, USAF, noted that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. and its European allies attempted to engage Russia by building political, economic, and military relationships – in other words: creating an order that would accommodate the country in the broader international order.[232] The Western expectation was that Russia would become a free-market, democratic state; a responsible and predictable player in the international order. It did not take long to emerge, however, that Russia did not share Western values and interests; accordingly, the frictions between the Euro-Atlantic community and Russia became more frequent. What prevented the

frictions from escalation was the relative weakness of Russia's political system, economy, and military. By the early 2000s, however, Russia felt confident enough to begin reasserting itself more aggressively. The war with Georgia in 2008, and the annexation of Ukraine in 2014, ended any hopes that Russia will accept the existing order.

Differences in Views on the Nature of Global Politics

There are numerous explanations for Russia's newly assertive policy and general confrontation with the U.S. and its allies. One of them is certainly the differences between the strategic culture of Russia, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the strategic cultures of the United States and its allies in Europe. Simply put, the two sides have differences in what they see as the nature of world politics, what the global order should look like and, accordingly, what they accept as proper foreign and defense policies.

Unlike the Cold War period when the Communist ideology had great impact on how Moscow defined its security and foreign policy, Russian policy-makers today have no similar ideology that transcends the nation. Instead, they are guided by what they see as the laws of *Realpolitik* – the unrestrained pursuit of power as the only way to ensure a state's survival and security.[233] In the world ruled by *Realpolitik*, only power – both soft and hard – can give the state influence over other states and the international environment. In such a world, any state with a substantial power is a potential threat to Russia. Very importantly, accordingly to *Realpolitik,* the nature of those states has no influence over whether they will emerge as a threat. In other words, any state – democratic, authoritarian, or totalitarian – can potentially threaten Russia if it possesses substantial power, especially military power. Thus, Russia sees the international security environment as dominated by a ruthless competition for power among large states.

It is this security outlook of the Russian policymakers that must be considered to understand Russia's reaction to the end of the Cold War. In Russia's view, the end of the dangerous confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was far outweighed by the loss of control in former Soviet republics and the former Communist states of Eastern Europe. Arguably the end of the Soviet Union brought benefits to newly independent Russia by ending the costly arms race, diminishing the danger of a nuclear war, and the inclusion of the country in the world economic system; however, in the view of Russia's security policymakers, the country lost power by retreating from areas it previously dominated. Furthermore, to Russia's dismay, many of Moscow's former clients in Eastern Europe were quick to seek integration in the EU and NATO; gradually, many of them joined both institutions. In other words, Moscow witnessed the expansion of former adversaries into its former backyard. Russia was once again under grave threat. In the 1990s, there was no immediate military reaction from Moscow to these developments as Russia was



Figure 2-13: NATO's expansion. *Source: Wikiwand*.[234]

in a rapid economic, political, and military decline. Nevertheless, Moscow made it clear that the expansion of NATO and the EU were threats to Russia's security. In Moscow's view, the West took advantage of Russia's weakness.

It must be noted that Russian policymakers not only view the world through the lenses of *Realpolitik*, but also believe that all other states see the world in similar terms. Thus, they believe that since the end of the Cold War, U.S. policy-makers, as practitioners of *Realpolitik,* have consistently sought to weaken Russia as a means of enhancing American power and security. In this view, the pursuit of power and security is a zero-sum game – the more power and security one state has, the less the other state has.

While, in the 1990s, Russia was weak and unable to counter what it saw as the expansion of its former adversaries – above all the U.S. – into its former sphere of influence, the 2000s witnessed a resurgent Russia. After years of weakness and turmoil, Russia finally found political stability in the early 2000s. Fueled by an improving economy and rising prices of oil and gas, of which Russia has plenty, the state embarked on more assertive foreign and security policies. Accordingly, Russia dramatically increased investments in hard power, embarking on defense modernization and military presence beyond its borders.

Official security- and defense-related documents between 2000-10 reflected Russia's views of the international security environment, and identified policies to confront perceived threats and guarantee the country's security. The country's National Security Strategy, Foreign Policy Concept, and Military Doctrine paint a bleak picture of the international security environment consistent with the *Realpolitik*'s view of global politics as an unrestrained completion for power and influence. Russia's National Security Strategy, approved on December 31, 2015, declares that the "role of force as a factor in international relations is not declining."[235] Furthermore the "process of shaping a new polycentric model of the world is being accompanied by an increase in global and regional instability."[236]

It must be pointed out that the emergence of a "polycentric model of the world" has been a consistent theme in Russian strategic thought since the end of the Cold War. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and during the political and military decline of Russia in the 1990s and early 2000s, Russian policymakers saw the U.S. as an uncontested power in a unipolar global order in which Russia had very little say and influence. Russia resented this unipolar moment in world politics, and instead called for the emergence of a polycentric world order that would be shaped by multiple great powers, including Russia. In fact, "consolidating the Russian Federation's status as a leading world power, whose actions are aimed at maintaining strategic stability and mutually beneficial partnership in a polycentric world" is defined as one of Russia's long-term national strategic interests."[237] Russia's interest contrasts with the United States' explicit quest to lead in global politics as stated in the U.S. National Security Strategy:

> *"Strong and sustained American leadership is essential to a rules-based international order that promotes global security and prosperity as well as the dignity and human rights of all peoples. The question is never whether America should lead, but how we lead"* [238]

and

"These complex times have made clear the power and centrality of America's indispensable leadership in the world."

Seen through the lenses of Realpolitik, America's quest for global leadership is seen by Russia as a threat to its security and role in the world. In the late 2000s, Russia finally perceived the emergence of a multipolar world order in which Russia and other states managed to end America's undisputed dominance in world affairs. However, Russia's National Security Strategy declares that the United States and its allies are still attempting to deny the country's place in world politics:

"The Russian Federation's implementation of an independent foreign and domestic policy is giving rise to opposition from the United States and its allies, who are seeking to retain their dominance in the world. The policy of containing Russia that they are implementing envisions the exertion of political, economic, military, and informational pressure on it."[239]

Russia's *Foreign Policy Concept* further elaborates this by pointing out that any policy by the U.S. and its allies aiming to restrain Russia, undermines regional and global instability, and prevents both sides from cooperating on important global issues.[240] Instead, Russia wants to create a world order where the country is treated as an equal power whose interests are considered on all important international issues. Not surprisingly, the *Foreign Policy Concept* says that Russia wants to maintain and strengthen the role of the United Nations – where Russia is a member of the Security Council and has veto power – as the institution where global conflicts are handled.[241]

Russia also demands similar changes to Europe's security order. It sees the post-Cold War security order as denying Russia's rightful place on the continent. Moscow considers Washington to be working to maintain an order that gives the U.S. disproportionate say in security matters while excluding Russia's legitimate interests.

Figure 2-14: NATO and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. *Source: Wikimedia.*[242]

The expansion of NATO in the last two decades, and U.S. willingness to consider Ukraine and Georgia as prospective NATO members, are seen as encircling Russia and squeezing it out of Europe. The U.S. allies in Europe are regarded as pawns in America's security design for the continent.

Accordingly, Russia's *National Security Strategy* identifies NATO's expansion and the location of its military infrastructure closer to Russian borders as a threat to its national security.[244] The Russian *National Security Concept* seconds this reading of the security order in Europe, tying the EU enlargement to the West's expansion to Russia's borders.[245]



Figure 2-15: NATO and CSTO in 2017. *Source: Wikiwand.*[243]

Similarly, *The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation* identifies the main external military threats to include, among others, the "build-up of the power potential of the NATO and vesting NATO with global functions carried out in violation of the rule of international law, bringing the military infrastructure of NATO member countries near the border of the Russia Federation, including by further expansion of the alliance," as well as the "deployment (build-up) of military contingent of foreign states (group of states) in the territories of the states contiguous with the Russian Federation and its allies, as well as in adjacent waters, including for exerting political and military pressure on the Russian Federation."[246] Russia's doctrine statement also opens the door to cooperation with the U.S. and NATO whenever the Western powers decide to end their threatening posture. The previous Russian military doctrine, published in 2010, also identified NATO and the U.S. as threats to national security.

The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation also identifies regime changes – organized by external powers, presumably the U.S. and its allies – as a military threat to Russia. This is consistent with Moscow's long-held view that the West is attempting to weaken Russia and its neighbors internally. What makes it extraordinary, however, is that a Russian security document identifies this perceived Western meddling as a military threat.

The U.S. and Russian approaches to security differ in one more crucial aspect: while the U.S. has fostered military alliances, and has a tradition of operating while carefully taking into consideration the interests of its allies, Russia has a more limited experience operating in an alliance framework. One may argue that the Warsaw Pact, a Moscow-led defense alliance during the Cold War, brought together countries that shared common values, namely the Communist ideology. However, Moscow rarely allowed its Communist allies to have meaningful say in defense policy. The disintegration of the Pact at the end of the Cold War left Russia alone, having limited influence in its former sphere of influence. In the 1990s, Russia sought to create an alternative to NATO, creating a defense organization known today as CSTO. The membership of CSTO includes most of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. By the end of the 1990s, however, some of the states had withdrawn from the bloc. Today, the CSTO includes Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia.

CSTO has failed to advance as a defense alliance on par with NATO. There is very little that binds the countries because there are no underlying shared values. The bloc simply serves as a platform for limited military cooperation. Although Russian security documents pay lip service to the need to foster defense integration in the bloc, the CSTO has demonstrated little utility for Russia beyond being a tool to regain influence in parts of its former sphere of control. Russia's allies in the bloc are either very weak, unstable, or unreliable. As one analyst puts it, strategically "Russia is on its own, and alone."[247] Russia's lack of strong

allies, however, frees the country to pursue its interests with limited regard to the interests of its formal defense partners. This explains the differences in defense and security approaches displayed by the U.S. and Russia. While the U.S. is careful to weigh the interests of its allies and to devote significant effort to integrate the policies of numerous states, Russia is relatively free to pursue strictly national policies while making little effort to enlist support from allies. The consequences of these differences can be seen in America's ability to rely on numerous allies – most of whom perceived no direct threat from either state or terrorist groups operating in them – while waging wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. On the other hand, most recently Russia has could rely on the support of only one state, Iran, while waging war to support the regime in Syria.

Universal versus National Values and Norms

U.S. and Russian security documents reveal one more important, culture-based friction point between them: they devote substantial space to the role of culture – values and norms – in national and global security. The U.S. *National Security Strategy* defines American values as "the freedoms of speech, worship, and peaceful assembly; the ability to choose leaders democratically; and the right to due process and equal administration of justice."[248] The document says that American values are reflective of universal values. The focus on values in the document is not surprising because the U.S. has consistently defined "respect for universal values at home and around the world," as one of its enduring national interests. It must be pointed out that this American interest has consistently been present in security documents since the end of World War II.[249]

The American NSS reiterates a consistent claim in foreign and domestic narratives, pointing out that human rights and freedoms, as the product of American founding values, are universal. In other words, they are not only American values but also the values of everyone else. The American NSS also declares: "From the Middle East to Ukraine to Southeast Asia to the Americas, citizens are more empowered in seeking greater freedoms and accountable institutions." In response to this global earning for rights and freedoms, the U.S. takes it upon itself to assist citizens worldwide:

> *"Defending democracy and human rights is related to every enduring national interest. It aligns us with the aspirations of ordinary people throughout the world. We know from our own history people must lead their own struggles for freedom if those struggles are to succeed. But America is also uniquely situated—and routinely expected—to support peaceful democratic change. We will continue mobilizing international support to strengthen and expand global norms of human rights."*[250]

Russia views U.S. policies on human rights, democracy, and universal values as subversive, aiming to weaken America's adversaries. Russia's security documents, although acknowledging human rights and freedoms, do not refer to them as universal. Instead, security documents focus on values, norms, and traditions that are uniquely Russian, and in no way universal. Russia's *National Security Strategy* devotes substantial space to discussing Russian culture, not only as something to protect and nurture, but also as a tool to enhance national security. The Russian *Strategy* identifies as an aim the "the preservation and augmentation of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values as the foundation of Russian society, and the education of children and young people in a civic spirit."[251] It defines Russian culture thusly:

"Traditional Russian spiritual and moral values include the priority of the spiritual over the material, protection of human life and of human rights and freedoms, the family, creative labor, service to the homeland, the norms of morals and morality, humanism, charity, fairness, mutual assistance, collectivism, the historical unity of the peoples of Russia, and the continuity of our motherland's history."

A cursory comparison between how the Russian and American national security strategies treat values reveals many differences. One of them, however, has significant consequences for the relations between the two states. The American belief in the universal nature of values – and the resulting policy to promote them beyond its borders – creates frictions with Russia's more nationalist understanding of the nature of values and policies associated with their protection. Thus, American and EU policies promoting democracy, human rights, and rule of law abroad – goals fully consistent with U.S. and EU values and security strategies – are considered by Russia as the "practice of overthrowing legitimate political regimes and provoking intrastate instability and conflicts …"[252] When the U.S. and the EU are seen to practice this policy in countries on Russia's border, Moscow considers this to be a threat to Russia. In fact, Russia's *National Security Strategy* very explicitly identifies Ukraine as one such example:

"The West's stance aimed at countering integration processes and creating seats of tension in the Eurasian region is exerting a negative influence on the realization of Russian national interests. The support of the United States and the European Union for the anti-constitutional coup d'état in Ukraine led to a deep split in Ukrainian society and the emergence of an armed conflict. The strengthening of far right nationalist ideology, the deliberate shaping in the Ukrainian population of an image of Russia as an enemy, the undisguised gamble on the forcible resolution of intrastate contradictions, and the deep socioeconomic crisis are turning Ukraine into a chronic seat of instability in Europe and in the immediate vicinity of Russia's borders."[253]

Russia's *National Security Concept* is careful to acknowledge the virtue of democracy, including human rights and freedoms, but qualifies that by pointing out that every country has its own unique features that must be considered when assessing democracy and human rights. Furthermore, the *Concept* states that Russia must resist attempts by other states to use human rights norms as an instrument of political influence and a pretext to interfere in Russia's internal affairs. As the U.S. National Intelligence Council observed, "Moscow prizes stability and order, offering Russians security at the expense of personal freedoms and pluralism."[254]

Differences between Russia and the United States in attitudes toward values and norms are also reflected in what they consider to be the sources of instability in world politics. The National Intelligence Council summarizes the difference thusly:

"China and Russia portray global disorder as resulting from a Western plot to push what they see as self-serving American concepts and values of freedom to every corner of the planet. Western governments see instability as an underlying condition

worsened by the end of the Cold War and incomplete political and economic development."[255]

In response to perceived U.S. and EU interventionism in support of universal values and democracy, Russia consistently refers to sovereignty and the international principle of non-intervention in a state's internal affairs as bedrocks of international law and stability. Thus, human rights violations in a state are no reason for other states to interfere in the violator's affairs. This explains why Russia has no qualms cooperating with states that are not democracies and which commit human rights abuses on a large scale. In other words, to Russia, the principle of non-interference in a state's affairs is more important than this state's obligations under international law in human rights and freedoms.

It must be pointed out that the United States, too, cooperates with states that commit human rights abuses. However, the U.S. NSS is careful to emphasize that – even when cooperating with such governments – human rights and values continue to be important:

"But, even where our strategic interests require us to engage governments that do not share all our values, we will continue to speak out clearly for human rights and human dignity in our public and private diplomacy. Any support we might provide will be balanced with an awareness of the costs of repressive policies for our own security interests and the democratic values by which we live."[256]

Concerning interference in internal affairs, Russia is especially adamant about opposing the international norm of "the responsibility to protect." This norm of international law requires states to prevent and halt genocide and mass atrocities. This requirement cannot be blocked by the invocation of sovereignty. In other words, if a state commits, or is unable to stop, mass atrocities and genocide, other states and international community have the obligation to interfere and stop the atrocities.[257] Russia rejects this norm and claims that it is used as a pretext by some states to intervene militarily in the affairs of other states.[258] The United States and its allies, on the other hand, support in principle the responsibility to protect as a norm:

"We affirm our support for the international consensus that governments have the responsibility to protect civilians from mass atrocities and that this responsibility passes to the broader international community when those governments manifestly fail to protect their populations."[259]

Russia national security documents differ from U.S. documents in one more significant aspect regarding values and culture: While the U.S. NSS sees American values as a source of strength and a shining example many other countries try to emulate, Russia sees national culture and values as a source of strength that must be constantly defended and reinforced. It sees Russian values under constant assault from abroad, and accordingly formulates a policy to defend and strengthen them. Unlike the U.S., Russia has always feared internal weakness – political, economic, and social – as a constant source of threat to its security. Accordingly, the Russian state, and previously the Soviet Union, has had proactive policies to maintain and

strengthen internal cohesion and stability. The latest Russian *National Security Strategy* is no exception, pointing out that:

> *"In order to avert threats to national security the Russian Federation is focusing efforts on strengthening the internal unity of Russian society, ensuring social stability, interethnic accord and religious tolerance, eliminating structural imbalances and modernizing the economy, and improving the country's defense capability."*[260]

The Russian *Strategy* considers culture as the one strategic national priority that ensures the national interests. It sees destabilizing of domestic political and social situation – including through inciting "color revolutions" (an implicit dig at Western support for democracy and human rights abroad) and destroying traditional religious and moral values – as main threats to state and public security.[261] To counter challenges to internal cohesion and traditional Russian values and culture, the Russian *Strategy* identifies policies involving the state, civil society, and citizens. These include "the enhancement of the role of school in educating young people as responsible citizens of Russia on the basis of traditional Russian spiritual-moral and cultural-historical values…," and "the raising of the quality of teaching of the Russian language, literature, Russian history, the fundamental of secular ethics, and traditional religions." The creation "of a system of spiritual-moral and patriotic education of citizens, the introduction of the principles of spiritual and moral development into the education system and youth and nationalities policy," is seen as aiding national security.[262]

Unlike the United States, the Russian state – and, previously, the Soviet Union – has a long tradition of maintaining and defending the country's social cohesion by instilling certain values, norms, and attitudes among the citizens; while trying to eliminate those which are not deemed to be traditionally Russian. The state mobilizes state institutions, media, the education system, civil society, the scientific community, the arts community, and others, in this effort.

Considering the resurgence of Russia, it comes as no surprise that numerous national security documents devote substantial attention to a growing Russian threat to American interests and security. The U.S. NSS, for example, points out that the U.S. and its European allies "are enforcing tough sanctions on Russia to impose costs and deter further aggression."

2.4.3 U.S. Interests and Areas of Culture-Based Congruence in the USEUCOM AOR

Russia is not the only important player in the USEUCOM AOR. There are other powerful states, most of them members of NATO and the EU; all of them, in contrast to Russia, broadly share U.S. interests. The shared interests are based broadly on shared values and norms. Accordingly, the U.S. and its allies in USEUCOM AOR seek to strengthen and enlarge this community of states. Therefore, the enlargement of the Euro-Atlantic community is another U.S. goal in Europe consistent with its core interest of expanding universal values abroad, and strengthening the rule-based international order that promotes peace, security, and opportunities through stronger cooperation. The strengthening of the Euro-Atlantic community is also a strategic priority and interest shared by U.S. allies in Europe.

Numerous national security documents point out that, compared to other COCOMs, USEUCOM includes not only the United States' greatest foe in the last seventy years, Russia, but also the greatest number of formal allies, all members of NATO. The U.S. also has numerous partner-countries that, although not

members of NATO, share similar security outlooks and have intensive relationships with America, while also sharing similar values.

USEUCOM is unique among the COCOMs as the U.S. maintains a "profound commitment to Europe that is free, whole and at peace."[263] Ever since the end of World War I, the U.S. has been forging intense relationships with European states – first with states in Western Europe, and later, after the end of the Cold War, with many states in Eastern Europe. The goal of the U.S. to expand stability and security in Europe based on rules-based order coincided with the desires of many East European states to join the formal institutions of the Euro-Atlantic community, mainly the EU and NATO. Interestingly, in response to this desire, both organizations expected prospective members to reform their political, economic, social, and defense systems in accordance with the Euro-Atlantic community's values, norms, and practices. In other words, these states had to demonstrate commitment to the rules-based order in the community.

It must be noted that there are states in the USEUCOM AOR which are not members of either NATO or the EU, but nevertheless are considered members of the Euro-Atlantic community – Switzerland, for example – as they share the fundamental values and interests of the community, and have intensive relationships with its members. In addition, there are several states in Europe – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, and others – that aspire to join both organizations and thus become formal members of the Euro-Atlantic community.

All states in the Euro-Atlantic community are very explicit about defining their foreign, security, and defense policies within the Euro-Atlantic framework. It assumes that members of the EU continue to integrate while the United States and Canada have a vested interest in the political, economic, and security integration of the countries on both sides of the Atlantic. The security integration of the community is forged mostly within NATO, although numerous other channels and frameworks exist, especially in policing, intelligence sharing, and counterterrorism.

Germany

Germany joined NATO in 1955 and is one of the founding members of the EU. Since the end of World War II, the country has consistently defined its security firmly within the Euro-Atlantic framework. Germany's latest defense "white paper" reiterates this long-standing position:

> *"Germany therefore embraces mutual interdependence in the domain of security. This includes functioning alliances, partnerships and other types of communities, and particularly Germany's close security partnership with the United States. Germany has one of the largest sets of armed forces in the European Union (EU), which it can make available for a variety of multilateral operations."*[264]

Germany is not a global power like the U.S. or a military power on Russia's scale; it thus can assure its security only in an alliance. Therefore, the German white paper places great emphasis on the country's need to act in accord with allies in pursuing its security and interests:

> *"It is only in cooperation with others that Germany can protect its territory and open society, make effective use of its profound but limited resources, and unfold its*

innovative and productive potential. Pursuing German interests therefore always means taking into account the interests of our allies and those of other friendly nations."[265]

What makes Germany's alliance with the U.S. so enduring and strong is the similarity of interests and values. Although Germany and the U.S. have different geographic locations, histories, and economic strengths, Germany's core security interests are strikingly similar to America's including: (1) protecting its citizens and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country; (2) protecting its allies; (3) maintaining the rule-based international order; (4) ensuring citizens' prosperity and a strong German and world economy.

German's defense white paper also includes three more interests, which the U.S. shares but does not view as core interests: (1) promoting the responsible use of limited goods and resources throughout the world; (2) deepening European integration; and (3) consolidating the Trans-Atlantic partnership. Based on shared interests, Germany identifies threats and risks to national and international security that are very similar to the ones identified by the United States, including terrorism, the proliferations of nuclear weapons, and Russia.

Germany also shares the U.S. commitment to maintaining and strengthening the existing global order, although it also sees this order as under assault. In the German view, the emergence of new powers, and the reemergence of old ones, increasingly challenge the values and norms of the existing world order. Germany has a policy like the U.S. policy for addressing these challenges:

"Particular attention must be paid to the global enforcement of international laws and to the universal application and observance of human rights. Above all, this means modernizing and strengthening global and regional organizations such as the UN, the EU, NATO and the OSCE [Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe], as well as other regional organizations"[266]

As you read this passage above, note that Germany cites the EU and NATO as two of the organizations that have important roles in the current international order. These are organizations that Russia considers a threat to its security and stability, and proponents of certain values and norms that Russia rejects. The white paper goes on to insist that there must be effective sanctions in case of violations of these rules and norms. In fact, the sanctions the EU and NATO countries imposed on Russia in response to its annexation of Crimea – and the support it provided to insurgency in Eastern Ukraine – were exactly in compliance with Germany's calls for effective enforcement of accepted international norms and law.

Germany also has a viewpoint like the U.S. perception of the international security environment: It believes that the balance of power in the world is shifting, but at the same time recognizes that the U.S. will continue to have a "profound influence on international security policy." It also acknowledges that the U.S. "has guaranteed security and stability in Europe since 1945," and, based on shared values, has encouraged integration processes in Europe. Furthermore, like the U.S., Germany believes that since the end of the Cold War, European countries, together with the U.S., have established a unique peace order in Europe to which all states have committed.

However, Germany sees the established European order under assault, mainly by Russia's actions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, where Moscow used force to unilaterally redraw international borders. The German white paper sees this as Russia's rejection of partnership with the Euro-Atlantic community, and that Russia has instead chosen to become a strategic rival. This is part of Russia's move to become an independent power with global ambitions. Mirroring the U.S. reading of Russia's moves, Germany sees Moscow as not simply challenging international borders in Europe, but fundamentally challenging the agreements that underpin the existing European and international order. Accordingly, the white paper calls for responses not only from the affected states, but also from the EU and NATO:

> *"Germany's security is inextricably linked to that of its allies in NATO and the EU. The transatlantic alliance is vital to the security of Europe. Only together with the United States can Europe effectively defend itself against the threats of the 21st century and guarantee a credible form of deterrence."*[267]

At the same time, and to a greater extent than U.S. security documents, the white paper underlines Russia's importance to stability and security in Europe: "Sustainable security and prosperity in and for Europe cannot therefore be ensured without strong cooperation with Russia."[268] However, in a direct rebuke to Russia's formal calls for the creation of a new security order in Europe, the white paper sees the restoration of stability on the European continent – not through the development of a new security architecture – but rather through the adherence to existing and proven common rules and principles.

Great Britain

Great Britain has traditionally been the closest U.S. ally in Europe. One of the reasons for the strong security and defense ties between our two countries is the similarities in our values and interests. The British national security priorities closely mirror American priorities, including the protection of its citizens, economic prosperity, the preservation of Britain's global reach and influence, and the maintenance of the rule-based international order, human rights, and democracy as the main national interests:[269]

> *"The UK has a proud tradition of protecting its people, promoting civil liberties, upholding the rule of law, and building diverse, integrated communities tolerant of different faiths and beliefs. Our democratic and inclusive values are the foundation of our security and prosperity."*[270]

Shared values and interests are the foundation of Britain's strongest alliances and partnerships, especially within the framework of NATO. Unlike Germany, however, Britain sees itself as a global political and military power and, accordingly, lists allies inside and outside NATO and the EU, including Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. Thus, U.S. partnership with Great Britain is the strongest – when compared with its partnerships with other European states – because it is based not only on shared values and interests, but also because of Britain's global military reach. Britain also lists France and Germany as two states in Europe with which it works very closely to maintain its security and influence.

Like the U.S. and its allies, Britain also see values as universal: "We will continue to promote universal human rights as an integral part of building prosperity and stability around the world."[271] Furthermore,

Great Britain embraces the international norm of "responsibility to protect"; this aligns Britain with its allies in Europe, but pits it against Russia, which rejects this norm.[272]

The United Kingdom's view toward the existing international order is consistent with the view shared by the United States and its allies in Europe. Even more:

> *"The UK was a leading architect of the current system of institutions and relations and we have been at the forefront of its expansion since the end of the Cold War … We have helped to shape the norms that govern use of force, prevent conflict, advance human rights and good governance, promote open and fair international trade relations and support freedom of navigation."*[273]

Britain sees the current international system as reflecting "core British values," including "democracy, the rule of law, open, accountable governments and institutions, human rights, freedom of speech, property rights and equality of opportunity, including the empowerment of women and girls…" National security depends on the stability of this system and, thus, maintaining and strengthening it is a core British interest. However, like its allies, Britain sees this system under assault as some powerful states and non-state actors are increasingly seeking to undermine the current order because they believe it runs contrary to their interest, or favors the West. Britain sees Russian actions as the most obvious challenge to this order in Europe:

> *"Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and destabilising activities in Ukraine directly challenge European security and the rules-based international order. We are working in NATO, the EU and the UN to ensure that Russia is held to account for its actions."*[274]

France

Another important member of the Trans-Atlantic community, France, also share values and interests that are like America's. Since the end of World War II, the U.S. and France have occasionally experienced frictions (France opted to leave NATO's military structure in 1966, but rejoined it in 2009; it never left the political structure of the Alliance); yet the similarities in values and interests of the two countries never allowed these frictions to escalate into conflict.

France, one of the founders and main engines of the EU, underlines the role of the Union in maintaining security and stability on the European continent and beyond. This is only possible based on shared values, which the French believe to be universal. As the latest French *White Paper on Defense and National Security* points out:

> *"Nowadays, Europe contributes to collective security by helping to contain regional crises. It does this be defending universal values. It is difficult to imagine that it might*

be the source of a major conflict. This is a new situation for Europe and for France in particular."[275]

The French *White Paper* was published in 2013, before Russia's intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea. Before 2014, France was not alone in Europe believing that war on the continent was unthinkable, something in the past. Russia's intervention in Ukraine send a shock wave throughout Europe. While France and its allies in the Euro-Atlantic community still consider war within the community unthinkable, they consider a conventional war on the European continent not only plausible but entirely possible. Accordingly, relations between the Euro-Atlantic community, including France and Russia, deteriorated.[276] In other words, unlike Russia – which has never considered the use of force as a declining factor in European politics – only after 2014 did some members of the Euro-Atlantic community accept the concept that military force was still an important factor on the continent.

The French *White Paper* devotes substantial space to the role of values in interests and security. It says that the creation of NATO "expresses the profound commonality of values and interests between the United States, Canada, and Europe."[277] Similarly, as a founding member of the EU, "France belongs to a community of 500 million citizens united by shared values of democracy, justice and peace."[278] Commonality of values shapes the commonality of interests based on similar readings of the global security environment:

"… (M)ost of the risks and threats are of identical concern on both sides of the North Atlantic. The very close, in-depth nature of our bilateral relations with the United States and Canada, our collective defense commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty and the commonality of our values structure a de jure and de facto solidarity between us, …"[279]

Since the end of World War II, France has traditionally stood out in the Euro-Atlantic community as an independent-minded member. France's unique perspective, especially during the Cold War, regarded the U.S. as "too dominant" in Europe – which partially explains why it withdrew from NATO's military structure – and, accordingly, was why – in France's opinion – the U.S. worked so hard to empower the EU as a truly equal partner. Additionally, France sought to preserve its freedom of action as it had a set of interests, particularly in Africa and the Middle East, that were not necessarily shared by other members of the community. Although, in the late 2000s – after France rejoined the military structure of NATO – it continued to endow the EU with more security and defense functions. On the other hand, the U.S. and many other members of the Euro-Atlantic community sought to preserve the primacy of NATO in security and defense matters. These differences notwithstanding, France and the U.S. shared a deep commitment to the same values and interests. Therefore, the frictions between the two countries have never led either country to question the other's commitment to strong bilateral relations or the Euro-Atlantic community.

Although the French *White Paper* was published before Russia's intervention in Ukraine and Syria, the document signals France's worry about Moscow's intentions and future behavior:

> *"Russia's military budget is growing rapidly. It is modernizing its nuclear arsenal and working to provide its conventional forces with enhanced intervention capabilities … At the same time, warmer relations with the United States and other western nations have not achieved all the declared objectives, as witness the continuing disputes over NATO, disarmament and the resolution of the Syrian crisis within the UN Security Council."*[280]

Accordingly, it was only natural that after Russia's intervention in Ukraine, France had a reaction similar to the U.S. reaction: it joined all members of the Euro-Atlantic community in condemning Moscow's moves, and to impose a series of escalating sanctions on Russia. Russia's actions in Ukraine and Syria clearly contradict France's commitment to "an international order based on the rule of law rather than on the use of force."[281] As part of this international order, France believes in the international norm of "responsibility to protect," a commitment it shares with the U.S. and the other members of the Euro-Atlantic community, but not with Russia.

European Union

Although the EU has relatively limited functions in security and defense (compared to NATO), it also has a security strategy. Rather than relying on military power, the Union relies on soft power – the ability to provide a model of democracy and prosperity that is emulated, with the Union's help, by states outside the EU. In 2003 the EU published its first security strategy: it focused on soft power as way to yield influence. It also boldly stated:

> *"Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure or so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history."*[282]

The latest EU's security strategy, published in 2016, takes a much more skeptical view of the European security environment:

> *"… (P)eace and stability in Europe are no longer a given. Russia's violation of international law and the destabilization of Ukraine, on top of protracted conflicts in the wider Black Sea region, have challenged the European security order at its core."*[283]

The document sees Russia's intervention in Ukraine not only as illegal, but as challenging "the principles underpinning the European security order." The 2016 security strategy also points out that "the EU and Russia are interdependent." In other words, unlike the U.S., the EU has no choice but to "engage Russia to discuss disagreements and cooperate if and when our interests overlap."

The EU strategy states that "our interests and values go hand in hand." Not surprisingly, the interests listed in the EU security strategy closely resemble the interests listed in the national security strategies of

the United States and its allies in Europe. These interests include the peace and security of EU citizens, economic prosperity, democracy, and a rule-based global order.

Much like American security documents, the EU security strategy considers human rights to be universal. Since the EU sees itself as a soft power, the document devotes substantial space to the role of and policies associated with democracy and human rights. In this respect, the EU security strategy is very similar to the U.S. NSS. The document also has a section on the EU's role in the promotion of a rules-based global order, "with multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its core." A rules-based order is seen as beneficial to EU interests because it unlocks the Union's potential and embeds democratic values within the international system.

Russia

There are areas where Russian and American values and interests converge. Indeed, even during the Cold War, both countries cooperated on numerous issues – arms control, for example. After the Cold War, the two countries found even more areas where their interests converged. Even now, at a time of heightened tensions in bilateral relations, the cooperation still exists. Areas of mutual interest and cooperation include the fight against terrorism, the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, arms control, trade, et cetera. For example, following the terrorist attacks against the U.S. in 2001 – and the consequent invasion of Afghanistan – Russia opened its sky and railroads to military transports supplying American and allied troops operating in Afghanistan. The two countries also cooperated in an agreement with the Iranian government to suspend its program to produce nuclear weapons. In other words, although Russia has distinct values and a unique political system, and is unhappy with the existing international order in which it sees the U.S. as a threat to its security, Russia does not want its complete replacement. For example, Russia values its place as a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations, where it has veto power. In other words, the UN Security Council is one place where Russia is equal to the U.S. Not surprisingly, Russian security documents devote substantial space to the importance of the UN and the need to strengthen its functions.

2.5 USPACOM: Culture in the Plans, Policies, and Strategies

2.5.1 U.S. Pacific Command Area of Responsibility

The USPACOM AOR is the largest of all six geographic CCMDs, as it encompasses roughly 105 million mi² (272 million km²) – over half the earth's surface – throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. The USPACOM AOR stretches from the waters off the west coast of the United States to the western border of India, and from Antarctica to the North Pole. It shares borders with all the other five combatant commands. The USPACOM AOR contains a total of 36 countries within its territory.



Figure 2-16: USPACOM AOR. *Source: USPACOM.*[284]

The magnitude of the size and population in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, combined with various potential factors of destabilization – such as natural disasters, climate change, increasing competition for natural resources, and terrorism and violent extremism – pose serious strategic long-term challenges for regional governments, as well as U.S. interests and strategies within the AOR.

Figure 2-17: USPACOM at a Glance. *Source: U.S. Department of Defense.*[285]

USPACOM's primary areas of focus include the following:

- constructively engaging a rising China
- dealing with provocations by North Korea
- monitoring an increasingly active Russia
- ensuring access to air and sea lanes
- encouraging peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes
- responding to natural disasters, as well as humanitarian and health-related issues
- countering the threat posed by radicalism among VEOs
- addressing transnational crimes, including cybercrimes, and drug and human trafficking[286]

A cornerstone of USPACOM policy includes maintaining and building upon partnerships in the AOR to deal with the challenges facing the region. Key focus areas of this policy are to:

- strengthen and advance alliances and partnerships
- mature the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship

- develop the U.S.-India strategic partnership
- remain prepared to respond to Korean Peninsula contingency
- counter transnational threats

These policies toward USPACOM and the strategies that guide the U.S. military's focus in the region are instructed by several U.S. government policy documents, including the White House NSS.

2.5.2 U.S. National Security Strategy

The 2015 White House NSS is grounded in the following value-based national interests:

- the security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners
- a strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity
- respect for universal values at home and around the world
- a rules-based international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.[287]



Figure 2-18: Asia-Pacific Region – the growing role of the Asia-Pacific region in the global economy. *Source: U.S. Department of Defense.*[288]

The 2015 NSS states that it provides a vision for "strengthening and sustaining American leadership" and that it "clarifies the purpose and promise of American power." It further asserts that it aims to advance U.S. "interests and values with initiative and from a position of strength."[289] As with any organization,

institution, or agency, the White House NSS also establishes its policies and strategies based on a culture of values. The NSS makes a point to acknowledge this, saying, "American values are reflective of the universal values we champion all around the world—including the freedoms of speech, worship, and peaceful assembly; the ability to choose leaders democratically; and the right to due process and equal administration of justice. We will be a champion for communities that are too frequently vulnerable to violence, abuse, and neglect—such as ethnic and religious minorities; people with disabilities; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) individuals; displaced persons; and migrant workers."[290] Values, in turn, inform U.S. interests in various regions throughout the world. This is especially true regarding U.S. interests in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

In terms of promoting democracy and human rights, the USPACOM AOR is of importance to U.S. interests in the region. The NSS states:

> *"Defending democracy and human rights is related to every enduring national interest. It aligns us with the aspirations of ordinary people throughout the world. We know from our own history people must lead their own struggles for freedom if those struggles are to succeed. But America is also uniquely situated—and routinely expected—to support peaceful democratic change. We will continue mobilizing international support to strengthen and expand global norms of human rights. We will support women, youth, civil society, journalists, and entrepreneurs as drivers of change. We will continue to insist that governments uphold their human rights obligations, speak out against repression wherever it occurs, and work to prevent, and, if necessary, respond to mass atrocities."*[291]

Oftentimes, U.S. values and interests will not coincide with those of other actors in the region, including governments of local states such as China, India, or North Korea, or broader multinational organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). However, the NSS asserts that "even where our strategic interests require us to engage governments that do not share all our values, we will continue to speak out clearly for human rights and human dignity in our public and private diplomacy."[292] Understanding the concept and role that cultural values play in strategic policy – and being aware of the cultural values that underpin a government's strategic and policy decision-making process, especially when values and interests may not coincide – can mitigate confusion and unnecessary escalation of conflict among key actors in the region.

2.5.3 U.S Strategies Toward USPACOM

In terms of overall U.S. strategic policy toward the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, there are two major directives that guide U.S. policy in the USPACOM AOR: (1) the U.S. Rebalance to Asia-Pacific, and (2) the Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy.

U.S. Rebalance to Asia-Pacific

The U.S. Rebalance to Asia-Pacific, also informally known as the "Pivot to Asia," is the U.S. policy to re-energize and refocus U.S. foreign policy and trade toward the Asia-Pacific region. American policymakers give emphasis to this region for many reasons, particularly because it is home to over half the world's population – thus making current (and potential) Asia-Pacific development, business, and trade opportunities vital to American economic interests. During her time as Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton

authored an article in *Foreign Policy*, titled, "America's Pacific Century," in which she stated: "Open markets in Asia provide the United States with unprecedented opportunities for investment, trade, and access to cutting-edge technology. Our economic recovery at home will depend on exports and the ability of American firms to tap into the vast and growing consumer base of Asia. Strategically, maintaining peace and security across the Asia-Pacific is increasingly crucial to global progress, whether through defending freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, countering the nuclear proliferation efforts of North Korea, or ensuring transparency in the military activities of the region's key players."[293]

The White House NSS reiterates the importance of the U.S. "rebalance" to the Asia-Pacific region by saying; "The United States has been and will remain a Pacific power. Over the next 5 years, nearly half of all growth outside the United States is expected to come from Asia. That said, the security dynamics of the region—including contested maritime territorial claims and a provocative North Korea—risk escalation and conflict. American leadership will remain essential to shaping the region's long-term trajectory to enhance stability and security, facilitate trade and commerce through an open and transparent system, and ensure respect for universal rights and freedoms."[294] Furthermore, in November 2014, during a visit to Australia, President Barack Obama highlighted how U.S. policy strategies toward the region are underpinned by cultural values. He said that the Rebalance is "a partnership not just with nations, but with people...for decades to come. Bound by the values we share, guided by the vision we seek, I am absolutely confident we can advance the security and the prosperity and the dignity of people across this region."[295]

The U.S. NSS further elaborates why the U.S. Rebalance to Asia-Pacific and the USPACOM AOR is important to U.S. economic, trade, and military interests:

Figure 2-19: Indo-Asia-Pacific Rebalance: Guiding Principles. *Source: U.S. Department of Defense.* [296]

"To realize this vision, we are diversifying our security relationships in Asia as well as our defense posture and presence. We are modernizing our alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines and enhancing the interactions among them to ensure they are fully capable of responding to regional and global challenges. We are committed to strengthening regional institutions such as ASEAN, the East Asia Summit, and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation to reinforce shared rules and norms, forge collective responses to shared challenges, and help ensure peaceful resolution of disputes. We are also working with our Asian partners to promote more open and transparent economies and regional support for international economic norms that are vital to maintaining it as an engine for global economic growth. The TPP [Trans-Pacific Partnership] is central to this effort.

As we have done since World War II, the United States will continue to support the advance of security, development, and democracy in Asia and the Pacific. This is an important focus of the deepening partnerships we are building in Southeast Asia including with Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia. We will uphold our treaty obligations to South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand, while encouraging the latter to return quickly to democracy. We will support the people of Burma (Myanmar) to deepen and sustain reforms, including democratic consolidation and national reconciliation.

The United States welcomes the rise of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous China. We seek to develop a constructive relationship with China that delivers benefits for our two peoples and promotes security and prosperity in Asia and around the world. We seek cooperation on shared regional and global challenges such as climate change, public health, economic growth, and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. While there will be competition, we reject the inevitability of confrontation. At the same time, we will manage competition from a position of strength while insisting that China uphold international rules and norms on issues ranging from maritime security to trade and human rights. We will closely monitor China's military modernization and expanding presence in Asia, while seeking ways to reduce the risk of misunderstanding or miscalculation. On cybersecurity, we will take necessary actions to protect our businesses and defend our networks against cyber-theft of trade secrets for commercial gain whether by private actors or the Chinese government.

In South Asia, we continue to strengthen our strategic and economic partnership with India. As the world's largest democracies, we share inherent values and mutual interests that form the cornerstone of our cooperation, particularly in the areas of security, energy, and the environment. We support India's role as a regional provider of security and its expanded participation in critical regional institutions. We see a strategic convergence with India's Act East policy and our continued implementation of the rebalance to Asia and the Pacific. At the same time, we will continue to work with both India and Pakistan to promote strategic stability, combat terrorism, and advance regional economic integration in South and Central Asia."[297]

Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy

Given the vast amount of coastal and maritime territory of Northeast and Southeast Asia, and the fact that trade with these areas is so vital to the global economy, it is understandable that local, regional, and global powers have such a high stake in ensuring access and freedom of navigation through this crucial maritime territory. The region contains eight of the world's ten largest ports and some of the busiest and most important maritime shipping and trading routes in the world, including the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea.

> "The United States has enduring economic and security interests in the Asia-Pacific region. And because the region – stretching from the Indian Ocean, through the South and East China Seas, and out to the Pacific Ocean – is primarily water, we place a premium on maintaining maritime peace and security."
>
> ***-Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy***[298]

The *Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy*, released by the DoD in August 2015, is a document that details the United States' emphasis on three maritime objectives in the Asia-Pacific region: (1) the need for safeguarding freedom of the seas, (2) deterring conflict and coercion, and (3) promoting adherence to international laws and standards.

In terms of the latter two objectives, the maritime security strategy document states: "For 70 years, U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region has played a vital role in undergirding regional peace, stability, and security. This presence has enabled tremendous prosperity and economic growth across the region and facilitated the unimpeded flow of resources and trade across vital Asian waterways. It is in the interests of all nations, not only those in the Asia-Pacific region, that the United States continues to deter and prevent conflict in this critical region."[299] It adds that the DoD, "in conjunction with interagency partners, regional institutions, and regional allies and partners, is working to ensure that the rule of law – not coercion and force – dictate maritime Asia's future."[300]Regarding the need for safeguarding freedom of the seas, the document reiterates the issue of China's claims of sovereignty over disputed islands in the South China Sea as a point of contention, highlighting that the South China Sea is a major thoroughfare for global trade for much of the world.

The South China Sea dispute is discussed in more detail in "Section VI: U.S. Interests in USPACOM," below.

Recognizing the growing complexity of the Asia-Pacific maritime domain, the *Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy* outlines four lines of effort that the DoD is employing to preserve security in this region:

- "First, we are strengthening our military capacity to ensure the United States can successfully deter conflict and coercion and respond decisively when needed. The Department is investing in new cutting-edge capabilities, deploying our finest maritime capabilities forward, and distributing these capabilities more widely across the region. The effort also involves enhancing our force posture and persistent presence in the region, which will allow us to maintain a higher pace of training, transits, and operations. The United States will continue to fly, sail, and operate in accordance with international law, as U.S. forces do all around the world.".
- "Second, we are working together with our allies and partners from Northeast Asia to the Indian Ocean to build their maritime capacity. We are building greater

interoperability, updating our combined exercises, developing more integrated operations, and cooperatively developing partner maritime domain awareness and maritime security capabilities, which will ensure a strong collective capacity to employ our maritime capabilities most effectively."

- "Third, we are leveraging military diplomacy to build greater transparency, reduce the risk of miscalculation or conflict, and promote shared maritime rules of the road. This includes our bilateral efforts with China as well as multilateral initiatives to develop stronger regional crisis management mechanisms. Beyond our engagements with regional counterparts, we also continue to encourage countries to develop confidence-building measures with each other and to pursue diplomatic efforts to resolve disputed claims."
- "Finally, we are working to strengthen regional security institutions and encourage the development of an open and effective regional security architecture. Many of the most prevalent maritime challenges we face require a coordinated multilateral response. As such, the Department is enhancing our engagement in ASEAN-based institutions such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF), as well as through wider forums like the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) and Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), which provide platforms for candid and transparent discussion of maritime concerns."[301]

Operations, Exercises, and Training

Another vital facet of the *Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy* is the DoD's focus on training exercises and other forms of engagement with allies and partners in the region; the goal of this training is to explore new areas of bilateral and multilateral maritime security cooperation in this vital maritime domain, as well as promote regional trust and transparency. According to the report, the United States is increasing the size, frequency, and sophistication of regional exercise programs in both Northeast and Southeast Asia, while incorporating a maritime focus into many of these engagements.

In Northeast Asia, the *Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy* report highlights the fact that the DoD conducts several regular maritime exercises with Japan and South Korea that are focused on enhancing capabilities to counter provocations and manage the changing Northeast Asian security environment. The reports states: "Though its original purpose was to counter special operations forces, the annual bilateral Key Resolve/Foal Eagle exercise with the ROK [Republic of Korea] now includes amphibious operations and anti-submarine warfare in recognition of the importance of the maritime domain in defending South Korea." It adds: "Similarly, the U.S.-Japan Shin Kame anti-submarine warfare exercise is designed to improve how U.S. and Japanese forces counter diesel submarines, a concern in the region."[302]

In Southeast Asia, a comprehensive bilateral exercise program with the Philippines helps this treaty ally to enhance and establish a more effective minimum credible defense. In 2015, the United States conducted more than 400 planned events with the Philippines, including the premier joint exercise, Balikatan. In 2015's iteration of Balikatan, more than 15,000 U.S., Philippine, and Australian military personnel exercised operations involving a territorial defense scenario in the Sulu Sea, with personnel from Japan observing as well.[303]

The U.S. is also expanding maritime engagements with other Southeast Asian partners, including Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam. The *Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy* highlighted that "(i)n Indonesia, the April 2015 iteration of the Sea Surveillance Exercises (SEASURVEX) included a flight portion over the South China Sea for the first time, and this past spring, our navies concluded their first tabletop Simulated Submarine Casualty Exercise (SMASHEX). We also established a new joint exercise with Malaysia, which is scheduled to occur for the first time in 2015, and in 2014, the Marine Corps participated in an amphibious exercise with the Malaysian Armed Forces, during which our forces trained side-by-side in eastern Sabah. In Vietnam, we are rapidly growing our maritime training, having recently concluded our sixth-annual Naval Engagement Activity (NEA) in March 2015, a historic five-day engagement that included a full day of at-sea operations. In just six years, our naval cooperation with Vietnam has grown from a simple port visit to multi-day engagements that allow our sailors to develop a better understanding of each other's operations and procedures."[304]

Additionally, the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise, which has been conducted since 1971, is the largest international military exercise in the world. The 2016 iteration was the largest on record, with participation from 27 nations, including 45 surface ships, 5 submarines, more than 200 aircraft, and 25,000 personnel in and around the Hawaiian Islands and Southern California. According to the *Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy* report, the objectives of this exercise are to "enhance the interoperability of the combined RIMPAC forces as well as to integrate new participants in the employment of multinational command and control at the tactical and operational levels."[306]

Figure 2-20: Ships and submarines participating in exercise RIMPAC 2012. *Source: U.S. Navy.*[305]

China participated in RIMPAC for the first time in 2014, though at a limited level. As the largest naval exercise in the world, RIMPAC provides an opportunity for the United States, China, and countries throughout the Asia-Pacific region "to exercise key operational practices and procedures that are essential to ensuring that tactical misunderstandings do not escalate into crises."[307]

2.5.4 Key Actors in the USPACOM AOR

Allies and Partners

The United States NSS, dated June 2015, highlights the importance of strengthening our global network of allies and partners. It states: "The presence of U.S. military forces in key locations around the world underpins the international order and provides opportunities to engage with other countries while positioning forces to respond to crises."[308] Regarding the USPACOM AOR and the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater specifically, it affirms that "we will press forward with the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, placing our most advanced capabilities and greater capacity in that vital theater. We will strengthen our alliances with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. We also will deepen our security

relationship with India and build upon our partnerships with New Zealand, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Bangladesh. Such efforts are essential to maintaining regional peace and building capabilities to provide for missile defense, cyber security, maritime security, and disaster relief."[309]

The 2016 version of the NSS emphasizes a similar focus: "Our alliances in Asia underwrite security and enable prosperity throughout Asia and the Pacific. We will continue to modernize these essential bilateral alliances while enhancing the security ties among our allies. Japan, South Korea, and Australia, as well as our close partner in New Zealand, remain the model for interoperability while we reinvigorate our ties to the Philippines and preserve our ties to Thailand."[310]

China



The USPACOM AOR is comprised of several key state actors, one of which is the People's Republic of China (PRC). The PRC is one of the largest players in this AOR, both in terms of U.S. economic interests in the region and around the world, and its relevance as a major political hegemon within the Asia-Pacific region. China is the second-largest economy in the world after the United States, and has been asserting a greater role both economically and militarily throughout the Asia-Pacific region. This has increased China's military presence and activity in disputed maritime territories in the region, and has made significant advancements in its military capabilities, operations, and missions. In his USPACOM Posture Statement delivered to the Senate Armed Forces Committee in April 2015, former Commander of U.S. Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM), Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, USN (Ret.), highlighted the fact that senior PRC leaders, including PRC President Xi Jinping, have been seeking an alternative security framework in Asia that provides Beijing with an increased influence and diminishes the role of the United States. Locklear noted that this was highlighted at the "Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia," held in Shanghai in 2014, where President Xi Jinping called on all Asian nations to support the development of a new security order centered around China, that, in effect, pushed for a reduced influence of the United States in the region.[311]

Admiral Harry Harris, USN, the current CDRUSPACOM, has noted that China is carrying out a comprehensive military modernization program with the purpose of transforming its armed forces into a high-tech military capable of conducting complex operations, in order "to achieve its dream of regional dominance, with growing aspirations of global reach and influence." Furthermore, many of these initiatives are intended to develop capabilities to deter or counter a third-party intervention in the region. These types of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities are focused on controlling access and freedom of operations in vast portions of the air and maritime domains, as well as in space and cyberspace. These efforts include a series of sophisticated and increasingly long-range, anti-ship cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, and kinetic and non-kinetic counter-space systems.[312] Furthermore, China is making significant strides in electronic warfare capabilities, which contribute to the A2/AD challenge.

Additionally, the Chinese navy is increasing its presence in the Indian Ocean, as well as expanding the area and duration of its operations and exercises in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. As the Chinese military modernizes its capabilities and expands its presence in the Asia-Pacific region, U.S. forces are drawn into closer and more frequent contact; thus, the risk of an accident or a miscalculation increases. Therefore, it has become a high priority to make efforts to increase mutual understanding and trust to reduce risk. According to former CDRUSPACOM Locklear's Posture Statement, "(t)he complexity of the

regional and global security environment, as well as China's military advancements, necessitates a continuous dialogue between the U.S. and Chinese militaries to expand practical cooperation where national interests converge and discuss areas where goals diverge, especially during periods of friction."[313]

According to USPACOM, "The United States believes that a strong U.S.-China partnership is essential for peace, prosperity, and both regional and global security," stating that "The U.S. continues to welcome a prosperous and successful China that plays a greater role in global affairs, but China's growing military capabilities coupled with its lack of transparency is concerning." Therefore, USPACOM calls for efforts to pursue a more transparent, enduring, stable, and reliable military-to-military relationship between the United States and China by maintaining "a consistent and meaningful dialogue to prevent miscommunication or miscalculation." USPACOM sees opportunities for cooperation in areas such as humanitarian relief and disaster response (HR/DR), counter-piracy efforts, non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), military medicine, and maritime safety. According to USPACOM, such opportunities will enhance the U.S.-China bilateral relationship while working toward common goals, candidly address differences, and demonstrate mutual commitment to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.[314]

While there is agreement across U.S. military and government agencies that economic and security partnership with China is an important and valuable strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, there is also concern with some of China's actions that are seen to be counterproductive to such a strategy. The U.S. NSS states: "We support China's rise and encourage it to become a partner for greater international security. However, China's actions are adding tension to the Asia-Pacific region. For example, its claims to nearly the entire South China Sea are inconsistent with international law. The international community continues to call on China to settle such issues cooperatively and without coercion. China has responded with aggressive land reclamation efforts that will allow it to position military forces astride vital international sea lanes."[315]

The DoD's strategy toward the USPACOM AOR, and specifically China, is detailed in the *Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy*. The 2015 version of this document highlights China's rise as a political, economic, and military actor as a defining characteristic of the twenty-first century, asserting that the U.S. maintains a complex relationship with China comprised of elements of both cooperation and competition. The document states: "The Department pursues an objectives-based military-to-military relationship with China that seeks to deepen cooperation in areas of mutual interest and to manage security competition and friction in a way that supports overall stability."[316] To reach these goals and objectives, the DoD maintains a defense-based relationship with China based on the following three pillars:

- a sustained and substantive dialogue through policy and senior leader engagement to develop common views on the international security environment and related challenges
- attempts to build concrete, practical areas to develop the capacity to cooperate in areas of shared interest
- the enhancement of risk reduction measures through focused activities that seek to improve operational safety and to develop and institutionalize modalities (such as the Defense Telephone Link) that can reduce the potential for accidents or miscalculations that could derail the overall bilateral relationship[317]

India

In addition to China, India is the other major political and military giant in the USPACOM AOR. India is politically and militarily drastically different from (and often at odds with) China; it is the world's largest democracy in terms of population, as well as the third largest standing military in the world after China and the United States.[318]As a major regional power, India has long understood the potential of establishing and strengthening political and military ties with its neighbors – not only in its own neighborhood, but in the greater Indo-Asia-Pacific region as a whole, including in Southeast Asia, where it has had historical and cultural ties for centuries. In 1992, under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, India initiated a "Look East" policy, which was an effort to bolster India's strategic and economic ties with Southeast Asia, and an attempt to counter the influence of China in the region. More than two decades later, during the East Asia Summit in Myanmar in 2014, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi launched India's "Act East" policy. This initiative followed up on its predecessor, the Look East Policy, by taking a more proactive role and increasing India's economic and security engagements with nations in the Asia-Pacific Region. The "Act East" policy was launched around the same time as the United States' Rebalance to Asia-Pacific policy, and has similar goals, including increased strategic economic and security cooperation with Northeast and Southeast Asia.

According to the *Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy,* the U.S. sees a "strategic convergence" between India's "Act East" policy and the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region; the American strategic assessment also declares that the U.S. is seeking to "reinforce India's maritime capabilities as a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean region and beyond." The report adds: "Given our broad shared interests in maritime security, the Department has developed a three-pronged approach to maritime cooperation with India: maintaining a shared vision on maritime security issues; upgrading the bilateral maritime security partnership; and collaborating to both build regional partner capacity and improve regional maritime domain awareness."[319]

Key provisions in the *Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy; "*U.S. Approach to Maritime Cooperation with India":

- "First, the United States and India's shared vision for maritime security in the region is reflected in the January 2015 U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region. India and the United States affirmed the importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea. This Joint Strategic Vision and the September 2014 U.S.-India Joint Statement also called on all parties to abide by international law, including the Law of the Sea Convention, to resolve maritime disputes and to avoid the use, or threat of use, of force.
- "Second, the Department of Defense and the Indian Ministry of Defense are upgrading their bilateral maritime security partnership, through growing bilateral exchanges between military personnel and by engaging in military exercises. Recent visits to India by then-Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet Admiral Harry Harris and Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus have highlighted the importance of naval engagement to the overall defense relationship. To bolster operational maritime cooperation, India has

participated in the RIMPAC multilateral exercise, and the two sides conduct the annual flagship naval exercise MALABAR. Since 2007, the JMSDF also have participated when the exercise has taken place off the Japanese coast and near Guam. The exercise has grown in complexity and improved participating countries' abilities to operate together in a collaborative environment, and the Department is supportive of including other partners on a regular basis, hoping to see the return of previous partners in future iterations of the exercise. The Department is also actively working to support the Indian Navy through the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI). The two sides agreed to enhance maritime technology cooperation, in part, by forming a working group to explore aircraft carrier technology sharing and design.

- "Finally, both the United States and India are active in building regional partner capacity and maritime domain awareness (MDA) in the region. Both countries are contributing to these goals individually with other partners, and are mutually contributing to counter-piracy efforts in the Indian Ocean. The Department will continue to seek opportunities to consult with Indian counterparts about these efforts where possible. By doing so, the two countries will bolster the shared vision laid out by their respective governments and contribute to overall peace and security in the region."[320]

North Korea

Admiral Harris stated in his February 2016 USPACOM Posture Statement that North Korea remains "the most dangerous and unpredictable actor in the Indo-Asia-Pacific." He also said in the same document that North Korean leader Kim Jung Un and the regime of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) "regularly conduct provocative and escalatory actions," and continues to propagate an aggressive attitude in advancing its nuclear capability and ballistic missile programs.[321]The USPACOM Commander highlighted that in January 2016, just one month prior to the Posture Statement being delivered, North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test, the fourth since 2006, which violated its obligations and commitments under international law, including several UN Security Council Resolutions. Additionally, in February 2016, North Korea conducted a ballistic missile test under the guise of launching a satellite. Admiral Harris asserted that these tests, coupled with the unprovoked landmine attack on South Korean soldiers in the DMZ in August 2015, are the latest in a series of actions intended to destabilize the Korean Peninsula, challenge South Korean President Park's leadership, and raise tensions.[322]

North Korea's announcement on January 6, 2016 claiming to have successfully tested a hydrogen bomb[323] has made it less likely that the country will live up to its international obligations and return – despite urging from the international community – to authentic credible nuclear-disarmament negotiations under the Six-Party Talks framework. North Korea's unwillingness to discuss denuclearization commitments and its continuing nuclear tests make the regime an ongoing challenge to security and stability in the region. According to the CDRUSPACOM, North Korea is expected to continue ballistic-missile development, to include mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Admiral Harris also believes that North Korea will conduct missile launches and nuclear weapons tests in direct violation of several United Nations Security Council Resolutions, such as the short-range ballistic missile launches in March 2015 and the alleged testing of a hydrogen bomb in January 2016. North Korea has repeatedly

announced its intent to conduct "annual and regular" drills to advance this prohibited capability.[324] Furthermore, North Korea has been accused of engaging in cyber warfare to damage computer systems at U.S.-based civilian companies, such as the hack of Sony Pictures Entertainment in November 2014. North Korea continues to launch cyberattacks against South Korean military and civilian networks. According to CDRUSPACOM, "North Korea refuses to abide by the rules and norms of the international community and represents a clear danger to regional peace, prosperity, and stability."[325]

Regarding North Korea, the White House NSS states: "Our commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is rooted in the profound risks posed by North Korean weapons development and proliferation."[326] Furthermore, the *National Military Strategy* warns: "North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technologies also contradicts repeated demands by the international community to cease such efforts. These capabilities directly threaten its neighbors, especially the Republic of Korea and Japan. In time, they will threaten the U.S. homeland as well. North Korea also has conducted cyber-attacks, including causing major damage to a U.S. corporation."[327]

ASEAN

In addition to the individual governments of the countries of Southeast Asia, the *Association of Southeast Asian Nations* (ASEAN), as a collective organization, also acts as a major player in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. With ten members (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam), the combined populations of ASEAN member nations is approximately 625 million people, and as a single entity, would be the sixth largest economy in the world. The strategic and economic importance of ASEAN, as well as its security cooperation engagements with major powers around the world, including China, India, and the United States, makes ASEAN an integral and vital player in the USPACOM AOR.

The *Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy* reports: "ASEAN is an increasingly important DoD partner, and the Department is working to bolster its engagement with and support of ASEAN's efforts to promote peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. DoD actively supports the ADMM-Plus (Asian Defense Ministers' Meeting) Experts Working Group (EWG) on Maritime Security, which seeks to facilitate information sharing, establish best practices, and build standard maritime operating procedures among participating nations in order to reinforce norms of behavior and reduce the risk of conflict."[328]Further U.S.-ASEAN cooperation is evident in the Asia-Pacific maritime security strategy document's emphasis on the need to strengthen regional cooperation, such as the first U.S.-ASEAN Defense Forum that was hosted in Hawaii in April 2014. The report states:

"This dialogue provided an informal opportunity for candid discussion with our ASEAN counterparts about shared challenges in the maritime domain and the need for greater information sharing among ASEAN States. Following these discussions, U.S. Pacific Command hosted a follow-on workshop in May 2015 to discuss possible models of information sharing and opportunities for greater maritime collaboration among the United States and ASEAN countries. Participants from all ASEAN member countries recognized the significant threats that are now present in maritime Southeast Asia and identified the need not only to pursue a framework that enhances

maritime domain awareness – which would greatly bolster their ability to tackle those threats – but also to share information between and among countries in the region."[329]

As far as shared goals and interests, the document states that the DoD is "working to stay ahead of the evolving maritime security environment in the Asia-Pacific region to ensure continued freedom of the seas, deter conflict and coercion, and promote adherence to international law and standards. From the Indian Ocean to Northeast Asia, we are strengthening our military capability to promote stability and respond decisively to threats; enabling our network of allies and partners to address challenges in the maritime areas of the region; leveraging military diplomacy to promote trust, stability, and standards of behavior; and bolstering the ability of regional organizations to address shared maritime security concerns."[330]

2.5.5 U.S. Interests in USPACOM: Regional Security Issues

According to the Posture Statement delivered by Admiral Harris before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 23, 2016, the USPACOM AOR deals with a number of significant regional security issues and challenges, including strategic intent and acts of provocation in the region by actors such as North Korea, Russia, and China. Additionally, the commander of USPACOM must contend with the issues of territorial and maritime disputes, the effects of climate change and natural disasters, violent extremism, nuclear proliferation, and transnational crimes such as drug and human trafficking.

Territorial and Maritime Disputes

"The world is connected by shared spaces—cyber, space, air, and oceans—that enable the free flow of people, goods, services, and ideas. They are the arteries of the global economy and civil society, and access is at risk due to increased competition and provocative behaviors. Therefore, we will continue to promote rules for responsible behavior while making sure we have the capabilities to assure access to these shared spaces."[331]

The continued access to shared spaces, which includes freedom of navigation and freedom of the seas, is a concern shared by nearly all of U.S. official security strategy documents across government and military agencies. The challenge posed to freedom of navigation and freedom of the seas in terms of regional security issues is expressed in the NSS by highlighting the fact that territorial and maritime disputes increase the risk of military miscalculations and escalation, and pose a threat to this universally agreed upon freedom of access to shared spaces. The NSS states that the United States has, throughout its history, advocated for the freedom of the seas for economic and security reasons. The NSS also states:

"The United States has an enduring interest in freedom of navigation and overflight as well as the safety and sustainability of the air and maritime environments. We will therefore maintain the capability to ensure the free flow of commerce, to respond quickly to those in need, and to deter those who might contemplate aggression. We insist on safe and responsible behaviors in the sky and at sea. We reject illegal and

aggressive claims to airspace and in the maritime domain and condemn deliberate attacks on commercial passenger traffic." Specifically, "On territorial disputes, particularly in Asia, we denounce coercion and assertive behaviors that threaten escalation. We encourage open channels of dialogue to resolve disputes peacefully in accordance with international law. We also support the early conclusion of an effective code of conduct for the South China Sea between China and the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN).”[332]

The *Asia Pacific Maritime Security Strategy* highlights the importance of the freedom of navigation and freedom of the seas, regarding the Asia-Pacific domain, by pointing out its integral role in the global economy: "Maritime Asia is a vital thruway for global commerce, and it will be a critical part of the region’s expected economic growth. The United States wants to ensure the Asia-Pacific region’s continued economic progress. The importance of Asia-Pacific sea lanes for global trade cannot be overstated. Eight of the world’s 10 busiest container ports are in the Asia-Pacific region, and almost 30 percent of the world’s maritime trade transits the South China Sea annually, including approximately $1.2 trillion in ship-borne trade bound for the United States. Approximately two-thirds of the world’s oil shipments transit through the Indian Ocean to the Pacific, and in 2014, more than 15 million barrels of oil passed through the Malacca Strait per day."[333]

South China Sea

Arguably, the most significant of the contemporary disputes are the disputes over small islands and maritime territory in the South China Sea. Due to the significance of the disputed area to important trade and shipping routes and fishing areas in the region, and the number of competing claimants, as well as the presence of the armed forces of several nations in the area (including the U.S.), this dispute has the potential of having a negative impact on security and stability in the region.



Figure 2-21: Overlapping Claims in South China Sea Dispute.
Source: Wikipedia.[334]

Six major claimants – China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines – have overlapping territorial and maritime claims in the South China Sea, particularly over the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands. Additionally, Indonesia has also expressed its opposition to China’s claims over the Natuna Islands, which it claims as part of its own territory, but have been included by China in its maritime claims. Indonesia has announced that it will take China to international court over the issue.[335]

Oil and natural gas reserves in the area make it attractive to countries whose expanding economies need energy to stay powered through the twenty-first century. Defending shipping lanes in the Yellow, East China, and South China Seas, as well as in the Taiwan Strait, is crucial to national economies of the region; these countries rely almost exclusively on maritime shipping to import and export goods.

There has been a steady increase in military air and sea patrols in the area, and claimants appear to be asserting their claims through increased maritime activity, outpost and facility construction, and land reclamation. The 2016 USPACOM Posture Statement stated that "Chinese coercion, artificial island construction, and militarization in the South China Sea threaten the most fundamental aspect of global prosperity – freedom of navigation."[336] The previous Posture Statement, in 2015, stated that while no country appears to desire military conflict, an escalation due to a tactical miscalculation cannot be ruled out. The 2016 Posture Statement further noted that as the populations and economies of the South China Sea claimant nations continue to grow, access to the oil, gas, minerals, and fisheries within the South China Sea becomes more important.[337]

China has the broadest claim in the disputed territory with its self-proclaimed "Nine-Dash line" that covers almost the entire South China Sea. For China to achieve its long-term goal of asserting its claim over disputed maritime territory, it has been carrying out a strategy that includes expanding outposts through land reclamation, preventing other nations from establishing or maintaining outposts, exploring for natural resources in disputed waters, and increasing the presence of its naval and air forces through exercises and patrols. China's land reclamation activities and construction projects military outposts throughout the South China Sea include new buildings, more capable berthing space for ships, and – it is conjectured – an airfield on the Fiery Cross Reef, a project that is China's largest reclamation effort. The completion of these projects will give China a greater presence in the area, increase the period that military assets can remain there, and expand the areas covered by A2/AD systems.

Figure 2-22: Aerial view of Woody & Rocky Islands in the South China Sea, including airstrip that PRC calls Yongxing Island Airport. The island is also claimed by Taiwan and Vietnam. *Source: Wikipedia.*[338]

Figure 2-23: Satellite image from May 2015 shows PRC construction on Fiery Cross Reef, Spratly Islands, South China Sea. *Source: Wikipedia*.[339]

Examples of activities in which China has been engaged to support its long-term strategy in the South China Sea include attempts to prevent resupply missions from reaching the small Philippine garrison at Second Thomas Shoal, and efforts to exclude Philippine and other fishermen from the disputed Scarborough Reef. In 2013, China also moved an oil drilling platform into Vietnam's claimed Exclusive Economic Zone; this resulted in a tense standoff between Vietnamese and Chinese maritime assets. In January 2016, China landed civilian aircraft on its man-made airbase at Fiery Cross Reef. China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) is installing new or improved radars, communications systems, and other military capabilities at seven separate reclaimed bases in the area. CDRUSPACOM has asserted that the scale and scope of these projects are inconsistent with China's stated purpose of supporting fishermen, commercial shipping, and search and rescue.[340]

CDRUSPACOM has highlighted that while the United States does not take a position regarding territorial claims in disputed areas in the South China Sea, the U.S. does insist that any claims must be in accordance with international law as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention. Furthermore, the U.S. also continues to emphasize that maritime and territorial disputes must be resolved peacefully and opposes the use of intimidation, coercion, or force to assert such claims.[341]

East China Sea

Another maritime dispute involving China is in the East China Sea, where Japan and China both claim sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The disputed islands are known as the Diaoyu Islands by the Chinese, and as the Senkaku Islands by the Japanese. According to CDRUSPACOM's 2016 Posture Statement, China seeks to challenge Japan's administrative control over the islands by deploying warships into the area, sailing coast guard ships inside the territorial waters surrounding the Senkakus, and intercepting Japanese reconnaissance flights. While the United States does not take a position on ultimate sovereignty over the islands – as CDRUSPACOM has stated –the U.S. Government has long recognized Japanese administration of them. In April 2014, President Obama affirmed that Article V of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty includes the Senkaku Islands. CDRUSPACOM's Posture Statement has further emphasized the fact that China's behavior in the area has resulted in uncomfortably close encounters at sea, aggressive Chinese air intercepts of Japanese reconnaissance flights, inflammatory strategic messaging, and the no-notice declaration of a "Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone" in the East China Sea.[342].[343]

India-China

India and China are engaged in territorial and border disputes over two large and various smaller unconnected territories along their shared border. The westernmost, Aksai Chin, is claimed by India as part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, but is controlled and administered as part of the Chinese autonomous region of Xinjiang. The other large disputed territory, the easternmost, is administered by India as the state of Arunachal Pradesh, but claimed by China. The disputed border of this area is known as the McMahon Line, which was part of the 1914 Simla Convention between British India and Tibet, an agreement rejected by China.[344]

India-Pakistan

Following the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 and the creation of India and Pakistan, the two newly established states became involved in a territorial dispute, both claiming sovereignty over the area of Kashmir. Pakistanis believed that because the basis of the creation of Pakistan involved the Muslim-majority areas of South Asia separating from Hindu-majority India, that Kashmir should have become part of Pakistan since much of the population of Kashmir was – and continues to be – Muslim. India believed that the state should be included in India because its last leader under British rule agreed to join India. Thus, the two countries have fought two wars over the state, in 1947-48 and again in 1965. Reaching a stalemate and succumbing to international pressure, the two countries accepted a ceasefire, without a resolution to the dispute, one that remains a source of tension to this day. Pakistan currently controls roughly one-third of the state, referring to it as Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, while India controls the remaining territory as the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Nuclear Proliferation Issues

The illegal proliferation of materials and technology that are used to build and advance nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction – including ballistic missile systems and their infrastructure – remains a critical issue in the USPACOM AOR. Lax export control laws and inefficient enforcement in some countries

in the region have led to the proliferation of such materials, thus posing a global challenge. The proliferation issue is exacerbated by the fact that technology manufacturing sectors in countries in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region are rapidly developing, and many countries do not have effective export controls. CDRUSPACOM Harris has highlighted that the USPACOM AOR includes some of the busiest air and maritime ports in the world, "with shipments of proliferation concern likely passing through these ports almost daily." Underscoring the critical nature of the issue, he said that "Iran built its robust nuclear infrastructure and advanced its ballistic missile systems with materials that passed through the USPACOM AOR" and "North Korea continues to procure for its nuclear and ballistic missile programs and proliferate conventional arms for revenue generation, using a network of individuals and entities throughout the region."[345]

To address this issue, USPACOM actively works with partners in the region in capacity-building activities designed to improve export controls and improve capabilities to prevent proliferation. In August 2014, USPACOM hosted personnel from 31 nations as part of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Exercise Fortune Guard, which marked the beginning of a six-year series of exercises that various "expert" nations in the USPACOM region will host, including New Zealand, Australia, Singapore, Japan, South Korea, and the United States.[346][347] USPACOM promotes exercises such as Fortune Guard to provide nations a forum to "demonstrate the intention to act and share the best tactics against proliferators, emphasizing a whole-of-government approach to confront this complex challenge."[348]

Violent Extremism

VEOs such as ISIL and al-Qaeda are an ongoing challenge in various parts of the region, especially as ISIL attempts to attract and recruit radical militants from the USPACOM AOR. This VEO threat became evident in December 2015, when ISIL released a propaganda video in Mandarin Chinese that was specifically aimed at the Chinese-speakers, urging Chinese Muslims to "rise up" in armed conflict in their region.[349] According to former CDRUSPACOM Locklear's 2015 Posture Statement, "Current assessments indicate approximately 1,300 foreign personnel fighting alongside the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant are from the Indo-Asia-Pacific." He adds: "A small number of these combat-experienced fighters who return home could enhance the capability of regional extremist networks within the most densely populated areas of the world."[350]

In South Asia, al-Qaeda has increasingly focused its rhetoric against U.S. partners in the Indian subcontinent, including the September 2014 announcement by AQ Chief Ayman Al-Zawahiri that the terrorist organization had established a new arm called "Al-Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent" (AQIS), which aims to carry out attacks against the governments of not only Afghanistan and Pakistan, where the organization is believed to be based, but also against India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar (Burma).[351][352] Other Pakistan-based extremist militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and others continue to remain active in the Indian subcontinent. CDRUSPACOM Harris stated in his 2016 Posture Statement that attacks in Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Australia have underscored regional concerns about self-radicalized actors. He pointed out that "small but growing numbers of Bangladeshi, Indonesian, and Philippine extremists have pledged fealty to ISIL, and threats to host nation and Western interests are rising."[353]

Former CDRUSPACOM Locklear highlighted in his 2015 Posture Statement that in Southeast Asia, "regional partners maintain persistent pressure on extremist networks; however, competing security priorities in the region, coupled with the sensationalism of developments in the Middle East, have pressurized counter-terrorism attention," adding that "extremist groups are increasingly interconnected and the (USPACOM) region remains a potential safe haven, facilitation hub, and area of operations for extremists."[354]

Natural Disasters/ Climate Change



Figure 2-24: Asia-Pacific Region: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, 2005-2014. *Source: U.S. Department of Defense.*[355]

Natural disasters such as typhoons, cyclones, earthquakes, landslides, and tsunamis, along with other extreme weather phenomena, frequently occur in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Between 2004-13, the region accounted for over 40 percent of the world's reported natural disasters.[356] The tectonic plate structure along the rim of the Pacific Ocean has created the Pacific Ring of Fire, an area with an exceptionally high risk of earthquakes, volcanoes, and tsunamis. Furthermore, understanding the scope and severity of the effects of long-term climate change is a global responsibility, as storms and natural disasters increase in severity and frequency because of climate change.

Because a significant portion of the region's population lives in coastal areas, and the coastal regions consist of some of the most densely populated areas in the world, such disasters tend to be particularly deadly. Thus, in the event of a natural disaster, the large populations, dense living conditions, and poor sanitary conditions in the USPACOM AOR create prime conditions for the rapid spread of human- and animal-borne diseases.

Therefore, as natural disasters and diseases continue to create public safety and health and humanitarian issues in the region, it is imperative that U.S. forces quickly and effectively implement Humanitarian Assistance/ Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations whenever they are needed in the USPACOM AOR. CDRUSPACOM has stressed the importance of addressing these challenges, highlighting that USPACOM focuses on pre-crisis preparedness by carrying out training and exercises with allies and partners in the region. As part of this effort, USPACOM's Center for Excellence for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DM) works to increase readiness of regional governments to respond to

natural disasters. Many of the lessons learned and preparedness measures implemented after Typhoon Haiyan (Operation Damayan, November 2013) reduced damage and loss of life when Typhoon Hagupit struck the Philippines in 2014.

> "We are building on our own energy security—and the ground-breaking commitment we made with China to reduce greenhouse gas emissions—to cement an international consensus on arresting climate change." President Barack Obama, White House *National Security Strategy*[357]

Regarding taking on the challenge posed by climate change, the White House NSS states: "As the world's two largest emitters, the United States and China reached a landmark agreement to take significant action to reduce carbon pollution. The substantial contribution we have pledged to the Green Climate Fund will help the most vulnerable developing nations deal with climate change, reduce their carbon pollution, and invest in clean energy."[358]

Trafficking

Drug Trafficking

The Asia-Pacific region is one of the greatest illicit drug production and trafficking regions in the world, being a significant source or opium, heroin, methamphetamines, and amphetamine-type stimulants. The latter two illicit drugs continue to be the primary drug threat in the USPACOM AOR, according to CDRUSPACOM's Posture Statement in 2015.[359] While a majority of methamphetamine available in the United States comes into the country from Mexico, the Joint Interagency Task Force-West (JIATF-W) reports that 90 percent of the precursor chemicals used to produce Mexican methamphetamine come from China.[360]

Additionally, the "Golden Triangle," a lawless mountainous region in Southeast Asia in where the borders of Myanmar (Burma), Laos, and Thailand converge, is one of the world's biggest sources of illegal opium and heroin,[362] with Myanmar being the world's second largest producer of opium, after Afghanistan. The Golden Triangle is second in opium production only to the "Golden Crescent," the mountainous region spanning the border regions of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran.



Figure 2-25: Golden Triangle. *Source: Wikipedia.*[361]

Many points of concern arise due to the drug trade in the USPACOM AOR: in addition to the devastating impact widespread drug use has on a society, the revenue generated from these illicit activities is also used to fund terrorist and violent extremist organizations.[363]

Human Trafficking

In his 2016 Posture Statement, Admiral Harris, CDRUSPACOM, noted that nearly 36 million victims of human trafficking are estimated worldwide, and nearly two-thirds of these victims are from Asia, with

India, China, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Thailand among the countries with the highest human trafficking rates. Furthermore, Harris pointed out that women and children – especially those from the lowest socioeconomic sectors – are the most vulnerable demographics affected by the human trafficking trade. Roughly a quarter of these victims end up in the commercial sex trade, while others are forced into difficult and dangerous positions in factories, farms, or as child soldiers. Other young human trafficking victims are bound to families as domestic servants. Not only do human trafficking victims often suffer physical and emotional abuse and social stigmatization, they are also usually denied their basic human rights and freedoms. CDRUSPACOM has stated that "While much remains to be done, USPACOM forces, including JIATF-W, are building partner capacity and sharing intelligence to combat these transnational threats."[364]

2.6 USSOUTHCOM: Culture in Plans, Policies, and Strategies

2.6.1 U.S. Values in the U.S. National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy

The NSS and the NMS reflect the national and global interests of the United States. These interests are informed by the cultural values the United States has as cornerstones to its democracy and nation, with an interest in ensuring and maintaining a peaceful and safe *global* environment. Along with advancing the U.S. universal values around the world as stated in the NSS, the NMS states that the U.S. is focused on deepening economic and security cooperation in the Americas.

The NSS and the NMS are higher-level, national policy that reflect the U.S. interests. However, each unified CCMD in the globe has specific areas of interest that are shaped by the NSS and the NMS.

2.6.2 Influence of NSS and NMS on U.S. Southern Command-Security Strategies

The two documents mentioned above explain how the U.S. intends to protect its strategic interests of maintaining the global common good and respecting and preserving universal values. These interests shape and influence USSOUTHCOM's approach to security and can be found in the Posture Statement(s) issued by each GCC.

Each year, the commander of USSOUTHCOM testifies before the Senate Armed Services Committee as part of the command's annual statement to Congress.[365]Posture Statements from the past decade contain common U.S. interests and security issues in USSOUTHCOM's AOR. According to the most recent Posture Statement (March 2016), USSOUTHCOM's overall interests are:

- to protect our interests
- defend our homeland
- uphold the global common good
- advance security, good governance, and opportunity

America's interest in deepening economic and security relationships and cooperation with Latin America may not be a reciprocal goal or a priority of different countries in the region. Aside from the mixed positions countries may have on these two issues, the beliefs or approaches to economic and security relationships in this COCOM may differ from the U.S. approach. For example, many of the codes of ethics of Latin American armed forces share similar interests of defending their country's homeland, territory, independence, and sovereignty. However, governments may perceive the U.S. pursuit of "global common good" or "advancing good governance" as a violation of their rights. Thus, U.S. values and U.S. interests can clash directly with other countries' values, interests, or approaches to similar interests. This block will expand on the similarities and differences and impacts of cultural values on plans, strategies, and policies in USSOUTHCOM's AOR.

2.6.3 The Main Security Issues in USSOUTHCOM's AOR that Affect U.S. Interests

According to USSOUTHCOM's current combatant commander, Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, USN, USSOUTHCOM, continues to pursue "an era of inclusive engagement" and "advance our 'Partnership for the Americas'" by:[366]

- ensuring the U.S. remains the premier security partner of choice in this hemisphere
- deepening our interagency collaboration to generate heightened trust
- becoming the innovation platform for the DOD, interagency, and international partners
- enabling the critical transregional operations and initiatives of our sister COCOMs and interagency partners

USSOUTHCOM has four Command Priorities:

- Countering transnational organized crime (CTOC), including counterterrorism and counternarcotics efforts
- Building partner capacity and professional development (International Military Education Training [IMET])
- Human Rights Initiative (HRI), humanitarian assistance, and humanitarian and civic assistance programs
- Contingency planning and preparation (whose exercises include PANAMAX, Fused Response, Fuerzas Humanitarias, and Integrated Advance)

USSOUTHCOM is specifically concerned about the security environment due to:

- transnational criminal networks
- foreign terrorist fighters
- regional stability
- global competitors

USSOUTHCOM's current security threats in Latin America include:

- drug trafficking networks from South America to Central America to North America
- regional stability in Brazil, Haiti, and Venezuela
- migration crises from Central America, to Mexico, and the U.S.
- human rights violations
- natural disasters

Along with the four command priorities, USSOUTHCOM has multiple programs and initiatives (capacity-building efforts) such as the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and the State Partnership Program. USSOUTHCOM also conducts multinational exercises – such as UNITAS and Tradewinds – to build a strong inter-American system of persistent defense cooperation.

2.6.4 Values and Interests of the Major Actors in the Region

USSOUTHCOM's AOR

USSOUTHCOM's AOR does not include Mexico because Mexico is geographically situated in North America and is, therefore, part of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). However, Mexico has transnational security issues that impact the USSOUTHCOM AOR, as well as the U.S. Therefore, Mexico will be discussed in this block of the RCLF curriculum.[367]

Figure 2-26: Area of Responsibility USSOUTHCOM. *Source: USSOUTHCOM.*[368]

The USSOUTHCOM AOR does not include all dependent, sovereign, or integrated nations in the general geographic vicinity. For instance, there are dependent territories that are geographically located in the Caribbean, but are not in USSOUTHCOM's AOR: Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands, Montserrat, Navassa Island, Puerto Rico, Saint Barthélemy, Collectivity of Saint Martin, Sint Maarten, Turks and Caicos Islands, and the Virgin Islands of the United States. Some islands such as Martinique (France) and Bonaire (the

Netherlands) are fully integrated into other nations. The Bahamas is a sovereign state that is not included in USSOUTHCOM's AOR. These will not be discussed in this block, but are mentioned to reiterate that several different international actors are active in the Caribbean, and thus in USSOUTHCOM's AOR.

2.6.5 Overview of Military Regimes in USSOUTHCOM's AOR

Latin America has a complex history of state and military activity, and the cumulative effect of the colonial and eighteenth century political cultures – with some variations – resulted in deeply embedded authoritarian and militarist political institutions in the region.[369]

The strongest military powers in South and Central America are, in order of strength: Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, Chile, Ecuador, Bolivia, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Uruguay.[370] Brazil is considered the strongest and has a total of 2,130,000 active and reserve military personnel. Brazil allocated the equivalent of $31 billion to its defense budget in 2016.[371] Comparatively, the U.S. had a total of 2,118,000 active, guard, and reserve personnel, and allocated $585 billion to its defense budget in 2015.[372]

Several independent countries in Central America and the Caribbean do not have standing armed forces; these include Costa Rica, Dominica, Grenada, Haiti, Panama, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. There are also overseas territories that still rely on their colonial conquerors for defense and foreign relations, but they are internally self-governed. Examples are the Cayman Islands (the United Kingdom) and Curacao (the Netherlands). Aruba is an autonomous country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands and depends on the Dutch military for its defense. Because of the mix of sovereign nations and colonial authorities, the Caribbean is prone to diplomatic complexity.



Figure 2-27: Military Dictatorships in the Americas. *Source: CAOCL.*

In contrast to the United States' development of its military as an institution that protects the nation mainly from outside threats, Latin American militaries developed with a focus inward; this was because inter-state conflicts and regional wars with neighbors were an uncommon phenomenon.[373]This is the

reason why, in the twentieth century, many armed forces in the region commonly intervened in politics, presidencies, and militarily operated in their own territories.[374]

Military dictatorships were widespread in the Americas during the twentieth century. Most of these regimes were very repressive (Rafael Videla in Argentina, August Pinochet in Chile, and Alfredo Stroessner in Paraguay, to name a few) while others were less repressive (Guillermo Rodríguez in Ecuador, for example). Except for Honduras, there were no more military dictatorships in the USSOUTHCOM AOR by the mid-1990s. Therefore, Latin American governments in the 1980s and 1990s were dedicated to trying to subordinate the military to civilian control.[375] However, "the end of military rule did not abolish the prerogatives and the self-appointed role of the armed forces to deal with 'threats'… violent backlashes in response to social mobilization or 'upheavals' remain a common feature of post-authoritarian Latin America."[376]

Denizens of the USSOUTHCOM AOR remember the hardship of military dictatorships, and are therefore especially careful to preserve their hard-won democratic rights. The memories of these past dictatorships are painful and still linger, especially in Chile and Argentina. To this day, there is a lively debate within current governments and people about punishing these past abuses of power "for the health of its democracies" that took place during these periods in history.[377] The recent past also shapes economic relationships: the regional trade block of Mercosur requires that all its members have a democracy as a condition for membership.[378]Nonetheless, in the twenty-first century, many countries with armed forces in Latin America continue to use their militaries as regulators of civilian institutions. For example, Guatemala uses the military as a domestic law enforcement agency. Currently, there are more than 20,000 Guatemalan soldiers deployed throughout the country.[379]

Overview of Armed Forces in USSOUTHCOM

Although there are many security issues in the AOR, there have been only about five wars between states in the region in the last two centuries.[380]Therefore, the traditional mission of national defense against foreign enemies "never played an important role in Latin American history," and there is no tradition of warlike conflict between states in Latin America, even if there were "critical" relations between some states (such as Nicaragua and El Salvador).[381]

Even though states may not be at war with other states, standing armed forces exist to deal with internal (and external) threats to their respective nations: in the last two centuries, there has been a high number of internal state conflicts (civil wars, revolutions, and military interventions). With the end of the civil war between Colombia's ruling government and the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC) in 2016, North and South America became are the only continents on the planet that had no civil wars or cross-border conflicts with neighboring countries.

Modern armed forces were created in South America from 1860 to 1920/30 – where the military was oriented toward Europe, specifically France and Prussia, which included compulsory military service and military academies.[383] After 1920, South American militaries pursued a nationalistic policy and sought to create a strong state – therefore, the military "was an institution of the state to supervise political process with the silent permission to intervene in arising dangers of statehood."[384] Therefore, the concept of the nation was a formative value in many Latin American militaries, notably Mexico, Peru, Chile, Bolivia, and Uruguay. This concept is still prevalent today.

Figure 2-28: Mexican Paratroopers. *Source: Wikipedia.*[382]

In contrast, the creation and development of armed forces in Central America and the Caribbean – a process that started at the beginning of the 1900s – was strongly influenced by the United States. Central American militaries began as "a national guard with low manpower and an organization and equipment that seemed to be a special police force," which was connected to certain party rulers.[385]

The missions of armed forces within USSOUTHCOM's AOR have changed substantially since the 1990s. Through U.S. influence, "drug cultivation, environmental degradation, and terrorism were included in security concepts."[386] Today, many Latin American militaries are also deeply involved in UN peacekeeping missions.[387]

Armed Forces in Latin America and Peacekeeping

In South America, the "regional security subculture is historically anchored in the peaceful resolution of disputes and a pronounced predilection for multilateralism."[388] Except for Suriname and Guyana, the nations in the region were all, at one point or another, members of the League of Nations and founding members of the United Nations.[389]

After the end of military rule and the reestablishment of democratic governments and human rights, the armed forces of South American nations began "searching for new externally oriented missions and [they] are thus enthusiastic about peace operations.[390] Currently, peace operations training centers in the region "are a key conduit for notions of professionalism and civilian-military interaction and are the locus of contact between military peacekeeping culture and national military cultures." Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, and Brazil all currently have peace operation centers.[391] One of the more notable centers is the Latin American Association of Peacekeeping Operations Training Centers for Peace (ALCOPAZ),[392]founded in 2007 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.[393]Argentina and Brazil send the greatest number of peacekeepers and police on missions around the world.[394]



Figure 2-29: Brazil's *Uniformed* Personnel in UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1990-2016. *Source: Providing for Peacekeeping.* [395]

Other nations in Central America have also participated in similar UN peacekeeping training and missions. El Salvador has sent its troops to Western Sahara, Haiti, Darfur, Cyprus, Afghanistan, South Sudan, and the Ivory Coast. Guatemala has participated in UN missions in Haiti, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Darfur, Lebanon, South Sudan, Nepal, and the Ivory Coast. Honduras, albeit more limited, has also sent its military to participate in UN peacekeeping activities in Western Sahara.

Although Central America and South America have participated and created centers for peacekeeping training, it is important to keep in mind that countries and their constitutions have different mandates. For example, Mexico does not participate in such peacekeeping missions outside the country because the constitution bans its military from leaving Mexican territory unless war is declared. In 2014, the Mexican President decided Mexico's armed forces would be sent to participate in peacekeeping missions – but any permission for future peacekeeping must be approved by Congress.

Armed Forces' Values in Latin America

Libros Blancos and Security Plans and Policies in Latin America

Latin American countries write white books, or *libros blancos*, of national defense that present their respective national defense policies and strategies. Many of these white books focus on the idea of a regional approach to security and economic issues with other countries from the respective region. However, per U.S. diplomatic traditions and historic preferences, the U.S. favors bilateral approaches, such as Plan Colombia with Colombia and the Mérida Initiative with Mexico.

The Concept of Nation in Latin American Militaries

The U.S. NMS, NSS, and USSOUTHCOM Posture Statements reflect the concern of the American government to uphold the global common good, respect and preserve universal values, and advance security, good governance, and opportunity. However, these core values may or may not be shared or emphasized by the armed forces of countries in the USSOUTHCOM AOR.

The armed forces of most countries in Latin America were developed and currently serve to defend *la patria*, which includes the nation's sovereignty, territory, and independence.

La patria is a concept that has changed throughout history, but is a term commonly heard or said in Latin America.[396]During times of war during the nineteenth century, *la* patria (the territory, myths, military heroes, and values) was at stake. With independence from the Spanish colonies, came the creation of "new" *patrias* forged through visions of collective identity – alternative or overlapping versions of *la patria* existed (liberal or conservative, Catholic or pluralistic, centralist, federal, or confederal). Nations emerged after hundreds of conflicts – all in the name of some *patria* or other. Therefore, *patria* can have different meanings for different people and groups of people. Today, *patria* can refer to a culturally constructed notion of a "nation" that is united by culture, language, or a common history.[397]

Similar language can be found on army, navy, and air force websites, military academic texts, and official national histories.[398] Instead of an emphasis on the universal value of life, there is an almost-universal claim that national (Latin American) military institutions preceded the nation itself*;* this remains a strong element of military discourse and culture.[399]

"…The Army is born with the Nation… its preamble in times of Conquest." –Venezuela

"The National Army is born with the Patria. It is a foundational army…" –Uruguay

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Due to the colonial past and territorial wars in the USSOUTHCOM AOR, these values have cemented a strong nationalist identity that is often considered more important than other values, such as democracy or human life. This is reflected in the actions of military dictatorships and extreme leftist governments in Cuba (1961 – present) and Venezuela (2016 – present).

"I am a Peruvian, citizen of a democratic state, with a military vocation. I am a warrior, wearing the Peruvian Armed Forces' uniform. I have chosen to dedicate my life to defend the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Republic. I have rights and duties, therefore my actions will be performed with strict observance to the Political Constitution of Peru, with utmost respect to Human Rights."

Peruvian Armed Forces' Manual of Ethics, author's translation[400]

This quote from the ethics manual of the Peruvian armed forces emphasizes independence and the defense of the sovereignty and territory of Peru. Although it highlights the importance of human rights, this does not always translate to the actions of security forces while they are engaged in missions intended to maintain order.[401]

The Use of Violence by Latin American Armed Forces

Although websites and texts about Latin American militaries repeatedly reinforce the value of human life, in practice national pride, order, and sovereignty often take precedent in violent military interactions with the civilian populace. According to many official national histories, the national armies are "permanent guardians" who created their nations and continue to be responsible for defending against foreign intervention and internal strife.[402] However, the "use of force" differs in each country.

In Latin American societies affected by long civil wars, violence, and terror there is a widespread sentiment that "violence is seen as a normal option with which to pursue interests, attain power or resolve conflicts."[403]Violence in the twentieth century in Latin America was, "employed to gain access to, or to secure, political power," and the national ideology was built around nationalism where the military were actively incorporated in the nationalistic agenda: their role was to serve "as arbiters of national order, stability, and progress."[404]There have been international and public calls for more openness in the regions. There has also been a rise in anti-corruption legislation creating more transparency in the judicial process. Nonetheless, the use of violence by the armed forces against unarmed citizens, and the lack of due process thereafter, can be found in almost all countries in Central America, the Caribbean, and South America.

Cultures of Impunity and Controversial Civil-Military Relations

Friction between the United States and Latin American militaries stems from differing interpretations of an "appropriate" civilian-military relationship. This relationship is often reflected in provisions defined in national constitutions.[405] Latin American constitutions frequently include clauses that permit the suspension of civil liberties and other human rights in the event of national emergencies such as natural disasters or an insurgency.[406]

In this context, state governments and militaries have a reputation of overstepping their power and using excessive force to solve problems. Whether they use power legitimately or illegitimately remains a controversial issue. This topic is directly related to the broader issue of human rights and the complexity of military/civilian relationships. Many people in this region have lingering memories of paramilitary forces, killing squads, military coups, and extreme right- and left-wing dictatorships, and the violence that ensued because of them.

Some of the key disconnects between U.S. military law and Latin American law result from the oversight of immunity and privileges, military jurisdiction, and the misuse of power and authority. Latin American military jurisdiction stems from the tradition of the *fuero* – or, in the most simplistic terms, "immunity and privileges."[407] In contrast to the procedures established by the U.S. *Uniform Code of Military Justice*, under the *fuero,* construct military personnel must obey *any* order they receive without question or discussion, and they have individual immunity for any action carried out under such orders. This unquestioned obedience spurs many human rights violations committed in the region, and contributes to the "culture of impunity" that pervades many Latin American societies.[408]

A culture of impunity, or *impunidad*, is a term often used in relation to countries in Latin America and elsewhere. *Impunidad* refers to situations where human rights abuses remain unpunished, and where there is little observance of the rule of law; it also refers to structurally inefficient judicial systems in which crime and corruption is perpetuated.[409]

Distrust and Trust of Armed Forces in Latin America

There is a spectrum of distrust and trust of the military across the AOR where "(i)n spite of the large number of systematic human rights violations in some of these [military] regimes, empirical evidence shows that the Armed Forces in Latin America continue to be an institution with relatively high levels of trust."[410]

These are the Latin American countries where the military is highly trusted by the public: Mexico (70.8 percent), Brazil (68.1 percent), Dominican Republic (68.1 percent), Colombia (65.6 percent), and Chile (65.2 percent).[411] Latin American countries with the lowest levels of public trust toward their military forces are Honduras (51.9 percent), Paraguay (41.5 percent), and Argentina (36.3 percent).

In some countries, there is more trust in the military than in judicial and police structures. For example, polling has consistently shown that civilians in Mexico respect and "have more confidence in the armed forces than in police or the justice system."[412] This trust in the Mexican military can have adverse effects because "it is likely that the armed forces will continue to be tasked to carry out jobs that in other countries would be police or judicial responsibilities."[413]Not only are the armed forces professional and well-respected in Mexico, but many Mexicans depend on the armed forces for medical services, physical and human development, and disaster relief.[414] The challenge for Mexico is that it must strengthen its civil institutions so that the armed forces will no longer be required to perform these domestic missions.

2.6.6 Overview of Key Actors in the Region

Key local, national, and international state actors – as well as non-state actors – in these regions influence security, political, and economic relationships. The U.S. has focused on the major issues of drug trafficking, natural disasters, and regional instability as security issues. Many countries in the region also consider these to be major security issues.

Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs)

In this region, criminal organizations are major non-state actors that have significantly shaped USSOUTHCOM's priorities. Transnational and national criminal organizations can control or influence the economy, politics, and stability of a region. Guerrilla groups such as the Shining Path (Peru) and the FARC (Colombia), *maras* (Central America, the U.S.), and gangs (Mexico, the Caribbean, Central America, and South America) have impacted the region's social, political, and economic infrastructure.

Recommended Reading:

Christina Perkins and Erin Nealer. "Achieving Growth and Security in the Northern Triangle of Central America," *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, (December 2016),

https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/161201_Perkins_NorthernTriangle_Web.pdf

Violence, homicides, and human trafficking have reached extremely high numbers particularly in the so-called "Northern Triangle" countries of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. The situation in this area has been exacerbated by the human migration crisis. The issues are complex and interconnected. The fact that Central America is a transport hub for drugs from South America to North America only increases violence, corruption, and human displacement.



Sources: Instituto Universitario de Opinión Publica and Prensa Gráfica (El Salvador), Central America Business Intelligence, CABI and Policía Nacional Civil (Guatemala), Instituto Universitario en Democracia, Paz y Seguridad and El Heraldo (Honduras)

Figure 2-30: Homicide Rates in the Northern Triangle. *Source: WOLA.*[415]

Drug transshipment routes to the U.S. and Europe frequently traverse the Caribbean. Over the past three years, Colombia has increased its U.S.-bound drug trafficking through the Caribbean to avoid cartel violence, law enforcement officials, and the southwest U.S.-Mexico border.[416]Mexican and Colombian drug trafficking organizations rely on Dominican traffickers to serve as transporters and retail distributors of cocaine and heroin to Europe and other parts of the world.[417]

Some U.S. efforts in the region have been met with suspicion. Bolivia for example expelled the U.S. Ambassador in 2006 and the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Peace Corps in 2008 because the country perceived the U.S. as a force that sought to undermine its government's legitimacy – particularly regarding its fight against cocaine production and increasing coca leaf eradication efforts. Although the U.S. continues to try to tackle these security issues, criminal organizations which have infiltrated social institutions and can be a part of the culture of many of the countries in the AOR.

Since pre-Colombian times, Bolivia views the coca leaf as an element of cultural heritage while the U.S. approaches it as the root of cocaine production that comes into the United States. In the high-altitude mountains of the Andean Region (Peru, Bolivia) and lowlands of the Amazon (Bolivia and Colombia), 98 percent of the global land area where coca is planted.418 Although Bolivia was a friend of the U.S. until the 1990s and pursued the eradication of cocaine through U.S. directed programs, today it vehemently rejects U.S. presence in its country and any 'demands' and what President Evo Morales calls 'blackmail', from the U.S.

In contrast, Colombia has been an avid partner of the U.S. in the eradication of cocaine production. Colombia has welcomed and participated in Plan Colombia, a U.S.-funded plan aimed to solve drug trafficking and internal conflict, for 15 years.[419]

Plan Colombia is a bilateral partnership between Colombia and the United States that "combined security, governance, social, and economic interventions to improve security and create lasting change in the country."[420] In 2016, the 50-year long civil-war between the government and the guerrilla FARC came to an end.

Global Competitors: China and Russia

China

USSOUTHCOM views China as "as a global power capable of challenging U.S. leadership and the established rules-based international system,"[421] with a "primary focus on trade and investment… [that] seeks to forge security relationships as part of its strategy to increase its influence in the region."[422] China's "(m)ilitary engagements tend to focus on soft-power," with offers of training in Beijing and donations of equipment. During May-June 2015, a Chinese Naval Hydrographic Survey Ship made port stops in Brazil and Ecuador.[423]The Chinese government views the "China-Latin America relationship as one based on economic benefits rather than an attempt to project political influence."[424]

Recommended Reading:

Jordan Wilson. "China's Military Agreements with Argentina: A Potential New Phase in China-Latin America Defense Relations," *U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,* (November 2015), http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%27s%20Military%20Agreements%20with%20Argentina.pdf

Sam Wang. "China and Latin America in 2016," *Council on Hemispheric Affairs*, (August 2016), http://www.coha.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Sam-Wang-China-LA-Final.pdf

Newly-developed trade relationships are neither perfect nor static, and can change with the election of different governments. For the past decade, China has strengthened its economic ties with countries that have had leftist governments, such as Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, and Peru. However, some countries in Latin America have recently shifted to center-right governments, such as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru. This trend marks the end of the so-called "pink tide," or the left-leaning elected governments from 1998 to 2014 in Latin America. The trend could also lead to new dynamics between China and South America. A poll conducted in 2014 indicated that people in Latin America viewed the U.S. more positively than China, with a 65 percent approval rate of the U.S., and a 48 percent approval rate for China.[425]

Russia

Russian influence in the Western Hemisphere is a concern for the United States. In 2013, Rafael Ramírez, president of *Petróleos de Venezuela,* S.A. (PDVSA), announced that, by 2021, PDVSA and Russia would together produce enough oil to render Russia "the biggest petroleum partner of our country." Russian companies are already producing more oil in joint projects with PDVSA than their Chinese counterparts.[426]

There is suspicion that this Russian economic activity is merely a "cover" for weapons deals and corruption. In 2008, Russian President Vladimir Putin sent a nuclear-powered warship and bombers to Venezuela.[427] From 2012 to 2015, Russia sold $3.2 billion in arms to Venezuela. Later, in 2014, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro pledged another $480 million to purchase 12 Sukhoi-30 jetfighters and to upgrade existing Sukhois.[428]

Recommended Reading:

Brenda Fiegel. "Growing Military Relations between Nicaragua and Russia," *Small Wars Journal*, (December 2014), http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/growing-military-relations-between-nicaragua-and-russia

Thomas W. O'Donnell. "Russia is Beating China to Venezuela's Oil Fields," *Americas Quarterly,* (January 2016), http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/russia-beating-china-venezuelas-oil-fields

Due to their connections to Cuba, Venezuela and Bolivia have developed strong relations with China and Russia, and do not consider the U.S. an ally. These two countries perceive the U.S. as an imperialist power and as a major security threat seeking to override their own national sovereignty and their governments' legitimacy. These feelings stem from historically opposite world views with the U.S. that heightened during the Cold War and have strengthened in recent years.

By contrast, some Latin American countries maintain a relationship with China or Russia and with the U.S. One notable example is Peru, which maintains economic, political, and military relationships with the United States, China, and Russia. Peru has a strong political and security relationship with the United States, and advocates a pro-trade, free-market economic policy;[429] but uses and primarily purchases Russian military equipment, and sends personnel to Russia for military training and education. In recent years, China has become the most important investor in Peru's mining sector.[430] Despite this balance, security issues, particularly those of drug trafficking and international terrorism, have been sources of conflict in the past, and have at times affected the country's relationship with the U.S. This has occurred in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia.[431]

Regional Organizations and Defense Cooperation: South America

In South America, the de-securitization of relations in the late 1970s and early 1980s "contributed to the process of democratization in the region…democratic governments further strengthened the idea of regional economic integration and security cooperation."[432]Thus, there are bilateral initiatives between countries in the region, such as the Brazil-Argentina strategic partnership (2003) and Chile-Peru joint security and defense committee (2001), among others.[433]

Founded in 1948, the Organization of American States (OAS) is the world's oldest regional organization. Currently, the OAS membership includes all 35 independent states of the Americas, and has granted permanent observer status to 69 states and the European Union. The mission of the OAS is to achieve "an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their independence."[434]

The OAS focuses on democracy, human rights, security, and development in the Americas. In Latin America, the OAS "has suffered from being regarded as a Washington-dominated institution, suffering from a severe lack of qualified personnel and adequate resources…. Is viewed by those who know it best as a bureaucratic tangle at the lowest common denominator."[435] Latin American governments that have left-leaning governments "usually regard it as a destination for diplomats on the verge of retirement, troublemakers and politicians that the government of the day wants out of the country."[436]Its security agency, the Inter-American Defense Board and College (IADB) is also regarded by these countries as irrelevant by many Latin American governments with left-leaning political views such as Bolivia and Venezuela.

Recommended Reading:

Pía Riggirozzi, Andrew F. Cooper, Rodrigo Páez Montalbán, Jessica Byron and Oliver Stuenkel. "Re-Thinking the OAS: A Forum," *Americas Quarterly,* (Winter 2015), http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/re-thinking-oas-forum

Ryan Evan Ellis, "The New Phase of "Constitutional" Struggle in Venezuela," *Strategic Diplomatic Relations,* (March 27, 2016),

http://strategic-diplomatic-relations.blogspot.com/2016/03/dr-r-evan-ellisthe-new-phase-of.html

Juliana Bertazzo, "New Regionalism and Leadership in Brazilian Security and Defense Policy," *Centro de Estudios Hemisféricos de Defensa,* (July 27-31, 2009), http://www.fes-seguridadregional.org/images/stories/docs/4986-001_g.pdf

The Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) is an intergovernmental organization based on the idea of social, political, and economic integration in Latin America and the Caribbean. ALBA was proposed by the government of Venezuela, and firmly established by the country's now-deceased president, Hugo Chávez. There are currently 11 member states in ALBA.

The Union of South American States (UNASUR) is an intergovernmental regional organization that is "part of a regional security governance in Latin America"; it includes 12 South American nations. With UNASUR, South American leaders sought to "create a region that is integrated in terms of culture, politics, economic, society, environment and infrastructure, and that reflects a specific South American identity."[437] Despite the language and histories that South American countries may share, the "trade and infrastructure links are poor, and its nations are prone to constant quarrelling."[438]

Most regional organizations such as ALBA and UNASUR were intentionally created to exclude the participation of the U.S. and to pre-empt the OAS initiatives and mandate. The UNASUR and OAS face challenges due to an overlapping of security conceptions and practices that can lead to less effective procedures and strategies.

The South American Defense Council (CSD), an agency of UNASUR modeled on NATO and a Brazilian initiative in 2005,[439] is responsible for "putting into action defense policies in military cooperation, humanitarian action, peace operations, industry and defense education and technology training."[440] This

body is meant to "promote confidence building and the introduction of a rational use of the continent's security component."[441] Specifically, the CSD's objectives are to:

- guarantee a South American zone of peace
- shape a common vision of defense
- discuss regional positions in multilateral forums on defense
- cooperate regionally in matters of defense
- support demining, and provide prevention and relief assistance to victims of natural disasters[442]

Nonetheless, even with these regional security approaches, distrust still exists between several South American countries, caused by a legacy of rivalry and unresolved border disputes.[443]

The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) consists of 33 sovereign states. CELAC aims to develop better integration within Latin America.

Clash of Approaches and Interests

Relations between countries in this region can be historically, politically, geographically, and socially complex. Generally, regional threats that pose the greatest challenge to U.S. interests in the USSOUTHCOM AOR include Chinese "outreach" in Latin America, the increased presence of Russia, regional security challenges, and the possible impact of Venezuelan instability in the region.

Geopolitics and Security in Latin America

The U.S. was involved in the development of security doctrines in response to the Cuban Revolution of 1959. U.S. policy concerning Latin America changed in the mid-1980s when issues such as "international drug-trafficking, democratization of the Latin American states, proliferation of nuclear weapons, free trade agreements and illegal migration" were added to the agenda.[444]

The U.S. influenced the armed forces, especially their actions toward communism, left-leaning political ideologies, and populism.[445] U.S. influence increased substantially after World War II – which boosted the region's military due to the increased risk of instability. During that time, U.S. concerns shifted from anti-fascism to anti-communism. The economic crisis of the 1980s, the end of the Cold War, and growing multilateralism have eased military competition and bilateral tensions.[446]In the late 1990s and early 2000s, left-leaning governments rose to power through anti-neoliberal policies, thereby strengthening a wave of left-leaning governments – a regional political trend commonly referred to as the "pink tide."

Latin America's left-leaning policies during the 1990s and 2000s are again changing, with the political atmosphere generally shifting toward the right. Although Ecuador, Venezuela, and Bolivia remain extremely leftist governments, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and Peru have been reverting to the center-right and conservative economic policies.

Rejection and Perception of the U.S.

A complicated past marked by U.S. interventions has led many Latin Americans to believe that the U.S. has historically undermined leftist governments and supported right-wing military coups. Some Latin American countries perceive the aggressive advancement of U.S. values like democracy and good governance in the region as possible violations of their sovereignty or independence.

In 2000, the CIA released information confirming that the Agency instigated a coup in 1970 against the recently elected, Leftist-leaning President Salvador Allende of Chile. (The CIA believed that Allende's election was not valid because he had failed to win an absolute majority, as required in the Chilean constitution.)[447] Although the U.S. was not involved with the 1973 military coup that lead to Augusto Pinochet's brutal dictatorship, the CIA was aware of the preparations that preceded the military coup and of the human rights violations that took place afterward; the Agency also continued to support of pro-Junta propagandists.[448]

The CIA's involvement in Chile and other parts of Latin America had a ripple effect of distrust against the U.S. in the minds of the citizens and governments in Latin America. This has strengthened some anti-American sentiment, and it has also fortified the commitment to protecting national sovereignty.

2.6.7 U.S. Approaches and Interests in Central America and South America

In South America, Central America, and the Caribbean, regional security cooperation efforts tend to be organized into further focalized approaches, from regional to subregional. For example, the U.S. has security initiatives in crucial areas of interest defined by geographic, economic, and security dynamics, such as the Alliance for Prosperity, the Central American Regional Security Initiative, the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, and the Merida Initiative.

Overview of U.S. Security Influence in the USSOUTHCOM AOR

The U.S. has been involved in several economic and security initiatives to address TCOs, drug trafficking, human trafficking, and border control in the Caribbean, Central America, and South America. Nonetheless, "economic exchange remains the most enduring and measurable dimensions of U.S. relations and influence in the region."[449]The U.S. is the most important economic partner in the region, but in Central America and the Caribbean, "U.S. investments are by far the most dominant as opposed to South America."[450]

The plan for the Alliance for Prosperity (AFP) "is a comprehensive strategy to promote economic growth and security throughout the region" – the plan sets forth an appropriate vision for transformation in the countries of the Northern Triangle.[451] El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras produced the plan for the AFP in 2014. These three countries welcomed the strategic intervention and partnership with the U.S. and other donors. In 2016, the U.S. Congress committed $750 million to the AFP.[452]

The Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) is an "integrated, collaborative regional security and rule-of-law program that strives to create a more stable, safe, and cooperative Central America in order to reduce threats to the region and the U.S." that the U.S. launched in 2008.[453] CARSI specifically focuses on the prevention of gang violence, reducing narcotic and arms trafficking, border security, and building partner capacity within law enforcement and justice sectors.[454] CARSI coordinates local programs such as *El Salvador Seguro* ("A Safe El Salvador"), which has helped reduced homicides by an average of 30 percent in 10 pilot municipalities since 2014. Other successes include Honduras, where the number of homicides has been cut in half in some of the most dangerous neighborhoods.

Along with CARSI, the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) is "one pillar of a U.S. security strategy focused on citizen safety through the Caribbean" that brings together the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Dominican Republic to collaborate with the U.S. as a partner.[455]

The Merida Initiative is "an unprecedented partnership between the U.S. and Mexico to fight organized crime and associated violence while furthering respect for human rights and the rule of law" that began in 2008.[456] This bilateral initiative is "based on principles of common and shared responsibility, mutual trust, and respect for sovereign independence."[457] This partnership includes Mexico's implementation of justice sector reforms, police capacity-building courses, establishment of anti-corruption programs, ongoing engagement with the government of Mexico, air mobility of Mexican police forces, providing training and equipment for the detection of illicit goods, and establishment of cross-border telecommunications between 10 U.S. and Mexican border sister cities, among other activities.[458] So far, the U.S. Congress has dedicated $2.5 billion to the Merida Initiative.

Overview of U.S. Economic Interests in Latin America

The U.S. has focused on strengthening economic ties and growth in the USSOUTHCOM AOR. This is evidenced by:

- bilateral free-trade agreements with Peru and Chile; the U.S. has also signed (but not implemented) trade agreements with Colombia and Panama
- the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), enacted in 1994 with Canada and Mexico
- the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), signed in 2005

However, countries with bilateral economic ties with the U.S. can face repercussions. The Obama Administration focused on bilateral relations with many countries in Latin America; thus, many of the security efforts are bilateral or have a regional approach. However, new initiatives could antagonize regional organizations, such as UNASUR and ALBA. Tensions could also arise between neighbors in the region because of one country's cooperation with the U.S.

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3 Cultural Variability in Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Environments

3.1 Introduction to Cultural Variability in Operations

In previous RCLF blocks – OB2/EB3, OB3/EB4, and OB4/EB5 – you studied culture general concepts and skills enabling military personnel to understand and work effectively with and among civilian and military populations in foreign areas of operations. You gained knowledge about how culture is often a factor in operations among civilian populations and in collaboration and cooperation with foreign military personnel. These missions involve working with local populations – civilian, military, insurgent, et cetera.

Many operations, however, require Marines work with other personnel and organizations that are not local, but are nonetheless deployed in the AO on missions similar to, or complimenting, the Marine Corps mission. These organizations range from humanitarian organizations delivering supplies and services to the local population, to international organizations addressing specific problems in the AO, to U.S. State Department personnel, to personnel from other branches of the U.S. military. In other words, Marines frequently participate in joint, interagency, and multinational operations. Operating in the same AO and working with the same local population, these diverse organizations have no choice but to create some cooperation and collaboration mechanisms that facilitate their missions. Thus, in addition to understanding and navigating the culture of the local population, U.S. Marines need to understand the cultures of the other organizations and personnel deployed to their AO.

This Chapter includes five sections. Each section includes a case study on cultural variability in operations within the five GCCs. Prior to reading the case studies, please read the following:

Rubenstein, Robert A. (2008). Peacekeeping under Fire: Culture and Intervention. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Press, pp 104-122. This is Chapter 7 of the text entitled, “Organizational Cultures and Peacekeeping.” ISBN-13: 978-1594515477.

To promote ease of access, a scan of the chapter follows.

7

Organizational Cultures and Peacekeeping

I was well into my second year of fieldwork at UNTSO, OGE when I began to hear grumbling from my informants about the present and previous leaders of both the observer group and of UNTSO. From a methodological perspective, it was not surprising that it had taken a long time for the military observers to warm up to me and to begin speaking candidly with me. It took considerable time to build rapport with members of a group, some of whose reactions upon meeting me, and learning that I would be doing an anthropological study among them, were suspicion and hostility thinly veiled by humor.

At the time that my informants began offering their complaints and critical assessments of their leaders, I was caught somewhat off guard. Not having a military background, and sharing in the general anthropological bias that allows our field to totalize and essentialize militaries in a way that would be unacceptable for other groups we study, I had the naïve belief that militaries participated in a common culture and that their similar structures implied common methods of acting.[1] As well, literature on military and diplomatic communities often downplayed the importance of culture for those participating in technical endeavors like diplomacy, military services, or multilateral institutions.

So I was surprised when one of my informants, a French captain, reflected on the differences he was experiencing in the way leadership was enacted in OGE compared to what he had experienced in his own army. He found the relationships between junior and senior officers in UNTSO to be much more relaxed and informal than in the French army. He worried that although he found this informality personally pleasant, making for a good social environment, it would make responding to a dangerous situation somewhat problematic. He suggested that "in case of emergency—and I mean if we are in danger to be shot at, to be bombed—those links among us would need to be tighter."

Another French officer observed that he too felt that the level of informality at UNTSO was greater than would be tolerated in the French army. He continued that although this offered no problem for him,

> If it had been reversed . . . probably, if the chief here would be French, I think some people, British, Anglo-Saxon people, American people, would find some problem—relationship problems—with a French officer. For example, one thing is that it is very amazing for a French officer to be called by his first name. We are not used to that in the French army. No. . . . And it's quite interesting seeing the chief very close to us. We can talk to him. I don't want to say that in the French army we can't talk, but the relationship is very much: there's the chief, there's the other [hand gestures showing one above the other].

In fact, it was not long before his supposition was confirmed. An American military observer independently raised the topic of leadership during one of our talks and described with considerable disappointment his experience working in a unit that had been commanded by a French colonel. About that colonel the military observer said,

> The French colonel had a different manner. He very consciously separated the French from the rest of us. . . . The French colonel was very much standoffish. And it was very hard to get them into any social activities at all, other than Friday night social affairs. The colonel had certain military expectations which maybe make sense for the French Army, and in particular the Foreign Legion, which was his background, but given the way the US army fills these slots these were unreasonable expectations. . . . He wanted me to know Arabic. He was very disappointed that I spoke no Arabic. He was disappointed that I didn't have a second language. . . . Even when he spoke to me the first time, he would lapse into French while he spoke to me. So, you knew automatically that I was a second-class citizen with him because I was neither a French speaker nor an Arabic expert.

As I heard more about these issues, I was tempted to think that they were just an expression of the tensions that emerge periodically between the Francophone and Anglophone worlds. Just as I was beginning to think this was the case, a Soviet military observer and I chatted over beers, and he expressed deep exasperation about his experience with the chief of the observer group. He was confused and upset and angry, he told me, because the chief had just chewed him out about his use of a United Nations vehicle for personal purposes. He acknowledged that this was an infraction of the rules but didn't understand why the chief had taken him to task, because earlier in the week they had sat

together in the very bar where we were now speaking, addressed each other by first name, and discussed personal and family matters. It was very odd, he told me, that a friend should treat him like that.

Peace operations bring together diverse actors: military officers and enlisted personnel from different services, agents of NGOs of varying scope and size, international civil servants, and individual "citizen diplomats," all of whom have different national, institutional, and personal backgrounds. In any encounter that includes such diversity, tensions and conflicts can be expected to arise.[2] When the sources of these conflicts result from mismatches about, for example, expectations of what action is appropriate, the speed and directness with which responses should be made, or the motivations that guide action, it is likely that some component of these conflicts is the result of cultural differences.

In the same way, peace operations bring the actors in the heterogeneous mission into contact with local populations. These local populations often draw upon cultural backgrounds different from those of the operation and its members. The potential for culturally based misunderstanding and conflict are increased. Participants in peace operations must therefore be equally aware of the local cultures of the people with whom they deal.

In this chapter, I return the focus to the dynamics at the group level. I discuss especially how organizational cultures affect the interaction among actors in a mission. Drawing on my discussion of culture in chapter 3, I consider some ways that culture affects peacekeeping on the ground and look at how these considerations have been approached. An additional level of complication results from the fact that the perception and legitimacy of peace operations at the macrolevel are affected by how those operations are viewed by both local populations and the international community. These views are influenced by the local-level interactions between peacekeepers and local populations as well as interactions among the military and civilian components of peace operations (see chapter 8).

The challenge facing peace operations resulting from the cultural diversity that they embrace is so great that it has been the focus of considerable discussion. Military components of peace operations increasingly find that they must cooperate with NGOs, IGOs, and agencies of national governments that are also working in the mission area. Indeed, General Sir Michael Jackson, the chief of the General Staff of the British Army, asserts that success in peace operations depends upon the integration of military and civilian efforts: "Success in any stability operation depends on weaving the various civilian and military lines of effort together like strands of a rope."[3] The interactions among these different organizations has at times been quite problematic. As a result, some effort has been spent on preparing military peacekeepers for their encounters with the cultures of these other organizations.

One approach has been to list presumed cultural differences between military and nonmilitary organizations as dichotomies. For example, table 7.1 sets out some generalizations about organizational cultural differences between these groups as described by US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke. The distinctions in the table are intended to show the contrasts between how militaries do business and how NGOs and IGOs do business. They were offered in the context of training for military personnel about to embark on peacekeeping missions. In a similar but more extended effort, the United States Institute of Peace compiled two editions of a book of brief general descriptions of NGOs, IGOs, the military, and government agencies involved in peace operations. These books also include brief descriptions of the characteristics of individual agencies and organizations. And they contain brief descriptions of what they term the "culture" of these organizations. Both guides provide suggestions for additional resources, divided by subject area—for example, economics, governance, and peacemaking—but neither provides suggestions about where to find further information on organizational cultures.[4]

Table 7.1: Generalizations about Military and Civilian Organizational Cultural Differences

Military	IGOs/NGOs
• Closely controlled	• Independent or semi-independent
• Hierarchical	• Decentralized
• Well resourced	• Minimally staffed, under resourced
• Extensive doctrine/standard operating procedures	• Few standard practices
• Short term	• Long term
• Culturally insensitive	• Culturally aware
• Precise, predictable	• Creative, unpredictable
• Highly accountable	• Little accountability
• Expeditionary, quick	• May already be in the area of operation
• One constituency	• Multiple constituencies
• Comfortable with status quo	• Idealistic change agents
• Appreciate precise tasks	• Thrive on ambiguity
• "Carries the flag"—well-defined official status and national identity.	• IGOs usually have official status; NGOs usually have no official status.

Compiled from *Civil Military Relations: Working with NGOs* (video) (Washington, DC: InterAction, 2002.

On first consideration, efforts such as these seem quite useful. They appear to move the discussion of culture away from the surface cultural elements that are the focus of the cross-cultural engagement found in travelers' advice (see chapter 1) to look at deeper aspects of culture. Unfortunately, these descriptions have the characteristics of stereotypes, and so treat culture as unchanging,

shared by all members of a group, and determining behavior. This can have the untoward effect of giving people who use them a false sense of competence in dealing with members of other organizations. So, while descriptions like those offered by Ambassador Holbrooke and in the United States Institute of Peace handbooks initially seem helpful, when they are taken as accurate guides for dealing with individual members of IGOs and NGOs, they do not enable peacekeepers to generate culturally appropriate responses to novel situations.

Thus, even to the extent that having a handy catalog of information about some of the actors in peace operations is useful, it is inherently limited. Because the cast of characters in peace operations changes constantly, there is no way to develop an inventory of all of the actors involved in those operations.[5] Rather, even at this level the only really useful way to approach organizational cultural differences is an analysis that engages the dynamic, partially shared, dispositional nature of culture.

Cultural Styles and Dimensions

In their attempts to move beyond the surface manifestations of culture, researchers who study intercultural encounters have developed a number of approaches for diagnosing culture-based conflicts. As a result, there are many schemes for understanding how and why culture affects interactions among different groups. All of these frameworks seek to describe groups in terms of cultural styles or dimensions.[6] Importantly, each derives from empirical research: comparative analysis of ethnographies, organizational surveys, or psychological analysis. Five of these frameworks are commonly encountered in discussions of international affairs and widely applied to training for peacekeeping missions and other areas of professional military education: (1) narrative resources and verbal style, (2) culture and context, (3) thinking and reasoning styles, (4) information processing styles, and (5) management of power and social relations. I review these briefly here because they are an important but, as I discuss in the next chapter, still incomplete advance in understanding culture and peacekeeping.[7]

In the following discussion, the dimensions, and their presentation in tables displaying contrasts in styles, implies a kind of dualism among groups. The researchers who use these dimensions to discuss cultural differences often array groups along a continuum, the ends of which are represented by the cultural extremes. When this is done, the dimensions are still used to mark out static, homogeneous, patterns. However, as I discuss in the next section of this chapter, the dimensions can also be reframed so that they become analytic categories for interpreting observed behavior rather than categories for describ-

ing collectivities of people. This reframing allows the cultural dimensions to be put to the service of more dynamic understandings of culture.

Looking for culture-based differences in the narrative resources and verbal styles used by different cultural groups results from the observation that groups use language differently. Some groups place special value on verbal skill, using it as a unique element of a person's reputation, while other groups do not. Based largely on the theoretical work of anthropologist Edward Hall, researchers distinguish between two styles of speech; direct and indirect. Table 7.2 shows the contrasting characteristics associated with each style.

Table 7.2: Narrative Resources and Verbal Style

Indirect	Direct
• Tend to be silent more often	• Value self-expression
• Use ambiguous language	• Value verbal fluency
• Avoid saying "no" to others to maintain harmonious atmosphere	• Express opinions directly

Differences in language use are most often said to distinguish Western from non-Western speech habits. It is also possible to see such differences between military language and diplomatic language: the directness and "transparency" preferred by military planners contrasts with the diplomatic preference for ambiguity and more "flowery" presentation.

A second culture-based style difference often noted is variation in the importance cultures assign to context in social relations. This dimension interrelates with preferences for particular narrative styles. The distinction is drawn between high- and low-context cultural groups. Table 7.3 outlines the characteristics of each style.

Table 7.3: Culture and Context

High-Context	Low-Context
• Attend to nuance and nonverbal cues	• Explicit content of message primary
• Polychronic	• Monochronic
• Collectivist	• Individualistic
• Concern with maintaining or saving face	• Tell it like it is

High-context cultural groups promote collective interests over individual interests and striving for harmony and action through consensus as ultimate goals. As a result, great attention is paid to nonverbal cues and situational nuance; multiple activities and agendas are pursued at one time; and care is given to avoid embarrassing others. In contrast, low-context cultural groups privilege individual interests over those of the group, and efficient, effective

action is more valued than is maintaining group harmony. The result is an expectation that people say what they mean and mean what they say, letting the chips fall where they may. This distinction is classically applied to cultural differences between Americans and Japanese or Egyptians, or between organizations that highly regard individual acts of initiative and those that seek consensus before proceeding.

A third, related, difference is said to be found in thinking and reasoning styles associated with cultural groups. Table 7.4 shows the extremes of the characteristics of thinking and reasoning styles.

Table 7.4: Thinking and Reasoning Styles

Nonlinear	Linear
• Reasoning process indirect • No search for measurement • No external truth	• Logic and rationality • Search for objective truth • Discovery of external truth

Differences in thinking and reasoning styles are used to account for a variety of cross-cultural misunderstandings. Persuasion is often an important feature of peace operations. Especially in concert with culturally conditioned expectations about verbal style, styles of thinking and reasoning contribute to the success or failure of persuasive efforts. For example, Americans are said to find accounts that provide a direct presentation of a logical argument bolstered by independently verifiable, objective measures to be most persuasive. In contrast, Arabic speakers report finding such arguments sparse and unconvincing, requiring in addition that their interlocutors' presentation display, through linguistic conventions, their personal commitment to (and belief in) what they are talking about. Anthropological linguist Barbara Johnstone Koch demonstrated that one characteristic of this Arabic persuasive style is repetition and presentation in slightly different ways of the claims that are being asserted.[9]

The danger of a mismatch in such an exchange is not simply that one party will fail to persuade the other of the correctness of its views; one or both may attribute to the other ill will, deceitful motivations, or lack of competence. Such attributions may chill relations between them and also between people who directly witness or otherwise hear about the encounter by affecting the ways that they characterize the interlocutors.

A fourth approach to cultural differences is to look at the way preferred information-processing styles handle uncertainty and ambiguity. Some cultural groups are described as highly valuing the ability of people to act even in situations that are ambiguous or have uncertain risks; to other cultural groups, such action is anathema. At one end of this dimension are groups that resist

innovation and change, finding deviant ideas and ways of proceeding to be dangerous. At the other end are groups that tolerate or seek alternative ways of action. It is often supposed that groups that avoid uncertainty motivate by appealing to group members' sense of security, esteem, or belonging, while groups that tolerate ambiguity are thought to motivate by appealing to group members' sense of achievement and efficacy.

This dimension of cultural difference was described by organizational researcher Geert Hofstede as tolerating or avoiding ambiguity and uncertainty. The characteristics of this dimension are shown in table 7.5.

Table 7.5: Information, Uncertainty, and Ambiguity

Strong Ambiguity Avoidance	Weak Ambiguity Avoidance
• Vigilant to avoid uncertainty	• Uncertainty is a natural part of life
• Ambiguity is a challenge and is stressful	• Ambiguity does not provoke stress
• Different ways of doing things are dangerous	• Different ways of doing things are interesting
• Structure and rules are essential	• Structure and rules are kept to a minimum

A fifth cultural dimension, described by Hofstede and often used in analyzing organizational conflicts, considers how group members relate to differences in power and authority. According to this line of analysis, peoples differ in their understanding, for example, of the proper way powerful supervisors should relate to people who are less powerful and people they lead. This dimension would be used to interpret the conflict between the Soviet UNMO and the OGE chief of staff, described at the beginning of this chapter. It characterizes groups according to culture-based expectations about the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations within a cultural group expect power to be distributed unevenly. In this continuum, low and high extremes have the characteristics shown in table 7.6.

Table 7.6: Power and Social Relations

Large Power Distance	Small Power Distance
• Great dependence on supervisor	• Limited dependence on supervisor
• Great emotional distance	• Small emotional distance
• No collaboration in decision making	• Prefers collaborative decision making
• Subordinate cannot contradict supervisor, who is seen as separate and unapproachable	• Subordinate can approach and contradict supervisor

The analysis of cultural differences by reference to varying styles and dimensions is an advance over approaches that focus only on the surface differences between groups. Analyzing styles and dimensions can also be an

improvement over approaches that treat culture as if it determined how members of a group act and as if it were shared equally by all members of a society, thus dealing with difference by asserting stereotyped caricatures of group differences. Despite offering overgeneralized descriptions of elements of a group's culture, and because dimensions and styles are described in terms of continua, they move attention away from the idea that cultural differences are absolute and toward the idea that they are relative. Thus, although cultural styles and dimensions can be used in the same static and homogenizing ways as travelers advice and stereotypes, they can also be used to embrace the idea that cultures are dynamic and heterogeneously shared.

Cultural Aspects of Military and Civilian Conflicts in Peace Operations

During peace operations, people from many kinds of organizations and different nations come together in the interest of maintaining collective security and promoting humanitarian ends. Obviously, cultural conflicts can occur between people from different national groups. Yet even among people from the same national group who participate in different organizations—military, relief, or international civil service—conflicts based on different organizational cultures may arise. Cultural models help people form expectations about the right way to proceed. They also provide the tools that people use to understand their experiences in a meaningful way.

In looking at specific cases, it is important to keep in mind that culture *informs* these processes; it does not determine them. Thus, even people from the same national group, serving in the same organization, may have differing understandings and expectations. Nonetheless, being aware of the role of cultural mechanisms, and the place of cultural styles, can help peacekeepers deal with cross-cultural conflicts and considerations.

There are several areas in which culturally based differences lead to conflicts in military and civilian expectations and understandings of peace operations. Not recognizing these may lead to difficulties in coordinating action. In general, such cultural considerations can be grouped into four areas: (1) management structures; (2) symbols, boundaries, and security; (3) media and information; and (4) context and legitimacy.

Management Structures

Just as there are different cultural styles in governing the relations between powerful supervisors and those whose work they direct, so military and civil-

ian organizations in peace operations give different meanings to and have differing expectations of management structures.

At one extreme, for the military, a consistent theme in peace operations management structures is reflected in a command framework that has four essential characteristics: (1) there should be unity of command; (2) the chain of command should be structured so that it can respond quickly and promote fast and efficient decision making; (3) areas of responsibility should be clearly defined; and (4) areas of responsibility should be of manageable size. In terms of cultural styles, this view of command and control would be similar to the large power distance style identified by Hofstede.

At the other extreme, humanitarian organizations, especially smaller ones, view management very differently. Partly because of constraints of size and resources, but especially for reasons of cultural (and historical) development, humanitarian organizations may be characterized not as seeking unity of command but rather camaraderie of command. In contrast to a hierarchical structure that clearly defines the tasks and responsibilities of each bureaucratically nested individual, all are expected to contribute their efforts and expertise whenever and wherever these are needed, regardless of the structural definition of their position. This view of management is similar to the low power distance style.

Some of the larger humanitarian agencies, like the Red Cross, appear to have a commitment to a hierarchical management structure. In fact, these organizations are cultural hybrids; they have explicit structures that imply larger social distances between supervisors and staff, but the organizational ethos still demands consultation and smaller distance. The preferences expressed within each organization derive in part from their history and interactions with military organizations. For instance, the International Committee of the Red Cross has a long history of managing large organizational structures and interacting with (although maintaining independence from) the military.[9]

When management structures follow clearly separate styles, the potential for discord is great, but the source of the discord can be quickly identified. In settings where management structures are very similar, problems may still arise because members of different organizations interpret those arrangements differently. A frequent complaint about peace operations, for instance, is that although they have what appears to be a traditionally hierarchical command structure, in fact this structure is interpreted differently by different national militaries and by civilian organizations. The high value placed on consultation and participation by humanitarian organizations, even in the context of clear, hierarchical structural management arrangements, presents a challenge to coordinated action.

Symbols, Boundaries, and Security

In cross-cultural encounters, differing interpretations of the context for action and how to relate to that context may disrupt relations. Similarly, cross-cultural considerations are important to managing peace operations because they influence the ways elements of the mission conduct themselves on the ground, perhaps especially in relations with the local population. In their ideal form, these lead humanitarian organizations to act without regard for a political program. Rather than providing aid in order to forward a political outcome, aid is distributed impartially. This impartiality is enacted in the way humanitarian workers give aid and symbolized by the placement of operations in the midst of local populations. Few boundaries—physical, political, or symbolic—are placed between aid workers and the people they serve. Aid workers are in close daily contact with the local population.

In contrast, military units involved in peace operations symbolize and enact their missions by control and separation. Thus, even in the most uneventful peace observation missions, military personnel are physically separated from local populations. Buildings and observation post perimeters are secured, and entry into the compound is tightly controlled.

This indicates that people working in humanitarian and military organizational cultures expect and support different kinds and amounts of ambiguity in their operating environments, and that security is interpreted differently as well; security arrangements deemed appropriate by one organization can undermine safety and security according to the other.[10]

To some degree, conventional military units tend to be more consumed by force protection questions than special forces units are. This varies across national militaries as well, but variation does not change the broader point that, without the same infrastructure/superstructure supporting them, aid workers tend to live in much closer relationship with local populations than do uniformed personnel.[11]

Media and Information

Just as culturally based verbal and narrative styles can lead to conflict among individuals, different expectations about the roles of information and media may make military and civilian coordination in peace operations difficult. On one hand, humanitarian actors treat information and its public dissemination through the media as a mechanism for indicating the dimensions of the humanitarian crisis they face. Images of refugees displayed by the media—the starving and the ill—serve to raise popular public support, including money, for their efforts. The tragedy is newsworthy, and its display, at least initially, is helpful for mobilizing public support.

Particularly in the case of peace operations that involve the use of force, news coverage can generate both support for the military and protests against it. Images of civilian casualties from military actions in a peace operation may turn public support just as quickly as images of soldiers dead or captured. The media, then, is a contingency to be controlled and given just the information deemed appropriate by the mission.

The potential for misunderstanding, suspicion, and conflict in relation to media access to information exists between military and humanitarian organizations. This is complicated by the need to include the organizational cultures of the media.

Context and Legitimacy

When military peacekeepers deploy to a mission area, they do so only after their mission has been authorized by the Security Council and following extensive discussions and agreements between the United Nations and local governments. They derive their legitimacy from the legal framework within which they work.

Some of the civilian organizations present in the mission area will also have negotiated with the local governments agreements that define the scope of their actions. These agreements confer legitimacy on their work also in a legal sense. As well, some NGOs, especially humanitarian organizations, may locate their legitimacy in the fact that they are implementing the humanitarian imperative of providing aid to those in need regardless of their political or legal standing.

Whatever the legal basis for their formal legitimacy, all of the organizations and agencies in the mission area must develop substantive legitimacy through their relations with local populations. It is to the dimensions of those relations that I now turn.

Peace Operations and Local Populations

In order to be effective, peace operations must engage the local population's sense of credibility and potential. It is therefore essential that the mission operate with an understanding of the traditional local structures of legitimacy and an awareness of how conflict may have fissured and fragmented those structures. Understanding the cultural aspects of relations with local populations can be developed using the same tools described earlier. Collective action by local populations results in part from the enactment and elaboration of cultural models.

Since cultural models are open to modification by feedback derived from prior action, the meanings and significance of words and deeds may change

over the life of the mission. The field of action is broad as well as variable. The following is a list of signposts that peacekeepers should be alert to during the life of the mission. Understanding the dynamics of these cultural domains prior to deployment will form the basis of a case-specific cultural knowledge briefing. Having this information will help in devising strategies for addressing culturally sensitive areas of action in ways that will enhance the efficacy of the operation and limit the negative effects of intervention.

Because peace operations enter a scene where social and cultural institutions already exist, the areas of potential concern to a peace operation are as varied as is social life, and attention to cultural domains may prove particularly important. These include four aspects of culture: (1) law, politics, and conflict; (2) social stratification; (3) gender roles; and (4) economic and subsistence practices. Not only is an understanding of these structures important for peacekeepers, military and civilian, who are working on-site, knowledge of these cultural features is essential for planners designing missions.

Law, Politics, and Conflict

All societies provide a context for managing competition over resources and resolving disputes over how those resources are acquired and used. These frameworks are often translated into various sets of rules, formal or informal. Norms—informal expectations about how people should behave—encode conceptions of appropriate or expected behavior. Such normative expectations include general, though perhaps ambiguous, guides, like "public officials ought not take bribes" or "people should be good to their parents" as well as specific behavioral directives, like "thou shalt not kill." A single society may hold contradictory norms.

When norms are systematized or elevated to a formal status, binding rules are created, which are laws. Laws encode the overall adaptive strategy of a society. Legal systems, as societies themselves, change over time. It is important to be aware of the sets of cultural norms that guide the behavioral expectations of both the local population and the members of the peace operation. It is also important to be aware of the legal system that guides the behavior of the local population and of how this system has changed over time.

Norms are based on cultural models, and both perform several different kinds of work within a society. Three aspects of normative expectations are particularly important for peace support operations. First, norms provide what might be called "reality assumptions," or general beliefs of what can be taken for granted in regard to actions that are thought to be meaningful within the local context. For example, the degree of intimacy required of friendships is often a normative behavior that is taken for granted. In some

societies, people expect that their friendships involve intense and frequent interactions, and in other societies friendships may be maintained over great distance and with infrequent contact. Second, norms help people evaluate the actions of others. Such norms, which might be called "ranking norms," are evaluative and underlie the achievement of status within a society. The third type of norm includes those that form the underlying expectations for membership in a particular group or social stratum. Such "membership norms" can include expectations about behavior, the performance of tasks, adherence to specific guidelines about how to act, or the display of a certain kind of symbolic costume. In areas of conflict, membership norms may include manner of dress or use of symbolic forms of greetings.

Legal systems and social norms are dynamic. Both change in response to new social and environmental realities. Sometimes these changes fracture traditional attitudes and ways of acting, breaking down various sets of relationships and the normative order surrounding them. It is likely that such transformations will occur in situations where peace operations take place. So it is useful to try to understand traditional normative structures themselves and how these may have fissured prior to the deployment of the peace mission.

Understanding the current systems of laws and normative relations is important for many reasons, but one of the most important is that these undergird a social group's sense of its traditional moral system. A moral system is the matrix from which legitimacy derives. For peacekeeping missions to be successful, they must be viewed as legitimate throughout their entire life cycle—from authorization by the Security Council to withdrawal. In addition, we need to understand the nature of the norms and laws underlying political legitimacy at the time the mission is deployed and to keep a sense of how these change while the mission is on the ground.

Failing to pay attention to the changing nature of normative expectations and legal encounters in a local population can lead to some undesirable consequences. For example, a mission may be welcomed when it is deployed, but as normative expectations change, influenced in part by the actions of the peace support operation itself, that welcome may turn into rejection and hostility, as happened, for example, during the deployments in Somalia discussed in chapter 1. Anticipating such a change in the mission climate depends perhaps most importantly upon keeping an awareness of the changing norms of behaviors, expectations, and group affiliations within the local population. It is worth noting that when interventions introduce governance, legal, and other structures that do not grow from local norms, they are setting the mission up for failure.

Peace support operations are often called upon to manage conflicts among local populations and to resolve disputes. It is important, therefore, to understand the traditional, legal, and normative dispute resolution mechanisms

available in a society. Again, the cultural models underlying disputing lead to norms and expectations about responsibility for actions, appropriate compensation, appropriate people for resolving disputes, and the like.

For instance, how do members of a society become part of a dispute? In some societies, responsibility for a dispute and its settlement rests only with those individuals who are involved in the creation of the point of contention. In other societies, inclusion in a dispute may result from a normative expectation that all members of a group—perhaps a kin group—are automatically included among the disputants simply because of their relationship to the original protagonists.

Working from a dispute resolution model that emphasizes the individual's responsibility, it is possible to transgress the normative expectations of a society that sees responsibility as lodged in kinship, corporate, or friendship groups. Transgressing such a boundary would make the mission appear partisan within the dispute, perhaps even escalating the critical events; yet to the unsuspecting member of the support operation, the action undertaken would appear neutral and nonpartisan. Hence, choosing the "wrong" local authority because of a lack of cultural knowledge can have far-reaching consequences for the mission, at all levels, from the safety of individual peacekeepers to the failure of the mission as a whole.

Authority—which is the right, rather than the ability, to make decisions, command obedience, and arrange for the settlement of disputes—reflects normative expectations about the proper boundaries of power. It is likely that different individuals will have authority over different domains of social life; thus, we need to understand the relationship between people who have authority in a household, for example, and people who have authority in the local community and in larger corporate contexts. Anthropologist Tanja Hohe describes how in East Timor the elections conducted under the auspices of the United Nations Transnational Administration in East Timor failed to account for local practices from which political authority derived. The result was that the state building intended by the international community was less effective than had been hoped. Similarly, Thant Myint-U and Elizabeth Sellwood describe the lack of local knowledge in the missions in Cambodia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In all three of these missions, the international community was less effective in its intended state building because lack of cultural knowledge meant the missions proceeded as though they had a blank slate upon which to work.[12]

Law, politics, and conflict management systems are often encapsulated in terms of political symbols and traditions of behavior and action. An understanding of the meaning of such symbols and sensitivity to them is one way to avoid unintentionally behaving in ways that appear partisan in the overall conflict. Since these kinds of subtle symbolic communications can have major

ramifications for the success of the mission, it is important early in the mission to try to articulate a set of potentially problematic political symbols.

Social Stratification

All societies make distinctions among people. These distinctions separate the in-group of the society from outsiders. Distinctions are also drawn within the society to classify people according to categories that are considered significant and distinct. This classification is based on selected perceived cultural, physical, or other differences. An important aspect of this process is that even things that strike an outside observer as being the same can be made significant in the process of group differentiation.[13]

How people speak, what they eat, the style of their clothing, or the design of their houses, for example, may all serve as markers for various group identities. These markers often form a cluster of symbols, some of which are considered to be essential for the definition of identity. Under ordinary circumstances, individuals may manipulate or deploy in strategic ways the various characteristics that are used to form identities. As resources become scare, or there is increased competition for political power and access to goods and societal benefits, identity can become a point of tension and conflict. Under such circumstances, it may become difficult for people to move back and forth among the various social identities in which they might otherwise participate. Boundaries between groups may at one time be relatively porous but in times of stress and conflict become quite solid.

It is important for members of a peacekeeping mission to understand the dimensions of stratification and how it is marked, symbolized, and enacted by local populations.

Gender Roles

Even when collective violence is experienced by an ethnic group without particular regard to gender, women generally suffer more than men do. In circumstances where organized fighting is taking place, men may leave their homes to join an organized or guerilla-fighting force. This frequently leaves women at home with increased responsibilities for child care and the maintenance of collective cultural identity—in a setting where resources are limited and they are exposed to manipulation and pressure from within and outside of their communities. Often, women are made to have special responsibility for maintaining their group's cultural identity. The assignment of identity preservation to women—by circumscribing the modes and range of their action, regulating their sexuality, or "nationalizing" reproduction—may be taken up

voluntarily or forced upon them. In either case, the result is that women's individual reproductive acts come to symbolize the collective identity of the group. As a result, political violence against women becomes freighted with symbolic meanings that go beyond the physical consequences to individual women.[14]

Women remain especially vulnerable when peace support operations are deployed in postconflict situations. There are two ways that this vulnerability is manifest. In many peace operations, local staff are hired to support the work of the operation. When this happens, real opportunities are created for women as well as for men. Unfortunately, in practice when local people are hired in a professional capacity they are paid less well and given fewer benefits and privileges than their international counterparts. Moreover, women are less likely to be hired for those professional positions.[15] This creates a gender gap, with women finding employment in lower-paying, more menial jobs that serve the well-paid international personnel. Such positions include secretarial, housekeeping, hotel, restaurant, and other legitimate but low-paying service jobs. In addition to nonprofessional roles, women who are vulnerable in postconflict settings may become involved in sexual relationships with the more powerful and wealthy international civil servants who are suddenly in the area.[16]

Criminal activity, including drug sales, smuggling of goods and people, and prostitution, may flourish especially in the early stages of peace operations, when the rule of law has not been fully established because the police force and judiciary are not yet working smoothly. Elisabeth Rehn and Ellen Sirleaf note that, "perhaps most disturbing of everything we saw and learned was the association, in the vast majority of peacekeeping environments, between the arrival of peacekeeping personnel and increased prostitution, sexual exploitation and HIV/AIDS infection."[17] The relationship is reciprocal. One recent study showed that there was a direct and positive correlation between the length of troops' peacekeeping deployment and the prevalence of HIV infection among them.[18]

Those planning peace support operations should be alert to the distortions in gender roles that can result from the sudden influx of wealthy and powerful personnel to an area. Also, there is a great need for planners to structure the operation so that it avoids creating the conditions that allow women to be exploited through criminal activities.

Economic and Subsistence Practices

In societies where conflict is severe enough to merit multinational humanitarian intervention, traditional economic practices and subsistence patterns will undoubtedly be disrupted. In addition to understanding how those traditional patterns are reflected in the organization of disputing groups, peace support

operations must be conducted with a self-conscious sense of how their presence distorts local practices.

Peace support operations introduce goods—like food supplies—that would be otherwise unavailable to local people, and they infuse the economy with currency resources that can distort local economies. In such a context, peacekeepers should be alert to the effects of this infusion. Care must be taken that the relative abundance of goods and money in the peace support operation does not become socially destructive. Profiteering, exploitation, and illegal activities are all likely to accompany such distortions.

Even under "normal" circumstances, in some societies business activities and patterns of reciprocity may be quite different from what members of peace operations are used to from their own societies. And distinguishing between damaging distortions and appropriate activities may present a challenge. It is therefore essential for people involved in peace operations to understand as fully as possible the normative local business and economic practices, so that care can be taken not to reproduce situations of dependency and partisanship.

Moving beyond Pattern to Meaning

Cultural factors come into play in many areas of peace operations. These influences may be subtle or unmistakable. Some of the conflicts that peace operations respond to will in fact be based on cultural factors. Within military and civilian organizations participating in peace operations, cultural factors will affect views of what to do, what is right and wrong, what goals should be pursued, and whether they are being accomplished quickly enough and at an acceptable cost. Differences in the way peacekeepers and local populations engage their shared experiences create points of tension among them as well. Being alert to the potential challenges and problems that these differences can create is an important step, as is developing tools for dealing with them. The analytic tools associated with attention to cultural styles and dimensions are important advances for understanding and addressing cultural differences in peacekeeping. But in spite of how helpful these tools can be, they are, unfortunately, inherently limiting.

The analysis of cultural styles and dimensions leads to characterizations of other organizations and communities that assume that the cultures of those groups are homogeneously shared. It also promotes the idea that once these organizations and communities are described, the patterns will always characterize the way people in them work. While there is nothing inherently wrong with seeking patterns, it is essential to recognize that these patterns are

3.2 USAFRICOM Case Study: Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) Outbreak in Liberia

3.2.1 Context

The Ebola virus disease (EVD), herein referred to as Ebola virus, is one of the deadliest diseases to have impacted the security posture of African countries. The outbreak was first detected in 1976 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), then known as Zaire, and although it was considered deadly it did not spread to the United States.[459] In 2014, however, the Ebola virus broke out in Guinea and spread to Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Nigeria, leading to a massive international intervention to stem the spread of the disease. The U.S. deployed Marines to aid the effort in support of Operation United Assistance. Further, the U.S. employed homeland security measures to prevent the spread of the virus to the homeland; even so, Ebola cases were diagnosed in New York City and Dallas—in Dallas, the virus claimed the life of a carrier, a Liberian national who was diagnosed a few days after his arrival from Liberia. The domestic measures included stringent entry-screening requirements at major entry points into the U.S.[460]

EBOLA VIRUS FACTS:

The Ebola virus spreads by direct contact between animals or humans and retains a high capacity to mutate and spread if uncontrolled.

Ebola symptoms range from a number, or a combination of the following: fever, severe headache, muscle pain, weakness, fatigue, diarrhea, vomiting, abdominal (stomach) pains, unexplained hemorrhage (bleeding or bruising).

The HA/DR effort brought together different actors including the UN. The U.S. effort, led by the USAID, was centered on Liberia and aimed at containing the virus to prevent its spread to the West and – most importantly – from reaching the U.S. At the end of the HA/DR operation in 2015, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reported 3,358 cases of the Ebola virus in Guinea, 3,163 cases in Liberia, and 8706 cases in Sierra Leone.[461]

Although Sierra Leone suffered the highest number of casualties, Operation United Assistance was centered on Liberia because of the historical ties between the U.S and Liberia.

3.2.2 Liberia: A Brief Historical Background

Liberia is a small country with a little over 4,503.44 million people.[462] It has strong connections to the United States as a colony set up largely by ex-Caribbean and freed returnee African-American slaves.[463] Liberia became an independent nation in 1821. Liberia is a Latin word and loosely translated means, “Land of the Free.”

Liberia lies on the Atlantic and is geographically in the southern part of West Africa. Liberia is bordered by Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire. It is mainly plateau and most of the landscape is covered by dense tropical forest. Liberia is a member of the UN, the AU, and ECOWAS. As reflected in its history, Liberia is an amalgam of different peoples that melded their differing ways and culture to form a



Figure 3-1: Map of Liberia. *Source: Wikipedia.*

union. The bifurcation between indigenous Liberians and Americo-Liberians is often used to explain the shaping of the country's politics, economics, social relations, and conflicts. However, Liberia's history goes back farther and deeper, as there were "original" settlers from as far afield as Ghana – a neighboring West African country.

The first African-American emigrants arrived from Providence Island, close to today's Monrovia. This return initiative was undertaken largely with the assistance of the American Colonization Society (ACS). Before their arrival, there were original inhabitants who could trace their roots back 700 years. The seminal work, edited by Donald A. Ranard, Liberia: An Introduction to their History and Culture, discusses the history of the early arrivals and settlement patterns of ethnic Liberians. It says:[464]

"The Mel entered Western Liberia between 1300 and 1700, followed shortly by Kwa-speaking groups. The Mande speakers arrived in northwestern Liberia between 1500 and 1550. Early arrivals may have migrated to Liberia in search of fertile agricultural land, after the desertification of their former habitats. The instability that followed the collapse of the third great Sudanic empire–Songhai–around the late 16th century likely prompted an influx of migrants as well. In the late 19th century, Samory Toure's conquests and eventual establishment of a short-lived empire in the area of present-day Mali, Guinea, and Sierra Leone, along with French colonial pacification campaigns in French West Africa, led to the movement of more people into the area that came to be known as Liberia."

The distinction continues to be made between these different peoples and settlers, which has gone a long way to shape social interactions at the micro (personal) and macro (larger) sense with state institutions. The distinction between settlers and indigenous people continues to be the basis of domestic conflicts; this difference also largely explains the tension – sometimes benign, and at other times cantankerous - and on one such occasion led to the bloody internal civil war that lasted from 1989 until 1997. Failing to arrive at an amicable resolution to this first war, rising tensions led to a second civil war that lasted from 1999 to 2003. As the author of this article further explains:[465]

"Indigenous Liberians are descendants of African ethnic groups who were already inhabiting the area when the first African-American settlers arrived. Americo-Liberians are largely made up of descendants of three groups: 19th-century African American settlers who founded Liberia, freed Afro-Caribbean slaves who came to Liberia in the mid-1800s, and Africans captured on U.S.-bound slave ships by the U.S. Navy (enforcing a U.S. law against the importation of slaves) and sent to Liberia. Americo-Liberians may also include some members of two other groups: children of marriages and informal liaisons between Americo-Liberians and indigenous Liberians, and indigenous Liberian children raised by Americo-Liberian families (a system known as wardship)."[466]

The Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, has this to say on Liberia's founding in 1821:

> *"The founding of Liberia in the early 1800s was motivated by the domestic politics of slavery and race in the United States as well as by U.S. foreign policy interests. In 1816, a group of white Americans founded the American Colonization Society (ACS) to deal with the "problem" of the growing number of free blacks in the United States by resettling them in Africa. The resulting state of Liberia would become the second (after Haiti) black republic in the world at that time."*[467]

Today, Liberia is considered a progressive African country, especially because it was also the first country on the continent to elect a female head of State, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf.[468] However, according USAID, it is still one of the least developed countries in the world:[469]

> *"The country boasts only 400 miles of paved roads, an electric grid that barely powers the capital city, and a police force of just 4,000 for a population of more than 4million. Liberia is ranked 177 out of 188 countries on the 2015 United Nations Human Development Index. According to the 2010 data from the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), it is also by far the most aid-dependent country in the world, with a ration of official development assistance (ODA) to gross national income (GNI) of over 176 percent, nearly three times the ratio of the next most dependent country (the Solomon Islands). This situation is likely only to have worsened with the devastating Ebola epidemic of 2014-2015, making Liberia an especially important setting for our study."*

3.2.3 U.S. Operation United Assistance

The Ebola virus is considered the largest and most fatal global health-care challenge to have hit Africa since the HIV/AIDS pandemic.[470] The CDC poignantly stated that:

> *"In West Africa, Ebola is now an epidemic of the likes that we have not seen before. It's spiraling out of control. It is getting worse. It's spreading faster and exponentially. Today, thousands of people in West Africa are infected. That number could rapidly grow to tens of thousands. And if the outbreak is not stopped now, we could be looking at hundreds of thousands of people infected, with profound political and economic and security implications for all of us. So this is an epidemic that is not just a threat to regional security – it's a potential threat to global security if these countries break down, if their economies break down, if people panic. That has profound effects on all of us, even if we are not directly contracting the disease."*[471]

President Obama further termed the Ebola outbreak a "national security issue." He even outlined objectives of a strategy to address the situation. The four goals he highlighted were:

- control the outbreak
- address the ripple effect on local economies and communities to prevent a truly massive humanitarian disaster;
- coordinate a broader global response;
- urgently build up a public health system for the countries involved for the future.

The President alluded to, not just West Africa, but other countries that do not have sufficient resources. With this strategic objective in mind, President Obama then stated:

"So today, I'm announcing a major increase in our response. At the request of the Liberian government, we're going to establish a military command center in Liberia to support civilian efforts across the region – similar to our response after the Haiti earthquake. It's going to be commanded by Major General Darryl Williams, commander of our Army forces in Africa. He just arrived today and is now on the ground in Liberia. And our forces are going to bring their expertise in command and control, in logistics, in engineering. And our Department of Defense is better at that, our Armed Services are better at that than any organization on Earth."[472]

The President continued:

"We're going to create an air bridge to get health workers and medical supplies into West Africa faster. We're going to establish a staging area in Senegal to help distribute personnel and aid on the ground more quickly. We are going to create a new training site to train thousands of health workers so they can effectively and safely care for more patients. Personnel from the U.S. Public Health Service will deploy to the new field hospitals that we're setting up in Liberia. And USAID will join with international partners and local communities in a Community Care Campaign to distribute supplies and information kits to hundreds of thousands of families so they can better protect themselves. We're also going to build additional treatment units, including new isolation spaces and more than 1,000 beds. And in all our efforts, the safety of our personnel will remain a top priority. Meanwhile, our scientists continue their urgent research in the hope of finding new treatments and perhaps vaccines. And today I'm calling on Congress to approve the funding that we've requested so that we can carry on with all these critical efforts."[473]

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) immediately responded to the President's directives, and took steps to address the situation. (A full transcript of a press briefing conducted by MG Darryl Williams, U.S. Army Africa (USARAF); U.S. Ambassador to Liberia, Debra Malac; and Ben Hemingway, USAID Deputy Disaster Assistance Response Team can be found at the link embedded in this endnote.][474]

This was the background to the U.S. President's decision to stand up Operation United Assistance – a whole-of-government effort, to work alongside other nations, international agencies, and International Non-Governmental Organizations, (INGOs) to stem the tide of the spread of the virus. These actors

worked with Community Based Organizations (CBOs) and local Civil Society Organizations, (CSOs) in Liberia to contain the virus.

Operational Environment



Figure 3-2: DoD Ebola-Related Cost. *Source: "Operation United Assistance at a Glance/DOD).*

Operation United Assistance was the first U.S. military operation to support a disease-driven foreign humanitarian assistance mission, with the U.S. expending over $2.3 billion.[475] The Liberian operational environment at the time of intervention was near paralysis. It was the Liberian government that directly appealed to and sought U.S. assistance to combat the virus. Given the fact that Liberia's health-care system had collapsed and was unable to cope, the intervention took on the challenge largely to prevent, treat, rebuild, educate, train, and strengthen Liberian health institutions so that they could continue after the intervention. As Michael Lumpkin, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict, stated before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, it was Liberia's entire social and infrastructural architecture that was dysfunctional. He testified, saying;

> "I traveled to the region thinking we faced a healthcare crisis with a logistics challenge. In reality, we face a logistics crisis focused on a healthcare challenge. The shortage of local transportation, passable roadways, and inadequate infrastructure to facilitate the movement of essential supplies and equipment are hindering the overall global community response to contain and combat the Ebola outbreak."[476]

Figure 3-3: President Obama Convenes Cabinet Meeting on Ebola. *Source: Official White House Photo.*

The operation was one that required the deployment of skills in an austere condition. The operation shined the light on practices that have come to define most U.S. operations abroad, namely: over-classification, reliance on digital communication, and the misperceptions about Reserve Component (RC) activation. As a result, the near consensus - even by the USARAF and JFC-UA Deputy Commanding General, BG Peter L. Corey, USA - was that the U.S. did not come to Liberia with the requisite situational, physical, and environmental awareness. In an interview, he is quoted as saying,[477]

> "I think we did a poor assessment. I think … [we lacked] a true understanding of what's there, and as a command we ought to have the resources, both in people and funds, to actually do some sort of survey on what's available in each country. That's a tremendous undertaking in Africa with 53 countries, but that [capability] just doesn't exist."

As succinctly restated in the abstract to the Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, (JCOA) report, *Operation United Assistance: The DoD Response to Ebola in West Africa of 6 January, 2016*:[478]

> "Although limited in capability, the use of a Service component headquarters (HQ), coupled with key enablers, allowed immediate operations and time to prepare for a tailored headquarters and response force. The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) executed a disciplined operation and supported the United States Agency for International Development (the lead federal agency), avoided mission creep, and enabled a timely and ordered redeployment that included a 21-day controlled monitoring regimen."

On August 5, 2014, the DoD established the Ebola Task Force at the Pentagon. A team head by MG Darryl K. Williams, USA, commenced operations as Joint Force Command-United Assistance (JFC-UA), instead of the more usual Joint Task Force (JTF). The JFC is considered more agile because it avoids unnecessary bureaucratic bottlenecks and the assumption of a perceived "sluggish mechanism to establish a Joint Manning Document (JMD) in which each service's equities would have to be considered." It was the JFC-UA that assessed the operational environment, developed relationships, operations, established infrastructure, and what other follow-on requirements would be needed. The team identified six initial "quick wins" as part of the coordinated process to combat the virus, namely to:

- institute DOD command and control
- deploy mobile labs for EVD testing
- acquire USMC MV-22s for mobility
- re-mission Navy Seabees to start construction
- establish camp infrastructure
- provide a hospital – the "Monrovia Medical Unit" (MMU) – for health-care workers

The DoD created four lines of effort (LOEs): logistics support, command and control, engineering support, and medical training assistance.

Operational, Tactical, and Logistic Challenges

The DoD successfully trained 1,539 health-care workers and support staff; it formed a 30-member medical support team for short-term assistance to civilian medical professionals; created over 10 DoD Ebola Treatment units; several 25-bed Monrovian medical units; 7 mobile labs that processed 4,709 samples; and contracted for the procurement of 1.4 million sets of personal protective equipment.[479]

The DoD then transitioned from Ebola epidemic support to Operation Onward Liberty.[480]



Figure 3-4: OUA Medical Effort, 7 October 2014. *Source: JFC-UA Briefing Slide.*

Transition to Operation Onward Liberty

1. DoD continues support of U.S. whole of government Ebola response effort and will provide a small DoD element of approximately **100 military, civilians and contractors** in Liberia slated to arrive no later than April 30.

2. DoD will **build partnership capacity** with the Armed Forces of Liberia focused on emergency response, engineering and medical training; and support a reach-back capability if additional personnel or materials are needed.

3. Continue military to military engagement in ways that support Liberia's growth toward enduring **peace and security**.

4. DoD begins obligating the **$112 million** received in the Ebola Emergency Funding request to develop Ebola vaccines and therapeutics.

Figure 3-6: DoD Ebola-Related Efforts. *Source: "Operation United Assistance at a Glance"/DOD.*



Figure 3-5: Active USG Programs for the EVD Outbreak Response. *Source: USG - Latest update as of September 10, 2014.*

"US Marines Complete Two Months of Support to Ebola Response in West Africa," by 1st Lieutenant Farao, Marine Corps Forces Europe (December 8, 2014) – Since Oct. 8, 2014 a detachment of 100 U.S. Marines and sailors from Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Crisis Response-Africa (SPMAGTF-CR-AF) provided support to Operation United Assistance (OUA), the U.S. response to the Ebola crisis in Liberia.

The rapid self-deployment of SPMAGTF-CR-AF Marines and sailors by four MV-22 Ospreys and two KC-130J Super Hercules provided a timely, mission-critical airlift capability to the Joint Force supporting OUA. The Marines enabled the Joint Force to reach remote locations that were virtually impossible to access by ground transportation during the rainy season due to washed out roads. Additionally, SPMAGTF-CR_AF also sent a Forward Resuscitative Surgical System detachment, which provided an enhanced surgical capability to support U.S. service-members contributing to OUA.

Over the past two months, the Marines conducted over 170 missions, flew over 240 hours, and transported over 1200 passengers and over 78,000 pounds of cargo. They also supported the movement of key personnel, such as the President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, U.S. Ambassador to Liberia, Deborah Malac, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Samantha Powers, and various U.S. Government and relief agency workers, to visit treatment locations throughout Liberia.

"This mission demonstrates the inherent versatility, scalability, and unique responsiveness of Special Purpose MAGTF Crisis Response – Africa," said U.S. Marine Corps Col. Robert C. Fulford, SPMAGTF-CR-AF and aircraft on the ground in Liberia, ready to actively assist with the Ebola relief efforts. While supporting the OUA mission in Liberia, we simultaneously maintained an additional alert force based out of Moron, Spain, prepared to respond to crisis in Africa; we continued to provide a security force in U.S. Embassy, Bangui, Central African Republic; and we conducted military-to-military training throughout Europe and Africa strengthening our interoperability and relationships with partners nations."

SPMAGTF-CR-AF supported OUA until December 1, 2014 when they were relieved by U.S. Army aviation assets from the 101st Airborne Division, who assumed the long-term responsibility of support to the OUA mission. Upon completion of their mission, the Marines and sailors shifted focus toward conducting maintenance, washing-down equipment in accordance with Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidelines, and preparing to move to U.S. Army Garrison Baumholder, Germany, where they will begin their 21-day controlled monitoring period.

"Looking at the situation from every vantage point we want to make sure that the Marines and sailors are healthy and the equipment is clean," said U.S. Navy Lt. Michael A. Schermer, SPMAGTF-CR-AF lead medical planner. "We are taking every precaution possible to ensure that we don't put others at risk when they return to their unit and eventually their families."

During the 21-day controlled monitoring period, the Marines and sailors will be under the care of trained healthcare professionals, undergoing temperature checks twice daily and evaluated them for symptoms of Ebola.

SPMAGTF-CR-AF is postured to respond to a broad range of military operations in the U.S. Africa Command area of responsibility, including: U.S. Embassy reinforcement, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP), training with partner nations, and other missions as directed.

Clash of Cultures, Development of Norms

Historically the questions of indigeneity, identity, and ethnicity between the different tribal groupings on the one hand, and between the indigenous people as a collective against the returnee Americo-Liberians and ex-Caribbean on the other; had created palpable tension on multiple levels. At one level, friction led to several physical clashes between the indigenous people and the Americo-Liberians with different values and cultural orientation, particularly in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[481]Furthermore, there was the implication that Liberians living in suburban towns and the inner cities were stratified along these identities.[482] Each ethnic group would huddle together with little or no direct contact with the other group or the Americo-Liberians. There was also a dichotomy that had more lately been perpetuated between Americo-Liberians that ruled Liberia since independence, until the coup that brought Samuel Doe, a former sergeant in the Liberian Army, to power in 1980. The emergence of Samuel Doe as president, being an indigenous Liberian himself, was a paradigm shift. Further divides could be identified between those Liberians who rose to prominent after Samuel Doe's administration: these were people who fled to America during his unduly oppressive regime, and returned to Liberia after the civil wars ended. These individuals were mainly urbane, professional, affluent, and well-to-do Liberians.

There are other forms of identities that shape relations, which has made forging a national norm extremely difficult. It also makes building a coherent national coalition difficult to sustain. This was evident during the Ebola epidemic. The professional and cosmopolitan Americo-Liberians were more receptive to the intervention, while the indigenous Liberians expressed reservations to the humanitarian situation. Thus, direct messaging was largely focused toward the inner cities and rural counties outside Monrovia, the capital.

In the early years of Liberia's independence, this instability was almost a permanent fixture along every conceivable line, from education to religion to the activities of Christian missionaries. The African-American returnees to all intents and purposes did not consider the indigenous people equals.[483] They very much regarded them as inferiors. As aptly captured by D. Sumowuoi Pewa in his article entitled, "The Indigenous & Americo-Liberian' Palava":

> "Our country is quintessentially a product of difficult historical circumstances, due in part, to the ill-conceived manner in which former slaves were shipped and settled in Liberia. Although these people were returning to the shores of their forefathers, most of them were born in captivity where their socialization and political conditioning were patented on a master-servant relationship. Their social conditioning dictated a shallow understanding of society having only "masters" and "servants." This mistaken perception of societal relationship is quite evident even today amongst some children of descendants of slaves, who constantly refer to fellow Liberians as Heathens."[484]

In terms of linguistic affiliation, most Liberians speak English – which is the country's official language - and those who live and share borders with Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire also speak French. In informal conversation, however, Liberians speak a creole form of "Liberian English," which is an amended form of conventional English. There are further distinctions people make based on skin color.

In terms of national-level identity, much of it is premised on the struggle between the tribal majority and the settler minority. This ethnic imbalance was significantly altered with the rise to power of Samuel Doe. Doe was a Krahn from Grand Gedeh County. During Doe's time as head of state, he deliberately filled all sensitive civilian and military positions with people that affiliated or identified with the Krahns, his ethnolinguistic group. This tension continues to play out in race relations in Liberia, and in how Liberians

view national-level issues. By the time of the Ebola outbreak this thawed somewhat, but it nonetheless posed challenges for U.S. interagency operations.

Negotiating Cultural Vulnerabilities. Why it Matters

As expected, one of the many challenges that complicates operations of this nature and magnitude is understanding – and effectively navigating – variations of culture, and the potential cultural, psychological, and sociological impacts on mission success within the operating environment. The intervention was affected by how ordinary Liberians perceived of the operation, given the despondent state they were at the time; and how they reacted to, or embraced the assistance being offered. This task was made more challenging by the prevailing attitude and myths already circulating about the virus, and the questions about the motives of the U.S. and other partners. The multinational nature of the Ebola intervention impacted the people at a critical level of engagement. At the strategic level, these challenges were not as apparent, since it was the Liberian government that reached out to the U.S. government for help and support.[485]

Challenges in Liberia included culture shock, cultural biases, stigmas, and superstition associated with the Ebola virus. Local myths and legends about Ebola included how it was contracted and transmitted, and questions about the efficacy of Western-style medicine – vis-*à*-vis local herbal remedies. Consequently, it proved useful to keep the public informed through messaging, networks, and by collaborating with local officials, traditional grassroots institutions, and the state media.

Influencing these misperceptions of Liberians was a daunting part of the counter-EVD strategy. Given the lukewarm attitude and air of resignation among Liberians at the time, it was important to have a nuanced messaging strategy, as rumors were already rife about U.S. intentions beyond helping to combat the Ebola epidemic. One example of such misguided misinformation was the belief that the U.S. was coming to permanently establish a military presence in Monrovia, and that the U.S. was planning to take over the government and recolonize the country.

Liberia

Given the fragile nature of the government of Liberia after two civil wars, it was important for the U.S. to counter these inaccurate narratives which took away from the core strategic objective: to contain the Ebola virus. As Deborah R. Malac, then-U.S. Ambassador to Liberia, stated:

> "The biggest impact was the announcement itself and having those boots on the ground, even if the U.S. military hadn't done anything else. The psychological impact was transformative to the Liberians. You have to understand the environment at that point in time: by July, August, September, there were dead bodies in the street, in the ocean. People were beyond afraid; they were despairing. The change was palpable within 24 hours of the president's announcement."[486]

One of the noteworthy obstacles to cooperation was deep-seated mistrust. This was already evident across communities before the health crisis, but became increasingly significant during the crisis, as local citizens not only distrusted government, but the communities were rife with tribal superstitions surrounding the causes and course of treatment of the disease. There was a fear of burying Ebola-infected deceased persons around properties and neighborhoods. Most of the people refused to allow the practice, and the Liberian government later made cremation of people who died mandatory, particularly near Monrovia. Other complicating factors included the wide geographic spread of the virus, populations

intermixing, and mobility – particularly in densely populated cosmopolitan counties. Ebola spread to 14 of Liberia's 15 counties, but Monrovia was hardest hit. A report from the World Health Organization (WHO) stated:[487]

> "In Monrovia, bed capacity could not keep up with the growing number of very ill Ebola patients. New treatment centres *[sic]* were opened by MSF (Medecins Sans Frontieres) and others, but were rapidly filled to overflowing. The WHO team estimated that 1,000 beds were needed just for the treatment of currently infected patients. Only 240 beds were available. Although another 260 beds were planned, the shortage meant that only around half of patients could be admitted to treatment facilities over the next several weeks and months."

All efforts – the U.S., international agencies, and partner nations – were geared toward overcoming the infrastructure deficit, and respond to the increasing number of infected patients who could not find treatment centers. These patients were mostly young men and women. The WHO report, cited above, noted:

> "As the first week of September ended, data indicated that that exponential growth of cases had overwhelmed response capacity in the capital city. Taxis filled with entire families, of whom some members were almost certainly infected with Ebola, constantly crisscrossed and circled the city, searching for a treatment bed. They found none. MSF announced that its facilities were overstretched and began to turn patients away."[488]

Adding to this was the visible presence of military personnel – recall that Liberia had been in the throes of a prolonged civil war that recently ended – and the image of humanitarian and health-care workers considered "outsiders" in "scary suits"; all became obstacles to effective communication. The Liberian government's public awareness campaign – whose slogan was "Ebola Must Go" – did help to rebuild some measure of confidence and trust, but many local people largely remained skeptical.

Figure 3-7: Ebola victim being stretched out from a makeshift apartment. *Source: USAID Photograph by Neil Brandvold.*

Mitigating the Challenges: Lessons Learned

An understanding of U.S. strategic objectives will in part help explain the nature of the mitigation and strategies adopted to ameliorate the misconceptions of the Liberian people. The U.S. objective was primarily humanitarian, despite attempts by some Liberians to read into the intervention as part of a broader U.S. strategic culture of projecting a direct military intervention, fostering democratic institutions, or nation-building. Indeed, this intervention was at the invitation of the Liberian government. Thus, the narrow objective was to control the spread of Ebola, and do this as seamlessly as possible with other nations, partners, and the Liberian government. Quite apart from this, the challenges essentially centered on mitigating the impact of the spread of the virus to other neighboring countries. The fear of a regional – and, possibly, global – epidemic was real. As this was the first time Ebola had appeared in West Africa, containment was the immediate strategic objective, while the broader goal was to control and prevent the virus from running wild and becoming a global epidemic like HIV/AIDS.

Within the cultural context of Liberia, like most West African countries, is divided along tribal lines, with mostly benign and sometimes hostile relationships between ethnic groups. These antagonistic social relations prevented aid and health-care workers from making the public understand the nature of the virus for what it was, and counter the negative narratives, particularly in Monrovia the capital. People erroneously linked the virus to sorcery, witchcraft, and evil machinations of the deceased individuals; and disregarded the medical explanation of the causes and symptoms of the virus. Messaging became a powerful tool in correcting this misinformation. During the "Ebola Must Go campaign," some of the posters, jingles, and billboards were all directed toward skeptics. This was followed by training and education for the health-care workers who were themselves coming to terms with the virus, probably for the first time. This, in turn, cascaded to the Liberian people about what to do, what not to do, basic hygiene lessons, and symptoms to watch out for.

Figure 3-8: Ebola How to Prevent it from Spreading. *Source: UNICEF.*

The example of dead bodies littering the streets of Monrovia (because neighbors refused to allow the bodies to be buried) fed the narrative of the dead bodies as evil spirits that would remain and haunt the property owners and/or residents. The real medical explanation for the decision to cremate the bodies was the fact that the infected bodies were already decaying and cremation was considered a more effective way of disposing of the bodies. Most messaging and seminars were conducted by USAID in conjunction with international non-governmental organizations and local civil society groups. Regardless, the schism between indigenous Liberians and returnee Americo-Liberians came to the fore. While most the returnee Americo-Liberians generally live in affluent neighborhoods, most of the patients affected by the virus were from the inner, depressed neighborhoods of Monrovia. This raised concerns of a social-economic and class conflict, while also raising the prospect of hostilities against these affluent Liberians.

Most Liberians did not, and still do not believe that the U.S. had done enough during the Liberian civil wars to bring the conflict to an end. It was the subregional body, that is, ECOWAS, under the aegis of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), that largely brokered the armistice that brought the civil war to an end.[489]

Building Alliances: The United Nations, Partners, and Allies Support

Although the United States played a leading role helping to contain the Ebola virus, the effort was supported by financial contributions provided by the UN, U.S. partners, and allies. Given the extensive reach of the UN, the reservoir of international medical experts within the UN System – through WHO, U.S. medical personnel, health-care experts, and other workers – labored collaboratively in an environment that was already steeped in cultural biases and taboos, and divided by suspicion and fear. This, on the one hand, raised the issue of working synergy, and on the other hand, an appreciation of a range of values, cultures, and cultural differences these different experts brought to the operating environment. Put differently, the challenge was, how to, firstly, understand and make sense of the differences between U.S. personnel and other experts from different nationalities; and secondly, transferring that understanding as a "collective" in making sense of the cultural values of the Liberian people to ensure mission success.

Figure 3-9: Moving Beyond Ebola: Rebuilding Liberia's Healthcare System, April 6, 2015. USAID is teaming up with Jhpiego a nonprofit organization affiliated with the Johns Hopkins University, to teach critical infection prevention and control procedures to Liberian healthcare workers.
Source: USAID/Jhpiego collaboration.

This understanding was seminal in determining how Liberians collectively viewed and perceived the work of the humanitarian and health-care workers; achieving this understanding was essential, given the divergent work experience, nationality, and background of these partner nations and the UN. It also raised the question of the strategic objectives of these partner nations and allies, and whether those objectives aligned with the U.S. Government's strategic short-, medium-, and long-term goals.

For the UN, its strategic objectives were anchored to five core goals:[490]

- stop the outbreak
- treat the infected
- ensure essential services
- preserve stability
- prevent further outbreaks

These UN goals were in sync with the four strategic objectives earlier identified by the U.S. President, however the UN emphasized that the much of the response would be executed within the rural communities. The UN Secretary General appointed a special envoy on Ebola; and then established the first-ever emergency health mission – the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response.[491] Since the

containment of the virus, the UN has continued to work – under the auspices of the WHO – to find preventive vaccines for Ebola. In a December 23, 2016 report, the WHO confirmed final trial results of a vaccine that provides "high protection." The experimental Ebola vaccine, the report further states, "is the first to prevent infection from one of the lethal known pathogens, and the findings add weight to early trial results published last year."[492]

The Ebola outbreak in Liberia and the coordinated international community response demonstrated U.S. resolve to provide speedy and effective support, and respond to international humanitarian situations. The U.S. continues to take an interest – post the emergency response situation – in helping the affected states to work toward finding a preventive and curative vaccine. This effort is a component of the U.S. resolve to strengthen existing domestic and homeland preventive security measures.[493]

Figure 3-10: Messages displayed on electronic message boards in United States airports for persons who had traveled to West Africa during the 2014 to 2016 Ebola Epidemic. *Source: CDC.*

Bringing it all Together: "Integrative Complexity" as Toolkit for Navigating Culturally Complex Societies

The Liberian Ebola intervention was considered a successful mission, to the extent that the four strategic objectives outlined by the U.S. President at the outset of the intervention were achieved – the primary objective being that Ebola be contained. And although isolated cases did emerge later, procedures and systems already in place promptly addressed those isolated cases. A good example of this prompt response is the case of the U.S. doctor[494] and the subsequent identification of two other patients working for the Samaritan's Purse charity.[495] In all three cases, the situation was quickly brought under control and the patients provided the appropriate medical care in the U.S.

With humanitarian interventions of this nature – particularly one that had the potential of exploding into a global epidemic – a strategic perspective is required, in terms of negotiating, sense-making, and cross-cultural understanding of the nuances of the people in the AOR.. This is in addition to understanding the basics of the operating environment. The substandard state of Liberia's health-care infrastructure contributed to complications in the AOR. The U.S. mission struggled with this variable of the operational environment initially, but was able by all accounts to overcome it; thereby ensuring that the success of the Liberia mission was repeated when there was an outbreak of the virus in the neighboring countries of Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Nigeria.[496]

3.3 USCENTCOM Case Study: Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan

3.3.1 Introduction

This case study will analyze the culture variability in joint, interagency and multinational environments by examining civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) through models of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan. These PRTs were led by different coalition nations. This case study intends to examine the organizational culture of each of the PRTs' main actors, their interactions, friction points, and how those variables affected performance in the achievement of main objectives. To highlight possible friction points, the case study will consider four broad areas: management structure, symbols, boundaries, and security; media and information; and context and legitimacy.



Figure 3-11: Map of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. *Source: United States Institute for Peace, Wikimedia.*

Culture affects interactions among different groups. Similarly, the culture of an organization (military, government agency, NGO, international organization, transnational organization, et cetera) affects the way members interact with those from other organizations. Interactions between members of different organizations can often lead to friction and conflict.

To understand the cultural factors and the dynamics involved with joint operations, it is necessary to define the concept of interoperability. Interoperability applies to joint efforts between U.S. government agencies—such as the DoD, uniformed military branches, USAID, and the Department of State (DoS) – as well as joint U.S. military training missions with foreign militaries.

Integrating civilian agencies into military operations is often a difficult task.[497] Interoperability among U.S. civilian agencies and the military is often challenged by faulty coordination mechanisms, different planning processes, resources, timeframes, and differences in organizational cultures.[498] Understandably, interoperability becomes exponentially more complicated and complex during a conflict or major disaster, when it is necessary to coordinate multinational operations with multiple NGOs and an unpredictable or unstable host government.

A Theoretical Framework

Robert A. Rubinstein, distinguished Professor of Anthropology and International Relations at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, wrote extensively about how cultural factors affect the ability of military and humanitarian actors to work together in joint, multi-agency missions; and how cultural factors affect work with local populations.[499] Rubinstein distinguishes between ***horizontal interoperability and vertical interoperability***. The former focuses on the organizational cultural factors affecting humanitarian and military groups; the latter focuses on their relations with local communities.[500]

Figure 3-12: Operations (CNO) Adm. Gary Roughead, middle, tours a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) site with other U.S. and Afghan leadership, in Afghanistan. *Source: U.S. Navy, Wikimedia.*

Rubinstein believes that "achieving interoperability among military and humanitarian organizations also requires a common understanding across broadly defined levels of operations, in addition to technological standardizations that will allow them to work together."[501] He concludes that achieving interoperability among military and humanitarian organizations requires "a deeper understanding of organizational culture, which can provide a dynamic and generative appreciation," which will need "historical and situational appreciation of the social contexts."[502]

Therefore, according to the framework proposed above, as we examine the PRT modules in Iraq and Afghanistan, we will be able to address cultural considerations in order to achieve a deeper understanding of horizontal interoperability among the groups described in this case study.

3.3.2 Background information and mission of PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan

According to the U.S. Army handbook, *Afghanistan: Provincial Reconstruction Team Observations, Insights, and Lessons*, a PRT is:

> *[An] interim civil-military organization designed to operate in semi-permissive environments usually following open hostilities. The PRT is intended to improve stability in each area by helping build the host nation's capacity; reinforcing the host nation's legitimacy and effectiveness; and bolstering that the host nation can provide security to its citizens and deliver essential government services.*[503]

The mission for a PRT is to assist province-level governments in serving their constituencies in the best way possible by achieving the following objectives:

- establish a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant government

- commitment to a just, representative, and accountable government
- avoid being a safe haven or sponsor of terrorism
- become integrated into the global economy
- contribute to regional peace and security

PRT: the PRTs were small, joint, civil-military organizations that aspired to promote progress in governance, security, and reconstruction.

PRTs began operating in Afghanistan in early 2002; at that time, they were known as Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLCs), founded by U.S. military forces under Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). These cells, commonly referred to as "chiclets," were comprised of 10-12 Soldiers from U.S. Army Civil Affairs (CA). The primary mission of CHLCs was to provide humanitarian assistance, intelligence gathering, and the execution of small-scale reconstruction projects. Additionally, these Army CA teams were responsible for interacting, coordinating, and establishing relations with UN assistance missions and other NGOs operating in theater.

In late 2002, the decision was made to enhance and expand this initiative and the role of these small cells; consequently, the PRT concept was created with an intent to tackle issues within three sectors: governance, security, and reconstruction. This resulted in the creation of 26 PRTs in Afghanistan led by 14 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) nations.

In Iraq, a similar PRT initiative, with significant modifications and an international transformation, was begun in 2005. There were 31 PRTs in all 18 provinces of Iraq. However, Iraq-based PRTs were typically much smaller, with an average of 26 personnel in each unit. PRTs in Iraq were usually led by a senior State Department civilian and assisted by a Lieutenant Colonel; the exception to this rule was the case of 13 PRTs embedded within combat units.[504]

PRTs became an effort of joint civil-military teams that encompassed 50-100 international civilians and military personnel. Although the goal for each PRT was the same, the model for each PRT varied in their structure, and strategy, depending on numerous factors. These factors included, but were not limited to the lead nation's policies and available resources. PRTs were generally comprised of personnel from military branches, interpreters, local government representatives, and the lead nation's civilian government representatives. Like the predecessor CHLCs, PRTs operated on a provincial level, with each team responsible for one or two provinces or a certain region within the country while they assisted the targeted country's main ethnic groups. PRTs were designed to simultaneously "achieve political objectives, counterterrorism, and promote social and economic development."[505]

The U.S. established and led the first PRT. Later NATO/ISAF became involved in the PRT initiative. ISAF-led PRTs reflected their stated mission, oriented to expand support and aid for the Afghan government outside of Kabul.[506]



Figure 3-13: PRT Organization Chart. *Source: United States Joint Force Command.*

Although responding to one mission, there was a "flexibility in the concept" of PRTs, resulting in varied units in size, military capability, nature and focus. This variation is due to several factors such as: the size of the region of responsibility, the security status, local conditions and needs, the leading coalition nation's policies and interests, resources, and the presence of other combat troops in the area.[510]

According to ISAF doctrine, all PRTs relied on Forward Support Bases (FSB) alongside Regional Commands; within which PRT military representation varied. In relatively peaceful regions, there were fewer (or a complete absence) of combat troops; this put the military requirement for PRTs at a higher demand, making the teams bigger in staff and troops. Such PRTs were often responsible for intelligence gathering, force protection, military presence, and – at times – the use of force. In volatile areas where the security situation was deteriorating (and where NGOs, humanitarian-relief activities, and local authority was absent), military units filled the void. It was mainly within this latter situation where the military-led PRTs had initially (and heavily) operated.[511]

In addition to the military capabilities within PRTs, some units encompassed non-ISAF divisions such as Police Mentoring Teams and detachments from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. These capabilities offered PRTs extra resources to perform security-sector reform in addition to reconstruction and force

protection.[512] It is worth mentioning that this military structure and ISAF chain of command applied to military personnel in the PRT and not the civilians within each unit. Additionally, nationally commanded troops within the PRT often fell under their own chain of command, as well as the ISAF chain of command. The PRT concept is unique: it not only brought military and civilians together, but also civilians from different branches and departments of coalition nations.

USAID

USAID was formally established on November 3, 1961 by President John F. Kennedy. Prior to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, political and military aid were not distributed separately from economic and development aid. In the 1970s, USAID shifted focus away from capital-assistance programs, and began to focus on development assistance: food and nutrition, population-planning initiatives, health and education, and human resources development.[513] The 1980s ushered in an era of assistance with the goal of stabilizing currencies and financial systems, while focusing on local employment and income opportunities. Programs began to shift from individual projects to large programs. While the agency has always operated within the framework of U.S. foreign policy, the links between the DoS and USAID have varied over the years.

USAID plays a critical role in international stability efforts and it played an essential role in the U.S.-led PRT initiative. It is a first responder that serves to enable the transition from conflict to long-term development by investing in agriculture, health systems, and democratic institutions. One of the main goals of USAID is to prevent conflict before it starts; this is safer and less costly than deploying military forces.

PRT models

This case study will examine different PRT models, their composition, leadership, focuses, and nationality.

American PRTs in Afghanistan

The model for the American PRT offers the most publicly available lessons learned. As described earlier, the U.S. had initiated the PRT concept in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The U.S. PRT model was known to be run solely by American personnel, without the participation of other partnering coalition nations. This was true for all U.S. PRTs, except for two units in Afghanistan: PRT Qalat, supported by Romania; and PRT Bagram, supported by South Korea.

Figure 3-14: Coalition medics travelling to remote villages in Ghazni Province to provide medical care. *Source: U.S. Army, Wikimedia.*

Known to be heavily focused on "quick impact and reconstruction"[514] efforts to win the support and trust of local populations, the U.S. PRT model has been heavily criticized by non-governmental actors (particularly NGOs) for running the PRT initiative for counterinsurgency purposes. However, it is worth noting that many of the U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan were operating in unstable and volatile regions. These were places where insurgencies existed and fighting took place with little to no NGO footprint. The unstable security situation in these areas prompted the U.S. to focus more on reconstruction, which some observers saw as a counterinsurgency motive.

A U.S. military-led PRT included an average of 100 military personnel and were mainly led by military commanders. Government civilian representatives serving on each PRT were comprised of two to three personnel of DoS, USAID, and other government agencies and departments. Coordination between military and civilians was facilitated through the PRT Command Section (which combined civilian representatives with the commander and his/her closest lieutenants), a replication of the successful British Joint Command Group model.[515]

Figure 3-15: Coalition nations in Afghanistan. Source: Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, an Interagency Assessment. *Source: USAID, June 2006.*

Despite efforts toward coordination and civilian integration, the U.S. model was perceived as being heavily dominated by military leadership, for which it has often been criticized. In U.S. military-led PRTs, embedded civilians (individuals representing USAID, for example) often provided information, advised, and monitored projects without participating in the selection of these projects.[516] This characteristic of the U.S. model has been identified as a major trigger point for internal friction between military and civilian PRT players; this friction affected team dynamics and – ultimately – mission accomplishment. The only U.S. civilian-led PRT was a small PRT established in Panjshir in 2005. It consisted of approximately 40 military personnel commanded by military leadership who worked under a civilian director representing DoS. Similarly, the director's advisors were civilians who represented USAID and the Department of Agriculture.[517]

The U.S. PRT support package in the field of governance and reconstruction was implemented through two channels: PRT projects and USAID activities. These CIMIC projects were supervised by military CA teams. Funding for these projects came from a variety of sources and programs, but the bulk of the funding was received from DoD allocations, such as the Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) and the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). This support from DoD offered U.S. PRTs rapid and flexible access to resources to fund locally contracted projects. Other funding came from USAID's PRTs Quick Impact Project (QIP). This USAID program funded projects executed by contracted NGOs or foreign commercial firms.[518] Experts have observed that whatever agency provides the bulk of funding often dominates and controls PRT projects and priorities.[519]

British (Nordic)-led PRTs in Afghanistan

The British-led PRT is one of the three original PRT models in Afghanistan. Established in July 2003 in the northern center of Mazar-e Sharif under OEF command, it was later moved under ISAF command in the of summer 2004. As opposed to the U.S.-led PRT, which did not include coalition nations as partners, the British-led PRTs included Northern European countries, particularly Norway and Sweden (as well as Finland, Denmark, Latvia, and Estonia), as effective partners where each country offered military and civilian support.[520]

The British-led PRT has been commended and credited for their successful efforts in "mitigating conflicts" between major warlords in northern Afghanistan. Initially starting with 50-150 troops, the British PRTs focused heavily on a mission known as "Security Sector Reform." Later, the British-Nordic PRTs were comprised of 150-200 soldiers. PRT Mazar-e Sharif (covering four provinces, "an area five times the size of Kosovo"[521]) had the largest complement – over 400 soldiers.

Figure 3-16: U.S. and Afghan engineers review blueprints for an Afghan National Army garrison currently under construction in Farah province. *Source: Farah PRT helps maintain peace, stability in Afghanistan, U.S. Air Forces Central Command.*

Known for successfully achieving "disarmament, mediation policy and conflict resolution" between competing actors and rivals through diplomacy, coordination, and cooperation with the local authorities, the British example has been copied and a well-regarded model in the PRT Handbook.[522] Michael J. McNerney, an associate director at RAND, credited the British-led PRT model of civil-military integration as the "finest example of interagency jointness on tactical level in Afghanistan."[523] He notes that "the civilian and military members of the UK-led PRT in Mazar-e Sharif, by comparison, trained and deployed together and understood that their mission was to support both military and civilian objectives."[524] Hence the mutual respect, open dialogue, and understanding of the mission and the main objectives made the British-led PRT a well-regarded and a successful model in the interagency arena. Civilian players in British PRTs were placed in significant roles on the team where they played an integral role in the following

sectors: political affairs, governance, development, civilian police, the penitentiary system, and counternarcotics.

Interagency coordination is that which occurs between elements of DoD and engaged U.S. government (USG) agencies to achieve an objective.[525]

The British PRT in Lashkar Gah, Helmand, has been praised as the "best resourced" for incorporating 28 civilian experts, which formed 15 percent of this PRT's total personnel. The PRT in Lashkar Gah was commanded and supervised by a Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) civilian appointee. Experts stressed that for effective civil-military integration to be successful and fruitful on the ground, there must be coherent institutional coordination and arrangement at the home-capital level. Some of the highlighted approaches utilized by British PRTs were the "Conflict Prevention Pools," which are "joint mechanisms for bringing together assets in foreign affairs, defense, and development,"[526] as well as the interdepartmental "Stabilization Unit."

Considered by ISAF as being the best practice, the British PRT leadership method was approved and disseminated later to all other PRTs as the "Integrated Command Group." It was based on and led by a "tightly knit" triumvirate of the three main agencies: the Ministry of Defense (MoD), FCO, and the Department for International Development (DFID). Projects, issues, and plans were all discussed and shared; decisions were made unanimously between the three-pillared committee.

As opposed to British PRTs (with their heavy civilian representation and leadership), and despite jointly running the PRTs alongside UK personnel, the Northern European model was headed and led by a military commander, usually a senior military officer. Despite being answerable to military leadership, the civilian component within the Nordic PRT was known to be effective, well-integrated, and of sufficient professional stature to be an equal to the military commander. This was evident when the team was engaged in close coordination, planning, and decision-making.

British and Nordic PRTs have largely focused on security rather than development in Afghanistan, opting to leave that field for specialized NGOs where their involvement included information sharing, coordinating, and advising with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Also, reconstruction projects were implemented through NGOs and local contractors, and were funded via a "CERP-equivalent" allocation to win the support and trust of locals.

German-led PRTs in Afghanistan

Germany inherited the small Kinduz PRT from the U.S.; six months later, it established its second PRT in Fayzabad, in the northeastern Badakhshan province. Over the years, the German-led PRTs grew, reaching 400-450 soldiers. German-led PRTs acted mainly as force protection; they patrolled districts and performed CIMIC activities. Despite heavy military representation, the German-led PRTs had, reputedly, an effective and well-integrated civilian component, usually about 10-20 experts, focusing on political issues, governance, reconstruction, and development. Most projects were implemented through CIMIC teams and German-funded NGOs operating in the region. The German military police also had a PRT mission: providing security, and supporting and training local Afghan police.

What made the German-led PRTs unique was their "dual leadership" approach. Each PRT was led by two chiefs: a military commander (usually a colonel) and a civilian official (usually a representative of the German foreign ministry); each leader was responsible for their own half of the PRT. Both chiefs jointly

collaborated, coordinated, and mutually decided on issues and projects. One study noted that tensions between the two camps had initially stemmed from differences in organizational culture; but these tensions subsided over time. Overall, four major components made up the German-led PRTs: the Federal Ministry of Defense, the Federal Foreign Office, the Federal Ministry of Interior, and the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development.

Turkish-led PRTs in Afghanistan

Established in November 2006, the first Turkish civilian-led PRT was in the Vardak province in Afghanistan under NATO/ISAF command. Following Turkey's initial success, it established a second PRT – Jawzan PRT – in Shibirgan province on July 2010. Turkey's PRT initiative in Afghanistan is considered one of the most successful coalition models.[527] This is mainly due to strong religious, historical, and cultural ties between Turkey and Afghanistan. A shared religion makes it a "brotherhood duty" for Turkey to help Afghanistan and its people.[528] However, it is safe to assume that a major factor playing into this success was the fact that the Turkish PRTs were all civilian-led units. These civilians were mainly diplomats, as well as personnel from the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (the equivalent of USAID), and other relevant Turkish ministries.

Although Turkey also had a military presence in Afghanistan, it believed that capitalizing on their historical, religious, and cultural ties through an all-civilian, non-military PRT would facilitate their direct interaction with locals, and – hence – provide the best way to accomplish their mission of winning heart and minds.[529] This strategy has earned Turkey recognition for their social and cultural contribution in Afghanistan because most of its over 200 projects focused on socio-cultural issues. Additionally, Turkish-led PRT civilians were well equipped and familiar with local languages and culture – an aspect that contributed tremendously to their effectiveness and success. By establishing an all-civilian PRT concept, Turkey eliminated some of the issues and tensions that frequently arise in joint civilian-military PRTs; these issues and tensions include – to name but a few – communications, objectives, lines of authority, and easy interaction with NGOs.[530]

Turkey joined the ISAF coalition in 2001. Its troops were deployed in Afghanistan on a non-counterinsurgency and non-counterterrorist mission. During the ISAF mission, military personnel from Turkey twice assumed the role of ISAF commander (June 2002-February 2003 and February 2005-August 2005), as well as the leadership of the Kabul Regional Command in 2009.[531]

3.3.3 General Friction Points

As mentioned earlier, a variety of factors defined PRT models. The biggest variable was whether the PRT was led by military personnel or civilians; this was usually decided by the coalition nation capital. Another influence was the group of priorities on the ground that favored one particular "sector, activity, or modality over some others."[532] This flexibility in the concept of PRT was perceived both positively and negatively. A flexible concept resulted in PRT units that were prepared to adjust and "bend the model and activities" in ways that suited their areas of responsibility, and were based on the circumstances and challenges they faced. However, this flexibility has been heavily criticized as being a "major error of the whole enterprise," as it produced no solid, clear, or unified guidelines for each player to follow. It was also believed that the "flexible PRT model" created incoherence which often led to poor communication and other significant friction points between players.[533]

Many official documents – drafted and approved by the different agencies participating in these CIMIC capacity building efforts – offer guidelines for dialogue, rules of engagement, and information sharing between these camps. However, there remained significant misunderstanding and lack of communication. This often hindered and undermined the overall mission. The U.N., for instance, has an official document which sets the rules of engagement with militaries operating in an emergency relief capacity in an affected area. This document is known as the Oslo *Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief*.[534]

Military involvement in humanitarian missions is not a new effort. However, the security environment and the nature of irregular warfare frequently brings military personnel in direct contact with local civilians caught in between; this adds another layer (humanitarian, relief, and stability efforts) to their role in each theater. The more the military becomes involved in humanitarian missions, emergency relief, and reconstruction efforts, the possibility of interactions with civilian and humanitarian actors in the field becomes higher. This, in turn, exposes the differences in culture, command, communication, and perceptions, and brings to the surface issues regarding security, environment, and local communities that both camps intend to assist.

The U.N. defines a Humanitarian Civil Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) effort as the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and – when appropriate – pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.[535]

Much has been written on the topic of CIMIC in humanitarian missions. However, to examine the array of friction points resulting from this interaction, one must examine how each actor perceives themselves and the other. It is also important to look at the level of mutual trust and respect.

While civilian humanitarian actors perceive themselves – and strive to remain – neutral, independent, and decentralized; they view military actors as motivated by political agendas, centralized, and controlled by a chain of command. They view the military as outsiders – with no humanitarian background, experience, or skills – who try to impose their agenda into the humanitarian sector and space.

Civilian humanitarian actors often expressed concerns – particularly regarding the PRT concept – about what they saw as the "militarization of aid," and the use of the humanitarian aid for “winning hearts and minds”; they believed that this new military mission is counter to the traditional humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, and impartiality.[536] Humanitarian actors see the involvement of the military as a last resort to during emergency relief and humanitarian assistance missions.[537] However, humanitarian actors always want to work in a secure environment, so they frequently ask the military for force protection.

One study, *PRT Models in Afghanistan*, published by the Crisis Management Centre Finland, concludes that experts working in PRTs “carry along attitudes, bureaucratic traditions and the legal restrictions of their employers back home.”[538] The study found that, aside from these personalities and attitudes, each PRT individual represents their military or humanitarian organization’s own unique “culture” that often differs completely from their national culture. (This phenomenon occurs even when members of a team share the same nationality and are serving the national interests of the same government back home. This translated into serious differences – and, at times, severe disagreements – on the ground in terms of how members of team perceived and treated the same problems.) At times, there have been competing and

colliding factors where "military-military coordination proves to be a challenge in conflict zones."[539] The study goes so far as to suggest that "putting together the military, police advisors, development experts and diplomats carries a serious potential for explosion,"[540] metaphorically.

The concept of security, and how each actor perceives it, also remains one of the main friction points among civilian and military actors. For example, U.S.-led PRTs often performed military patrols in their theater, even though the actual mission of the military component within the U.S.-led PRT was solely force protection. (Some experts acknowledge that this "dual-mission" phenomenon was often a necessary product of the security environment and U.S. operational traditions.) However, situations like this frequently created tensions with NGOs and UNAMA personnel operating in the same area.[541]

A 2010 working paper by the DoS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) titled *Fostering PRT-Military Partner Relationships*, identified several friction points between military and civilians within the PRT framework. The concept of "timeframe" was one friction point that led to disagreements between the two camps. While military actors sought shorter timeframes (often due to the security situation and the urgent need to earn the trust of local populations), civilian partners operated on longer timeframes that usually took years to yield results. (It is not unusual for civilian humanitarian relief planners to think in terms of generations, not just years.)

Military deployment is constrained by a timetable – hence, the pressing need to achieve certain objectives within a certain – and often short – period. However, civilians operate within longer and often looser timeframes: they address the same issues through a different lens.

The military is mission-driven; civilians are purpose- and policy-driven. In that sense, it is safe to conclude that the military culture is monochronic — where things happen singularly in a certain order and fashion. The civilian culture, on the other hand, can be considered polychronic, where more than one thing happens at a time, and where there are no limitations or restrictions on time or how and when to achieve a certain goal.

Meanwhile, the strikingly different planning and decision-making processes used by military and civilian partners were also identified as issues that led to skepticism and divergence.

The military dedicates time and effort into the planning process, which incorporates the commander's intent, security and local factors, timeframes, and other crucial aspects. This process offers tactical flexibility, as well as alternative courses of action (COAs) to prevent surprises; it provides a commander with the knowledge needed to make the best possible decisions to achieve the mission.

By contrast, the civilian planning process is elaborate, detailed, and often repetitive — particularly in terms of discussions that precede any decision-making. Additionally, civilians usually make decisions by seeking a consensus among all the people who have a stake in the decision; this often requires more time, meetings, and discussion. The civilian decision-making process, observes the author of *Fostering PRT-Military Partner Relationships,* often frustrates military partners in the field.

Another aspect that makes the two camps different is how they operate in certain and uncertain environments. While the military is trained to operate in uncertain and chaotic environments, they value solid facts and certainty. On the other end, civilians – particularly academics, researchers, and subject matter experts – are comfortable operating in an uncertain environment that is different from their own. Civilians thrive in an organic environment, preferring to allow the normal process to take its time without

any interruption. Civilians and academics are comfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity; they recognize that their efforts may not yield immediate results. The value for civilians is what can be learned while waiting for results to occur.

As for communication styles, the language used by different partners within a unit was often mentioned as an additional source of tension and frustration. The military tends to use clear, direct, assertive, short, and bullet-pointed sentences and language with plenty of abbreviations and acronyms. Meanwhile, civilians are the opposite. Elaborate research and methodologies are applied with a great deal of doubt and skepticism. This different style in communication often created misunderstanding and, at times, a lack of communication.

"Resources" were another point of contention between PRT partners. As mentioned earlier, with funding streams, the military could secure money and personnel for PRTs operating in Afghanistan and Iraq. The resources readily available to the military supported immediate objectives and small local projects. These resources gave military-led PRTs dominance over their civilian counterparts.

Civilians were constrained by cost sensitivities, long-term effects, and sustainability. However, as highlighted by statements from a 2011 round-table discussion sponsored by the Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning (CAOCL) on civil-military coordination and interaction, resources and funding often brought competing actors *together*: it forced these partners to work through their disagreements and come to consensus throughout the design and approval process. This ultimately produced fruitful results. Moreover, most civilian experts within the PRT lacked logistics and security assets, which made them rely on their military partners for protection, particularity in volatile environments like Afghanistan and Iraq. This, in turn, diminished their role and opportunities to effectively interact with locals in the same way that military personnel did.

Regarding interactions with locals, particularly militarized societies – as in Afghanistan and Iraq – it meant that locals generally valued and respected members of the military. They perceived them as having the power to solve issues and implement projects. This gave the military leverage when engaging locals, an aspect that exacerbated the already tense relationship between civilians and military personnel. Also, age and expertise were valued in a hierarchal culture; this was another issue that faced young civilian experts and – sometimes – junior officers.

Media and information sharing: although mentioned earlier as being the model with the most public information and written lessons learned, U.S.-led PRTs headed and commanded by military personnel were criticized for lacking sufficient public and available information on mission outcomes or goals achieved.

A report by the U.S. Institute for Peace (USIP) notes that "the absence of an effective public information campaign was surprising, given that one of the objectives of the PRT program was winning the public support."[542] The USIP report also observes that, there was even less public information available from PRT models led by other coalition nations.

Reviewing the different PRT models, it becomes very clear that some models work better than others. One might conclude that a PRT with a better chance of success has all-civilian actors with a cultural affinity for the host nation – such as the Turkish model. Another key to the success of the PRT was having a clear and agreed-upon set of partner guidelines – such as the British-led PRT model.

The Turkish model opted to avoid or limit potential clashes between civilians and military by deploying an all-civilian expert to run their PRT; these Turkish experts were mostly diplomats. However, the main reason for not incorporating military elements in the PRT was a decision by the Turkish government that it would not to be involved in any counterinsurgency capacity. Additionally, a very crucial aspect contributing to the Turkish-led PRT success was the shared religious, cultural, and historical ties between Turkey and Afghanistan. Moreover, being an all-Civilian PRT – mainly composed of diplomats who came from the same organizational culture and background – diminished any possible frictions that might have occurred if the team had a more diverse background and array of expertise. Therefore, it is perhaps unfair to compare or even hold the Turkish PRT as the ideal prototype.

However, it is certainly fair to examine the leadership styles, decision-making mechanisms, and pre-deployment training of other models to identify best practices and aspects that made these models a success.

For example, the British "Integrative Command Group," a triumvirate composed of the MoD, FCO, and DFID, proved to be one of the most successful approaches to PRT leadership and decision-making. It balanced power-sharing between all three partners (including military and civilians) with clear guidelines.

Moreover, prior to the establishment of the British-led PRT, coordination and interaction was made with UN and NGO representatives to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. Therefore, the UK model focused on security sector reform more than humanitarian assistance and development projects.

Another example was the German-led PRT, with its dual-leadership approach. Power was successfully shared between military and civilian personnel through the appointment of two chiefs: a senior officer (colonel) on the military side; a senior civilian official on the other side. While the chiefs led their own respective teams, they closely coordinated and collaborated on every major issue and project, including final decisions.

3.3.4 Conclusion

The available public information and literature shows us that mutual understanding and clear guidelines were relatively absent in U.S.-led PRTs, where the military dominated through its size and ability to project power. Some experts also attributed the dominance of the military to its virtually unlimited resources.

Examining the Nordic and German PRT models, where the PRT teams had even bigger military muscle, PRT leaders managed to strike a balance between themselves and their civilian counterparts. Some of this success can be credited to their preapproved leadership style, operating guidelines, and shared pre-deployment training. Conversely, lack of clear guidelines resulted in organizational cultural norms and personal chemistry being the primary currency in dealing with their counterparts.

3.4 USEUCOM Case Study: Operations Mare Nostrum and Triton

The purpose of this case study is to present an analysis of cultural variability in the joint, interagency, and multinational operating environment of Operations Mare Nostrum and Triton. These Mediterranean security and humanitarian operations were conducted primarily by the Italian government and FRONTEX, the EU border agency, respectively.

Operations Mare Nostrum and Triton demonstrate that seemingly straightforward operations can quickly be confronted by a host of competing political, operational, and cultural issues due to divergent priorities and operational cultures across a variety of actors. These confrontations are sometimes heightened at the transnational level, where transnational actors must negotiate policy and security obligations with humanitarian considerations, as well as the varying parochial interests of key stakeholders that include civil society and state actors.

> "Under Italy's "Mare Nostrum" operation, some 150,000 so-called "irregular" migrants, many of them from the most troubled nations in Africa and the Middle East, have arrived safely over the past 10 months in Europe, where today many are pursuing claims for asylum.
>
> IOM [International Organisation for Migration] notes that despite the rescue efforts of Italy and other Mediterranean coastal nations – including Greece, Malta and Spain – an estimated 3,200 migrants have perished attempting to cross the Mediterranean in 2014, many of them victims of ruthless criminal gangs seeking to profit from the misery of men, women and children fleeing conflict and oppression."
>
> **— International Organisation for Migration, United Nations, 31 OCT 2014**[543]

This case study is divided into four main parts:

The Introduction includes brief descriptions of Operations Mare Nostrum and Triton, and a description of key players in these operations—including the Italian government, Frontex, and key civil-society actors.

The Background section takes an in-depth look at both Operations Mare Nostrum and Triton, as well as their preceding operation, Operation Constant Vigilance. These examinations explore the CONOPS relating to these relevant operations, and the intended outcomes of these efforts in the southern Mediterranean Sea.

The Cultural Variability and Friction section explores Operations Mare Nostrum and Triton through the more specific prisms of cultural variability and friction. In both operations, otherwise limited-seeming mission sets, were set against a complex contextual ecosystem of varying (and sometimes competing) actors, motivations, and definitions of success. This environment sometimes had the effect of enhancing and furthering the operational missions; at other times, it detracted from it. But the experience aptly underscores the ways by which diverging organizational and operational cultures in a complex operation can lead to unexpected situations and outcomes.

The Conclusion reviews the case study in the context of possible future operations, and how the U.S. Marine Corps, and other U.S. military and government agencies, might learn important lessons for future operations.

3.4.1 Introduction

Why Operations Mare Nostrum and Triton?

Operations Mare Nostrum and Triton were conducted by the Italian government and Frontex, respectively, to provide border security and some measure of humanitarian coverage in the southern Mediterranean region. However, while Mare Nostrum and Triton appeared to have relatively straightforward goals, they were, in practice, sprawling operations that included a variety of transnational, state, and civil society actors and inputs.

Recommended Reading:

For additional details on the humanitarian situation in the southern Mediterranean as of 2014, see:

"Rescue at Sea: The Situation in the Sicilian Strait," Borderline Europe (2014).

http://www.borderline-europe.de/sites/default/files/readingtips/2014_08_b-e_Dossier%20Mare%20Nostrum%20(1)%20(1).pdf

Operation Mare Nostrum is described in the following manner by the Italian Ministry of Defense:

"The Mare Nostrum Operation was launched by the Italian Government on 18 October 2013, as a military and humanitarian operation aimed at tackling the humanitarian emergency in the Strait of Sicily, due to the dramatic increase in migration flows. The Operation ended on 31 October 2014, coinciding with the start of the new operation called Triton.

"This Operation was an upgrade of the force for monitoring migration flows already operating within the operation Constant Vigilance, which the Italian Navy has been conducting since 2004, permanently deploying a ship in the Strait of Sicily along with maritime patrol aircraft.

"Operation Mare Nostrum had therefore the twofold purpose of

- safeguarding human life at sea, and
- bringing to justice human traffickers and migrant smugglers.

"The force included personnel as well as sea and air assets of the Italian navy, air force, Carabinieri, financial Police, harbor masters corps /coast guard, personnel of the Italian Red Cross military corps, and of the Ministry of the Interior/state police, embarked on Italian navy vessels, with the contribution of all the governmental agencies involved in controlling migration flows by sea."[544]

Operation Triton as described in this manner by Frontex:

Frontex will also deploy five debriefing teams to support the Italian authorities in collecting intelligence on the people-smuggling networks operating in the countries of origin and transit of the migrants as well as two screening teams. The operational area of Triton will cover the territorial waters of Italy, as well as parts of the search and rescue (SAR) zones of Italy and Malta.

"We have finalised all the necessary preparations for Triton and we are now ready to launch the operation" said Gil Arias Fernandez. "I would like to underline that

operation Triton focuses on border control and surveillance. Having said that saving lives will remain an absolute priority for Frontex" – he added. Frontex will operate under the command of the Italian Ministry of Interior, in cooperation with Guardia di Finanza, as well as the Italian Coast Guard.[545]

Figure 3-17: Irish Naval Service personnel rescuing migrants as part of Operation Triton, June 2015.
Source: Wikimedia.

Operations Mare Nostrum and Triton serve as strong case studies because they represent two operations with similar goals that grew out of common circumstances; they also reveal a broad spectrum of circumstances and operational cultural context in their execution.

Horizontal and Vertical Interoperability

Cultural factors can play a major role in the processes and outcomes of government and military operations. This is particularly true of military and humanitarian organizations and groups working together in joint operations, and further compounded during missions requiring interactions with diverse local populations. Culture has a role to play in a variety of ways; typically, cultural interaction is regarded as something of a vertical process, flowing from the government or military actor to the local population, or the reverse.

Robert A. Rubinstein, a Professor of Anthropology and International Relations at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University, calls this "vertical interoperability." Given the predominance of U.S. and Western counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, and stabilization mission sets over the previous several decades, the question of cultural factors have primarily been affixed to the question of cultural relations between the government or military force and local populations. However, it is arguably equally important to account for cultural interrelations between collaborating organizations, agencies, and military groups. This is referred to as "horizontal interoperability."

Rubinstein discusses these issues with two main questions:[546]

"How can understanding culture be used to improve the way various component organizations collaborate in an Area of Operation?" is asked in an effort enhance the ability of the agencies, organizations, and people who are part of a mission to work together in an efficient and effective manner. The question asks about what is needed for these actors to work together across their different structural locations in a mission. This raises a concern for what I call Horizontal Interoperability.

The second question is: "How can understanding the culture of the people who are receiving humanitarian aid improve the delivery of that aid?" People asking this question are interested in enhancing the way that the organizations, agencies and people—both military and civilian—work with local populations. I call this Vertical Interoperability.

Achieving interoperability among military and humanitarian organizations also requires a common understanding across broadly defined levels of operations, in addition to technological standardizations that will allow them to work together.

Horizontal interoperability accounts for the interaction and coordination of a diversity of operational cultures toward a common operation or mission. Each actor in a joint operation is likely to represent a divergent kind of animating operational culture, leading to disagreements, misunderstandings, and even crises between otherwise cooperating groups. This case study examines these phenomena in action during two separate but closely interrelated missions, Operations Mare Nostrum and Triton.

Figure 3-18: Borders of Operations Mare Nostrum (red) and Triton (green). *Source: Wikimaps.*

3.4.2 Background

Operation Mare Nostrum

In 2013, the Italian government launched a predecessor to Mare Nostrum; this earlier effort was called Operation Constant Vigilance. Operation Constant Vigilance was a small monitoring mission conducted by the Italian Navy to track and disrupt smuggling and refugee flows in the southern Mediterranean, and specifically the Strait of Sicily.[547] Operation Constant Vigilance consisted of one naval ship and maritime patrol aircraft.

Operation Mare Nostrum was a major expansion of this preceding effort, established to respond to a mounting humanitarian emergency following a dramatic increase in irregular migration flows from North Africa into the southern Mediterranean.

This wave of migration was made more tragic by the shipwreck in Lampedusa, Italy, in early October 2013,[548] in which hundreds of refugees died because of unsafe vessels on one hand, and inadequate SAR operations on the other. The tragedy served as the most direct impetus for the expansion of operations. Mare Nostrum was aimed to conduct SAR operations, and to interdict and disrupt extant trafficking and smuggling networks.

Operation Mare Nostrum was led by the Republic of Italy, which deployed a range of assets to support the mission. According to the Italian Defense Ministry, the Italian government deployed:

- 700 to 1,000 personnel
- 1 Landing Platform Dock amphibious vessel with specific command and control functions, equipped with advanced medical facilities for Role 1 care, including a shelter and a biocontainment pod. The ship can also carry landing craft and Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs), and is able to receive onboard representatives of other ministries or national/international organizations involved in the operation

Figure 3-19: Italian Navy frigate Fenice attached to Operation Mare Nostrum. *Source: Wikimedia.*

- 2 "Minerva"-class corvettes
- 2 "Costellazioni/Comandanti"-class patrol vessels, each providing 1 SH-212 helicopter, one of which in the fisheries surveillance role
- 1 medium-to-heavy SH-90 (TRR) helicopter embarked onboard the amphibious vessel, along with 2 S-100 unmanned aerial vehicle
- 1 EH 101 (MPH) helicopter, deployed ashore in Lampedusa
- 1 MM P180 aircraft and 1 PS P180 aircraft equipped with Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) cameras, deployed at Pratica di Mare
- 1 LRMP Breguet Atlantic, deployed at Sigonella
- 1 medium AW139 helicopter (Police Force), deployed at Lampedusa
- 1 AW109 Light Utility Helicopter (Carabinieri), deployed at Lampedusa
- Italian Navy coastal radar network and Automatic Identification System (AIS)

The sea and air force was under the command of an Italian navy admiral embarked on a flagship serving as command and control platform. Also serving aboard the flagship were personnel of the Public Security Department – Central Directorate for Immigration, and Border Police, who effectively contributed to the improvement of onboard migrant identification procedures.

On all vessels, medical checks were carried out by the shipboard medical staff, assisted by doctors of the Sea and Air Border Health Department (ISMAF), personnel of the Military Corps and Voluntary Nurses of the Italian Red Cross, along with voluntary medical personnel of the Order of Malta's Italian Relief Corps (CISOM) and Francesca Rava Memorial Foundation.[549]

Recommended Reading:

For additional details on the conditions in the strait of Sicily as it relates to irregular migration, border control, and search and rescue, see:

"Search and Rescue in Central Mediterranean Sea," Migreurop (2015).

http://www.migreurop.org/IMG/pdf/report_wtm_migreurop-arci-ep_08242015.pdf

The Italian navy spearheaded Operation Mare Nostrum with key support from other elements of the Italian government, such as the coast guard, air force, Carabinieri (Gendarmes), financial police, Italian Red Cross military corps, and the interior ministry.

Operation Triton

Operation Triton was a follow-on mission originally meant to supplement Operation Mare Nostrum, but ultimately served to supersede it after the Italian government announced in 2014 that it was ceasing Operation Mare Nostrum.

Operation Triton was an effort led by Frontex, the European Union border agency. Operation Triton currently operates under Italian leadership and includes voluntary contributions from 15 additional EU and non-EU states, including: Croatia, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, France, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, Austria, Switzerland, Romania, Poland, Lithuania, and Malta.

Operation Triton in many respects was the successor to Operation Mare Nostrum. The Italian government, and the Maltese and Greek governments (in relative terms), had assumed the bulk of the burden for managing surging refugee flows from North Africa, and all three states lobbied strongly for "burden sharing" and greater involvement by the European Union due to the overwhelming scale of the security and humanitarian problem – and the concomitant resources demanded to address those issues.[550]

Italy ended the operation in 2014, citing the extensive resources ($142 million) that had been invested into the operation with little support from the European Union.[551] As Mare Nostrum ended, the EU border agency Frontex launched Operation Triton, which was more specifically oriented to border security (versus SAR) and initially received less than a third of Mare Nostrum's approximately $9 million per month funding.[552]

A string of additional migrant tragedies[553] in the southern Mediterranean prompted Frontex to increase funding for Operation Triton to a level comparable to Mare Nostrum, under which it continues to operate today.[554] However, the Operation Triton mandate continues to be more restricted when compared to Mare Nostrum. According to Frontex:

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25 European and Schengen Associated Countries are taking part in Operation Triton by deploying experts and/or technical equipment. The deployment levels depend on the level of migratory pressure in the area. To give an example, in February 2016, Frontex deployed 275 officers, four aircraft, two helicopters and nine vessels in the area…

Mare Nostrum was a military operation ran unilaterally by the Italian Navy. Operation Triton was launched to assist Italy with the increased migratory pressure on its external borders. It takes place in a different operational area, involves mainly civilian assets and was never intended to replace Mare Nostrum.[555]

Although Triton was not intended as a replacement for Mare Nostrum, it has, in effect, become, by necessity, its *de facto* replacement. The relationship between these two operations, and how they came to be developed, is itself a product of cultural variability and frictions at multiple levels.

3.4.3 Cultural Variability and Friction

Operation Mare Nostrum and Operation Triton exemplify differing and contrasting operational cultures between organizations involved in joint operations. One aspect of these differing approaches was intimately tied to issues of both geography as well as ambiguity over how and to what extent operational responsibility flows from the civil society/non-governmental level to the state level to the transnational level.

State Level: Italy

On the state level, operational culture considerations are more complex compared to NGOs. States – and particularly states with democratic governments – in many cases are not able to operate without a broader view of interests that often go beyond humanitarian considerations. Questions of resource allocation and political considerations—including domestic sensitivities to the mission, whether perceived as being for either good or ill—inform the character and extent of state involvement.

Figure 3-20: Italian Navy personnel preparing equipment during Operation Mare Nostrum. *Source: Italian Navy.*

The question of legitimacy is particularly salient, as governments—and especially democratic governments, but not only those—are accountable in varying ways to the perceived interests of their local populations. A state's ability to conduct various operations is ultimately conditioned on the perceived legitimacy of the state itself, its general conduct, and its specific conduct related to the operation or issue in question.

Civil Society

Figure 3-21: Cooperating groups and assets in Operations Mare Nostrum and Triton. *Source: MigrantReport.org.*

Narrower Apertures

Civil society actors and NGOs tend to operate with an organizational focus on the mission. This mission may or may not be affected by external factors, such as funding sources or political allegiances, but that mission frames the organization's overall participation and, invariably, their evaluation of an issue. This narrower field of view is often described, and generally internally viewed, as being more morally justifiable because it tends to eschew overt considerations for politics, popularity, or even money. While organizations must generally have a sense of these considerations to thrive, that same branding is simultaneously dependent on appearing focused foremost on the mission at hand. In the case of Operations Mare Nostrum and Triton, civil society organizations were focused primarily on the humanitarian aspects of the situation in the southern Mediterranean.

The volatile and dire humanitarian situation in Libya, combined with frequent cases of refugee accidents and deaths in transit to Europe, were chief areas of concern for civil society actors. Accordingly, NGOs focused on advocating—and in some cases, even themselves conducting—SAR and greater state and transnational efforts. In some ways, NGO groups working together have provided a range of services that would be otherwise be attributed to a state actor, even if on a more limited scope.

Figure 3-22: Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS) deployed independent assets to conduct SAR. *Source: MSF.org.*

NGOs and civil society organizations are narrowly focused; this means that their missions and organizational cultures can conflict with one another.

While NGOs demonstrated an impressive ability to cooperate over the humanitarian situation in the Mediterranean, outward signs of collaboration may obscure internal divisions over divisions of labor, competition for funding, and even organizational management and efficiency.

Additionally, civil society actors not only have differing missions, but also varying levels of resources and capability. For example, even among NGOs conducting SAR operations in the southern Mediterranean, organizations devoted their resources to maximize their impacts. Reportedly, larger NGOs like Doctors Without Borders (MSF) and Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS) could conduct genuine SAR operations that involved rescuing refugees at sea and dropping them off at Italian ports; meanwhile, less robust organizations like Sea Watch used smaller vessels to spot refugees in transit, provide supplies, and escort them until a larger vessel could arrive.

Turf Wars

In the case of Operation Mare Nostrum, the role of the state was very well-defined in that the government of the Republic of Italy had assumed responsibility for the operation without significant active support from other states or transnational organizations like the EU, of which it is a part. While the Italian government had appealed repeatedly to neighboring Mediterranean states and the EU partners to support its operations, Operation Mare Nostrum was ultimately almost entirely resourced and supported by Italian government and military assets.

Figure 3-23: Italian Naval forces conducting Operation Mare Nostrum.
Source: Italian Navy.

Internally, however, Operation Mare Nostrum was comprised of a diversity of governmental and military organizations and agencies, including: the Italian navy, coast guard, air force, Carabinieri (Gendarmes), financial police, Italian Red Cross military corps, and the interior ministry. Not entirely dissimilarly from varied actors within civil society, the individual organizations and agencies within the Italian government also have their own mandates, mission specialties, legitimacy, and leadership that conditioned their ability to effectively cooperate.

For example, the Italian navy assumed the lion's share of the operational tempo for Operation Mare Nostrum, even though in many respects its mission—of law enforcement/security and SAR—was the traditional province of the Italian coast guard, which although technically part of the Italian navy, falls under the direct control of the Italian transport ministry. However, the scale, complexity, and unfamiliarity of the problem set during Operation Mare Nostrum demanded the participation of the larger, blue-water Italian navy as well.

While interoperability between Italian government organizations and agencies appeared to be largely seamless, the ability of each organization to conduct itself appropriately and fulfill its mission almost certainly became factors in ongoing political and budgetary considerations within the Italian government.

Even more saliently, the Italian government's decision to suspend Operation Mare Nostrum in November 2014, despite the lack of a comparably robust replacement effort, is itself a reflection of operational culture considerations. The original impetus for Operation Mare Nostrum was a succession of humanitarian tragedies involving transiting refugee flows in the southern Mediterranean, which was highlighted by the Lampedusa shipwreck in 2013.

The Italian government's decision to unilaterally intervene was based on the infamy generated by these high-profile events, and international calls for local authorities to be more involved to prevent such incidents. The Italian government, sensitive to such pressure, thus launched Operation Mare Nostrum.

Foreign Policy "Culture"



Figure 3-24: Liland's illustration of mutually reinforcing aspects of foreign policy and culture. *Source: Bibsys.no.*

In his seminal 1993 paper, international relations scholar Frode Liland formulated how culture plays foundational, functional, and resource-oriented roles in the development of a state's foreign policy. Liland uses an illustrative graphic to show how these aspects interrelate (see Figure 3-25).

The cultural characteristics of any given society (1) are important, because the cultural characteristics make up the cultural framework (2) in which the foreign policy establishment operates. In other words, culture can be said to be a foundation of foreign policy.

Culture can also be a part of foreign policy: the formulation and organization of cultural policy is a task given to the foreign policy establishments (3), as is the cultural diplomacy between nations (4). In addition, the implementation and effects of cultural diplomacy in foreign countries (5) are most interesting themes.

Lastly, it is important to note that culture can function as a foreign policy resource of its own: the cultural interchange between nations (6) may yield power to some countries, foreign culture may have an effect on policymakers (7) and they may consequently act as "agents" for foreign countries in their own societies (8).[556]

Italy the "Strong Follower"

The foreign policy leadership in Italy, while clearly sensitive to humanitarian considerations, does not regard itself as the security manager over the Mediterranean, or even the southern Mediterranean. While the Italian navy is one of the more capable maritime services in Europe (and can conduct complex operations independently), the foreign policy culture in Italy is not one that perceives itself—nor aspires to be—an independent power in the wider region.

Recommended Reading:

Frode Liland's classic on culture and foreign policy describes some of the theoretical aspects of state-level foreign policymaking as a reflection—and reinforcing element—of a society's cultural context: "Culture and Foreign Policy: An Introduction to Approaches and Theory" (1993).

https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/99411/INF0193.pdf

Instead, the Italian government regards itself as a key member of other Western institutional communities. This is primarily embodied by the EU, but also includes institutional Euro-Atlantic organizations like NATO, or the more informal "Western identity." While the Italian perception of its role within organizations like EU—and, to a lesser extent, NATO—is not insignificant, the Italian government nonetheless regards itself as one of several other players—more influential than some, perhaps, and with sufficient autonomy in accordance to its economic strength, but never as the leading power.

This notion contrasts with Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, which each have claims and/or aspirations to leadership or independent capability. For example, the cultures of foreign policymaking in France and the United Kingdom are heavily predicated on the ability—or at least the theoretical ability—to conduct complex operations independently, which is potentially an outgrowth of the two countries' imperial histories and longstanding institutional memory of conducting operations independently.

While Germany's imperial history is more overtly suppressed compared to France and the United Kingdom, its position as the leading economic power in Europe and a regular policy-setter for economic and social issues in the EU has thrust Berlin into the role of leader. Italy, by comparison, has neither the economic weight of Germany, nor the celebrated imperial history of France or the United Kingdom; if anything, Italy's punctuated attempts to establish itself as a European power in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—Italy only unified as a state in the mid-nineteenth century—are mostly remembered as failures at best, and uncivilized militarism at worst.

Within this context, Italy's decision to launch Operation Mare Nostrum was widely predicated on the assumption that other European state and transnational authorities would play a more robust role. While Italy's past colonial involvement in Libya likely played a role in the Italian government's decision to unilaterally launch Operation Mare Nostrum, Italy's prevailing foreign policy outlook depends

Figure 3-25: Italian aircraft carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi. *Source: Wikimedia.*

on multilateral involvement from its key partners.

In the case of the southern Mediterranean, this sensibility was especially amplified due to the widely accepted view that refugee and migrant flows were both a humanitarian crisis and security issue that affected the entire continent. While Italy – and a few other southern Mediterranean European states like Greece and Malta – were "frontline" actors, the arrival, transit, and management of these refugees were regarded locally as a problem for the entire European continent. Italy's cessation of Operation Mare Nostrum reflected internal Italian political frustration at the extended costs of supporting these operations independently and, by extension, Europe's apparent lack of interest in playing more than a passive role.

Transnational Considerations

While Italy's decision to withdraw Operation Mare Nostrum might be seen as a reflection of the failure of European states to collectively participate in collective efforts in the southern Mediterranean, the transnational impetus for such an endeavor was ultimately weak. While Italy bore the brunt of the responsibility and impact in managing migrant and refugee flows from North Africa, non-southern Mediterranean powers lacked strong incentives for participating in a significant way.

Problems with Transnational Governance

In many ways, this is a structural issue borne from the EU's simultaneously centralized but weak levers of governance. For example, while several common rules affecting border management, weights and measures, and trade are made by EU regulatory bureaucracies, larger decisions to enact new activities or decisions are subject to extended debate and unanimity from all member states. In some cases, that unanimity may be secured through consensus by member state leaders, though in more fundamental cases—such as strengthening the powers of the EU itself—consensus is required from national legislatures.

However, while the challenges facing Italian efforts to recruit assistance from the EU were fundamentally structural in nature, those structures are a product of the idiosyncrasies that lie at the heart of the transnational project. The EU concept of "pooling sovereignty" has been an evolutionary process with antecedents going as far back as the mid-twentieth century.

During that approximately 70-year period, the bonds of transnational governance have developed only gradually, and continue to be negotiated at all levels of European transnational and national governance. That includes the transnational and state levels, but also in many respects on the sub-regional and civil society levels as well. To give one example, the constituent federal regions of Wallonia and Flanders in Belgium have special powers to block EU-level foreign policy deals. In late 2016, Wallonia singlehandedly torpedoed what was set to be a major trade agreement between the EE and Canada.[557]



Figure 3-26: Asylum Applications by Nationality in 2013. *Source: Europa.edu.*

Managing Divergent Perceptions

In the specific case of Operation Mare Nostrum, marshalling financial and political support from states not yet directly affected by refugee flows was complicated by sharply divergent threat perceptions at both national and transnational levels. In many respects, non-Mediterranean states saw the Libya situation as primarily an Italian problem by dint of geography, while Italy correctly (but not necessarily unparochially) diagnosed the issue as one with implications for the entire continent.

Other states—particularly smaller, non-littoral member states—might have looked at the issue as being an outgrowth of the Anglo-French-led military operation to unseat the preceding Libyan regime (in which, militarily at least, the U.S. played an outsized role). The multiplicity of interests and divergent views complicated Italian efforts to develop a common response to the issue.

Operation Triton was launched as the European response, but while it was meant to augment the Italian navy's ongoing operations as part of Operation Mare Nostrum, it was announced and launched too late—by which point the Italian government had already put a stop to its own independent efforts. Reflecting uncertainty and even a degree of agnosticism toward the Mediterranean migrant issue, Operation Triton was initially only funded to one-third of the level of Operation Mare Nostrum, had a far more restricted mandate, and deployed fewer and less-capable assets compared to the Italian government's previous operations.

It was only after high-profile tragedies at sea in early 2014 that the EU invested more resources in Operation Triton, which resourced efforts to a level more comparable to Operation Mare Nostrum — although the Operation Triton mandate remains far less robust. This is also a reflection of the operational culture disposition of EU bureaucracies, which did not engage in the same humanitarian mission that was part of the Italian mandate, and instead dedicated resources primarily to border control.

Risks and Opportunities

Operations Mare Nostrum and Triton underscore the broad diversity of various actors that are cooperating—and, in some respects, sometimes simultaneously competing—in the execution of a given

mission or mission set. While these groups, organizations, and agencies may have seemingly common overarching goals, they are invariably tethered to their organizational cultures and the structural limitations for which they are oriented.

Recommended Reading:

While somewhat dated, this report examines tackling irregular Mediterranean migration as a broad-based European initiative: "*Mare Europaeum*? Tackling Mediterranean Migration" (2014).

http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_25_Mare_Europaeum.pdf

Lessons Learned

The clearest lesson for observers, participants, and decision-makers is that the performance and execution of various actors cannot be assumed to be homogeneous. On the contrary, as Operations Mare Nostrum and Triton demonstrated, groups at the civil-society level, the state level, and the transnational level have different priorities, approaches, and organizational understandings of the problem and the proposed solution.

It is important to consider that the diversity of interests exist on every level. For example, multiple civil-society groups, while supposedly oriented to a common goal, are inherently motivated by individual situations, contexts, priorities, and structural abilities.

In the case of migrant aid in the southern Mediterranean, groups like MSF and MOAS both sought to fill gaps left by national and transnational authorities, but had differing levels of functionality, experience, and assets with respect to the situation, and so forged a special complementary cooperation to optimize their efforts. The operating culture in the home country of an organization —Malta for MOAS, France for MSF, for example—can also play a major role in how the groups identify, operate, and cooperate.

Figure 3-27: MSF rescue ship. *Source: MigrantReport.org.*

Not all civil society organizations achieved—or could achieve—equal levels of coordination. The same general principle is also true of agencies within the Italian government, or between states at the transnational levels. These groups must coordinate among one another, and then these broader sectors are faced with the even more significant task of coordinating with groups or agencies at the other level. In each case, from the smallest civil-society organization to the largest state navy or transnational authority, organizational cultural factors are decisive.

"All operations coordinated by Frontex are intelligence-driven. They are based on a detailed risk analysis of the situation at the external borders, migratory trends, situation in the countries of origin and transit, methods used by people-smuggling networks, strengths and vulnerabilities of border control at the specific points of the external EU borders.

"A detailed operational plan is devised in consultation with an EU country which is either currently facing migratory flows or is likely to in the future. The Operational plan includes the number and the type of technical equipment (vessels, planes, patrol cars et cetera.), as well as the number and the

specialisation of border guards to be deployed – these can include, according to the needs, forged document experts, border surveillance officers, debriefing officers, screeners."

"Frontex then sends out a call for participation to all EU Member states and Schengen Associated countries (SAC) in order to fill out the required deployment needs. Once all the equipment prescribed in the operational plan is provided, a Joint Operation is launched."

—FRONTEX description of operations coordination[558]

Strengths of Diversity

The diversity of organizations is not necessarily a weakness, however. While variability in outlook, operations, and cultural context can serve as a high barrier to effective cooperation, it is also a potential strength in operations. Interoperability is a priority not only for reasons related to politics, legality, or resources, but also as a means of identifying and utilizing comparative advantages and niche capabilities across different actors.

For example, the far narrower focus of civil-society organizations affords these groups a special ability to operate more effectively in terms of direct humanitarian aid. Meanwhile, state agencies can typically more effectively conduct security operations and/or marshal larger quantities of equipment. Transnational organizations can utilize mechanisms to capture a wider variety of state actors, elevating an issue to that of a broader level of importance, and developing a more concrete political mandate.

In many respects, this was the case in the southern Mediterranean. Organizations like Sea Watch were extremely effective in delivering aid directly to migrants. And while they could not field comparable resources compared to state agencies, they were far nimbler in adapting to the changing situational context: when Operation Mare Nostrum ended suddenly, and Operation Triton represented a significant drawdown in operations, civil society groups dispatched monitoring, aid, and SAR capabilities to the southern Mediterranean relatively quickly.

Figure 3-28: Sea Watch aid workers assist migrants in the Mediterranean. *Source: YouTube.*

The challenge for interoperability and joint operations is identifying how the heterogeneity of contributing organizations, agencies, and actors can be turned into strengths for the broader operation. Locating and identifying the organizational and operational cultures within these groups can assist in this effort.

3.4.4 Conclusion

The variability in organizational and operational cultures in joint missions can contribute to serious complications, and even failure; but it can also be a unique strength to be leveraged and utilized. Operations Mare Nostrum and Triton demonstrate both these aspects fully: clashing expectations and perceptions on multiple levels of interoperability—and particularly between the state and transnational—meant that much-needed security and humanitarian operations were variously stalled, postponed, and canceled amid a serious, and still ongoing, migrant and refugee crisis in the southern Mediterranean Sea.

At the same time, these differences were also sources of strength. When transnational authorities failed to play a more robust role at the onset of the crisis, the Italian government unilaterally launched Operation Mare Nostrum. When the scale of the crisis became clearer—and, more obviously, a broader threat to the wider European continent – the European Union's border agency Frontex launched Operation Triton. When the Italian government ceased its independent operations, a variety of civil-society organizations—some already operating on some level on the issue—began undertaking complex humanitarian and SAR operations, largely independently. Frontex, in response to escalating humanitarian disasters in the Mediterranean, expanded Operation Triton to bring it to a level more comparable to the level of the preceding operation, Mare Nostrum.

In this case, the failures do not necessarily outweigh the successes, and vice versa. However, they do well illustrate how interoperability can be either optimized or undermined by the divergences of organizational culture.

3.5 USPACOM Case Study: Pakistan Flooding in 2010

3.5.1 Introduction

Overview of Flooding and Context

The flooding that inundated Pakistan in 2010 represented the worst natural disaster in the country's history. Ultimately damaging 16.5 percent of Pakistan's landmass—an area larger than Mississippi—and directly impacting 20 million Pakistanis, the deluge resulted from the rare confluence of a seasonal, easterly monsoon with a powerful and unusually placed westerly jet stream that extended across all of Eurasia.[559] Colliding over Pakistan, the weather systems produced record-breaking rains throughout northwestern Pakistan from 28 to 30 July. Hardest hit initially was the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK or KP), where particularly drenched areas experienced between 12-16 in (30.5-40.6 cm) of rain within 48 hours. The provincial capital of Peshawar recorded 772 percent more rainfall for the month than typical.[560]

Funneled and propelled by the mountainous terrain of northern Pakistan, the downpour produced an initial wave of flash floods that wiped away thousands of homes and damaged or obliterated scores of bridges.[561] With inadequate warning, many people in KPK were caught unaware by the deluge, which "severely affected" 10 of the province's 26 districts.[562] Nearly 60 percent of the 1,985 flood-related deaths recorded by the Government of Pakistan (GoP) were consequently borne by KPK citizens, though flooding would prove to be a more intractable problem in the southern provinces.[563]



Figure 3-29: Extent of Pakistan Flooding. *Source: La Historia con Mapas.*

Figure 3-30: Map of Pakistan. *Source: La Historia Con Mapas.*

The disaster shifted slowly southward over the next several weeks, as record flows of water coursed down northern rivers such as the Kabul and the Swat before converging on and entering the Indus River, Pakistan's main north-south waterway. Flowing southward toward the Indian Ocean at a rate of about 18.5 mi (29.77 km) per day, peak river swells were fed by rains from a second powerful, albeit weaker, collision of weather systems from 5-9 August. Between 6-7 August, the rising Indus waters created a 1.7-mile (2.73-kilometer) breach in the Tori Bund, an artificial levee system located at the northern end of Sindh Province. Effectively creating a new branch of the Indus, this "northern avulsion" flooded the adjacent agricultural plain, destroying crops and displacing over 1.3 million people. Though it diverted an immense volume of water away from the Indus's main waterway, a similarly scaled "southern avulsion" nevertheless occurred on August 27 in south Sindh Province.[564] Together, the

twin avulsions explain why Sindh was the hardest hit province, suffering 43 percent of Pakistan's rupee-measured losses, even though it received relatively little rain during the monsoons.[565]

By the time the GoP declared an end to the disaster-relief phase of the recovery on January 31, 2011, some six months after the first intense rainfall, Pakistan had suffered $10.1 billion in immediate economic losses, an amount equal to 5.7 percent of its total GDP. Comprising much of that sum was damage to 1.6 million houses; 10,192 education centers; 485 health facilities; 14,810 mi (23,831 km) of roads, paths, and railways; 6,673 water and sanitation schemes; 92 power plants; 32 power grids; 1,864 mi (3,000 km) of power lines; 146 industrial plants; 100,000 shops and businesses; 90 banks; 1,457 governmental and environmental structures; 8,108 mi² (13,050 km²) of agricultural land; and the loss of 1.5 million large and small farm animals.[566]

Table 1. Provinces in Pakistan Affected by Flooding
(As of September 6, 2010)

Province	Deaths	Injured	Houses Damaged	Population Affected
Baluchistan	48	102	75,261	672,171
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	1,156	1,193	200,799	4,365,909
Punjab	110	350	500,000	8,200,000
Sindh	199	909	1,058,862	6,988,491
AJ&K	71	87	7,108	245,000
Gilgit Baltistan	183	60	2,830	81,605
Total	1,767	2,701	1,844,860	20,553,176

Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, September 14, 2010.

Figure 3-31: Provinces in Pakistan Affected by Flooding. *Source: United Nations.*

Though reports produced by Pakistan's government routinely emphasize that the unusually intense rains made the flood destruction both unavoidable and extensive, other analysts have been more circumspect. Echoing the findings of a Pakistani judicial committee commissioned to investigate the floods, one set of American scholars noted that the northern avulsion in Sindh Province occurred at least 17 days before peak water levels reached that part of the Indus. Peak flow on the river was, at any rate, "not exceptional compared to late twentieth-century events," and the levee at the site of the northern avulsion would therefore never have been "topped" by any of the flood surges. Instead, poor maintenance and corruption by government officials led to the gradual degradation of the levee. The levee's subsequent collapse – under conditions it should have been able to handle – permitted the river surges to spill out unfettered onto the agricultural plains. Much of the suffering experienced in Sindh, the hardest hit province, may have been avoidable.[567]

Overview of the Pakistani Relief Effort

The democratically elected, civilian-led GoP was ostensibly in charge of directing all relief efforts via the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), an agency regrettably plagued by structural problems. Created in 2007 to play a leading role in Pakistan's concomitantly revamped emergency response system, the NDMA was still a new organization during the 2010 floods. Problems related to its recent formation were no doubt compounded by organizational uncertainty within the national system. Indeed, NDMA was not formally given control of the entire national system until November 2010, more than three months into the 2010 flood relief effort.[568] NDMA was also understaffed and underfunded. Though sitting at the apex of the entire national emergency response system, it was run by only 21 officers who managed an annual budget of merely $1 million. Finally, NDMA seemed to lack both authority and prestige, which might explain why no government ministry acquiesced to its requests to borrow personnel during the flood. Despite the incredibly pressing situation, only the Pakistani military forwarded personnel to the agency.[569] But it was constitutionally obligated to aid civilian authorities during times of crisis.[570]

If NDMA was tasked to lead relief efforts without being given the manpower and budget to see its mission through, the Military of Pakistan (MoP) had been given the requisite capability but not the formal mandate to provide leadership and aid. Given the pressing need for immediate and massive rescue and relief services, however, practicality overruled politics and the MoP quickly came to dominate the response to the floods. Its participation was not unexpected, at any rate, because the military had already established itself as Pakistan's de facto emergency response force following the 2005 Kashmir earthquake, a disaster that killed over 142,000 people and affected almost 1.3 million Pakistanis.[571]

Pakistan's soldiers, sailors, and airmen proved to be an undeniably effective aid-provision force. Utilizing 61 helicopters and 1,238 boats, the MoP rescued 1.4 million people, established 5,392 relief camps, distributed 310,000 tents and 53,403 metric tons of food, and provided health-care services to 4.7 million people, all within seven weeks of the first rainfall.[572] The army clarified in September 2010 that it was providing three times more aid than the GoP—about 58 percent of the total to the GoP's 20 percent.[573]As the MoP assumed overall leadership of the relief effort both in actuality and in the public's mind, some observers questioned whether the GoP might face a legitimacy crisis at the exact moment that the military was accruing power.[574] Pakistan's democracy was undeniably fragile, having suffered multiple military coups since its foundation in the 1940s and emerging from its latest period of military rule just two years prior to the floods, in 2008.

Overview of U.S. Relief Effort

U.S. relief efforts in 2010 and 2011 consisted of support from the DoD, U.S. Government aid via the DoS and USAID, and contributions from private U.S. organizations and citizens. Valued at approximately $700 million, the American response collectively represented the largest source of foreign support received by Pakistan.[575]



Figure 3-32: Pakistan 2010: Aid Delivered by Foreign Militaries, by Country and Amount (in short tons). *Source: RAND.*

The U.S. military conducted a robust response to the disaster, particularly in terms of providing desperately needed airlift capabilities and conducting air-rescue missions in hard-to-reach areas under dangerous conditions. The American effort was also timely: Afghanistan-based U.S. Army helicopters departed within 12 hours of the GoP's first request for assistance; and the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) left the Gulf of Aden for the flood-ravaged area within an additional 60 hours. In just three days, the U.S. military similarly scrounged up and transported to Pakistan 436,944 *halal*-compliant[576] MREs. All told, and utilizing 24 helicopters and 5 cargo planes, about 600 in-country American servicemen and servicewomen rescued more than 26,000 stranded people and delivered over 11,000 metric tons of relief supplies in slightly over three months.[577]

Overview of the Response by NGOs and the UN

The international community's collective response to the 2010 Pakistan flood represented one of the largest international relief efforts in history. Hundreds international and domestic NGOs and UN-related international organizations (IOs) took part, providing emergency aid critical to the survival of perhaps hundreds-of-thousands of people. Their work has been credited specifically with preventing the spread of major epidemic diseases via mobile disease early-warning systems and the provision of food, nutrition, water, and sanitation facilities and supplies.[578] The UN coordinated funding, leading the effort to raise $1.96 billion in relief funds, and provided critical airlift capabilities and disaster management expertise.

Figure 3-33: Médecins Sans Frontières was a major provider of aid in Pakistan. *Source: Doctors Without Borders.*

3.5.2 The Culture of Actor Interests and Policies

Overview of Culturally Driven Conflict

As outlined above, the scale of both Pakistan's 2010 flood disaster – and the domestic and international humanitarian response to it – were unprecedented. To alleviate suffering and prevent death as quickly and effectively as possible, hundreds of international and domestic organizations had to work near, and in collaboration with, each other. Most importantly, virtually all humanitarian aid providers had to work under the general oversight, and sometimes the immediate direction of, the MoP.[579] Culturally driven interoperability friction and conflict resulted. While the consequences were often not overly problematic, in the worst cases culture clashes unquestionably delayed or prevented the delivery of critically needed services and supplies.

The relief effort's most serious interoperability conflicts nearly always involved the MoP, a fact that does not necessarily impute blame, in part or in whole, on the Pakistani military. Indeed, the MoP's centrality in intergroup cultural friction might just reflect the military's domination of the relief effort in terms of both leadership and aid provision, and not that it had objectively "wrong" preferences. The MoP nevertheless clearly served as a "hub" of intergroup conflict with "spokes" extending to three main groups. Specifically, the MoP was frequently at odds with: 1) NGOs and IOs; 2) NDMA and the GoP; and 3) foreign militaries and governments. While these disagreements will be detailed throughout this case study, it is worth summarizing them quickly in this section.

Figure 3-34: Cultural conflict occurred when the UN rejected NATO airlift support, despite Pakistan's formal request for the air bridge. *Source: NATO.*

Major disagreements between the members of the first conflict pair — the MoP and NGOs and IOs — were concentrated along three lines, all related to some aspect of physical security. First, key civilian organizations protested strongly against, and even tried to prevent, the use of military assets when civilian assets were available, or when the use of military assets was deemed by the civilians to be unnecessary for other reasons. Second, disagreements emerged over the use of armed escorts in unsafe areas, with certain civilian organizations resisting or rejecting armed protection, while the MoP argued for and sometimes insisted on military or police escorts. Third, a split appeared when NGOs and IOs perceived that the MoP was denying aid to certain parts of the country for political reasons, a practice anathema to most in the international humanitarian community.

Serious interoperability friction between the second paring of actors, the MoP and the GoP, emerged from two interrelated sets of factors. The first was the GoP's insecurity about its ruling legitimacy vis-à-vis the military, a chronic concern that became acute in the face of the GoP's inadequate response to the floods, and its consequent dependence on the MoP for provision of flood relief. The second was the MoP's determination to prioritize Pakistani sovereignty and national security over flood relief, a decision that delayed aid and produced obvious friction with NDMA, which was less reluctant to sacrifice some sovereignty and security if it meant faster and better flood relief.

The third group to suffer damaging interoperability conflict was composed of the MoP and foreign militaries and governments. While much of the conflict among these organizations was a product of the MoP's aforementioned cultural affinity for sovereignty and security, it also resulted from the organizational culture of the foreign militaries and governments. To quickly give one illustration of the damaging influence of security-prioritizing cultures, early in the flood relief effort the MoP denied the American military access to certain Pakistani military airfields while, conversely, the U.S. refused to share flood data obtained via classified technologies.

While this case study focuses primarily on interoperability conflicts involving the MoP, intergroup friction in which the military played no part did of course occur. Most prominent were interoperability problems within the GoP, particularly between Pakistan's national- and provincial-level authorities. These impactful disputes will be detailed below. Other cases of culturally driven interoperability conflict are largely beyond the scope of this case history, as they were neither as pronounced nor important. They nevertheless include conflicts within the groups comprising the U.S. military and government, as well as problems between international governments and within the humanitarian community.

The Ambiguity of Authority in Pakistan

It is awkward, and, in some ways, impossible to discuss the MoP, the GoP, and NDMA as distinct actors participating in flood-relief efforts. The central difficulty emerges from the fact that the MoP became the locus of de facto sovereign authority and decision-making during the floods, particularly regarding certain aspects of flood-relief policy. Even significant flood-related plans ostensibly emerging from NDMA or another element of the GoP may therefore have been made by the MoP. Further muddying the issue, NDMA and GoP promulgations may likewise have been formulated in consideration of perceived or existing GoP decision constraints.

It is unfortunately also problematic to consistently treat the three Pakistani organizations as a single unified actor under the firm direction of the MoP for two reasons. First, the MoP's power was nowhere near absolute: conditions could arise through which the GoP or NDMA could overrule its policies. Second, opacity clouds the extent to which the MoP made decisions for, or otherwise delimited the policy options of, the GoP and NDMA, especially at the level of individual decisions. To state the problem more clearly,

no irrefutable testimony or evidence has emerged from Pakistani sources claiming the MoP compelled the GoP or NDMA to follow its policy lead in any given instance. In fact, NDMA's key lessons-learned report overtly praises the MoP by detailing many of its accomplishments in providing flood relief, and avoids criticizing the military directly.[580]

Critical observers can nevertheless uncover evidence of serious tension over the problem of national leadership in the NDMA report. Included at the end of the section overviewing the Pakistani military's many achievements, for instance, the report issued many critical recommendations. First, it argued that "NDMA should be fully empowered and resourced to coordinate and monitor rescue and relief efforts at [the] national level." With NDMA's leadership role clarified, the report urged in its second recommendation a "clear definition of roles and responsibilities of all parties."[581] Put in simpler terms, and in consideration of the location of these recommendations just after the military accomplishments section, the report was carefully reminding its audience that NDMA was the agency charged with leading disaster response at the national level, and that other stakeholders, even the military, must understand and accept the NDMA's apex position.

Figure 3-35: LtGen, Ret., Nadeem Ahmed took over NDMA just after retiring from the military. *Source: Wikimedia.*

The NDMA's lessons-learned report was consequently subtle in form, but not in meaning. Its oblique tactic is not surprising, since overt criticism of the military remains unusual in Pakistan. Instead, hagiographical accounts of the MoP dominate and are often written by retired military officers.[582] The NDMA report was typical on the latter point: the executive summary version of the report was signed by LtGen, Ret., Nadeem Ahmed, who headed NDMA during flood relief operations and who had retired from 40 years of active duty service just months before the floods.[583]

The Culture of Interests: the MoP, the GoP, and NDMA

Ambiguity concerning the locus of decision-making authority during the flood response means that readers of this case study and accounts like it must be judicious when ascribing policies to specific Pakistani organizations. Yet it is essential to consider the issue of actor agency, if one intends to examine how organizational culture informs interoperability conflict. Determining policy authorship is necessary, because the culture of the organization that promulgated a given policy, or otherwise delimited the selection of outcomes for others, is normally far more critical to understand than the culture of the organization that merely *ostensibly* "created" or "carried out" the policy.

While uncertainty regarding decision-making remains throughout much of this accounting of the flood response, there are two reasons for addressing it forthrightly. First, readers must keep the fact of authority ambiguity in mind throughout their handling of the case study. As in the real world, readers will need to accept this opacity and draw conclusions despite it. Second, some of the ambiguity can be mitigated by considering overall organizational interests and preferences and, therefore, the culture informing them. Doing so not only gives a stronger sense regarding which state agents supported or opposed a given measure, but can also clarify the organization or organizations deciding policy.

Rubenstein's Horizontal and Vertical Interoperability Model

As outlined above, conflict in the relief effort occurred primarily at the nexus of civilian and military organizations, and was particularly evident between the MoP and the international humanitarian community, and between the MoP and GoP. Importantly, the nature and tenor of the problems experienced during the Pakistan relief operations were not unprecedented; similar conflict has occurred repeatedly in prior international relief efforts.

The anthropologist and international relations scholar, Robert Rubenstein, argues that civilian-military intergroup conflict in humanitarian operations is driven primarily by differences in the cultural norms underpinning civilian and military organizations.[584] According to Rubenstein, culturally driven conflict occurs along two axes—horizontal and vertical—with horizontal interoperability representing the collaboration of civilian and military organizations in relief operations, and vertical interoperability being the interaction of civilian and military relief organizations with aid recipients.

The two axes are intertwined during humanitarian crises, particularly on the issue of security. On the horizontal axis, both military and civilian organizations desire coordination to maximize the provision of rescue efforts, supplies, and services. Despite their shared goal, problems can emerge from the vertical axis in the event security threats are extant or arise among or near the aid-recipient population. If the security situation is bad, or if it deteriorates, both civilian and military organizations strive to improve safety according to their respective institutionalized cultural preferences.[585]

When security threats appear, military organizations consequently tend to increase the distance between themselves and the local population by implementing kinetic practices such as the aforementioned armed escorts, or even denying aid to areas where a perceived threat exists. Civilian organizations, in contrast, tend to decrease the distance between themselves and the local population by emphasizing the apolitical nature of their organizations and aid missions. They typically accomplish this by both distancing themselves from the kinetic preferences of the military, and by providing aid without consideration of political prejudice.[586] In the Pakistan flood relief effort, horizontal and vertical interoperability issues explain the conflict over armed escorts. They also clarify why the government prevented the flow of aid to certain groups, while civilian organizations strived to deliver aid despite government preferences.

It is worth noting that Rubenstein's model does not require a military-civilian split. It can be applied to any relief situation, provided three criteria are met: (1) aid providers perceive a dangerous security situation, (2) the respective cultures of the relief providers produce the aforementioned conflicting preferences of "moving away from" and "moving toward" the aid recipient population, and (3) coordination of the aid providers involved in the dispute is necessary or perceived as necessary. Such conditions were met in Pakistan when locally based GoP officials and politicians refused to provide aid or relief to approximately 500 Ahmadi Muslims. Viewing them as a security threat because they were not "Muslim," local leaders actively prevented the Ahmadis from being rescued and given supplies, and denied them access to relief camps and housing.[587] These actions represented a "distancing" because of security fears, though the military was not obviously a party to the aid denial.

Rubenstein's Cultural Roots of Conflict

Rubenstein argues that culture can promote organizational conflict in civilian-military humanitarian operations along four pathways: (1) management structures, (2) symbols, boundaries, and security; (3) media and information; and (4) context and legitimacy. He notes that a cultural mismatch of organizations does not automatically cause conflict. Instead, its processes are indirect, informing the understandings

and expectations of organizations as they perceive the challenges of a given aid mission and how best to meet those challenges.[588]

Management Structures

Management structures are powerful representations of culture in organizations, as they have evolved over time in response to real-world experience. Rubenstein contends military management structures are "reflected in a command framework that has four essential characteristics: (1) there should be unity of command; (2) the chain of command should be structured so that it can respond quickly and promote fast and efficient decision making; (3) areas of responsibility should be clearly defined; and (4) areas of responsibility should be of manageable size." In great contrast, civilian humanitarian organizations have developed management structures that encourage "a camaraderie of command" rather than a unity of command, and are not rigidly hierarchical but emphasize that all should contribute effort and expertise, regardless of formal position in the management structure. Rubenstein notes that the size of a civilian organization generally influences its management structure. On the one hand, smaller organizations tend to more strongly reflect the civilian management norms described above. Larger civilian organizations, on the other hand, tend to have hybrid characteristics, because the demands of management in larger organizations produce management imperatives somewhat akin to those faced by the military, even while those imperatives remain balanced by a general civilian culture.[589]

The management structure of the MoP clearly influenced the nature of the relief effort in a number of ways. First, the military's priority during relief efforts remained firmly focused on the core national interest of a traditionally defined national security concept, rather than a more liberally interpreted "human security" concept. The military accordingly resisted efforts to diminish its commitment to counter India, a state Pakistan views as "its eternal foe that not only seeks to dominate Pakistan but to destroy it if and when the opportunity arises."[590] The MoP similarly remained unwilling to risk the gains it had achieved in recent fighting with insurgents in Waziristan in northwestern Pakistan, with a top military spokesman noting, "The involvement of our troops in relief activities will have no impact on our fight against militants."[591] One consequence of these twin imperatives is that the military commitment, though large in overall scope, never equaled more than about 10 percent of Pakistan's active duty military manpower.[592] Another consequence was that the military actively strived to prevent NGOs from delivering aid to groups the MoP was trying to destroy or otherwise did not trust, a policy that drew condemnation from many humanitarian organizations and some foreign governments.[593]

The management structure of MoP similarly contributed to an obvious prioritization of sovereignty over efficacy in the relief effort. Thus, per a RAND report, "the Pakistani military's discomfort with the size of the U.S. footprint was evident... Particularly during August, Pakistani military personnel underplayed the severity of needs and resisted acknowledging their need for assistance. During September, however, the need for foreign help in responding to the disaster became more widely recognized on the Pakistani side."[594] MoP distrust of U.S. forces nevertheless remained a problem. One USMC report noted that the Pakistanis were "very guarded and were specific… where they did not want assistance. They [especially] did not want any ground support that would give the civilian population any idea that the Pakistani government was not in charge."[595] Other related issues that arose included U.S. military access to Pakistani airfields, periodic enforcement of standard customs and immigration procedures, and tight restrictions on the number of service members the U.S. could deploy in-country.[596] The MoP's concerns about sovereignty also contributed to conflict between the MoP and the GoP over the utilization of foreign resources, with the leadership of the government's NDMA overriding objections to U.S. military involvement in the relief effort.[597]

Symbols, Boundaries, and Security

Symbols, boundaries, and security comprise Rubenstein's second pathway through which culture informs conflict during humanitarian missions. These three phenomena are interrelated and inseparable. To see how they inform culturally driven conflict in peace operations, consider first how all civilian and military organizations desire security. Military units traditionally achieve security through setting up boundaries between themselves and aid recipients. These boundaries can be physical, such as large distances between military bases and aid-recipient populations, guarded perimeters around bases, and the weapons and equipment that service members will often carry or utilize. Other boundaries can be symbolic, and range from service members' uniforms and flags to language capabilities and even the racial and sexual composition of the foreign service members providing aid.[598] Importantly, these symbolic boundaries are part of the reason why military organizations put in place force-protection, physical boundaries to begin with, as military units realize that they might be targeted precisely because they represent a particular foreign state.

Far fewer boundaries separate civilian humanitarian organizations from the people they serve. One key way civilian organizations eliminate boundaries is by employing people from the local population. Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières), for instance, employed 1,200 Pakistanis while deploying only 135 international staff.[599] Civilian relief groups also tend to work directly in and among local populations, rather than operating out of distant and well-guarded bases. Civilians consequently possess far fewer distancing symbols than do military organizations. Finally, as discussed earlier, civilian NGOs strive to remain politically neutral, providing aid without prejudice and sometimes accepting little to no assistance from military or government authorities. Doing so prevents political boundaries from emerging between the civilian aid organizations and the aid-recipient population, thereby decreasing the likelihood that the organization will be targeted by groups in conflict with the state.[600]

Of course different NGOs possess conflicting ideas about when coordination and cooperation with state governments or militaries crosses beyond the threshold of behavior delimiting humanitarian neutrality. In Pakistan, for example, the World Food Program (WFP) worked closely with the US military, a practical policy that was driven in part by the relatively high number of Americans who staff WPF.[601] The International Rescue Committee (IRC) was more reserved. But it was nevertheless willing to brand American-originated relief supplies when informed by sources—including the Pakistan military and government—that local populations would perceive US aid positively.[602] MSF's aid policy contrasted sharply with WFP and IRC: It neither permitted the branding of supplies, nor allowed military assets to deliver them on MSF's behalf.[603] Indeed, in order to differentiate itself from more government-friendly NGOs, MSF not only resisted being called an NGO,[604] but also refused to be included in UN situation update reports.[605] And MSF resolutely denied Pakistani demands that it use armed escorts in dangerous areas, even if refusal meant MSF could not enter areas where residents desperately needed aid.[606]

Media and Information

Media and information comprise Rubenstein's third pathway informing cultural conflict, and in Pakistan these twin forces played an interesting role. Media coverage of widespread destruction and suffering certainly motivated the GoP and MoP to take more aggressive steps to provide relief, including loosening some restrictions on foreign military and foreign NGO involvement in the relief effort. Information represented a challenge for the GoP, whose response to the floods had broadly been considered unsatisfactory and which faced a potential national-level leadership challenge from the military. The aforementioned September 2010 report that concluded that the MoP had provided about three times

more aid than the GoP—about 58 percent of the total to the GoP's 20 percent—must have been particularly galling in this regard.[607]

A similar tension existed between the U.S. and its Pakistani counterparts. One of the reasons why the U.S. was eager to take part in the relief effort was to "win hearts and minds" in Pakistan, especially since America's so-called "global war on terrorism" and support for India internationally had deleteriously impacted public perceptions of the U.S. among Pakistanis. American planners hoped for a repeat of the improvement in Pakistani public perception that had occurred due to American relief efforts following the 2005 earthquake in northern Pakistan. Unfortunately, American designs were thwarted to some extent because Pakistani authorities actively tried to suppress information about American relief efforts inside Pakistan. An unknown, but possibly not-insignificant, portion of the U.S. "hearts and minds" campaign was consequently thwarted. Citing a research poll that found that 50 percent of Pakistanis were unaware of U.S. aid to Pakistan, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) noted that "public relations gains from aid may be fleeting, at best."[608]

The GoP obviously felt incredible pressure from negative press reports. In its 2011 Lessons Learned report, the NDMA noted:

"Weakness in media reporting and analysis were also observed by some media pundits, foreign donors and government agencies. In some instances, sensational reporting created a negative impression of the work of the relevant government institutions trying to arrest the grave problems caused by the floods. Some of the media displayed a lack of full understanding of the roles and responsibilities of various arms of the government at the federal and provincial level, the various government agencies and oversight bodies and armed forces. This led to a section of media depicting the role played by the armed forces in helping the affectees as 'stand alone' and detached from the functioning of the civilian arm of the government. However, the GoP through NDMA was coordinating all civilian and military efforts during the relief and rescue phase."[609]

The GoP therefore recommended:

"The media should be encouraged through workshops and briefings, both at the local and national levels, to gain a fuller understanding of the challenges of humanitarian response and reporting more sensitively and systematically, and refrain from sensationalizing incidents of human suffering. This does not mean the such incidents should not [be] highlighted but that they should be understood in the larger perspective of poverty and underdevelopment of Pakistan."[610]

Context and Legitimacy

All of the foreign aid missions to Pakistan enjoyed substantial legalized legitimacy, because all operated within the context of official sanction by the Pakistani government. Rubenstein argues:

> *"When military peacekeepers deploy to a mission area, they do so only after their mission has been authorized by the Security Council and following extensive discussions and agreements between the United Nations and local governments. They derive their legitimacy from the legal framework within which they work. Some of the civilian organizations present in the mission area will also have negotiated with the local governments agreements that define the scope of their actions. These agreements confer legitimacy on their work also in a legal sense. As well, some NGOs, especially humanitarian organizations, may locate their legitimacy in the fact that they are implementing the humanitarian imperative of providing aid to those in need regardless of their political or legal standing. Whatever the legal basis for their formal legitimacy, all of the organizations and agencies in the mission area must develop substantive legitimacy through the local populations."*[611]

Interestingly, some aid organizations can enjoy tremendous legitimacy among local populations when they are not sanctioned by governments. Such was the case in Pakistan in 2010, when extremist Islamic organizations—some of which were considered enemies of the state—supplied aid and relief to people in their local communities. CRS highlighted America's concerns on this point:

> *"Some extremist-run charities have undertaken relief efforts in areas where government aid has been lacking. By providing food, shelter, and other benefits to desperate victims, such organizations may win sympathy and even (additional) future support from affected residents. Of potential concern, especially from a U.S. perspective, are the activities of the Falah-i-InsaniatandJamaat-ud-Dawa. (JuD). These are the charity and political wings, respectively, of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) held responsible for the Mumbai attack of November 2008, as well as many other terrorist activities."*[612]

3.5.3 Adaptations to Cultural Variability

UN-Provided Training

In the years following the flood relief effort, the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of the OCHA operations *in Pakistan. It noted:*

> *"OCHA supported the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator and the Humanitarian Country Team to provide effective and principled humanitarian action in Pakistan. OCHA core functions in Pakistan included operational coordination, humanitarian financing, advocacy and information management. The Humanitarian Country Team worked with the Government of Pakistan to increase its ability to respond to humanitarian crises and find longer term mitigating solutions."*

The audit found, however, that "effective and efficient management" was lacking and "the governance, risk management and control processes examined were unsatisfactory," because "the host government had not supported" efforts to promote coordination, including instruction in cultural elements. In fact, the audit was conducted because of the risks of:

> *"(i) inadequate coordination of the overall humanitarian activities because of the complexity of recurring emergencies and insecure operational environment; and (ii) inadequate monitoring of projects executed by implementing partners, potentially exposing OCHA to reputational and financial risks relating to the use of pooled funds."*[613]

While culturally related problems did of course occur at the operational level in 2010, the MoP was not without considerable experience in working with foreign forces: the MoP had frequently participated in humanitarian peacekeeping and aid operations internationally.

Pakistan's History of Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Peacekeeping Operations

While Pakistan is ordinarily better known for being a recipient of international aid, the GoP has engaged in a variety of humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations abroad. Despite persistent internal problems with social dislocation and economic deprivation,[614] including significant poverty and substantial levels of income inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient[615]), Pakistan has sought to be a player in both humanitarian assistance and international peacekeeping, and particularly the latter.

The GoP's humanitarian assistance agenda is relatively limited and almost entirely regionally oriented, but it does exist in several forms. While Pakistan is better known as a recipient of international aid, particularly tied to counterterrorism, economic development, and disaster relief efforts – such as the devastating October 2005 earthquake[616] – the GoP has played a role as aid provider in several recent situations. In the wake of the destructive *tsunami* in early 2005, Pakistan reportedly deployed teams of some 500 medical and military engineering staff to Indonesia and Sri Lanka.[617]

Pakistan has also played a role in assistance to Afghanistan, both directly and indirectly. In the wake of periodic natural disasters, Pakistan has sent emergency medical and relief supplies to neighboring Afghanistan.[618] Less directly, Pakistan has also served as a conduit for other international relief, development, and military supplies that poured into Afghanistan in the wake of the 2001 U.S. invasion and subsequent – and ongoing – coalition mission,[619] including allowing the transit of Indian aid supplies, despite the extended geopolitical rivalry between these two South Asian countries.[620] Also indirectly, but no less importantly, Pakistan hosted large numbers of Afghan refugees at various points, for which it often played the role of primary supplier.[621]

Of course, Pakistan's relationship with Afghanistan and coalition forces has more frequently been of the military variety, particularly in the GoP's participation in U.S.-led counterterrorism operations. More controversially, the Pakistani government – or at least elements within it – are frequently suspected of colluding or outright supporting extremist elements within Afghanistan, such as the Taliban and even al-Qaeda. Similarly, Pakistan has provided military assistance elsewhere in the region, including, reportedly, as part of the Sri Lankan civil war. An early backer of Buddhist-majority-led government forces against ethnic Tamil separatists known as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, or "Tamil Tigers"), who are

overwhelmingly Hindu, Pakistan provided military aid that included resources, arms, and even forms of direct assistance against the LTTE insurrection.[622] According to one 2005 report, Pakistani air force personnel were even deployed to Sri Lanka to directly assist Sri Lankan air force assets in air-mounted operations against LTTE targets.[623]

Yet, while Pakistan's military assistance in many respects overshadows the country's periodic humanitarian outreach, it is balanced by Pakistan's regular position as one of the top national contributors to international peacekeeping missions. For example, in 2013, Pakistan was listed by the UN as the largest single national source of military and police contributions to UN missions.[624] Pakistan's position fluctuates from year to year, but it is consistently among the top countries in the world, alongside other South Asian states like India and Bangladesh.[625]

Figure 3-36: Pakistani Peacekeepers in DRC. *Source: Pakistani Army.gov.*

Quaid-E-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, openly embraced the UN and Pakistan's participation in UN missions, paving the way for the country's participation:

> "Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill toward all the nations of the world. We believe in the principle of honesty and fair play in national and international dealings and are prepared to make our utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the nations of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed peoples of the world and in upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter."[626]

The MoP's first UN peacekeeping mission began in July 1960 in the DRC, where the Pakistani military contributed some 800 troops over a four-year period.[627] It would not be the last time Pakistan conducted peacekeeping and stabilization operations in the DRC, where it deployed nearly 40,000 peacekeepers between 1999 and 2010, and continues to have a residual contingent.

Since the first UN peacekeeping mission in 1960, Pakistan has deployed troops on stabilization missions in: West New Guinea (October 1962 - April 1963); Namibia (April 1989 to March 1990); Kuwait (December 1991 to October 1993); Haiti (1993 to 1996); Cambodia (March 1992 to November 1993); Bosnia (March 1992 to February 1996); Somalia (March 1992 to February 1996); Rwanda (October 1993 – March 1996); Angola (February 1995 to June 1997); Eastern Slavonia (May 1996 – August 1997);[628] and Sierra Leone (October 1999 to December 2005). Pakistan is currently participating in eight international peacekeeping missions:[629] in the DRC; in Liberia; Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast); Sudan; Central African Republic; Haiti; Western Sahara (Morocco); and personnel directly seconded to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. In total, Pakistan currently supports nearly 7,300 military troops, police, and UN monitors in support of international peacekeeping missions.

Pakistan's disproportionate participation in UN peacekeeping is not merely a function of the country's commitment to international cooperation, but also a pragmatic decision. The Pakistani military, one of

the largest in the world, is also extremely expensive to maintain, given the country's many socio-economic challenges. Providing large quantities of military personnel to international peacekeeping missions provides the Pakistani military with both a means of providing international-level training and field experience – and, in some cases, combat experience – as well as a steady source of funding from UN budgets. When Pakistan personnel are participating in UN missions abroad, they are paid directly by the UN at a rate that is greater than what they would ordinarily receive at home; this helps the GoP save money, provides a financial incentive to Pakistani military personnel, and injects badly needed money into the Pakistani economy in the form of remittances.[630] Pakistan is hardly alone with this practice, as its neighbors India and Bangladesh also have high rates of UN peacekeeping participation for similar reasons.

Figure 3-37: Pakistani Participation in Peacekeeping. *Source: Pak Peace Keepers*.[631]

3.6 SSOUTHCOM Case Study - United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti – MINUSTAH

The purpose of this case study is to present an analysis of cultural variability in the joint, interagency, and multinational operating environment of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). This paper is organized in four parts, as summarized below:

Recommended Reading:

For a complete narrative history of Operation *Unified Response:*

USSOUTHCOM, Operation Unified Response: Support to Haiti Earthquake Relief 2010;

http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Pages/Operation-Unified-Response-Support-to-Haiti-Earthquake-Relief-2010.aspx

The Introduction includes a United Nations statement containing the purpose, mandate, and historical background of MINUSTAH. This is followed by a summary of the role of USSOUTHCOM in Haiti, especially during the 2010 earthquake. This section describes the United Sates observer status in the mission, and defines the role of the United States Observation Group (USMOG). This section introduces the student to challenges associated with cultural variability and joint interoperability, and the publications utilized in joint environments. It also explains the importance of learning from the experiences, approaches, lessons learned, and perspectives of other potential partner nations. The introduction presents a brief theoretical approach utilized in this case study, which explains how this paper was organized in relation to its educational objectives. The theoretical approach also provides a framework that identifies matters that affect cultural interoperability in MINUSTAH, which this paper will focus on.

Part 1 presents background information related to the MINUSTAH as of November 2016, (when this paper was developed). This section details the historical and situational importance of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions (UNPKOs) to their counterparts in Latin America, especially to the Brazilian Military in MINUSTAH. It briefly highlights differences in core missions between the U.S. armed forces and the Latin American countries.

Part 2 examines matters of interoperability, with a focus on the challenges encountered by the Brazilian military contingent in MINUSTAH, as well as on their lessons learned. This section presents another brief theoretical approach, “Rubinstein’s Culture Aspects of Military and Civilian Conflicts in Peace Operations.” This theoretical framework focuses the analysis on the specific issues that apply to this case study. Other culture-based obstacles for interoperability are also section discussed.

Part 3 details the Brazilian armed forces adaptations to cultural variability and interoperability in the MINUSTAH AO. This section also discusses how the Brazilian military contingent sought to adapt, and to mitigate, challenges of frictions caused by variation of operational cultures in the AO. These adaptations are detailed in the context of the Brazilian Joint Training Center for Peace Operations (CCOPAB), and how they adapted their educational and training procedures to an ever-evolving mission in Haiti. This section also details the Brazilian contingent's lessons learned, and the evolution of approaches to culture training for this specific mission. Finally, it explains how the Brazilian contingent consolidated these adaptations and lessons learned by aligning them internally, with doctrine, and externally, in the joint environment.

Part 4 combines the in-depth analysis of the Brazilian contingent in the previous sections, and broadens it by including brief overviews of the Argentine and Uruguay contingents in MINUSTAH. This section highlights the differences and similarities of the situational, historical, and organizational cultures of these

militaries in the context of MINUSTAH. This section also briefly discusses Argentine and Uruguayan military educational and training approaches to mitigate challenges of cultural variability in the context of the mission in Haiti. The section concludes with an analysis of how the joint experience of these countries in the context of MINUSTAH has fostered an emerging regional security community in South America.

3.6.1 Introduction: The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti – MINUSTAH

MINUSTAH mission facts (as described in the UN website[632]):

"The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was established on 1 June 2004 by Security Council resolution 1542. The UN mission succeeded a Multinational Interim Force (MIF) authorized by the Security Council in February 2004 after President Bertrand Aristide departed Haiti for exile in the aftermath of an armed conflict which spread to several cities across the country.

The devastating earthquake of 12 January 2010, which resulted in more than 220,000 deaths (according to Haitian Government figures), including 96 UN peacekeepers, delivered a severe blow to country's already shaky economy and infrastructure. The Security Council, by resolution 1908 of 19 January 2010, endorsed the Secretary-General's recommendation to increase the overall force levels of MINUSTAH to support the immediate recovery, reconstruction and stability efforts in the country.

Following the completion of Presidential elections in 2011, MINUSTAH has been working to fulfill its original mandate to restore a secure and stable environment, to promote the political process, to strengthen Haiti's Government institutions and rule-of-law-structures, as well as to promote and to protect human rights.

The Mission has continued to mobilize its logistical resources to assist in the effort to contain and treat the cholera outbreak of October 2010."[633]

The Role of USSOUTHCOM in Haiti

USSOUTHCOM has been conducting joint security cooperation, counterterrorism, peacekeeping, and disaster exercises in its AOR for decades. Rapid response missions are the principle focus of these exercises; a secondary focus is on enhancing collective capabilities in the region. The exercises have been key to improved interoperability between participating regional militaries.[634] These exercises have also provided opportunities to integrate multinational operations, and to train international forces, involving civilian agencies from throughout the region.[635] USSOUTHCOM leverages the "Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias" (FA-HUM) or Humanitarian Allied Forces, a staff exercise that includes regional military and civilian organizations.[636] USSOUTHCOM has also been sponsoring multinational peacekeeping operation (PKO) exercises in the region since 1996. These joint exercises have included up to 23 nations and 7 nongovernmental organizations, and take place on alternate years, between PKO North (Central American and Caribbean Nations) and PKO South (South American nations).[637]

These efforts and other interagency disaster-relief exercises, such as *Tradewinds,* have paid off and have greatly improved the capabilities of regional partner nations in combined and multinational integrated operations.[638]

The largest challenge to multilateral, interagency preparation in disaster relief was greatly tested during the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. USSOUTHCOM's role in the aftermath of the disaster Haiti was massive and swift, but not without important lessons learned to be incorporated for continued improvement. In a report assessing the coordination challenges USSOUTHCOM faced in this disaster-relief operation, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) summarized their recommendations for improvement:

Recommended Reading:

For additional details on USSOUTHCOM's lessons learned on their disaster response, interoperability and coordination in 2010:

GAO, "U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates interagency Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed Challenges Conducting a Large Military Operation.";

http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/307800.pdf

"While SOUTHCOM developed a command organizational structure designed to facilitate interagency collaboration, the scale of the Haiti earthquake disaster challenged the command's ability to support the relief effort. Combatant commands need to be organized and manned to meet their daily mission requirements and be prepared to respond to a wide range of contingencies, including large-scale disaster relief operations. However, SOUTHCOM's nontraditional combatant command structure created difficulties in responding to the crisis and in augmenting military personnel during its initial response."[639]

USSOUTHCOM's response to the earthquake was intertwined with MINUSTAH's response and that of hundreds of other agencies. These interactions and challenges have been thoroughly reviewed and documented by USSOUTHCOM's internal processes and lessons learned, as well as by studies and reports conducted by the GAO. This case study will focus mostly on the perspectives of the primary participant nations in MINUSTAH: Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. The goal is to present additional perspectives to interoperability, while also considering these nations history, national security strategies, and the organizational cultures of these armed forces.

Figure 3-38: Cap-Haitien, Haiti. Staff Sgt. Michel J. Leandre Jr., who was born in Haiti interprets a conversation between a doctor at a local hospital and Col. Daniel Stoltz, the commander of the Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command. The United States and other international military and civilian aid agencies conducted humanitarian and disaster relief operations as part of Operation Unified Response in the aftermath of the earthquake that hit the area. *Source: U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communications Specialist Robert J. Fluegel/Released.*

The United States Observation Group – USMOG – in MINUSTAH

Since 2005, the U.S. participation in MINUSTAH has been small in terms of personnel, but very significant in its importance. The U.S. sends observers from USMOG, who

perform joint command authority and administrative support to U.S. military personnel in support of UN military observer missions.[640]

USMOG assigned to the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti, assist with coordination between U.S. and UN entities.[641] Additionally, "U.S. military observer teams help raise the efficacy of UN military operations by providing a professional example. As part of the UN military staff, they provide expertise in intelligence, operations, and civil affairs to significantly enhance the level of play, sometimes beyond the mission area."[642]

USMOG members are the United States "unofficial military ambassadors" who interact in a professional and personal manner with civilian and military personnel from various nationalities in the UN and its agencies, NGOs, national governments, police staff, and many other civilian organizations.[643]

Understanding the Challenges of Interoperability

USMOG members bear witness to the interoperability problems that generally occur in peacekeeping missions and, in this case, in MINUSTAH. Frictions can occur among any of many actors from various civilian and military organizations, which generate problems that are compounded by the need to interact with the local population. Populations in PKO areas are certainly under significant stress caused by conflict or disaster; this increases the potential for culture-based conflict and misunderstandings at various levels and layers of the interagency and multilateral environment.[644]

Even in a domestic situation, integrating civilian agencies into military operations remains a difficult task.[645] Interoperability among U.S. civilian agencies and the military is bound to lead to frictions due to a myriad of factors, such as faulty coordination mechanisms, different planning processes, and differences in organizational cultures.[646] Therefore, interoperability becomes exponentially more complicated and complex during a conflict, or major disaster, with a multinational operation involving 20-40 countries, hundreds of civilian organizations, NGOs, and a crippled national government. This was the scenario of the MINUSTAH in Haiti, since 2004.

Recommended Reading:

For a complete volume, with chapters written by several scholars from the region and from the U.S. - a joint effort, that provides a diversity of perspectives and insights on peacekeeping by South American countries:

Kai Michael Kenkel, ed., *South America and Peace Operations: Coming of Age* (New York, NY: Cass Series on Peacekeeping, Routledge, 2013).

An example of the challenges of interoperability and cultural variability in interagency, multinational operations: "What kind of culture training is needed for this mission?"

During a pre-deployment brief on Haiti to a USMOG team, one of the members with in-country experience, stated that "all you need to know about Haiti and dealing with Haitians is in a very good and concise book entitled *Haiti,* by Philippe Girard. What we need to learn about is how to deal with the Brazilian military in charge of the mission. I have deployed to multiple combat missions and they have not, yet, they act as if being in Haiti is like being at the top of the world."[647]

To understand the cultural factors and dynamics involved in the question "What kind of culture training is needed for this mission?" mentioned above, we need to first deal with Interoperability. Interoperability is addressed by most U.S. Government agencies, including DoD, USAID, and DoS. USAID, as the lead U.S. Government organization for foreign disaster assistance, published in 2015, guidance on how agencies must interoperate: *USAID Policy on Cooperation with the Department of Defense.*[648]

Recommended Reading:

Rubinstein's perspectives on peacekeeping regarding interaction of the peacekeepers with the local community, the interaction of the peacekeepers with one another, and the interaction of the peacekeepers with the mission organizers and donor nations:

Robert A. Rubinstein, *Peacekeeping Under Fire – Culture and Intervention* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2008).

The U.S. military addresses interoperability in publications dealing with joint training, especially with NATO. For instance, the *2016 Multinational Interoperability Reference Guide,* published by the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, explains the complexities of interoperability by acknowledging that even among the U.S. military services there are many differences and subcultures.[649] Nevertheless, despite the high diversity of military personnel and their various organizational cultures, the U.S. military is mostly homogenous and bound by a common military culture.[650] The recommendation for mitigating approaches regarding interoperability with multinational task forces, involves "understanding cultural sensitivity and friction points when task-organizing units their own interpretations of potential cultural differences prior to forming the task force."[651]

The Need for Other Perspectives

Publications such as the above-referenced *Multinational Interoperability Reference Guide,* are still primarily focused on American organization, doctrine, procedures and processes – not on the actual formal incorporation of multinational aspects of integration.[652] LTC Barbara R. Fick, USA, a scholar who has published extensively about interoperability, and former special assistant to the commander of USSOUTHCOM explains:

> *"(L)ittle work has been done formally to incorporate representatives, perspectives, and practices from potential partner nation military, civilian, and nongovernmental entities who may offer significant insight on the process of integration into coalition efforts led by or involving the U.S. Government and its forces. This is particularly the case with respect to developing nations, who may contribute unique experiences and approaches to operations in less stable and underdeveloped parts of the world."*[653]

It is precisely due to this lack of joint publications with actual formal incorporation of multinational aspects of integration that this case study was created. This paper will focus mostly on the Brazilian contingents in Haiti, and on the Argentine and Uruguayan contingent experiences. The goal is to capture – from the standpoint of their perspectives – their approaches to address challenges with cultural variability, their techniques to mitigate those challenges, their lessons learned, and the changes they incorporated into their doctrines.

MINUSTAH represented an opportunity for these developing nations, and many others in Latin America, to work together to solve a security and instability situation in their region, which was later compounded by the 2010 earthquake. In this multinational and interagency environment, our Latin American counterparts experienced interoperability challenges related to cultural variability. These nations are all potential partner nations with whom the U.S. military already conducts security cooperation. However, MINUSTAH was not a U.S.-led mission, and the unique experiences and approaches to joint efforts that our Latin American counterparts experienced in Haiti may provide valuable insight for future events.

As highlighted above by LTC Fick, our understanding of this complex issue is enhanced by capturing perspectives and approaches used by our counterparts to address challenges with cultural variability, their techniques to mitigate those challenges, their lessons learned, and the changes that they subsequently incorporated into their doctrine. Additionally, Marines assigned to missions in the context of multinational, interagency operations, will be better-prepared to work with their Latin American counterparts, as they will acquire additional insight concerning the historical, cultural, and organizational cultures of their Brazilian, Argentine, and Uruguayan counterparts.

A Theoretical Framework: Horizontal Interoperability vs. Vertical Interoperability

Robert A. Rubinstein, a distinguished Professor of Anthropology and International Relations at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University, has been cited many times in this document. He wrote extensively about how cultural factors affect the ability of military and humanitarian actors to work together in joint, multi-agency missions; and how cultural factors affect work with local populations.[654] Rubinstein distinguishes between horizontal interoperability and vertical interoperability. The former focuses on the organizational cultural factors affecting humanitarian and military groups; the latter focuses on their relations with local communities.[655]

Rubinstein addresses which culture factors could interfere with collaboration among military and humanitarian organizations, by seeking answers to two questions. The first question is as follows:[656]

> *"The first: "How can understanding culture be used to improve the way various component organizations collaborate in an Area of Operation?" is asked in an effort enhance the ability of the agencies, organizations, and people who are part of a mission to work together in an efficient and effective manner. The question asks about what is needed for these actors to work together across their different structural locations in a mission. This raises a concern for what I call Horizontal Interoperability.*

The second question is: "How can understanding the culture of the people who are receiving humanitarian aid improve the delivery of that aid?" People asking this question are interested in enhancing the way. that the organizations, agencies and people - both military and civilian work with local populations. I call this Vertical Interoperability."

Rubinstein believes that "achieving interoperability among military and humanitarian organizations also requires a common understanding across broadly defined levels of operations, in addition to technological standardizations that will allow them to work together."[657] Rubinstein concludes that achieving interoperability among military and humanitarian organizations requires "a deeper understanding of

organizational culture, which can provide a dynamic and generative appreciation," which will need historical and situational appreciation of the social contexts."[658]

This case study will utilize the above-mentioned framework to look at interoperability in MINUSTAH, focusing on the need of senior Marine officers assigned to multinational and interagency missions to learn some key military organizational culture features and pertinent historical factors regarding the Brazilian military, as well as of other Latin American counterparts. Thus, the next sections present an overview of the historical, situational, and organizational cultures of some of the largest contingents of Latin American militaries in MINUSTAH, including Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay.

3.6.2 Part 1: Background – MINUSTAH as of November 2016

Under current UN mandate (Security Council Resolution 2313, of October 2016), valid until April 15, 2017, the MINUSTAH mission includes members from 48 countries, a total of 6,014 personnel, including: 4,708 uniformed personnel; 2,358 troops; 2,350 Police; 1,245 civilian personnel; 304 International civilians; 941 local civilians; and 82 UN volunteers.[659]

Figure 3-39: MINUSTAH troops location in Haiti (as of August 2016). *Source: UNDPKO (2016).*

Country	Troops	Police	Country	Troops	Police
Brazil	982	4	Paraguay	83	1
India	440	6	Argentina	73	12
Chile	392	11	Burkina Faso	44	-
Uruguay	249	8	Niger	-	69
Peru	161	-	Jordan	3	340
Rwanda	160	18	Nepal	2	166
Senegal	160	13	Pakistan	-	140
Philippines	137	-	Benin	-	51
Bangladesh	112	306	United States	4	19

The Brazilian Military in MINUSTAH

In 2004, after the ouster of Haiti's President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a surge of political turmoil and widespread violence culminated in a peace plan presented by the UN, the OAS, the Caribbean Community Regional Integration (CARICOM), the United States, France, and Canada. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1529, requesting the deployment of a Multinational Interim Force (MIF) to Haiti.[660]

When the MIF mission was first set up in 2004, the U.S. sent a large contingent of Marines, along with Canadian, French, and Chilean troops.[661] But due to the controversies regarding the U.S. role and the subsequent outbreak of violence in Port-au-Prince, the United States asked Brazil to lead the military mission. France's former President, Jacques Chirac (1995-2007), made a personal call to former Brazilian President Luis Inácio da Silva (2003-2011), known as President Lula, reportedly requesting the same.[662]

MINUSTAH was established on June 1, 2005 to replace the MIF. Ever since MINUSTAH's inception, and for over a decade, commanders of the military component were from Brazil, and their assistants were Argentine, Chilean, and Uruguayan commanders.[663] For the past decade, these countries have also regularly sent the largest military contingents in the UN peacekeeping troop-contributing system, positioning themselves as the security guarantors in South America, a reflection of their geopolitical views.[664]

Initially, the Brazilian contingent was assigned to Port-au-Prince, where most of the violence was occurring. Argentine troops supporting the MINUSTAH mission in Haiti were assigned to Gonaïves, the Chileans were deployed to Cap-Haitien, and the Uruguayans were sent to the Great Peninsula.[665] These were all very large swaths of territory; a total of 12 countries participated in this phase of the mission.[666]

President Lula accepted the mission and the high costs associated with it, mostly because it fit within his vision of projecting Brazil in the global arena. For President Lula, success in this mission was vital for his master plan to obtain a permanent seat on the UN security council.[667] Peacekeeping was part of a broader strategy; it was the means used to help integrate defense and foreign policy.[668] Therefore, the Brazilian military in Haiti was responsible for policy implementation in such a way that it forced diplomats and military to coordinate policies in a joint, interagency setting.[669]

Since 2004, Brazil's taxpayers have spent billions on MINUSTAH.[670] In principle, the UN should reimburse these expenses, but in recent years the reimbursements have amounted to only 25 to 40 percent of the payments made by the Brazilian government.[671] This discrepancy occurs because the UN does not reimburse expenses for pre-deployment training, an area that Brazil invests heavily.[672] All these expenses were considered an investment by Brazil, something that would eventually payoff politically and increase the country's prestige in the international arena.[673]

Brazilian foreign policy has historically promoted Brazil as a "peaceful nation." The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs describes Brazil's participation in the United Nations peacekeeping operations as follows:

> *"For a founding member of the United Nations, historically committed to the peaceful settlement of disputes, participating in peacekeeping operations is a natural extension of its international responsibilities. Under article 4 of the Federal Constitution, among the principles governing Brazil's international relations are the promotion of peace, the peaceful settlement of conflicts and the cooperation among nations for the progress of humanity. Brazil has not shirked from engaging in conflict resolution – such as those in Angola, East Timor, Lebanon, and Haiti."*[674]

Therefore, at the national defense/strategy level, the Brazilian military objectives in participating in peacekeeping operations had a clear alignment with Brazil's diplomatic history. The Brazilian military is proud of its longstanding tradition of participating in UN peacekeeping operations since its inception. In 1956, Brazil sent troops in support of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) operating on the Suez Canal, the Sinai Peninsula, and on the Gaza Strip, when the UN faced one of its first major crisis: to guard a buffer zone established to avoid escalation of the conflict between Israel and Egypt.[675]

Nevertheless, the motivation to participate in MINUSTAH varied significantly between the political arena and the military. While the success of this mission was vital for the geopolitical ambitions of President Lula, the military embraced it for other very urgent and practical reasons. The reality was that the role of the armed forces had dramatically changed in Brazil since 1985. That was when the re-democratization process had begun, with the armed forces handing over power peacefully back to civilians after 21 years of military rule. Since then, the Brazilian military has been under the authority of an anti-military, left-wing executive branch. This period also coincided with one of the most severe economic crises in Latin America. The crisis affected many countries in Latin America, especially Brazil, where hyperinflation took place, evaporating the salaries and savings of all citizens. Concomitantly, Brazil's newly empowered congress sharply reduced military expenditures and military pay. Therefore, the military withdrawal from power coincided with an economic downturn, resulting in deeper budget cuts for the military. However, Brazil was already among the countries with the lowest levels of military expenditures, and those levels have declined sharply over the last three decades.[676]

All these events forced the Brazilian armed forces to search for a new mission, a new role in society, while struggling with obsolete equipment and low pay. Therefore, to resume peacekeeping, something that the Brazilian armed forces did not do during the two decades of the military dictatorship, seemed a good option. MINUSTAH offered the Brazilian military the perfect opportunity to modernize their outdated equipment, boost salaries, acquire training, and align the military with the strategy of the civilian government.

The decision to embrace peacekeeping missions paid off in multiple areas. During MINUSTAH the Brazilian military acquired much-needed training for their troops. As MINUSTAH's largest contingent, the Brazilian Battalions (BRABATs) managed to pacify the most violent neighborhoods in Haiti, such as Cité-du-Soleil in 2005. Shortly thereafter, upon their return to Brazil, the military used training obtained in Haiti and equipment purchased for that mission, to launch similar cleanup operations in the crime-ridden slums of Rio de Janeiro.[677]

General Augusto Heleno Ribeiro Pereira, First Commander of the Military Force for MINUSTAH, summarizes his views on the initial phase of the mission during his 2005 brief to the Brazilian government about the "Peace Operations in Haiti":[678]

> *"From the military point of view, there are many advantages for Brazil to participate in Peacekeeping missions such as these, for example: individual education; learning about logistical support; effective testing of the equipment employed; evaluation of the guidelines provided; experience in peacekeeping operations; learning other languages, among other. Our Brazilian contingent is learning with the Mission in Haiti; there has been great development in the creation of the Brazilian Peace Force."*[679]

The benefits and advantages of participation in MINUSTAH were also felt throughout the Brazilian defense sector, which experienced a considerable boost to the defense industry. By 2012, Brazil had spent approximately $80 million on vehicles, $12 million on ammunition, $11 million on arms, and $9 million on transport and shipping."[680] Brazil's total expenditures in Haiti reached approximately 1.7 billion Reais ($835 million) by 2012.[681]

Figure 3-40: Lieutenant-General Augusto Heleno Ribeiro Pereira from Brazil (center), Force Commander of MINUSTAH, conferring with some United Nations soldiers during an opening ceremony in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. *Source: UN Photo/Evan Schneider.*

In sum, most of the Brazilian military personnel who volunteer for and deploy to UN PKOs feel very good about their professional standing, as Brazil only sends their most accomplished officers to PKO missions. These officers are also quite satisfied with the excellent pay – by Brazilian standards – that they receive in UN PKO missions. They are motivated to use new equipment, and to acquire new skills and training. Thus, understanding these situational and historical key facts helps U.S. Marines understand that, for a Brazilian officer to be part of a UN PKO mission such as MINUSTAH or in any other such mission, means that these officers are on a high moment of their career, and possibly "feeling they were at the top of the world."

These perspectives regarding the Brazilian military – and what is valued in their professional lives and in these UN PKO missions – differ significantly from the motivations of a higher-ranking officer in, for example, the U.S. Marine Corps. USMC officers are part of the most powerful military in the world, they have access to the best technology, training and equipment on the planet, their careers have been historically composed of warfighting and in major wars, and their pay is several-fold higher than most militaries in the world. Their Brazilian military counterparts differ considerably in all the above.

3.6.3 Part 2: Interoperability – Challenges and Lessons Learned

The Brazilian Experience in MINUSTAH

Despite the political and military will – and generalized optimism and confidence in the mission – the Brazilian military encountered many difficulties in Haiti. Some of these challenges were due to the volatile and dangerous circumstances in Haiti; others were caused by logistical, technological, and organizational obstacles. The Brazilian military contingent also encountered difficult interoperability challenges with the myriad of NGOs, humanitarian organizations, and several layers of civilian and military authorities in the AO.[682]

In the initial phase of the mission, the Brazilian contingent improvised and counted on the widespread belief on the "high level of adaptability" of the Brazilian culture, to deal with culture-based frictions.[683] Nevertheless, during subsequent phases of the mission, the Brazilian military sought to mitigate many of these challenges with pragmatic changes to pre-deployment training, to processes, and to their organizational structure, as discussed below (Part 3). One of the initial, harder tasks was to identify the roots of these cultural and organizational challenges. As Rubinstein states, "there is now an acknowledgement that problems in coordination between the various elements of a mission can be a major obstacle to the effectiveness of the mission."[684]

Rubinstein's Culture Aspects of Military and Civilian Conflicts in Peace Operations

Rubinstein acknowledges that there are several approaches to diagnose culture-basis conflicts in PKOs. These approaches are helpful to locate the root of frictions based on a closer look at the organizational cultures of all parts involved.[685] Rubinstein identifies four main areas that may lead to friction during interagency coordination in multilateral environments such as in peacekeeping operations: "(1) management structures; (2) symbols, boundaries, and security; (3) media and information; and (4) context and legitimacy."[686] This case study will highlight all of those possible friction areas in the context of MINUSTAH: management structures, symbols, boundaries and security; media and information; and context and legitimacy.

Management Structures

Lieutenant-General Augusto Heleno was the Force Commander in the very early, chaotic phase of MINUSTAH, when the main interagency frictions appeared. During a 2005 brief to the Brazilian government, he identified one of these conflicting points between the Brazilian Forces, the UN, and the other members of the international community.[687] He stated, "The Military Force does not have any responsibility regarding the development of projects. On the contrary, it was criticized when it interfered in areas that were not under its administration."[688] His statement implies that the Military Force attempted to get involved in the implementation of development of humanitarian projects and was rebuffed.

General Heleno shared his vision about the potentially broader role for the military in Haiti in the early years of the mission:[689]

"My personal view of the mission differs from many people, it is a vision not shared by the United Nations nor by the International Community, because I would like to enter Cité-du-Soleil, for example with the troops, followed immediately by four trucks

to pick up the trash in that area; along with a team of doctors to install three health outposts to take care of the population."[690]

In the statement, General Heleno expresses his frustrations with the UN for being denied the opportunity to get involved in social projects in Cité-du-Soleil slum after a military operation. He wanted to act in accordance to his genuine intentions to help the Haitians, and per the organizational culture of the Brazilian army. He wanted his actions to reflect Brazilian army doctrine, which considers it vital to the success of military operations for the troops to conduct social actions to gain support from local populations.[691] Therefore, the UN restrictions went against General Heleno's organizational structure, as it clashed with Brazilian army doctrine.

Analyzing the incident above through the lens of Rubinstein's "management structures" brings out additional clarification to the root of the friction in consideration.[692] In this context, management structures refer to differences in meanings and results the military and civilian organizations assign to and expect from, their respective management styles.[693] For instance, General Heleno's management structure is aligned with a command framework that include a chain of command. The military's management style favors a hierarchical approach to tasks, to promote efficiency and resolve the problem encountered.[694] This style clashes with the humanitarian organizations styles and views of management, that places high value on consultation and participation – and, thus, presents a challenge to coordinated action with military style that favors a unity of command.[695]

General Heleno's approach conflicted with NGOs that were already operating in the AO, as they feared the military was taking over their responsibilities.[696] General Heleno did not get his way, but he did not agree with it nor apparently understood why his genuine intentions to help the Haitians and guarantee mission success brought about such opposition from the UN and from the international community. He did not comprehend at that time that he was creating a power struggle with the humanitarian organizations in charge of such efforts.

Figure 3-41: MINUSTAH doctor helping a local patient in Bel-Air, Port-Au-Prince. *Source: UN Photo/Sophia Paris.*

Rubinstein states that humanitarian aid agencies seek to create coordination mechanisms that ensure the military and these organization are equal partners, and keep certain boundaries between their actions.[697] For instance, the 2013 *OCHA's Guidelines for Haiti* details each one of those restrictions, in line with the Oslo Guidelines (2007), where "direct assistance, infrastructure support, and/or indirect assistance by the military are to be requested only if and when need arises and as an option of "**last resort**."[bold in the original quote].[698] Rubinstein presents other examples of humanitarian agencies seeking to "prohibit... militaries from engaging in humanitarian activities, defining what information aid workers can legitimately share with militaries (and vice versa), and limiting the military presence out of respect for humanitarian principles, as opposed to strategic concern."[699]

Figure 3-42: A doctor with the French Red Cross treats a Haitian woman at a clinic in Place Jérémie, Port-au-Prince, Haiti. *Source: UN Photo/Pasqual Gorriz.*

These guidelines contrast with the Brazilian army's constitutional mission, which is heavily focused in internal civil affairs actions. For example, the Brazilian army mission statement says it performs state functions in remote areas of the vast national territory, especially in the Amazon region, as detailed in this quote from the Brazilian army Website:

"The Army, present in the Amazon since the beginning of the 17th Century, has been intensifying its presence by creating new Border Units. Such facilities represent development nuclei around which small urban clusters grow, guaranteeing the national sovereignty in the area. Such pioneering, trail-blazing action of the Brazilian Army, not only in the Amazon but in other regions throughout the country as well, is part of the Army's constitutional mission.

Helping the populating of remote areas, providing a minimum infrastructure till development reaches the area, supplying basic services, this silent work is a solid parcel of the Army's contribution to the progress of the Nation."[700]

The social actions are such an intrinsic part of the internal mission of the Brazilian army that its motto is *Braço Forte Mão Amiga* ("Strong Arm Friendly Hand"). This means for instance, that in the same way strength and force is deployed to enter a slum and crack down on gangs, a "friendly hand" will deliver humanitarian assistance in the same area.[701]

The reality in Haiti, however, presented a unique operational setting for humanitarian organizations, the police, and the military.[702] In 2013, the UN's OCHA addressed interoperability in the revised issue of the *Guidelines for Civil Military Coordination in Haiti*.[703] These guidelines were endorsed by the Humanitarian Country Team and by MINUSTAH. The document highlights in its introduction that one of its main purpose is to address the "blurring of line" between the military and the humanitarian organizations.[704] OCHA's guidelines establish that MINUSTAH Joint Operations Center (JOC) is the civil-military coordination platform for the military, MINUSTAH police, Haitian National Police (HNP), government and civilian actors, as well as for UN Security and OCHA liaison officers.[705]

After the 2010 earthquake, the collaboration of the UN Country Team (UNCT) and MINUSTAH was tightened with the creation of the Joint Operations and Tasking Force (JOTC).[706] OCHA's guidelines include provisions for administering training in UN Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) to familiarize all actors involved on the principles and application of humanitarian and civil-military coordination.[707]

Therefore, despite the initial frictions with the humanitarian agencies, as illustrated by General Heleno's comments, common ground was found through negotiation and active pursuit of mitigation for frictions. MINUSTAH did sign OCHA's *2013 Guidelines,* and the Brazilian military adapted their institutional doctrine accordingly, as detailed below (Part 3).

Recommended Reading:

For additional information on publications on interoperability with humanitarian organizations:

Interorganizational Cooperation—Part II of III: The Humanitarian Perspective - By James C. McArthur, et al.; http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/643234/interorganizational-cooperationpart-ii-of-iii-the-humanitarian-perspective/

"A Way Ahead for DOD Disaster Preparedness," *Joint Force Quarterly* 82 (3rd Quarter, July 2016), By Frank C. DiGiovanni; http://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-82/Article/793256/a-way-ahead-for-dod-disaster-preparedness/

"Separate and Equal." *Joint Force Quarterly*80, (1st Quarter, 2016). By Paul A. Gaist and Ramey L. Wilson; http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-80/jfq-80_45-53_Gaist-Wilson.pdf

Symbols, Boundaries, and Security

Rubinstein explains that cross-cultural environments, such as in peace operations, are bound to foster conflicting interpretations of symbols, boundaries, and security. For instance, for civilian agencies aid is to be distributed impartially, without a political goal or plan, and for that reason, impartiality and neutrality are key symbols to their relations with the population.[708] For the military, the main goal is to follow their mandate, which in many cases include the use of force, something that clashes with the civilian agencies.

In 2004, the political situation in Haiti was volatile; various illegal groups were challenging MINUSTAH authority. While the U.S., Canada, and France pressured for a more proactive use of force, the civilian organizations in the field threatened to bring charges against MINUSTAH for the use of force.[709] One of those agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) demanded neutrality to conduct their activities, and were highly critical of the use of force.[710] They claimed impartiality must be the centerpiece of their own operations and mandate, and close cooperation with the military that was resorting to the use of force was not viewed as impartial or neutral, neither by the population nor by the civilian agencies.[711]

The main UN peacekeeping symbols – the blue helmets and the white vehicles that carry humanitarian supplies and assistance – became easily identifiable targets or culprits, for any given conflict or disruption. This was especially true during the initial peace enforcement phase of MINUSTAH. During the early years of the mission, frictions between the military component and the civilian agencies were a constant, especially when those two groups were operating in the same area.

As Rubinstein explains, the concept of boundaries is different for the military and the civilian agencies as well. While humanitarian workers distribute aid in close contact with the population, the military interpret boundaries in terms of control and separation.[712] These boundaries are viewed as necessary by the military to provide security.

However, after being forced to work together throughout multiple disasters in Haiti, under very difficult circumstances, and after years of mutual recriminations and finger-pointing, the various parties have come to agree over a set of norms, which has improved coordination to a level that has become mutually acceptable.[713]

Media and Information

In Rubinstein's approach to diagnose culture-basis conflicts, "media and information" are also sensitive areas that often experience friction.[714] In the same 2005 brief to the Brazilian government, General Heleno expressed frustration that he "didn't want to have the military component always being portrayed 'as the bad guys,'" by the media.[715] Rubinstein explains that in many instances, images of casualties shared by the media during a peace operation, can make the work of the peacekeepers very difficult.[716] These images are normally accompanied by reports containing distortions of the actions and of the intentions of people or institutions. This often results in misunderstanding and confusion, complicating the environment and relations with the local populations, and raising tensions throughout the interagency environment.[717]

Rubinstein states that the interagency environment becomes even more complex and complicated with the presence of the media, and he suggests, as a remedy, "the need to include the organizational cultures of the media."[718]

Another example of media-related culture-conflict in the AO was also brought up by General Heleno: he said that there was tension during the initial phase of the mission because of what he labeled "the tendency of the press, to portray MINUSTAH as a Brazilian Mission."[719] He said that this distorted information generated negative reactions in the UN, among the section heads of all other country contingents, and among the NGOs working in Haiti.[720] In his words, "Every time the press tried to make MINUSTAH look like a Brazilian operation, there was an immediate "slamming on the brakes" by the various sections heads in the Mission. They would say that they were not in Haiti working for Brazil, but for the United Nations, because it was a UN mission and not Brazil's."[721]

Context and Legitimacy

The initial phase of MINUSTAH in 2004 was largely a peace enforcement mission, when constant security challenges resulted in complex urban operations, intense patrolling, and clashes with illegal armed groups that required the use of force.[722] Many interoperability challenges occurred during this period, since most South American contingents had serious reservations about the use of force, and had agreed to participate in a peacekeeping operation – not on a peace enforcement mission.[723] The limitations imposed by Argentina's mandate in this initial phase will be discussed below (Part 4). These limitations were evidenced in the location of the contingents in the country. For example, Argentina's contingent had to be located far from the violent areas, so they were sent to Gonaïves, in the northeast of Haiti, away from Port-au-Prince where the main fighting was taking place.[724]

Recommended Reading:

These publications will enable you to better understand the "Brazilian way of peacekeeping" from the perspective of the Assistant to the MINUSTAH Force Commander, describing in detail the military challenges, the interoperability conflicts, and cultural approaches in the field:

Carlos Chagas Vianna Braga, "MINUSTAH and the Security Environment in Haiti: Brazil and South American Cooperation in the Field," *InternationalPeacekeeping* (2010) 17:5, 711-722. Available online at the Marine Corps Library: DOI: 10.1080/13533312.2010.516979

However, Rubinstein notes that all contingents in MINUSTAH deployed with legitimate mandates from the UN Security Council, and the NGOs did the same by negotiating with the local authorities.[725] Nevertheless, both the military and the civilian agencies needed to continue to work to keep and develop relations with the local populations to maintain their legitimacy.[726] The Brazilian contingent knew they could only keep their legitimacy – and count on the support of the population – if they only resorted to a minimal amount of force. This was very difficult to do in the initial phase because the Brazilian contingent was subject to armed attacks from the gangs, and they were not allowed to provide social assistance, which they believed would have relieved tensions with the local populations and helped maintain their legitimacy.

Other Culture-based Obstacles for Interoperability

General Heleno identified another problem for interoperability during his time as the Force Commander: the language barrier. First, very few officers spoke French and/or Creole, the two-official languages in Haiti (English is the UN's working language). However, most officers in the mission came from Spanish-speaking countries in South America, which created conflict due to a sense of segregation between the Spanish-speaking contingents and the Anglophones.[727] General Heleno's suggestion to solve the language problem: "It should be a requirement for the Force Commander to also speak Spanish to keep in contact with the contingents located in the most critical locations, out of Port-au-Prince – but unfortunately the UN does not take this into consideration."[728]

Concerns about the language barrier expressed by General Heleno remains an issue for interoperability; the problem still exists. The Special Committee of Peacekeeping Operations regularly requests changes to be made regarding the need for UN guidance to be made available in all UN official languages.[729] More than 11 years after General Heleno shared his observations about language differences, his concerns were reiterated in a peace operation "Lessons-Learned" publication produced by the Brazilian CCOPAB:

> *"In the case of contributing countries from this region and in relation to the operational capacities as a whole, we can verify that the use of languages (English and French) is a limiting factor that, in some cases, becomes a real obstacle to reach the necessary capacity of interoperability between the components of an operation."*[730]

3.6.4 Part 3: Adaptations to Cultural Variability

The Brazilian Joint Training Center for Peace Operations (CCOPAB)

The first Brazilian contingents in peacekeeping missions were responsible for their own pre-deployment training.[731] In 1989, the UN issued a resolution that "encouraged the State Members to establish training programs for military and civilian personnel for their deployment in peacekeeping operations."[732] Pre-deployment training comes with a cost, and Brazil has invested in the Brazilian contingent's UN PKO training more than any other contributing countries, an expense that is not reimbursed by the UN.[733]

Since 2001, the Brazilian military received special peacekeeping training at the Center of Preparation and Evaluation of the Brazilian Army Peace Missions, which in 2010 became the CCOPAB, in Rio de Janeiro.[734] CCOPAB operated under the authority of Brazilian Ministry of Defense, under the army's Land Operations Command (COTER), and under the Brazilian Army Department of Education and Culture.[735]

CCOPAB provides training for all three branches of the Brazilian military; it also trains military personnel from other nations. CCOPAB's mission is: "To support the preparation of military, police and civilian personnel from Brazil and friendly nations for peace missions and humanitarian demining missions."[736] Colonel Luis Felipe Baganha – who commanded the Center in 2012 and was interviewed by *Diálogo*, a USSOUTHCOM-sponsored online military magazine – described the role of CCOPAB:[737]

> *"(A) major part of the training offered at the CCOPAB is that of cultural diversity, one of the basic principles of the UN. 'This is very easy for us, because our culture already has a multicultural integration since the beginning, and we have been raised this way; our colonization was like this, which makes it very easy,' said Col. Baganha. He added, 'For the Brazilian people, it is not difficult to adapt to different environments. It is very easy to take part in a party in Nepal, or a meeting in Sri Lanka; we have traces of all cultures in our country, so communication comes naturally and easily to the Brazilian people.'"*[738]

Colonel Baganha described CCOPAB's organizational structure and highlighted the fact that the CCOPAB does not provide regular classes, as its curriculum is built around internships that have different durations, depending on the need and mission of each student or group.[739] Colonel Baganha explains further:

> *"(T)he internships may last one week, 15 days, one month, or more. The requirement is that they must be officers, regardless of their ranks. The Humanitarian Demining Internship, for instance, is composed mostly of lieutenants. There is an internship for the training of squadrons and sub-unit commanders, devoted to the Brazilian*

Squadron in Haiti (BRABAT), which is essentially for lieutenants. The internship for the training of contingent Joint Staff commanders and officials, however, is for senior officers and commanders who are usually colonels. There is also the UNIFIL [UN Interim Force in Lebanon] Internship, which works with Joint Staff officers and other senior officers."[740]

CCOPAB provides internships for those assigned to conduct humanitarian demining; for UN military observers; UN police offers; UN staff officers; and for media advisors and journalists in conflict areas.[741] CCOPAB also prepares the following categories of military staff: Command and Staff, Unit Commanders and Joint Staff, Sub-Unit Commanders and Platoon Leaders, Civil-military Coordination, Military Translators and Interpreters, Logistics and Reimbursement, Commander and Staff of Maritime forces (MTF)-UNIFIL.[742]

CCOPAB follows the guidelines of the UN DPKO, known as the *Standardized Specific Training Modules* for UNPKO; the CCOPAB curriculum includes a culminating session of practical exercises, with role-players and assessments.[743] Additionally, the internships include full joint-training exercises sponsored by other nations, such as Canada, Argentina, Great Britain, and many others; and UN pre-deployment advanced field exercises, for current missions such as MINUSTAH.[744]

Training Adaptations - How Training Evolved with the Mission

As previously noted, the initial Brazilian contingent sent to MINUSTAH in 2004 encountered several operational challenges, such as the need to be involved in complex urban operations, intense patrolling, and clashes with illegal armed groups that sometimes necessitated the use of force.[745] Therefore, MINUSTAH had to engage in more peace enforcement than peacekeeping. This initial need for peace enforcement guided the development of new pre-deployment training that focused on military operations.[746]

Figure 3-43: MINUSTAH Peacekeepers Secure Streets Around National Palace, Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Brazilian peacekeepers secure the streets around the National Palace, following the outbreak of protests because of escalating food prices. *Source: UN Photo/Logan Abassi.*

In the years that followed Brazil's first MINUSTAH deployment, the Brazilian Battalion (BRABAT) mission evolved toward an urban pacification model, which included numerous complementary actions to get the support of the local population.[747] By 2009, the mission was in good standing. Therefore, plans were made to transition these tasks to the Haitian government.[748] Shortly thereafter, in January 2010, the massive earthquake hit and changed dramatically all the circumstances on the ground, and – accordingly – the UN Security Council changed MINUSTAH's mandate.[749]

The Brazilian Army Command made a strategic decision – followed by the other services – to use a system of a six-month rotations for the BRABATs, with the goal of benefiting a maximum number of personnel.[750] Another reason for this system is summarized below:

"This methodology allowed military personnel, from all the regions of the country, to have the opportunity to participate in a peace operation that brought dynamics and high degree of reality to the training, and allowed the modernization of equipment and the incorporation of operational and logistics techniques, tactics, and procedures."[751]

The Brazilian contingent learned from the challenges encountered on the ground, and attempted to mitigate many interoperability problems, misunderstandings, and misperceptions. This was a slow but pragmatic process that occurred over time through the continued adaptation of pre-deployment training from one battalion to another. For instance, CCOPAB addressed the previously mentioned concern – expressed by General Heleno in 2005 – regarding confusion and bad press reported by the media: CCOPAB sought to mitigate this problem by offering training to the media, to effectively prepare the press for challenges encountered in conflict zones. They increased and improved pre-deployment culture training, adapting it to the realities encountered by each rotating battalion, which included dramatic new challenges, such as the devastating earthquake in 2010.

Recommended Reading:

For additional information on interoperability in USSOUTHCOM:

"Joint Communications Support Element - The Voice Heard 'Round the World." By Kirby E. Watson, *Joint Forces Quarterly*, issue 69, 2nd quarter (2013). Available at: http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-69/JFQ-69_49-55_Watson.pdf

"Improving Joint Interagency Coordination: Changing Mindsets." By Alexander L. Carter, *Joint Forces Quarterly*, issue 79, 4th Quarter (2015), 21. Available at:

http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-79/jfq-79_19-26_Carter.pdf

Another concern expressed by General Heleno was his frustration with not being able to give the Haitians and the international community a positive image of the Brazilian contingent; he wanted the Brazilian contingent to be allowed to deliver more social assistance projects. As previously mentioned, his organizational culture played an important part in this frustration. What he considered positive short-term social actions to be conducted by his troops (such as handing out food and cleaning up trash in the slums), are called "Short-term Social Civil-Military Actions" (ACISOs, the Portuguese acronym). ACISOs were not part of the UN mandate at the time, but they were an intrinsic part of the Brazilian military doctrine. This friction point was addressed several years later, and will be discussed below.

In a later phase of the mission, the Brazilian military had numerous opportunities to conduct social actions and contribute to Haiti's relief and development, as General Heleno envisioned – but with many adjustments. This especially occurred during the aftermath of the earthquake, when the UN modified MINUSTAH's mandate for the relief operation, and during the transition phase that begun in 2013. It was then that the Brazilian contingent became involved in planned civil-military actions, during the "Transition/Hand-over and Withdrawal/Liquidation" phase, which is set to end in 2017.[752]

Alignment of Management Structures

During the transition/final phase of the Haiti Mission, the civil affairs (G9) component of the BRABATs sought to reduce short-term ACISOs and increase the number of long-term projects. This last phase required transfer of authority back to the Haitian people, and called for training the Haitian agencies for

the final hand-over and withdrawal phase. This was achieved by the Brazilian contingent after careful planning, which included a conscious internal culture-change approach. In this case, BRABAT 18 set out to change doctrine and to "change the culture of the Brazilian Army military personnel in regards to the fact that Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) and Social Civil-Military Actions are not the same thing."[753] This was in response to complaints from many humanitarian organizations in Haiti that the medical component of the Brazilian contingent was attempting to do their job, something that created frictions with the humanitarian agencies.[754] This was precisely the point that General Heleno was not aware of in 2005, because, at the time, the organizational structure of the Brazilian army considered ACISO actions, along with military operations, as the norm.

This self-administered culture change was led by CCOPAB, and took place in the internships provided for the G9 in pre-deployment phase, in Brazil.[755] They also conducted an "informal dialog campaign" with military personnel involved directly and indirectly in CIMIC.[756] This culture change was considered a key element for BRABAT's success in this last phase of the mission, because it increased the necessary command support for the mission.[757] This effort was considered successful, as practically all BRABAT's command and staff subsequently demonstrated a new and correct interpretation of the meaning of CIMIC actions.[758]

During this last phase, with adjustments and change of functions, BRABAT also sought to increase coordination and information in their AOR with the civilian actors, especially with other UN agencies, international organizations, agencies of the Haitian government, and NGOs.[759] The effort to increase coordination with all other agencies was consolidated in the signing of OCHA's *2013 Guidelines*.

Hurricane Matthew (October 2016) – Excerpts from OCHA's "HAITI: Hurricane Matthew," *Situation Report* No. 30 (26 December 2016)," illustrate improved interoperability and coordinated efforts between MINUSTAH and the humanitarian organizations in Haiti in recurring disasters:

"The National Police of Haiti (PNH) has indicated that armed escorts for humanitarian organizations will be interrupted from 24 December till 2 January included in Jeremie and 5 January in Les Cayes. Some humanitarian distribution activities are likely to slow down during the period as this interruption will impact MINUSTAH armed escorts from UNPOL and FPU, which can only operate in conjunction with the PNH."[760]

"(I)n terms of civil-military coordination, armed escort statistics through 21 December show an increase in requests in December compared to November, reflecting an increase in humanitarian assistance to remote areas but also revealing of the over reliance on armed escorts for humanitarian activities. OCHA presented the draft cash standards at the Cash Working Group meeting in Port-au-Prince on 21 December. In addition, UNDP presented its cash-for-work approach for the emergency-to-development phases. Members of the group provided recommendations to develop and circulate an updated mapping on ongoing and future cash based response and to ensure that cash standards are harmonized in the field. Meanwhile, at the Working Group's meeting in Jeremie on 22 December, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Work (MAST) was designated as lead of the Working Group and UNDP and Care as co-leads. In Les Cayes, OCHA, MINUSTAH's Human Rights Section and protection actors decided to reactivate the Protection Sector in Sud region as a means to improve protection coordination."[761]

MINUSTAH also continues to interface with USSOUTHCOM with coordination efforts to assist humanitarian assistance for disasters in Haiti. For instance, with the Joint Task Force Bravo, composed of

1,700 sailors and 700 Marines, that supported humanitarian efforts in Haiti after the devastating Hurricane Matthew in 2016.[762]

Other Institutional Adaptations and Pre-deployment Training

As of December 2016, Brazil has sent 26 rotating Brazilian contingents to Haiti. They have attempted to address all cultural and interoperability challenges associated with the mission. This approach involved an overall institutional effort, with commitment to resources and actions that included the creation of a joint culture training center, and over 12 years of proactive adjustments in pre-deployment training. The Brazilian army attempted to overcome limitations imposed by the UN, by the international community, and by their own organizational structure, highlighting the high priority of this mission to the Brazilian army.

In 2011, the Commander of the Brazilian army issued a guideline requiring actions to incorporate lessons learned in the institutional memory of the force.[763] In accordance to that directive, Brazilian Major Alexandre A. Andrade conducted a qualitative study of the influence of the organizational culture of the Brazilian army – and the lessons learned in MINUSTAH – to assess its impact in military doctrine and in peacekeeping operations.[764]

Figure 3-44: Colonel Thomas Prentice, commanding officer of Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force – Southern Command, discusses possible staging areas for helicopters that will be utilized during relief operations to provide aid to areas affected by Hurricane Matthew, with Ernst Renaud, director of Toussaint Louverture International Airport at Port-au-Prince, Haiti, Joint Task Force Matthew was a U.S. Southern Command-directed team deployed to Port-au-Prince at the request of the Government of Haiti, on a mission to provide humanitarian and disaster relief assistance in the aftermath of Hurricane Matthew. *Source: USSOUTHCOM/ Photo By: Sgt. Adwin Esters.*

Major Andrade's study focused on the first six contingents, utilizing data collected from seventy questionnaires, and in interviews from two main groups: one composed by officers at the Command Course at the Command and Staff College (CCEM; the Portuguese acronym), and the second group from officers that were not at the CCEM.[765] The questionnaires referred to the first phase of the mission – the peace enforcement phase (2004-5).[766] The first two contingents faced numerous operational difficulties due to the complexity of the mission, volatility of the security situation in AO, and by the absence at the time of intelligence services.[767] The third contingent deployed in 2005 – during a time the contingent's size changed from a brigade to a battalion – and coincided with an outbreak of violence during the elections in Port-au-Prince.[768]

Major Andrade's study reveals an important characteristic of the organizational culture of the Brazilian army. It represented a considerable change and modernization resulting from the experience in MINUSTAH: written reports were not a preferred method for lessons learned prior to Haiti.[769] The Brazilian military culture preferred that lessons learned, best practices, and experiences be transmitted orally, not by written reports.[770] Therefore, the first contingents relied on oral reports, and subsequently had greater difficult grasping all the requirements and challenges of the mission. This oral tradition also allowed for gaps in the transmission of their experiences to the new battalions.

However, after the 2010 earthquake, when the Brazilian contingent was required to send an additional battalion, the lack of written doctrine and procedures for such massive disasters created numerous problems, such as a huge delay in the Brazilian contingent's response to the disaster (compared to the faster response by the U.S.).[771] It took six days for the Brazilian contingent to deploy the additional battalion to the AO, while it took only eight hours for the U.S. to implement Operation Unified Response.[772] Additionally, the U.S. also deployed the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE), which arrived in Haiti within 24 hours of the earthquake, an important element that provided the first joint and secure communication capabilities in the country.[773] Despite the overwhelming superior performance, the GAO criticized USSOUTHCOM's handling of its logistical support for Haiti's 2010 earthquake, citing flaws in the "underlining planning and staffing processes."[774]

The Brazilian contingent became aware of the wide disparity in their emergency response processes and those of the U.S. The reality was that, prior to that time, the Brazilian contingent had not captured procedures in writing, so they had to scramble to recruit volunteers that had previously served in battalions that had been deployed to Haiti.[775] Major Andrade identifies the main shortcomings of the Brazilian response:

"It is not only a matter of resources, because Brazil's peace mission sector has considerable resources, but it could not respond fast enough to the necessities during the earthquake. There was a lack of other factors unrelated to resources such as a single command between the Forces, a fast and well trained decision-making process, a well-trained and efficient logistical support, etc., should consider improving the Brazilian Army's response and Brazil's response in moments of crisis."[776]

Major Andrade concludes, based on evidence of his study, that 98 percent of the Brazilian military agree, at least partially, that participating in MINUSTAH contributed to doctrine innovation in Brazil.[777]

Another relevant academic study, also conducted by a Brazilian military officer, provided insight on the Brazilian army's learning curve on culture training for the peacekeepers. In her doctoral thesis, Rejane Costa – then a major in the Brazilian army – presents a qualitative approach study regarding multiculturalism in peace studies, with a focus on MINUSTAH. Major Costa is now a professor and research scholar at the Brazilian Ministry of Defense War College.[778] The findings of her 2009 study indicate that "cultural factors" were positively identified as stressors in peacekeeping missions.

Major Costa's study echoed many of Major Andrade's conclusions; she also used a similar research method: she submitted questionnaires to officers who had been deployed to Haiti between December 2006 to early 2008.[779] It is important to note that both studies focused on groups that were part of infantry battalions, the ones that had more direct contact with the Haitian population, and therefore the questions were formulated in such way to explain vertical interoperability. In other words, the questionnaires were not directly focused on culture-based stressors prevalent in horizontal interoperability, which is the focus of this case study. Nevertheless, both studies offer many valuable insights about the way Brazilian army officers in Haiti perceived culture-based conflict, and how they sought to mitigate these culture-based conflicts through pre-deployment training.

Inherent Cultural Characteristics of the Brazilian Contingent

Major Costa's study points out that even though these earlier contingents did not benefit from having a formal cross-cultural training in pre-deployment, they developed strategies to "survive in a multicultural environment as well as to adapt to the environment."[780] This supports findings in Major Andrade's study that reveal that an overwhelming 98 percent of the interviewees who responded felt that their initial cultural difficulties were mitigated with "the high level of adaptability of the Brazilian culture which contributed to mission success."[781] This self-perception of being part of a highly adaptable culture comes from the celebrated and widespread popular discourse in Brazil of belonging to a nation that is inclusive of cultures of ethnic diversity. Accordingly, Major Costa quotes an interviewee who corroborates this notion:

> *"(T)he experiences with counterparts from other nations were fantastic. At the office, we were contacted by counterparts from other nations from Peru, Bolivia, Chile and others, to help them with loans of tools and materials and this way we would talk and exchange knowledge (...)"*[782]

General Heleno displayed similarly optimistic views regarding joint operations with neighboring battalions, with blended troops of various countries: Sri Lanka and Brazil, Peru and Brazil, Brazil and Jordan, or Jordan and Argentina.[783] He highlighted that "fortunately, there were no disciplinary problems or any other problem related to task completion or work division. This fact is very important because it shows that there is a military culture, in which hierarchy and discipline speak louder than anything else that could have marked the history of those countries, **except for cultural matters** [bolded placed by this author]. This was a highly positive point of the Mission."

The Need for Formal Cultural Training

Major Costa's study provides a cautionary approach to these apparently excessive optimistic views on the high level of adaptability and communicability within the Brazilian culture. Her conclusions echo many comments made by General Heleno, particularly his frequent expression (here in bold): "**except for cultural matters**." Major Costa quotes another interviewee who hinted that "we did not experience this kind of problem [to deal with different cultures]. Maybe the Argentineans did, but that remained at a joking around level."[784] Nevertheless, despite all the overwhelming indications of a self-perception of the high level of adaptability of the Brazilian military in Haiti, some responses in the questionnaires raised concerns: some interviewees indicated they resented not having an education or formal training that effectively prepared them for cultural matters in peacekeeping.[785]

Major Costa states that formal culture training prior to deployment would allow the peacekeeper to be better prepared and not have to fend for themselves during the mission – something that could harm relations and affect organizational productivity.[786] The self-perceived adaptability and high communicability of the Brazilian military contingents were not cultural characteristics shared by other international military contingents participating in the mission; this created many interoperability challenges – for all contingents, even the Brazilians.

Additionally, Major Costa quotes interviewees who expressed discomfort with some cultural practices within non-Western military units, notably: Indian, Jordanian, and the Nepalese battalions:[787]

"During pre-deployment training the troops should learn some of the culture of the countries that are part of the mission, so they are not surprised by habits that are perplexing to our culture, such as men holding hands walking around on base, like the Nepalese."[788]

Major Costa provides an overview of UN's *Standardized Training Generic Modules* (SGTM, the educational modules used for training Brazilian contingents), and notes that the Brazilian contingents serving until 2008 only received a 50-minute standardized UN brief on multiculturalism.[789] "This theoretical brief reflected only a folkloric vision of multiculturalism, one that only attempted to minimize some internal work-related issues to avoid harm to the mission, in detriment of a broader understanding of multiculturalism."[790] This observation reveals that there were some concerns regarding horizontal interoperability, but it was considered an adjacent concern, something that could be accommodated to ensure mission success.

Nevertheless, some interviewees were explicit regarding their perceived need to receive holistic, hands-on training that included language learning and more culture information regarding the dozens of other contingents from different countries in order to improve interoperability.[791] Major Costa's study indicates that by 2008, with the mission shifting from peace enforcement to peacekeeping, the Brazilian contingents had to interact more with civilian and humanitarian organizations, and therefore began to request better training to integrate the military and civilian components – or more horizontal interoperability.[792]

3.6.5 Part 4: The Argentine and Uruguay Contingents

A Brief Overview - The Argentine Military in MINUSTAH

Argentina is another South American country that has a long peacekeeping history, having sent troops to over 50 UN missions.[793] Since the end of the Cold War, Argentina has deployed over 20,000 volunteers to more than a dozen UN peace operation missions.[794] However, the decision to participate in MINUSTAH divided the country over concerns that it would clash with the country's longstanding non-intervention foreign policy.[795] It was only after Brazil and Chile agreed to participate in MINUSTAH that Argentine policymakers decided to participate as well – a decision that reflected their concern that Argentina would be left out from a regional strategic cooperation setting. Nevertheless, it was not without a strong internal debate and division over this participation. Therefore, Argentina's congress initially only allowed for a short-term mandate, with limited functions. As the mission progressed and succeeded in the early phase, congress granted the Argentine mission a broader mandate.[796] After the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, Argentina's troop contribution to MINUSTAH surged to more than 700 troops, making Argentina the fourth largest contributor to the mission at the time.[797]

Figure 3-45: United Nations staff of the World Food Programme (WFP) unload water bottles, as the members of the Argentinean battalion of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) provide security, Gonaives, Haiti. *Source: UN Photo/Logan Abassi.*

The Argentine military has embraced peacekeeping as a common ground between the aspirations of their political leaders and the military's need to find a new role in society after their poor human rights record during prior eras of military rule. The Argentine military case differs from the Brazilian case in two ways: (1) because of its history of violently repressing public dissent at the behest of the country's political leadership during the Cold War, and (2) because Argentina suffered a disastrous defeat during the Falklands/Malvinas War with Great Britain in 1982.[798] During the Cold War, the Argentine military was used as a force to counter leftist urban guerrillas. These armed insurgencies convinced the public to support military-backed governments between 1966 to 1973, and again from 1976 to 1983. During these periods, the military arrested tens of thousands of political opponents; tens of thousands more people simply "disappeared."[799]

The Falklands/Malvinas war was the military's final attempt to rally the population in a nationalistic surge to boost the armed forces popularity and to justify their role in politics. However, their military defeat to Great Britain was not only a military fiasco, but was also an international embarrassment for the Argentineans. In 1983, after a long and bloody military rule, a senseless war and a ruined economy, the civilian government that came to power sought to establish a new role for the military – a role entirely separate from internal security and politics.[800]

The Argentine military's economic situation in the 1990s was similar to what the Brazilian military was experiencing: rampant hyper-inflation and cripplingly low wages, shortages of basic equipment and supplies, and deep cuts to military expenditures. At the lowest point, Argentine soldiers trained without ammunition, and pilots learned to fly without taking to the sky due to a lack of fuel.[801] The economic crisis helped to foment three revolts in the armed forces, and one failed coup attempt, deepening civilian distrust of the military.[802]

Overall, peacekeeping operations in Argentina has greatly contributed to assigning a new role to the Argentine armed forces. It has improved civil-military relations, since it alleviated the deep crisis within the ranks. High-ranking officers who had taken part in these revolts against the government began gradually to accept the leadership of the national president and of the Joint Chief of Staff in the Ministry of Defense.[803] Peacekeeping recruitment used a strategy that aimed to benefit officers who had taken part in past revolts by sending them away on UN missions that focused on issues different from the internal issues with which they had previously been involved.[804]

The end of the Cold War greatly reduced the activities of Communist-oriented guerrillas and thus nullified the military call to put an end to the internal threat. By 1993, Argentina's political leaders had succeeded in their task of redirecting the armed forces away from internal matters. Argentina not only had joined the UN Security Council as a non-permanent member, but had also become a leader in international peacekeeping.[805] The security orientation of the Argentine armed forces shifted from internal interventionism to internationalism. This shift offered a low-cost solution to operate the military; it also worked well with the government's new strategy to align with the U.S., both in security and in economic liberalism. The nomination of Admiral Enrique Molino Pico, a former military attaché in the U.S., to Chief of Staff of the Navy, highlighted this convergence of interests with the U.S. and the pursuit of a completely new foreign policy.[806]

Like the Brazilian military, the Argentine military followed a rotation system to maximize the number of troops and officers that participated in peacekeeping operations.[807] Between 1992 and 2000, more than 40 percent of Argentina's army officers had participated in UN PKO missions. These numbers by far surpass Brazil's participation in number of troops, proportionate to the size of the country's armed forces.

Only two percent of Brazilian officers have UN PKO experience, and only ten percent of Brazil's armed forces have been exposed to UN PKOs.[808]

The Argentine military benefits from participation in PKOs mirrors the Brazilians in many ways. At a personal and professional level, there are significant monetary incentives: higher wages abroad, training with some of the world's most highly trained and equipped militaries, and availability of equipment and supplies funded by the UN.[809] This is how the financial benefits to Argentina's military institutions were characterized:

"The UN's reimbursement system provides the Argentine government with an economic incentive only to the extent that it supports the country's contributions – the national government pays their troops the whole amount provided by the UN and covers approximately 30 percent of total costs. Significantly, the Ministry of Defense established the Joint Equipment Procurement Program for Peacekeeping Operations (PECOMP; acronym in Spanish) in 2006 in order to manage UN payments more efficiently. As a result of this program, a new mobile hospital was acquired and general conditions for deployed peacekeepers were considerably improved. This is particularly important because UN reimbursements had been at the center of political and bureaucratic competition between the Finance and Defense Ministries prior to 2006. UN compensation payments constitute a significant economic incentive for individuals to serve as peacekeepers, since peacekeepers are provided with additional allowances for their service. These allowances consist of the UN payment of $1,028 per month, along with the $1,200 foreign per diem that the Argentine government pays to deployed personnel on a monthly basis."[810]

Overall, Argentina's participation in PKOs has greatly contributed to a new role for the armed forces. It has improved civil-military relations, alleviated a deep crisis of morale within the ranks, and has allowed the armed forces to elevate its status from total humiliation to a respected institution, while also assisting the government to implement a Western-focused foreign policy.[811]

In 1995, the Joint Peace Operations Training Centre (CAECOPAZ) was founded in Argentina to train civilian and military personnel deploying to PKOs.[812] Most CAECOPAZ courses are offered to personnel from foreign militaries; seats in CAECOPAZ classrooms are allocated through the Ministry of Defense.[813] CAECOPAZ capabilities include:

"In Argentina's Joint Peace Operations Training Centre (CAECOPAZ), civilians actively participate, either as instructors or as students. Diplomats, politicians and psychologists give courses on several issues, including international law, humanitarian intervention and psychological adjustment to pre- and post-deployment stages. Instructors at CAECOPAZ invite scholars and international participants to train and provide information to Argentina's peacekeepers. An

intensive course for journalists is also given every year at Campo de Mayo's CAECOPAZ, in Buenos Aires."[814]

Figure 3-46: UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (right) salutes the troops during a visit to CAECOPAZ, at Campo de Mayo, an important military base near Buenos Aires, Argentina. *Source: UN Photo/Evan Schneider.*

Additionally, the Centre's course catalog lists 14 courses taught by a permanent staff composed of national and international instructors, including Brazilians, Chileans, and French.[815] The course-times range from one to three weeks and include: Train the Trainer, Humanitarian Relief, Technical French in PKO, UN Logistics, Gender Perspective, Technical English for Peace Operations (Intermediate Level), Military Expert On Mission (MEoM), International Negotiation in WPO, Human Rights in PKO, Training Seminar in PKO, Cruz Del Sur – PKO Planning, Protection of Civilians, Civic Military Coordination in PKO (CIMIC), Journalists in Hostile Areas, and Staff Officer.[816]

Figure 3-47: Argentinean peacekeepers administer medical aid to residents of Les Cayes affected by Hurricane Matthew, Jeremie-Les Cayes, Haiti. *Source: UN Photo/Logan Abassi.*

CAECOPAZ was the first peacekeeping center to establish a training course specifically for women in PKOs; the instruction is entitled, "Gender Perspective."[817] Argentina's military is using UN PKOs to incorporate women into the armed forces:

"This policy will now allow women to serve aboard warships, facilitating gender-integrated policies in the armed forces themselves. Decision-makers expect that Argentina may one day be able to appoint the first South American female UN force commander."[818]

Unlike the Brazilian army, despite the increase in Argentina's participation in UNPKO missions since the 1990s, PKOs are not defined as part of Argentina's core military mission.

A Brief Overview - The Uruguayan Military in MINUSTAH

Uruguay is a small country located in an important strategic area in South America: the River Plate Basin, between two large countries, Brazil and Argentina. As a buffer state, Uruguay has historically invested more in diplomacy than in military power. Uruguay's diplomacy has been characterized by maintaining the regional balance by alternating its support to Argentina or to Brazil.[819]

Nevertheless, Uruguay's diplomacy continues to maintain two longtime weaknesses, which are shared by the armed forces: faulty hiring practices and a flawed organizational design.[820] Uruguayan scholar and professor Julian Gonzalez Guyer, also a former advisor for the Uruguayan Minister of Defense (2005-2006, 2010 and 2011), explains:[821]

"The Ministry's hiring practices and organizational design appear to serve parochial interests more than those of the institution itself. This shows striking similarities with the armed forces. Indeed, military and foreign affairs officers share exceptional status vis-à-vis other civil servants. Both are averse to transparency and accountability, and possess very strong corporate subcultures.

"(I)n essence, rather than formatting an overarching foreign policy approach to peace operations and other strategic issues, decision makers have acted as selfish rational maximizers of their own benefit. The above recourse to historical and structural dimensions is necessary to fully explain the roots of these social behaviors. This attitude reflects a widespread sociopolitical perception constructed over a century of Uruguayan civil-military relations: that of the triviality of the military. Ultimately the roots of the military problematic status in Uruguayan society lie in the country's origins as an independent state, and were reinforced by the excess of military rule."[822]

Like Brazil and Argentina, Uruguay emerged from 13 years of a military dictatorship (1973-1985), and was needed redirect its armed forces toward a new mission. The Uruguayan armed forces have historically "suffered from low social legitimacy, and their fundamental mission has continuously been in question."[823] Additionally, participating in PKOs alleviated "potentially serious civil-military tension" created by the democratization that began with Uruguay in 1985.[824]

The decision to join MINUSTAH was also consistent with Uruguay's long history of UN PKO participation.

Nevertheless, Uruguay's current troop contributions have surpassed all other South American countries.[825]

Figure 3-48: Felicio de Los Santos, Deputy Force Commander of MINUSTAH and a national of Uruguay, awards medals of recognition to peacekeepers of the mission's Uruguayan contingent, at a ceremony in Les Cayes, Haiti. *Source: UN Photo/Logan Abassi.*

More striking, however, is the proportion of UNPKO troops in relation to the country's population of less than 3.5 million people.[826] As of December 2016, Uruguay contributes a total of 1,492 troops to 7 UN missions.[827] The main reason Uruguay sends such large numbers of troops to UN PKOs is because this is how Uruguay funds its armed forces and justifies their existence.[828] Uruguay contributes close to 25 percent of its military personnel to UNPKOs. Its contributions to MINUSTAH come in many forms:

> *"Uruguay's commitment to MINUSTAH began in 2004, when a battalion of 57 officers and 500 soldiers was deployed. In 2006, Uruguay doubled its force by supplying an additional battalion. It also contributed 40 air force pilots in support of UN air contingents (known as UNFLIGHT). In 2009, the Uruguayan Navy assisted Haiti's Coast Guard Commission in safeguarding the island's maritime sovereignty. Uruguay's Maritime Peacekeeping Unit (URUMAR) was created with 187 marines and 21 patrol boats to control the Haitian coasts. By 2010, with over 1,130 troops, Uruguay became MINUSTAH's second largest TCC [Troop Contributing Countries] (with about 14 percent of the entire force, second only to Brazil). While troop commitments for Haiti have decreased since 2011, Uruguay maintains close to 5 percent of its total military strength on the Caribbean island."*[829]

Uruguay's decision to send troops to MINUSTAH was also influenced by the fact that Argentina and Brazil had already done so.[830] Additionally, Latin American participation in Haiti was viewed as the only option other than having the U.S. lead the mission, a matter that is hugely controversial and unanimously unpopular in Latin America. However, despite Uruguay's contributions to MINUSTAH, Uruguay's representation yielded considerably less political influence in Haiti, compared to the influence of Argentina and Brazil.[831] Uruguay has been largely absent in the political and diplomatic forum in Haiti. This reflected Uruguay's domestic politics at the time, during the presidency of left-leaning President Tabaré Vázquez (2005-2010), who focused on internal issues, while paying little attention to regional relationships.[832] This led Uruguay to regional political isolation during that period. However, after the election of President José Mujica (2010-2015), also a former guerrilla fighter, regional relations improved.[833]

The change in domestic politics also explains another discrepancy between Uruguay and its Argentine and Brazilian counterparts in MINUSTAH: Uruguay's foreign policy and peacekeeping strategy lacked coordination.[834] In 2012, the National Defense Act attempted to remedy this by strengthening the Ministry of Defense, eroding the commander's policy leverage.[835] The reason behind this shift: despite 25 years of civilian rule, until 2005 the High Command still controlled the military budget, which was overstaffed and underpaid, thereby contributing to the poor reputation of the armed forces.[836] Civilian control of the budget finally resumed after 2010. Soon after, however, a huge mismanagement scandal resulted in the imprisonment of several high-ranking officers over the Navy's handling of UN reimbursement funds.[837]

In ways similar to Brazil and Argentina, Uruguay's participation in MINUSTAH yielded multiple benefits to the armed forces at the institutional level and at the individual level. PKO missions provided a legitimate occupation for the military, increased the nation's international prestige, provided funding to replace obsolete equipment, and contributed to personnel training for the armed forces.[838] Uruguayan military pay is the lowest among all public services in the country.[839] PKO missions bring financial relief to officers and troops that participate in these missions, mostly because their salaries more than triple during these

missions.[840] In sum, for officers and troops, participation in PKO missions is professionally appealing and financially rewarding.[841]

Personnel coming from Uruguay initially trained at the army's Instruction Center for Peace Operations (*Centro de Instrucción para las Operaciones de Paz del Ejército* [CIOPE]), founded in 1995. In 2008, the CIOPE was renamed, "Escuela Nacional de Operaciones de Paz del Uruguay" (ENOPU) – a center for training military, police, and civilian personnel.[842] ENOPU has trained 9,000 national students and over 650 foreign students from 32 countries.[843] ENOPU however, is not considered as sophisticated and developed as the Brazilian and Argentine training centers:

> *"The Uruguayan Peacekeeping Operations School, in contrast, is informal in its approach and institutionally underdeveloped. The curriculum is not stated in manuals, there is no debriefing and there are virtually no civilian components. Despite the fact that the training provided at the centre is joint and inter-service, the instruction is strictly military with little or no civilian intervention. Military officers provide courses on international and humanitarian law and rarely invite outsiders or expert scholars to their lectures."*[844]

One distinct type of training that Uruguayan troops receive is counterguerrilla training; this training is forbidden in other Latin American countries (for example, in Argentina).[845]

Regional Security Community and Cultural Affinity in Peacekeeping Operations

In the initial phases of MINUSTAH, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile – all "Southern Cone" countries in South America – were the primary troop-providing countries. This case study focused on the role of the Brazilian contingent, which led the mission, and presented a summarized overview of the participations of Argentina and Uruguay, the largest troop contributors in the mission in the initial phase.

The armed forces of all three countries presented in this case study have been mostly involved in internal affairs for most of the twentieth century. All three militaries faced similar challenges – though in varying degree of intensity and of response: violent, leftist, urban guerrillas, who sprang out in the context of the Cold War and were inspired by the Cuban revolution and by Marxism. The armed forces within these countries violently confronted these leftist insurgencies, and sometimes rose to national power – often with U.S. approval and assistance.

After the end of the Cold War, all three armed forces were either pressured to transition to democracy (as happened in Brazil), or were forced out of power by civilian control in a newly democratized state. After democratization resumed in these countries, their respective armed forces suffered budget cuts worsened by a widespread economic crisis; thus, these armed forces had to find a new role in society, which included finding a new identity, a new purpose, and new missions.

Historically, the Southern Cone nations of South America have cultivated a tradition of multilateralism based on the peaceful resolution of conflicts. This tendency has been well-documented in the region, and is well-institutionalized by democratic means in the countries in the region. This strong support for international multilateralism, for pacific dispute resolutions, and participation in UN PKOs, were already part of these countries historical traditions prior to the internal conflicting years of military rule.

Therefore, increased participation in PKOs was the route chosen to move forward. The motivation to embrace PKOs missions were many, but mostly concentrated in three areas: "international signaling" (an effort to show the international community a change in foreign policy); military reform; and economic incentives.[846]

For most Southern Cone countries, PKO participation is a win-win to all: from the national-strategy level to the institutional level, and down to each officer and soldier participating in PKO missions. This case study highlights the main similarities and differences in the levels and degrees that MINUSTAH was important for the national strategy, to the military institutions of these countries, and to the officers and soldiers who served in Haiti.

Haiti's challenging situation fostered a concerted foreign policy effort, with a regional focus on crisis management. MINUSTAH served as a catalyst for an evolving consensus among South American nations for a regional approach on shared responsibility to increase the region's autonomy.[847] This is especially true among the Southern Cone nations, which are more stable states, with stronger political institutions than the Andean States.[848] This regional policy consensus has manifested in several joint initiatives that have considerably enhanced joint interoperability of these countries, contributing to mission success in Haiti. This new – but not yet fully developed – regional security community in South America is a novel concept for post-conflict response.[849]

Shared principles of sovereign equality, nonintervention, international legality, and the search for regional security solutions, have both evolved and shaped a South American regional security subculture.[850] This sense of community in security matters is enhanced by other shared regional values, such as a belief in democracy, in free markets, respect for human rights, and by many similar cultural traits as all well.[851] These include other aspects of a common Latin culture: history, a shared identity in religion, sports (especially soccer), and a mutual appreciation of music and the arts.

In the context of MINUSTAH for instance, the cultural and linguistic affinity shared by the militaries of the South American countries have played a significant role in facilitating horizontal interoperability in the mission.[852] For example, the representatives of the Southern Cone countries conducted political consultations and military cooperation both in Haiti and in their capitals; this contributed to the formation of an unique group identity and *modus operandi* that was noticed within MINUSTAH, the international community, and by Haitian authorities.[853] This concerted effort to increase horizontal interoperability among Southern Cone members also contributed to increased vertical interoperability because it positively influenced Haitian authorities, particularly during their national elections.[854]

MINUSTAH has exponentially increased the process of "collective identity building" in the Southern Cone countries.[855] A sense of community in security matters is evidenced in the eagerness – and in the pragmatic ways – these nations have pursued PKO training in joint training centers, such as at CCOPAB in Brazil, at CAECOPAZ in Argentina, and at ENOPU in Uruguay. In 2007, sponsored by Argentina, these joint efforts culminated in the creation of the Latin American Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (ALCOPAZ), which was another initiative aimed to increase doctrine alignment and joint operations initiatives in Latin America.[856]

ALCOPAZ unites all regional countries that contribute troops to MINUSTAH, except for Bolivia.[857] Canada, the United States, France, and the Russia Federation hold observer status.[858] While the individual centers strive to improve, adapt, and to mitigate challenges encountered by their joint elements in complex interagency and multinational PKOs environments, ALCOPAZ unites these efforts with the collective goal

to influence multilateral forums at global levels. Additionally, ALCOPAZ aims to present a common view in the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC), and standardization of training and procedures between the various militaries, police, and civilian components.[859]

In 2008, Brazil promoted the creation of an overarching forum to promote a regional defense identity, the South American Defense Council (CSD).[860] One of the goals of CSD is to increase the armed forces interoperability, to share UN PKOs lessons learned, especially the challenges faced by member states during these missions.[861]

3.6.6 Conclusion

This case study presented an analysis of cultural variability in the joint, interagency, and multinational operating environments of MINUSTAH. The case study offers insights to Marine officers assigned to multinational, interagency operations about the historical, situational, cultural, and organizational cultures of their Latin American counterparts – especially of military personnel from Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay.

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[459] In 1976, Ebola (named after the Ebola River in Zaire) first emerged in Sudan and Zaire. The first outbreak of Ebola (Ebola-Sudan) infected over 284 people, with a mortality rate of 53 percent. See: https://web.stanford.edu/group/virus/filo/history.html Last accessed December 6, 2016

[460] Despite these precautionary steps, "The 2014 West African Ebola outbreak was the first time Ebola reached US shores. An Ebola infected Liberian-American traveled from Liberia, via Nigeria and Brussels, to Dallas. He eventually succumbed to the disease and infected two nurses, raising the specter of EVD spreading domestically. In addition, three American healthcare relief workers contracted EVD in Liberia and returned to the United States for treatment. The relief workers survived but the national media reported heavily on these cases, creating significant public angst regarding a potential Ebola outbreak in the United States." And as the US President reiterated, "And the American people are reasonably concerned – Ebola is a terrible disease, and the fact that, in an interconnected world, infectious disease can be transported across borders is one of the reasons we have to take it seriously." "Statement from the White House Office of the Press Secretary," *The White House*, 8 October 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/10/08/remarks-president-conference-call-state-and-local-officials-ebola.

[461] CDC, "Ebola Update," *CDC,* https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/whats-new.html.

[462] The World Bank, "World Population Prospects," *The World Bank*, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL. (Last accessed December 7, 2016).

[463] "A young African American man from Virginia named Joseph Jenkins Roberts declared the colony of Liberia in West Africa an independent republic on July 26, 1847. The following year he became the first elected president of the new country. Roberts had moved there in 1829 at the age of twenty from Petersburg, Virginia. At that time, Liberia was a colony owned by a group of people in the United States." See: Library of Congress, "Joseph Jenkins," http://www.americaslibrary.gov/jb/reform/jb_reform_liberia_1.html Last accessed December 7, 2016

[464] "Robin Dunn-Marcos, Konia T. Kollehlon, Bernard Ngovo, Emily Russ, Donald A. Ranard eds., "Liberians: An Introduction to their History and Culture," *U.S. Department of State*, April 19, 2005, http://www.hartfordinfo.org/issues/wsd/immigrants/liberians.pdf (Last accessed December 7, 2016).

[465] Dunn-Marcos, Kollehlon, "Liberians: An Introduction."

[466] For a detailed ethnic composition and linguistic mix of these groups, see, Robin Dunn-Marcos, Konia T. Kollehlon, Bernard Ngovo, Emily Russ, Donald A. Ranard eds.," Liberians: An Introduction to their History and Culture", 19 April 2005. "The overwhelming majority (about 97%) of the Liberian population is indigenous; Americo-Liberians make up the remaining 3%. The indigenous groups speak languages belonging to the Niger-Congo family of African languages, found throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, and can be further subdivided into four ethnic clusters on the basis of cultural and linguistic similarities: • the Kwa, consisting of Bassa, Belle, Dey, Grebo, Krahn, Kru, and Sapo; • the Mande-Fu, consisting of the Gbandi, Gio/Dan, Kpelle, Loma, Mano/Ma, and Mende; • the Mande-Tan, consisting of the Mandingo and Vai; and • the Mel or West Atlantic, consisting of the Gola and Kissi. There are also a small number of Fanti, who are originally from Ghana."

[467] U.S. Department of State, "History of Liberia, " *U.S. Department of State*, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1830-1860/liberia.

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[483] Genesys Santana, "A case of Double consciousness: Americo-Liberian and Indigenous Liberian Relations 1840-1930." Paper presented at 36th Annual National Council for Black Studies *http://www.ncbsonline.org/.*

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4 Next Steps

Now that you have completed the courseware for the RCLF Senior Region, please log back into MarineNet and complete the following:

☐ End-of-Course Evaluation (MarineNet)
☐ End-of-Course Survey (MarineNet)

The end-of-course evaluation is a short assessment designed to assess learning. Completion with an 80% or better is required in order to advance. Multiple attempts are permitted. In addition to being a course requirement; the course evaluations support RCLF's ability to assess, evaluate, and improve the course. Once the end-of-course evaluation is complete, please take some time to provide feedback via the end-of-course survey. The survey is designed to help RCLF improve the entire program. Completion of the survey will trigger course completion.